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Glossary of terms
Advanced-level qualifications Recognised as level 3 on the National Qualifications
(A-levels)  Framework, A-levels are normally completed in years 12 and 
 13 of secondary school (age 17 to 19 years) and follow from  
 GCSEs. They are the main route into higher education. 
Advancement Support Adviser  Employment specialist holding a position specifically created
(ASA) as part of ERA. These individuals were based in Jobcentre Plus
 offices and provided ERA participants with continuing advice  
 and assistance intended to help them overcome obstacles to  
 steady employment and find pathways to better job  
 opportunities and higher wages.
DfES Department for Education and Skills (now DFE, Department for 
Education).
Employment full time A paid job of 30 or more hours per week.
Employment part time  A paid job of less than 29 hours per week.
Employment Retention and  A demonstration programme which offered a combination of
Advancement (ERA) programme employment counselling services and financial supports
 to certain recipients of government benefits or lone parents 
 claiming the Working Tax Credit. Its purpose was to help  
 people stabilise and improve their work situations.
General Certificate of Secondary  The main national qualifications for 14 to 16-year-olds
Education (GCSE)  taken in a range of academic and applied subjects. GCSEs  
 constitute levels 1 or 2 on the National Qualifications  
 Framework, depending on the grade achieved. 
Income Support (IS) A means-tested benefit for working-age adults who are not 
required to sign on as unemployed. They may work up to 15 
hours per week.
In-work training  This refers to training completed while participants were 
working. It should not be confused with ‘on-the-job’ training 
since the training may have taken place outside work (but 
while people had jobs).
Jobcentre Plus An agency of the Department for Work and Pensions which 
provides help and advice on employment and training for 
people who can work and financial support for those of 
working age who cannot.
Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) The main benefit for people of working age who are out of 
work, work less than 16 hours a week, on average, and are 
available for and actively seeking work.
Glossary of terms
xxi
Lone parent  Parent or guardian who is not in a cohabiting relationship, with 
a dependent child under age 16. The vast majority are female.
National Qualifications Framework Sets out the level a qualification can be recognised in England
(NQF)  and Wales. These are regulated for standardisation and quality. 
 In Scotland a parallel, but different, educational system  
 applies. 
National Vocational Qualifications Industry- and work sector-specific qualifications which are
(NVQs)/Scottish Vocational  based on practical, work-related tasks. NVQs can be attained
Qualifications(SVQs)  at levels 1 through 5 on the National Qualifications Framework. 
New Deal programme  The UK’s main welfare-to-work initiative during the time in 
which ERA was operating. New Deal services included the 
development of individual action plans outlining customers’ 
work goals and job search assistance and training to help 
them achieve these goals.
New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+)  Mandatory New Deal programme which was in effect while 
ERA operated. It served longer-term unemployed people 
(mostly males) age 25 or over who were claiming Jobseeker’s 
Allowance for 18 or more months (or 18 months out of the 
last 21). Various elements of provision were made available 
through a Personal Adviser and participants followed a 
programme of mandatory activities.
New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) Voluntary New Deal programme which was in effect while 
ERA operated. It aimed to help and encourage lone parents 
to improve their job readiness and employment opportunities 
and gain independence through working. Various elements 
of provision were made available through a Personal Adviser. 
Eligibility for NDLP included all lone parents aged 16 or over 
whose youngest child was aged below 16 and those who were 
not working or were working less than 16 hours per week. 
Most participants were female.
Personal Adviser (PA)  Employment specialists, working in Jobcentre Plus offices, who 
provided job advice and assistance to New Deal customers 
who were not randomly assigned to the ERA programme group.
Post-Employment Team (PET)  A group of Advancement Support Advisers whose sole task in 
the ERA programme was to assist in-work customers.
Technical Adviser (TA)  Staff position specifically created as part of ERA. These 
individuals, posted in each ERA district, ensured that ERA 
services were delivered in accordance with the policy design 
and provided general support for the evaluation effort.
Working Tax Credit (WTC) A means-tested earnings supplement. Lone parents were 
required to work at least 16 hours a week to qualify.
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Preface
I am delighted to welcome this final report of the Employment Retention and Advancement 
demonstration. It represents the culmination of over ten years work by many people, in both this 
country and the United States. 
The results are an important and timely contribution to the evidence base on how to support people 
once they have entered work – not only the likely impacts of providing support, but also what works 
in terms of policy design and delivery, and for which people. In addition to this, there is a wealth 
of information about the experience and aspirations of the people covered by the demonstration. 
The full value of ERA will be realised as we continue to explore this information in coming years, 
including monitoring of even longer-term outcomes. This report by no means represents the end of 
the ERA story. 
The aims of ERA were, however, not only about testing a particular type of policy intervention, 
but also concerned learning about new and better ways to build an evidence base. This report 
demonstrates the success of this part of the enterprise. Most obviously, it shows that it is possible, in 
a UK context, to undertake a large-scale, rigorously designed and implemented, randomised control 
trial in a social policy field. As well as showing that it is possible to do this – something that was 
initially not universally believed – ERA has taught us a lot about how to do this most effectively. 
It also shows very clearly the value of taking a long-term approach to evidence-building, where 
timescales allow. The results presented here show how the effects of ERA evolved over a five-year 
follow-up period, and how an earlier end to the project could have led to significantly different 
conclusions. While clearly we often need to operate to shorter timescales, it is important to have a 
balance between shorter- and longer-term work.
There have been other ways in which we have benefited from the transatlantic exchange of 
experience in developing our analysis. For example, over the course of the project, we have 
substantially advanced our understanding of how to use administrative data. 
And finally, by making explicit connections between interventions being trialled in the UK and the 
US, ERA has shown how we can learn from each other’s experiences.
Amanda Rowlatt
Chief Analyst 
Department for Work and Pensions
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Introduction
This report presents the final results on the implementation, impacts, costs, and economic benefits 
of the UK Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) programme, which sought to improve the 
labour market prospects of low-paid workers and long-term unemployed people. Launched in 2003 
in selected Jobcentre Plus offices, which administer Government cash benefits and employment 
services, the programme was envisioned as a ‘next step’ in British welfare-to-work policies. 
Participants in ERA had access to a distinctive set of ‘post-employment’ job coaching and financial 
incentives, which were added to the job placement services that unemployed people could normally 
receive through Jobcentre Plus. Once employed, ERA participants could receive at least two years 
of advice and assistance from an employment adviser to help them continue working and advance 
in work. Those who consistently worked full time could receive substantial cash rewards, called 
‘retention bonuses’. Participants could also receive help with tuition costs and cash rewards for 
completing training courses while employed. The programme has been carefully evaluated though a 
large-scale randomised control trial.
ERA targeted three important groups with different views on, and preparation for, work and 
advancement: 
• ‘The NDLP group’: Unemployed lone parents receiving Income Support1 and volunteering for the 
New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) welfare-to-work programme;
• ‘The WTC group’: Lone parents working part time and receiving Working Tax Credit (WTC), which 
supplements the wages of low-paid workers;
• ‘The ND25+ group’: Long-term unemployed people aged 25 or older receiving Jobseeker’s 
Allowance2 and who were required to participate in the New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+) welfare-to-work 
programme.
These target groups faced somewhat different types of challenges that impeded their success in 
the labour market. A goal of the evaluation was to determine whether ERA could help each of them 
1 Income Support is an (almost) unconditional out-of-work benefit typically received by 
individuals who are not employed or are working fewer than 16 hours a week. Entitlement for 
benefits depends on one’s other income, and its value varies with family size and composition. 
It is roughly comparable to the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families programme in the 
US, although recipients are not required to look for work. When ERA began, lone parents 
with children under age 16 could receive Income Support and were not required to look for 
work; currently, only those with children under the age of seven are exempt from a work 
search requirement. Once their children reach age seven, non-employed lone parents who 
are capable of, and available to work, must actively seek employment and would receive 
Jobseeker’s Allowance rather than Income Support. 
2 Jobseeker’s Allowance is a conditional cash benefit available in Britain to unemployed 
individuals who are actively seeking work. Recent workers who built up entitlements while 
employed can receive contribution-based payments for six months, unaffected by other 
household income. The contributory portion of Jobseeker’s Allowance is similar to the US 
unemployment insurance benefit. Other low-income people can receive Jobseeker’s Allowance 
as a means-tested benefit and must be actively seeking work.
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2similarly, and whether it worked better for some than others. This report thus compares the results 
for all three target groups and provides the final evidence of the programme’s effectiveness over a 
five-year follow-up period. 
Over 16,000 people from six regions of Britain (East Midlands, London, North East England, North 
West England, Scotland, and Wales) applied to the programme. In order to test conclusively 
whether or not ERA really helped those who volunteered for it, half were randomly assigned to the 
programme, and the remainder served as a ‘business-as-usual’ control group – a counterfactual, 
which did not receive any assistance from ERA and thus provided a benchmark indicating what 
would have happened in the absence of the ERA programme. By randomly dividing the sample into 
these two groups, the study was able to test conclusively whether or not ERA helped its participants 
work more, earn more, advance further, and achieve better outcomes in other areas than they 
would have without ERA’s help. This is a far more powerful test of the effectiveness of a programme 
than those commonly applied to social policy pilots in Britain. The evaluation also included an 
assessment of the programme’s implementation, a cost-benefit analysis, and several special studies.
The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) oversaw the overall implementation and evaluation 
of the programme. A research consortium carried out the study. The consortium was headed by 
MDRC (headquartered in New York City), and in Britain it included the Policy Studies Institute, the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies, the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, and the Office 
for National Statistics. A subsidiary goal of the project was to help build capacity in Britain to 
conduct randomised trials of promising social innovations. This was accomplished through direct 
collaborative work between the US and British research partners and DWP, and also through broader 
US-UK learning exchanges involving practitioners and researchers. 
Findings in brief
At the time ERA was launched, the New Deal programmes and Jobcentre Plus offered participants 
who entered work little further assistance once they obtained jobs. ERA was thus a major departure 
from ‘business as usual’, and there was no guarantee that Jobcentre Plus could implement the 
model. The evaluation found that, after initial start-up problems, and despite variations in quality 
across offices and staff, ERA was largely implemented as designed, attesting that it was feasible to 
attach a post-employment component to the work of Jobcentre Plus or other employment agencies. 
But was the model an effective one?
ERA produced short-term earnings gains for the two lone parent target groups: the NDLP and WTC 
groups, which were made up mostly of women. The early gains resulted from increases in the 
proportion of participants who worked full time (at least 30 hours per week). This pattern aligns with 
the programme’s requirement that participants work full time in order to qualify for the employment 
retention bonus. These effects generally faded in the later years, after the programme ended. 
However, an earnings gain appears to have lasted longer among NDLP participants who were better 
educated, though initially unemployed. Compared with other unemployed lone parents, this group 
may have had more unrealised potential to succeed in work, which ERA may have tapped into. From 
a cost-benefit perspective, ERA did not produce encouraging results for the lone parent groups, with 
the exception of the NDLP better-educated subgroup. 
More impressive were the results for the long-term unemployed participants (mostly men) in the 
ND25+ target group. For them, ERA produced modest but sustained increases in employment and 
substantial and sustained increases in earnings. These positive effects emerged after the first year 
and were still evident at the end of the follow-up period. The earnings gains were accompanied by 
lasting reductions in benefits receipt over the five-year follow-up period. ERA proved cost-effective 
Summary
3for this group from the perspectives of the participants themselves, the Government budget, and 
society as a whole. This is a noteworthy achievement for a group that is widely considered among 
the most difficult to help. 
The ERA model
Overall, ERA aimed to intervene decisively in the ‘low-pay, no-pay’ cycle, whereby low-skilled and 
disadvantaged workers move frequently between low-paid work and out-of-work benefits, and to 
turn them, instead, into regular full-time workers. The ERA model built on Britain’s New Deal welfare-
to-work programme, which offered job placement help and other pre-employment assistance 
to out-of-work recipients of Government benefits. The New Deal programme was operated by 
Jobcentre Plus, a network of Government offices that administers cash benefits and employment 
services. To the existing pre-employment New Deal services, ERA added a new set of financial 
incentives and job advisory services (on a voluntary basis) following participants’ entry into work. 
The model drew on past evaluations of work incentive projects in the US and Canada, and on 
advancement strategies concurrently being tested in other US pilots.3
The ERA programme was available to participants for up to 33 months. For the two unemployed 
target groups – NDLP and ND25+ participants – ERA began with job placement and other pre-
employment assistance, largely following the same procedures as the regular New Deal programme. 
This assistance was expected to last for up to nine months. The programme then continued into 
a unique post-employment or ‘in-work’ phase expected to last for at least two years. During 
that phase, ERA’s job coaches, known as Advancement Support Advisers, were expected to help 
customers avoid some of the early pitfalls that sometimes cause new jobs to be short-lived. These 
ERA advisers were trained to help participants advance to positions of greater job security and 
better pay and working conditions, at either their current employer or a new one. ERA also offered 
special cash incentives and other resources to promote these goals. These included: an employment 
retention bonus of £400 three times a year for two years for staying in full-time work (at least 30 
hours per week for 13 out of every 17 weeks, or about 75 per cent of the time); tuition assistance for 
training courses (up to £1,000) while employed; a bonus (up to £1,000) for completing training while 
employed; and access to emergency payments to overcome short-term barriers to staying in work. 
Members of the WTC group, who were already working when they entered ERA, began the post-
employment phase immediately. These lone parents were offered in-work support and incentives, 
plus help getting re-employed if they left their jobs or if their jobs ended.
The evaluation design
Qualifying members of the three target groups were invited to volunteer for a fixed number of ERA 
openings that would be allocated on a randomised basis. After completing an informed consent 
process, half of the volunteers were assigned randomly to the ERA programme group, and the rest 
to a control group. Those in the control group could continue to receive whatever services they were 
normally entitled to receive from Jobcentre Plus or could obtain elsewhere in the community. Thus, 
control group members in the two New Deal customer groups went on to receive regular New Deal 
pre-employment services, but were expected to have little regular or intensive involvement with 
Jobcentre Plus staff after entering work. Control group members in the WTC target group would 
not normally enter the New Deal programme because they were not receiving Income Support 
or Jobseeker’s Allowance. Therefore, they were not offered pre- or post-employment services or 
3 For a summary of relevant projects and findings, see Michalopoulos, 2005.
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4incentives through Jobcentre Plus, though sometimes they sought advice from Jobcentre Plus staff 
on their own initiative and could seek other services or training on their own.
For all three groups, ERA’s success was determined by comparing the outcomes of the programme 
group, such as average earnings, with the outcomes of the control group. Because the random 
assignment process created two groups with similar observable and unobservable characteristics at 
the beginning of the study, the only thing that varied between them was that one group was offered 
the programme and the other was not. Thus, any differences in outcomes that emerge over time 
can be considered as ‘impacts’ or ‘effects’ of the programme. When the differences are statistically 
significant (i.e., unlikely to be the product of statistical chance), one can be confident that they are 
caused by the ERA programme and not by other factors.
Intake into the study began in October 2003 and continued through the end of 2004 for most 
participants; it was completed for all by April 2005. With over 16,000 people randomly assigned 
through this process, this study is one of the largest randomised social policy trials ever undertaken 
in Britain. 
The impact analysis relies heavily on administrative data. Employment and earnings administrative 
records data were provided to DWP by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and maintained in DWP’s 
Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study (WPLS) database. Benefits receipt data available from DWP 
are the primary source of benefits information. In addition, data are available from three waves4 of 
a longitudinal customer survey administered at 12, 24, and 60 months following each individual’s 
date of random assignment (when they entered the study). The survey data provide a basis for 
assessing how much ERA participants used ERA’s employment-related services and incentives, how 
much participants’ receipt of training and other services differed from that of controls (who were 
free to seek alternative services on their own from Jobcentre Plus or other agencies), and whether 
the ERA group’s employment, earnings, and benefits receipt differed from those of the control group 
over the five years after sample members entered the study.
The study also uses qualitative research (i.e., in-depth interviews with ERA staff and participants), 
along with financial data on bonus receipt and other programme records, to provide further 
insights into the experiences of operating ERA within Jobcentre Plus, participants’ responses to the 
programme, and participants’ experiences in work.
ERA’s economic impacts for lone parents in the NDLP group
For NDLP participants, balancing continuous employment with family responsibilities was typically 
the most immediate priority, with advancement a more distant goal. This created an important 
challenge for ERA. Because these lone parents were new to the labour market, they tended to want 
time to adjust to the new routines of working and balancing job and family responsibilities before 
focusing on advancement. And while some were interested in full-time work, others were not 
because of their family circumstances. Nonetheless, ERA increased this group’s likelihood of working 
full time, at least early on.
• ERA increased NDLP participants’ employment and earnings in the short term, primarily by 
increasing their likelihood of working full time. However, these effects faded after participants’ 
enrolment in the programme ended. 
4 For the ND25+ group, only two survey waves, at 12 and 24 months, were conducted.
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6Table 1 shows the impacts of ERA on key economic outcomes for each target group. For NDLP lone 
parents, who were not employed when they began ERA, ERA increased employment and earnings 
within the first two years, but the effects faded thereafter. ERA also increased earnings in the first 
full tax year after participants’ enrolment (tax year 2005-2006) by an estimated £308, a statistically 
significant gain of about nine per cent over the control group average. (The earnings outcomes for 
each group are averaged over all sample members in the group, whether or not they worked; the 
estimates do not refer to earnings per worker.) The impact was smaller in later tax years, and the 
cumulative effect on earnings over the four tax years for which data were analysed (2005-2006 
through 2008-2009)5 is not statistically significant. 
Earnings effects can arise due to an increase in the likelihood and duration of employment, hours 
worked, or wage rates. The fact that the earnings effect in 2005-2006, in percentage terms, was 
about double the employment effect in that same year suggests that the increase in earnings was 
driven in part by ERA group members working more hours or receiving higher wages. According to 
data from the two-year customer survey, ERA increased the proportion of NDLP participants who 
worked full time, probably in response to the programme’s retention bonus, which rewarded only 
full-time work. Data from the 60-month survey, compared with earlier surveys, indicate that this 
effect did not persist, as the control group increasingly worked full time and closed the gap.
There is no clear evidence that ERA boosted NDLP participants’ employment retention rather than 
employment per	se, or that it increased their progression in work over the course of the follow-up 
period (relative to the control group). However, it did encourage them to go into full-time work 
sooner than they might otherwise have done, which has always been a major part of successive 
Governments’ policies towards lone parents.
• ERA caused a small reduction in NDLP participants’ receipt of Income Support payments.
Lone parents in the NDLP group all claimed Income Support at the time of random assignment. ERA 
reduced participants’ number of months on Income Support within the first two follow-up years, 
but not thereafter (result not shown in table). ERA produced a longer-lasting effect on the amount 
of benefits participants received. Here, significant reductions were seen in each of follow-up years 
1 through 3. Over all five years, those in the ERA group received almost £500 less in cumulative 
Income Support payments than those in the control group, a statistically significant reduction of five 
per cent relative to the control group average.
• ERA’s impacts varied among NDLP subgroups according to their educational qualifications, with 
better results observed for participants with higher qualifications. 
An analysis examined the impacts of ERA across several subgroups defined according to 
participants’ characteristics measured at the time of random assignment. One key subgroup is 
based on educational level. It was anticipated that a person’s level of education might influence 
their response to the programme’s incentives and assistance, and might affect their opportunities 
in the labour market. Those with more human capital would presumably have better opportunities. 
But it was uncertain whether the programme would be more helpful to them, relative to what they 
could achieve on their own, or more helpful to those with lower qualifications, for whom ERA’s 
assistance might be more essential. 
5 Earnings data from the 2004-2005 tax year were not used because, for some sample 
members, that tax year included some months before the start of the study.
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7The subgroup analysis found that ERA had substantial and longer-lasting positive impacts on 
earnings for NDLP lone parents with higher educational qualifications (i.e., those with A-level or 
equivalent qualifications6) at the time they entered the programme. It increased their total average 
earnings over the four tax years 2005-2009 by about £3,500, a gain of 15 per cent over the control 
group average. At the same time, ERA had no earnings effects for those with lower qualifications. 
One interpretation of this finding is that lone parents who were unemployed, but possessed better 
skills, had more ‘reserve capacity’ to obtain and manage full-time work. ERA’s incentives and 
support may have motivated and helped them make more effort to act on that capacity than 
they would have made on their own. Other (exploratory) subgroup analyses suggest that ERA may 
have produced larger earnings gains and benefit reductions for ethnic minority NDLP and WTC lone 
parents than for white lone parents.
• Despite its early impacts on earnings, there is little evidence that ERA affected overall well-being 
among the lone parent groups or the well-being of their children.
The analysis examined a variety of measures of parental well-being, including overall levels of 
happiness, anxiety, health, and financial security, plus a variety of outcomes for children, such as 
their school performance, health, and behaviour. It found little evidence that ERA affected these 
outcomes in either a positive or a negative way. It may be that the earnings effects were simply not 
large enough to be consequential in these ways.
ERA’s economic impacts for the WTC group
Of the three target groups, WTC lone parents (who were already employed part time when they 
entered ERA) most fully embraced ERA’s advancement goals. In part because of the way they 
were recruited to ERA – through a general community outreach effort, rather than as part of the 
normal New Deal intake process within Jobcentre Plus – the WTC participants were a more selective, 
advantaged group than the NDLP and ND25+ target groups when they began the programme. Not 
only were they already working, they had better educational qualifications and, compared with the 
NDLP lone parents, were somewhat older and had older children. They joined ERA with the explicit 
intention of improving their current position in the labour market and were generally more receptive 
to advancement support and more interested in steady, full-time work. This group was the most 
likely to receive ERA’s retention bonuses.
• ERA had no impact on the percentage of WTC participants who worked in any given month, but it 
increased their likelihood of working full time and their earnings. The earnings effect faded after 
their participation in the programme ended. 
Because WTC participants were already employed at the time of random assignment, it was not 
expected that ERA would increase their likelihood of working during the follow-up period. More 
relevant was whether it would increase the consistency of their employment, their likelihood of 
working full time, and their advancement and earnings. 
ERA’s main effect for the WTC group was a short-term increase in earnings. As Table 1 shows, the 
programme increased earnings in the 2005-2006 tax year by an estimated £402, a statistically 
significant gain of about six per cent above the control group average. However, the earnings 
impacts were not statistically significant in later years, or for the follow-up period overall. 
6 A-level qualifications indicate that a person passed a series of advanced secondary school 
examinations usually taken around age 18, or recognised equivalents that often involve a 
more vocational element.
Summary
8The short-term earnings gain was largely due to ERA participants working more hours. According to 
data from the two-year customer survey, ERA increased the percentage of participants working full 
time by nearly 13 percentage points above the control group rate. However, this difference shrank 
to seven percentage points over time as the control group caught up, which may explain why the 
longer-term earnings impacts, though still positive, are not statistically significant. 
• ERA had no effects on the receipt of out-of-work benefits or in-work tax credits among the WTC 
group or on measures of parent or child well-being. 
At the time of random assignment, WTC participants were working 16 to 29 hours a week and were 
not eligible to claim an out-of-work benefit, such as Income Support, at that time. Instead, they 
were receiving tax credit payments conditioned on work. Because ERA did not affect this group’s 
employment rates or trends, it also had no effect on its receipt of benefits or tax credits. 
ERA’s economic impacts for the ND25+ group
The mostly male ND25+ group was generally the most disadvantaged of the three target groups 
ERA served. For example, when they entered the study, 36 per cent had no formal educational 
qualifications (compared with 23 per cent and 12 per cent of the NDLP and WTC groups, 
respectively). Health problems, histories of substance abuse, and involvement with the criminal 
justice system were not uncommon. It is a group that was widely viewed as difficult to help. 
Not surprisingly, ERA advisers reported greatest difficulty engaging ND25+ participants. Advisers 
suggested a number of reasons for this, including some resistance to staying in contact with 
their advisers due to negative feelings about Jobcentre Plus, a greater ethos of self-reliance, and 
less awareness of available in-work support. In addition, ND25+ participants, unlike lone parents, 
were required to participate in the New Deal programme (which was incorporated into ERA as the 
programme’s first phase). Consequently, they were a less select group to begin with and might have 
been less motivated to follow through with ERA’s post-employment phase, which was not required. 
Given these challenges, it is noteworthy that ERA had larger and more sustained labour market 
impacts for the ND25+ group than it did for the two lone parent groups.
• ERA increased ND25+ participants’ employment rates and earnings, and these positive effects 
persisted through the end of the study, suggesting that the ERA model can work for a highly 
disadvantaged population.
ERA generated modest positive employment impacts for ND25+ participants in all five follow-up 
years, peaking at a statistically significant 3.6 percentage points during the second year, an increase 
of about 11 per cent relative to the control group average. Positive effects on employment continued 
even after participants’ enrolment in the programme ended.
ERA’s earnings impacts for this group are substantial and statistically significant in each year, 
totalling £1,481 over the four tax years for which earnings data are available. This represents a gain 
of 12 per cent above the control group average. In percentage terms, the earnings impacts are 
larger than the employment impacts, suggesting the possibility that there was also an impact on 
either hours of work, hourly wage rates, or both. 
Impacts for the ND25+ group did not vary across subgroups to a statistically significant extent. This 
suggests that a broad range of individuals within this group could benefit from the programme. 
The sustained impacts of ERA for the ND25+ group are especially noteworthy in light of the fact 
that this group was so severely disadvantaged and so difficult to employ normally, as suggested 
by outcomes for the control group. Only about one-third of ND25+ controls worked in any given 
Summary
9year during the follow-up period, and just over half (55 per cent) had ever worked during that five-
year period. (In contrast, 79 per cent of the NDLP controls and 87 per cent of the WTC controls had 
worked at some point during the follow-up period.)
• ERA reduced receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance among the ND25+ group.
ND25+ participants had been receiving cash benefits in the form of Jobseeker’s Allowance when 
they entered ERA. By the second year of follow-up, ERA had begun to reduce their reliance on that 
benefit. Over all five follow-up years, ERA reduced total average benefits received by a statistically 
significant £426 per ERA member, which is six per cent of the control group average. 
The costs and benefits of ERA
The evaluation’s cost-benefit analysis offers a way to summarise the net economic gains and losses 
that ERA produced, taking into account its combined effects on a wide variety of measures and the 
likely longer-term value of those effects after the end of the evaluation’s five-year follow-up period. 
It considers gains and losses not only from the perspective of participants themselves, but also 
from the standpoint of the Exchequer (and, thus, taxpayers), which paid for the programme, and for 
society as a whole (which simply reflects the results for the other two perspectives combined). 
• ERA was most cost-effective for the ND25+ group, producing a net economic gain for participants 
and a positive return on the Government’s investment. 
ERA markedly increased the net incomes of the ND25+ group. Using one set of assumptions to 
estimate cost-benefit results over a ten-year time period, the analysis found that participants’ 
average net income increased by about £725 per participant. (This estimate is spread over all 
programme group members, whether or not they worked or received ERA services; those who were 
actually affected by ERA would, of course, have gained more.) ERA also returned a little over £1,800 
to the Exchequer for every participant enrolled in the programme. This represents a return of £4.01 
for every £1 it spent on ERA. The results from the overall perspective of society as a whole were 
positive as well.7
• For the NDLP group, ERA had very small effects from all cost-benefit perspectives.
On average, ERA resulted in a small loss in the net income of NDLP participants and small losses 
for the Government’s budget and society as a whole. However, a separate cost-benefit analysis for 
the NDLP subgroup with A-level and equivalent qualifications suggests that, for this subgroup, ERA 
increased the disposable income of participants while producing savings for the Exchequer. At the 
same time, the opposite effects are likely to have occurred as a result of ERA for NDLP participants 
with lower qualifications. 
• The net cost of operating ERA was greater for the WTC group than for the NDLP and ND25+ 
groups, but this greater expenditure did not yield a better return on the Government’s investment 
or substantial net income gains for participants. 
For the WTC group, ERA cost over twice as much per participant to operate than for the two New 
Deal groups. This is largely because the WTC group had a longer post-employment phase, which 
lasted the full 33 months of the programme. In contrast, the two New Deal groups received pre-
employment services during the first nine months or so, which cost about the same as they did for 
the controls; in other words, the added cost of ERA for the first phase of the programme was almost 
negligible.
7 The overall pattern of cost-benefit results holds up in the face of various sensitivity checks 
using different assumptions, including shorter and longer time horizons.
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ERA appears to have modestly increased the disposable incomes of WTC participants. But because 
it was costly to operate, it produced a net loss for the Exchequer, and as a consequence, an overall 
loss from the societal perspective. 
The relative importance of adviser support, incentives, and training
• Both ERA’s in-work support from advisers and its employment retention bonus may have 
contributed to the programme’s positive labour market effects. 
All of the elements of ERA were offered as a package, and this makes it very difficult to determine 
whether some components of the intervention were more effective than others. For example, 
by design, participants were expected to speak with staff about advancement issues each time 
they received a retention bonus. However, the intensity with which local Jobcentre Plus offices 
implemented each of these components varied, and the local offices did not necessarily implement 
each component equally well. 
In one attempt to shed light on the relative contributions to the programme’s success of incentives 
versus in-work support, the evaluation included an exploratory cross-office analysis using data on 
the NDLP sample. The findings suggest that in offices where programme group members were more 
aware of the employment retention bonus (perhaps because of better marketing), there were larger 
increases in employment and larger reductions in the number of months that participants received 
Income Support. Furthermore, in offices that provided more support to participants while working 
or more help with in-work advancement (relative to what local control groups received on their 
own), there were also more positive impacts on employment and larger reductions in months on 
Income Support. Although not definitive, these findings suggest that ‘implementation matters’ and 
that how each of these core elements of ERA were implemented could influence the programme’s 
effectiveness.
• ERA increased participation in training courses, especially for the WTC target group. However, 
these impacts appear unrelated to ERA’s effects on labour market outcomes.
Many lone parents in the WTC group reported that they volunteered for ERA specifically because 
it offered support for training. Thus, they began ERA with a keen interest in training, and even in 
the absence of the programme, many would have taken training on their own, as indicated by 
high training rates for the control group. For example, within the first two follow-up years, nearly 
60 per cent of controls participated in education or training activities. However, the ERA group’s 
participation rate was even higher, reaching 72 per cent. Thus, ERA increased the training rate by 
almost 13 percentage points, which is a statistically significant gain of about 22 per cent over the 
control group average. The impact on training was positive but smaller for the NDLP group, which 
experienced a gain of almost five percentage points relative to the control group rate of 55 per cent. 
ERA had no impact on the training rate for the ND25+ group.
Analyses comparing ERA’s impacts across target groups, subgroups, and offices suggest that any 
increase ERA caused in training did not lead to long-term earnings gains. For example, even though 
ERA increased participation in training for the NDLP group and, especially, the WTC group, it did not 
produce lasting earnings impacts for either of them. In addition, ERA’s impacts on earnings were no 
larger for subgroups that experienced larger impacts on training than for those with smaller impacts 
or no impacts on training. For example, ERA produced a sizeable earnings gain for NDLP participants 
who had A-level or equivalent qualifications, but it had no effect on that subgroup’s use of training 
courses.
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Broader lessons
• ERA’s labour market impacts for unemployed lone parents are smaller than those produced by a 
fairly similar programme in the US. 
An employment retention and advancement programme in the US state of Texas, which was 
evaluated as part of the US ERA demonstration, shared many similarities with the UK ERA model. It 
included pre-employment and post-employment support for unemployed lone parents and offered 
financial incentives for full-time work. The cash value of the Texas incentive was roughly comparable 
with ERA’s retention bonus, although it was paid monthly rather than every four months. Like ERA, 
the Texas programme was tested with a random assignment design, and both the programme 
and control groups received pre-employment services, such as those offered by the New Deal 
programme. 
Two of the three pilot cities in the Texas study fully implemented the post-employment features 
of the model, and these two cities produced larger cumulative earnings gains than UK ERA 
generated for the NDLP group. Why the Texas programme’s effects were larger is uncertain. One 
speculation is that this may be partly because in Texas, the size of the retention bonus relative to 
the local minimum wage and to the amount of benefits available to non-working lone parents 
was considerably greater than in Britain, so that full-time work would ‘pay’ more. This may have 
increased the power of the Texas incentives to make a more enduring change in participants’ labour 
market behaviour. 
• ERA’s pattern of results for lone parents, where earnings impacts emerge early on and then 
decline after the incentives ended, is broadly consistent with the pattern found for other 
programmes in the US and Canada that used financial incentives for similar populations. 
Several other randomised control trials in the US and Canada tested interventions that offered 
financial work incentives – either alone or in combination with job placement and other pre-
employment services – to unemployed lone parents receiving cash benefits similar to Income 
Support. Although important exceptions exist, these programmes, like ERA, produced early positive 
impacts on employment and earnings but saw their impacts fade over time, after the work 
incentives had ended.8
• To be more effective, advancement-focused interventions like ERA may require advisers to have 
more expertise on industry-specific job opportunities, local knowledge, and training that is better 
aligned with those opportunities. 
ERA was a very different kind of programme for Jobcentre Plus. Consequently, its managers and line 
staff, who were expected to deliver an innovative advancement-focused intervention, faced a steep 
learning curve. In addition, they had to operate the intervention within a Jobcentre Plus environment 
that placed a high priority on job placement and offered little reward to staff for focusing on 
advancement-related outcomes for people who got jobs. However, as ERA advisers acquired more 
experience, they grew more adept and confident in helping employed participants develop and 
pursue advancement goals, such as moving up to better positions with their same employers, 
switching jobs, and finding training courses to improve their skills.
At the same time, ERA advisory staff functioned as employment ‘generalists’. They offered 
participants general advice and guidance on adapting to work, encouraged them to consider seeking 
full-time work, helped them address issues of balancing work and family life, advised them on 
seeking promotions and finding better jobs, and urged them to enrol in training courses in whatever 
8 Michalopoulos, 2005.
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areas interested them. However, ERA advisers were not expected to have in-depth knowledge of 
particular occupations or industries or expertise on the career ladders and training requirements 
for jobs in those areas. Nor were they expected to steer participants assertively towards particular 
occupations known to offer real advancement opportunities. They were also not positioned to 
connect participants who had trained in particular occupational areas with relevant employers 
who were hiring people with the new skills those participants had acquired. These limitations might 
have undermined the benefits of the extra participation in training that ERA caused. Perhaps future 
advancement-focused programmes would be more effective if they included more career advice 
that is sector-specific and more narrowly focused on opportunities available in the local labour market. 
The ERA findings by no means imply that training is irrelevant to advancement. However, they do 
suggest that other ways to try to ensure that training will have a pay-off in the labour market ought 
to be considered and carefully tested. 
Conclusions
Before the ERA project, little rigorous evidence was available on how to improve employment 
retention and advancement outcomes among disadvantaged populations in Britain. The ERA 
findings underscore the difficulty of achieving long-term improvement in employment retention and 
advancement. The study shows that, for some groups, short-term improvements do not necessarily 
grow into longer-term gains, and, for them, ERA would not be a worthwhile Government investment. 
At the same time, the evaluation found that, for specific populations, gains can be achieved, even for 
some of the most disadvantaged job seekers, and that those gains can be sustained over a five-year 
period. These results suggest that the core elements of ERA offer something to build on in future 
post-employment interventions. 
Comparing the findings across the three target groups also illustrates the importance of appropriate 
control groups in assessing the programme’s effectiveness. As it turned out, the ND25+ group of 
long-term unemployed people, which, by far, had the worst ‘outcomes’ (e.g., employment and 
earnings for the ERA group alone), and which many observers had expected might benefit the least 
from ERA, actually benefited the most. Thus, comparing outcomes across the three target groups, 
rather than impacts (i.e., the ERA versus control group differences in outcomes), would have resulted 
in the wrong answer to the question: For whom did ERA work best? 
More generally, the ERA evaluation provides unusually rich, long-term information on the 
employment retention and advancement experiences of low-income groups that have long been an 
important focus of Government policy. It also highlights a number of key implementation challenges 
that future programmes, hoping to break the ‘no-pay, low-pay’ cycle and reduce poverty through 
work, would do well to address. 
The evaluation includes a number of other reports of interest to policymakers and researchers. A full 
list and description of these publications is found in Appendix E.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Introduction 
This report presents the final results from the UK Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) 
demonstration, which carefully tested the effectiveness of a new method of improving the labour 
market prospects of low-income people relying on various government cash transfers. ERA operated 
in six regions of Britain from 2003 through 2007 and targeted three groups:
• ‘The NDLP group’: Unemployed lone parents receiving Income Support9 and volunteering for the 
New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) welfare-to-work programme;
• ‘The WTC group’: Lone parents working part time and receiving Working Tax Credit (WTC), which 
supplements the wages of low-paid workers;
• ‘The ND25+ group’: Long-term unemployed people, mostly men, aged 25 or older receiving 
Jobseeker’s Allowance10 and who were required to participate in the New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+) 
welfare-to-work programme designed for that harder-to-assist population. 
One objective of the evaluation was to test whether ERA was similarly effective for each of these 
three target groups or worked better for some. This report presents the final evidence of the 
programme’s effectiveness for all three groups over a five-year follow-up period.
Unemployed participants in the NDLP and ND25+ groups first received welfare-to-work assistance 
through the regular New Deal programme operated by Jobcentre Plus to help them find jobs. This 
process was expected to last nine months or less, after which participants who had entered work 
began ERA’s post-employment phase. This phase generally lasted about two years, but longer for 
those who entered work sooner. Participants could remain in ERA for a maximum of 33 months.
Post-employment or ‘in-work’ assistance included a combination of (1) help and guidance from 
advisers on remaining employed and improving one’s position in the labour market and (2) various 
forms of financial assistance to help and encourage participants to remain employed and advance. 
Participants who entered and remained in full-time work received substantial cash bonuses 
(covering up to 24 months of employment), help paying for training courses, and cash rewards for 
completing training while employed. ERA participants also had access to a fund to help avert minor 
financial emergencies that threatened to prevent a participant from continuing to work. 
9 Income Support is an (almost) unconditional out-of-work benefit typically received by 
individuals who are not employed or are working fewer than 16 hours a week. Entitlement for 
benefits depends on one’s other income, and its value varies with family size and composition. 
It is roughly comparable to the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) programme 
in the US, although recipients are not required to look for work. When ERA began, lone parents 
with children under age 16 could receive Income Support and were not required to look for 
work; currently, only those whose children are under the age of seven are exempt from a 
work search requirement. Once their children reach age seven, non-employed lone parents 
capable and available to work must actively seek employment and would receive Jobseeker’s 
Allowance rather than Income Support.
10 Jobseeker’s Allowance is a conditional cash benefit available to unemployed individuals 
who are actively seeking work. Recent workers who built up entitlements while employed 
can receive contribution-based payments for six months, unaffected by other household 
income. The contributory portion of Jobseeker’s Allowance is similar to the US unemployment 
insurance benefit. Other low-income people can receive Jobseeker’s Allowance as a means-
tested benefit and must be actively seeking work.
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WTC participants, who were already employed when they entered the programme, began ERA’s 
post-employment phase from the start.
ERA’s post-employment phase was voluntary for all target groups. However, the pre-employment 
New Deal phase was compulsory for the ND25+ group and voluntary for the NDLP group, in 
accordance with regular New Deal policies.
In order to test conclusively whether or not ERA really helped those who volunteered for it, half 
were randomly assigned (according to a computerised algorithm) to the ERA programme, and the 
rest remained as ‘controls’ and did not receive any assistance from ERA. By randomly dividing the 
sample into these two groups, the study was able to test conclusively whether or not ERA helped 
its participants work more, earn more, advance further, and achieve better outcomes in other areas 
than they would have without ERA’s help. This is a far more powerful test of the effectiveness of 
a programme than those commonly applied to social policy pilots in the UK.11 The evaluation also 
includes an assessment of the programme’s implementation, a cost-benefit analysis, and several 
special studies. 
ERA was implemented as a research demonstration project in four regions in England, one region 
in Scotland, and one in Wales between October 2003 and October 2007. Random assignment took 
place for a little over one year. The UK Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) oversaw the overall 
implementation and evaluation of the programme. The evaluation design process, including all the 
background and theoretical considerations, was described in detail in a previous report.12 A research 
consortium headed by MDRC (headquartered in New York City) and including the Policy Studies 
Institute, the Institute for Fiscal Studies, the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, and 
the Office for National Statistics, carried out the study in Britain. MDRC led the consortium because of 
the organisation’s extensive experience mounting similar demonstration programmes in the US. The 
consortium fostered a learning exchange that helped to build capacity in the UK to do similar work 
in the future. This unique partnership is discussed in more detail in the Afterword. 
This introductory chapter explains the policy background of ERA and the policy developments that 
affected the control group during the study, reviews the literature previously published on retention 
and advancement, describes the groups targeted by ERA and the service delivery model, and 
explains the random assignment design and the various methods used to evaluate the programme. 
This is the final impacts report on the UK ERA demonstration.13 
This report summarises findings from previous reports on participants’ use of ERA’s in-work services 
and financial incentives, updating and extending those analyses by including data covering the 
final months of the programme. It also examines how participants adjusted to the end of the 
11 More usually, ‘test areas’ are compared with non-randomly matched comparison areas. 
Area contrasts can be indicative, but not conclusive, in the way that random assignment is 
conclusive, because they usually make it difficult to rule out with confidence the possibility 
that factors other than the intervention that distinguish the areas may have caused any area-
based differences in measured outcomes.
12 Morris et	al., 2003.
13 The evaluation includes numerous other reports covering topics ranging from the random 
assignment process, qualitative studies on labour market advancement, a mixed-methods 
report on ERA training, an analysis of how the effects of ERA varied with office-level 
implementation and context, a non-experimental analysis of worker outcomes, an assessment 
of how non-participation affects the generalisability of ERA results, and the impacts of ERA at 
the first and second years of follow-up. An overview of each of these reports is presented in 
Appendix E. For more detail specifically on the background of ERA see Dorsett et	al., 2007; 
Hall et	al., 2005; Hoggart et	al., 2006; Riccio et	al., 2008; and Walker et	al., 2006.
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ERA programme (through 2009). The report goes on to discuss the effects of the programme on 
participants’ labour market experiences, benefit receipt, and other outcomes within five years after 
random assignment. It then examines the programme’s benefits and costs and concludes with a 
discussion of the lessons and implications of the results.
The research uses data from multiple sources, including in-depth qualitative interviews with 
programme staff and participants; three waves of survey interviews with programme and control 
group respondents (at 12, 24, and 60 months after random assignment)14; and administrative data 
on participants’ employment, earnings, and benefits receipt.
1.2 Research on retention and advancement in work
Recurring unemployment and a lack of advancement are common among disadvantaged and low-
paid workers. Many become entrenched in a ‘low-pay, no-pay’ cycle, in which they shift repeatedly 
between low-wage work and unemployment. Often these individuals seek Government benefits to 
supplement their incomes. Importantly, the ‘low-pay, no-pay’ cycle may persist even during periods 
of high employment levels; it is not simply a consequence of weak labour demand.15 
Much research has demonstrated that many individuals who struggle to retain employment and 
advance in work face a multitude of barriers to finding and keeping well-paid jobs, including low 
education levels, difficulties accessing transport, and poor health. Some studies suggest that  
moving frequently between work and benefits may have a ‘scarring’ effect, because individuals  
who spend more than a few weeks unemployed have been shown to experience chronic difficulty  
in re-establishing themselves in the labour market.16 Some research also suggests that the 
experience of low-wage employment may have almost as large an effect as unemployment on 
future prospects.17 
Low-wage workers tend to leave jobs for a variety of reasons. For example, some have short-
term contracts, which they often accept reluctantly because they have difficulty finding more 
permanent employment. Some, of course, cannot meet employers’ performance expectations. 
Others leave work by choice, because the jobs are not the kind of work they want to do, they are 
unhappy with the pay or work conditions, or they experience situational problems that undermine 
their performance, such as transport, health, or family difficulties. Lone parents, in particular, often 
encounter unexpected difficulties with the cost and reliability of childcare and transport, balancing 
work and childcare responsibilities, and employers who are unwilling to accommodate their 
employees’ family responsibilities.
Advancing within work is also increasingly difficult for low-wage workers. In fact, wage mobility 
in the UK has declined since the 1980s,18 while wage inequality has grown.19 Instead of moving 
into better jobs over time, many low-wage workers remain stuck in low-level positions that require 
few higher skills, are often part time or temporary, and offer few opportunities for training.20 Such 
14 There were three waves of surveys for the NDLP and WTC samples, but only two waves for the 
ND25+ group.
15 See, for example, Nunn et	al., 2007.
16 Arulampalam, 2001.
17 Stewart, 2007.
18 Dickens, 2000b; Stewart and Swaffield, 1999.
19 Machin, 1999.
20 Dickens, 2000a.
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conditions make it difficult to climb a career ladder. Some research also suggests that employees 
who earn the lowest wages and whose working conditions are poor are generally less able to 
negotiate better working conditions for themselves21 and are actually more likely to return to 
benefits than to improve their earnings.22 Lone parents who do work face the added challenge of 
balancing family and work responsibilities, which may make it more difficult to pursue advancement 
opportunities, including working longer hours.
1.3 Policy background
ERA was envisioned as a next step in Britain’s ‘welfare-to-work’ policy, which has been evolving since 
the early 1970s, when the Government began supplementing the wages of working families to help 
them overcome the cycle of unemployment and in-work poverty.
In its third year in office in 1999, the Labour Government faced a quarter to a third of children living 
in relative poverty – a rate that, if measured by the contemporary index of the proportion of families 
with incomes below 60 per cent of the national median, had doubled between 1979 and 1995. More 
than half of lone parents remained out of work. In response, the Government made two important 
pledges:
• to halve the child poverty rate by 2010 and to eliminate child poverty by 2020; and 
• to raise the proportion of lone parents in paid work for at least some hours each week to 70 per 
cent by 2010.
The policies that have ensued – particularly those directed at lone parents – were largely aimed 
at meeting these goals. For example, tax credits were designed to ‘make work pay’ by providing 
enough incentive to work while meeting the increasing challenge of keeping low-paid workers’ 
standards of living in sync with those of the working majority who have higher earnings. In 1999, 
the Working Families’ Tax Credit was introduced, offering more generous wage supplements to 
low-income workers as well as help covering most of the formal cost of childcare. This reform was 
underpinned by the National Minimum Wage, which took effect in the same year, and which many 
believed was essential, in part, to prevent employers from reducing wages in the face of higher 
government-funded wage supplements. In 2003, the Working Families’ Tax Credit was replaced by 
the WTC, which was the first major tax credit also available to low-paid workers without children, 
and the Child Tax Credit, which simplified support so that families with children could have a clearer 
idea of how much they could expect to receive in and out of work. The new Coalition Government 
has plans to streamline and re-engineer the current system of benefits and tax credits, starting in 
2013. 
1.3.1 Welfare-to-work policy for lone parents23 
Over the past decade, lone parent welfare-to-work policies have been aimed at tackling child 
poverty and family worklessness. The UK Government is committed to eradicating child poverty by 
2020. Helping lone parents through financial assistance and supporting them in employment was 
(and is still) considered to be the main route to improving children’s and parents’ future life chances. 
NDLP, the first of such strategies, was introduced in 1998, with the primary aim of increasing lone 
parents’ employment. This voluntary programme was operated by Jobcentre Plus. NDLP participants 
were assigned a Personal Adviser to provide pre-employment job coaching services. Personal 
21 Dex and Smith, 2001.
22 Dickens, 2000b.
23 See Appendix Table B.1 for a chronological summary.
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Advisers could offer job search assistance and try to address any barriers participants had that 
challenged their search for work. Personal Advisers could also inform participants of their likely 
in-work income and help them access education or training programs or Employment and Support 
Allowance if their capability for work was limited by a disability or health condition.
Since 1998, almost 824,200 lone parents have joined NDLP, and since October 1998, over 458,000 
lone parents in the programme have found work.24 The employment rate for lone parents also 
increased during roughly the same period, from 45 per cent in 1997 to over 56 per cent in spring 
2006, although a number of factors may have contributed to that increase. Still, some research 
pointed to high job exit rates and continued cyclical benefit receipt patterns among NDLP 
participants.25 
Many observers have recognised the importance of increasing work to reduce child poverty. With 
over half (58 per cent) of children in non-working lone parent families living in poverty, compared 
with 19 per cent of children of lone parents who work part time and only seven per cent of those 
who work full time,26 the Government has deepened its efforts to get more lone parents into paid 
employment.
It is within this context that a more radical change to the welfare system for lone parents was 
announced in 2007 with the Labour Government’s plans to move more lone parents onto ‘active’ 
benefits that condition benefit receipt on looking for work. This directly affected eligibility for Income 
Support, which is a largely unconditional cash transfer. Since 2008, a policy referred to as Lone 
Parent Obligations required increasing numbers of lone parents to engage in job search activities 
as a condition of receiving cash benefits. In one step in this direction, lone parents with a youngest 
child aged 12 or older (rather than 16 or older, as had traditionally been the rule) were no longer 
entitled to Income Support solely on the basis of being a lone parent. Instead, they could claim 
Jobseeker’s Allowance, which required them to look for suitable work of 16 or more hours per week. 
This obligation was extended in October 2009 to other lone parents with a youngest child aged 
ten or older, and in October 2010 to those with a youngest child aged seven or older. The same 
condition will be applied to lone parents with a youngest child of age five commencing in early 2012.
Lone parents who continued to receive Income Support were required to participate in Work-
Focused Interviews at Jobcentre Plus and invited to participate in the voluntary NDLP programme. 
In April 2008, that programme was revised in ways that gave more attention to job retention and 
advancement, borrowing some ideas from the ongoing ERA demonstration, which included in-work 
adviser support and an Emergency Discretion Fund for lone parents who entered work for at least 
16 hours per week. The revised programme was rolled out nationally as part of what was called 
the New Deal Plus for Lone Parents (ND+fLP) programme.27 At the same time, a wage supplement, 
known as In-Work Credit, which had been piloted since 2004, was rolled out nationally to lone 
parents who had been on Income Support or Jobseeker’s Allowance for at least 12 months and who 
moved into work of at least 16 hours per week (in contrast to ERA’s 30 hours per week requirement).
24 Lessof et	al., 2003, p 6; Yeo, 2007, p 15.
25 Yeo, 2007, p 16.
26 Department for Work and Pensions, 2010.
27 ND+fLP, piloted in 2005, offered a more coherent package of support, which extended into 
employment, than NDLP. It was rolled out nationally to lone parents in 2008 in advance of 
Lone Parent Obligations. The ND+fLP pilot (which also included support for couple parents) 
came to an end in July 2010. Some members of the ERA NDLP control group may have been 
involved in this voluntary system of support, but because the changes occurred near the end 
of the follow-up period, they are not likely to have changed the overall pattern of impact 
results reported in later chapters.
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Low-income lone parents who were not eligible and became recipients of Jobseeker’s Allowance 
were, like other recipients, required to look for work as a condition of receiving benefits. However, 
those with children under age 16 could meet the requirement with fewer hours of work and, 
additionally, for those with children under age 13, hours tailored to their children’s school schedules. 
They could receive job search guidance from Jobcentre Plus advisers, and if they remained unable 
to find work, they could be referred to other government welfare-to-work programmes operated by 
private not-for-profit and for-profit providers. 
1.3.2 Welfare-to-work policy for recipients of Jobseeker’s Allowance28 
Until recently, policy for recipients of Jobseekers’ Allowance had remained relatively stable. 
Generally, for the first 18 months of a claim, recipients 25 years of age or older were required to 
submit evidence of completing a job search activity at a fortnightly meeting held at Jobcentre Plus. 
After 18 months, claimants were mandated to join the ND25+ programme, the principal back-
to-work programme for longer-term unemployed people. A Gateway period of up to four months 
consisted of regular advisory meetings and possible referral to basic skills training and specialist help 
to address other work barriers. This was followed by an Intensive Activity Period that lasted up to 
26 weeks. The Intensive Activity Period entailed mandatory work-related activities, such as work-
focused training, work placements, and workshops to bolster motivation and confidence. The focus 
was on getting people into work, rather than helping them to stay in work and advance.29 
The recent changes in lone parent welfare-to-work policy, in parallel with changes in entitlements 
to disability and health-related benefits,30 have greatly altered the profile of Jobseeker’s Allowance 
claimants, introducing greater variation in support needs. To address this diversity and to more 
vigorously tackle unemployment, the previous Labour Government introduced major changes in 
Jobseeker’s Allowance. In April 2009, it introduced the Jobseekers Regime and Flexible New Deal in 
28 of the 50 Jobcentre Plus districts across England, Scotland, and Wales. It applied the concepts of 
escalating conditionality as a claim progressed, increasing adviser flexibility to apply interventions, 
and mandating work-related activities at an earlier time in a claim.31 
1.3.3 Welfare reform in 2011 
In June 2010, the new Coalition Government announced its intention to overhaul and further 
streamline the employment, welfare, and benefits systems. From mid-2011, a new Work 
Programme will be implemented across Great Britain to provide a holistic and comprehensive 
range of services for all jobseekers. It will replace other back-to-work schemes,including the New 
Deal programmes, but include similar forms of assistance. Generally speaking, Jobcentre Plus will 
continue to offer assistance in finding jobs, but it will refer those who are more difficult to assist and 
those unable to find work within a specified amount of time (one year or less, depending on the 
group) to contracted providers for more intensive assistance and job placement. The providers will 
operate under performance-based contracts. 
28 See Table B.2 for a chronological summary.
29 In some areas of Great Britain, where there were higher concentrations of long-term 
unemployment, Employment Zones replaced ND25+. These services were contracted by DWP 
to private sector suppliers. Employment Zones were not operating in areas where ERA was 
implemented.
30 From October 2008, the implementation of a new Work Capability Assessment (WCA) with 
broader measurement criteria meant that increasing numbers of non-working people 
with health- and disability-related issues were identified as ‘fit for work’ and subsequently 
registered for Jobseeker’s Allowance.
31 Knight et	al., 2010.
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1.4 Design of the ERA programme
A team established by the Cabinet Office in 2001 to devise the ERA demonstration sought to 
develop an intervention that would build on, but go beyond, the kinds of assistance already offered 
by the New Deal.32 They hypothesised that a mix of job coaching, advancement guidance, and 
financial incentives while participants were employed would improve individuals’ persistence 
and advancement in work. Before entering employment, participants would be supported to find 
good jobs with prospects for advancement and encouraged to seek full-time employment. Once 
in work, they would be offered continuous close support, including advice on how to find a better 
position with the same employer or a new employer, as well as financial incentives to stay in 
work and take up training opportunities. The in-work support would also help them to continue 
to resolve situational problems (like child care and transport issues) that threaten to undermine 
stable employment. The design envisioned that these strategies, working in combination, would 
help participants achieve steadier employment, better jobs, and higher earnings than they could 
achieve on their own or with the help of existing welfare-to-work services focused primarily on job 
placement.33 
The development of the programme was inspired by a similar demonstration project already being 
implemented in several US states, referred to by a similar name. Launched in 1999, the US ERA 
project tested a variety of retention and advancement models, many of which included similar kinds 
of post-employment advisory support adopted by UK ERA (see Box 1.1). One programme, in the 
state of Texas, also included financial incentives for sustained full-time employment and, overall, 
was most similar to the UK ERA model. Many of the early findings from the US project informed the 
implementation of the UK ERA programme. The evaluation of the US programmes was directed by 
MDRC, which also leads the consortium conducting the UK ERA evaluation. MDRC helped to build a 
learning exchange across the two projects, involving practitioners as well as researchers. 
Box 1.1  Description of the US Employment Retention and Advancement  
  project
Research completed since the 1980s has yielded substantial knowledge about how to help 
US-based welfare recipients and other low-income individuals prepare for and find jobs. Many 
participants in these successful job preparation and placement programmes, however, ended 
up in unstable, low-paying jobs, and little was known about how to effectively help them keep 
employment and advance in their jobs. The US Employment Retention and Advancement 
(US ERA) project sought to fill this knowledge gap, by examining over a dozen innovative and 
diverse employment retention and advancement models developed by states and localities for 
different target groups, to determine whether effective strategies could be identified.
(Continued)
32 For a detailed discussion of the design process, including all the background and theoretical 
considerations behind the ERA design, see Morris et	al., 2003.
33 In the design phase, there was a great deal of deliberation about whether to test several 
variants on the treatment, such as incentives alone, adviser support only, or a combination 
of approaches. The decision to test the combination was based on the complexity of 
implementing a differential impact design, as well as evidence from US studies that incentives-
only or adviser-only interventions were less likely to be effective than the combination of these 
two elements.
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Box 1.1  Continued
Using a random assignment research design, the US ERA project tested the effectiveness of 
models that attempted to promote steady work and career advancement for current and 
former welfare recipients and other low-wage workers, most of whom were women and 
lone parents. Unlike the UK ERA model (which tested one model for different populations 
and locations), the US ERA evaluation studied highly diverse and decentralised models. The 
programmes – generally supported by existing public funding, not special demonstration 
grants – reflected state and local choices regarding target populations, goals, ways of providing 
services, and staffing. The US ERA evaluation is being conducted by MDRC, under contract to 
the Administration for Children and Families (ACF) in the US Department of Health and Human 
Services, with additional funding from the US Department of Labor. Final effectiveness findings, 
or impacts, are available for 12 of the 16 US programmes.34
Key findings 
• Of the 12 US ERA programmes, three produced positive economic impacts; nine did not. 
Increases in employment retention and earnings were largest and most consistent over 
time in the Texas ERA programme in Corpus Christi (one of three sites that operated this 
program); the Chicago ERA programme; and the Riverside County, California, Post-Assistance 
Self-Sufficiency ERA programme. Of these, Corpus Christi’s was most similar to UK ERA.35 
These programmes increased annual earnings by between seven per cent and 15 per 
cent relative to control group levels. Each of them served a different target group, which 
suggests that employment retention and advancement programmes can work for a range 
of populations. However, three-fourths of the US ERA programmes did not produce gains 
in targeted outcomes beyond what control group members were able to attain on their 
own with the existing services and supports available in the US ERA sites, which highlights 
the difficulty programmes in the US have had in improving these outcomes. An analysis 
of subgroup impacts found that programmes had better impacts among those who had 
moderate previous labour market attachment (those who were on the edge of good or bad 
advancement trajectories). 
• Increases in participation beyond control group levels were not consistent or large, which 
may have made it difficult for the programmes to achieve impacts on employment 
retention and advancement. Engaging individuals in employment and retention services was 
a consistent challenge.
 
A related demonstration project, the Work Advancement and Support Center (WASC) demonstration, 
was launched in the US in 2005, two years after the UK ERA programme began. MDRC designed 
and is evaluating WASC.36 Early findings from both the US and UK ERA programmes subsequently 
informed the implementation of WASC. The US ERA and WASC programmes were implemented by 
a variety of public and non-profit operators, including the public welfare and workforce systems, 
community-based organisations, and for-profit providers.
1.4.1 The target groups
The ERA programme targeted two groups of lone parents: an unemployed group that was entering 
the NDLP welfare-to-work programme and a group working part time between 16 and 29 hours 
34 Hendra et	al., 2010. 
35 The UK ERA and Corpus Christi ERA programmes are compared in Lundquist and Homonoff, 
2010.
36 Miller et	al., 2009.
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a week and receiving WTC. It also targeted longer-term unemployed job seekers (mostly men) 
who were at least 25 years old, claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance, and mandated to join the ND25+ 
welfare-to-work programme.
ERA’s two lone parent target groups represented lone parents who entered ERA at very different 
stages in their working lives. The group entering through the NDLP programme was interested in 
working, usually after an extended period of time out of the labour force; for them, job retention 
was likely to be an immediate priority and advancement a more distant goal. In contrast, members 
of the already employed WTC group were more focused on improving their current position in the 
labour market. Viewing the effects for NDLP and WTC lone parents in tandem may thus offer a rough 
sense of how ERA might affect outcomes for lone parents when introduced at these different points 
in their working lives, although other important differences distinguished the groups, as discussed 
below.
These different target groups brought to ERA different kinds of employment challenges. They had 
different capacities, labour market histories, and perspectives on work and advancement. But all of 
them were expected to face difficulties progressing in work without assistance, which is why they 
were targeted by ERA. 
Most of the people who entered the NDLP programme were mothers, and many faced an array of 
labour market disadvantages, such as lack of work skills and experience, poor family health, financial 
disincentives to working, lack of confidence, problems with transport, lack of job opportunities, 
and employer reluctance to offer flexible work conditions.37 Many lone parents also struggled to 
balance work and care for their children, which often resulted in employment instability. Findings 
from interviews in a national survey in 1999 and 2000 showed that 17 per cent of lone parents in 
employment left for either unemployment or inactivity.38 Other research on NDLP itself found that 
20 per cent of lone parents who left Income Support returned within about ten months,39 and that 
lone parents had higher job exit rates than parents in couples and single childless women, even after 
personal and job characteristics were statistically controlled.40 At the same time, studies found that 
employment rates for lone parents steadily increased during the time the ERA programme operated.
Much less was known about the broader group of lone parents who receive WTC payments, in part 
because Jobcentre Plus does not traditionally serve this group and so does not have information on 
their demographic characteristics and barriers to work. However, data from the 2001 Families and 
Children Survey indicated that they, too, were disadvantaged and faced employment challenges. For 
example, many lacked the transport needed for steady employment, and many lived in (subsidised) 
social housing, although to a lesser extent than NDLP lone parents.
Individuals served by the ND25+ programme have long been characterised as having sometimes 
extreme and multiple barriers to employment. At the time the ERA demonstration was launched, 
nationally about 80 per cent of ND25+ customers were men, although the number of women 
entering the scheme had been increasing. About 13 per cent belonged to an ethnic minority.41 Those 
with multiple disadvantages may have represented at least a quarter of the caseload, totalling 
about 100,000 entries a year. At least a third of these were on their second or third spell in the 
system. In total, about three-quarters of a million people had entered ND25+, and about 300,000 
of these (roughly 40 per cent) had been recorded as leaving the scheme for paid work. The typical 
caseload was about 60,000 participants.42 
37 Millar and Ridge, 2002.
38 Marsh, 2001.
39 Hales et	al., 2000.
40 Evans et	al., 2004.
41 Adebowale, 2004.
42 Adebowale, 2004.
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1.4.2 Pre- and post-employment services 
Table 1.1 summarises the staff and services available through ERA, compared with the services 
available to participants who were not in ERA. The following sections set out the full details of the 
ERA design.
Table 1.1 Staff, incentives, and services available to ERA (programme group) 
 and non-ERA (control group) customers
Feature
New Deal Target Groups WTC
ERA
(Programme)
Non-ERA
(Control)
ERA
(Programme)
Non-ERA
(Control)
Job coaching staff
ASA PA ASA• PA: Personal Adviser
• ASA: Advancement Support Adviser
Eligible for New Deal pre-employment 
services
ü ü• Job placement assistance
• Advice on training and increasing 
skills
Eligible for in-work support
ü ü
• Coaching on advancement in 
current position and/or finding a 
better job
• Rapid re-employment services when 
necessary
Eligible for in-work bonuses
ü ü
• Retention Bonus: Up to six 
payments of £400 for each period 
when customers work 30 or more 
hours per week for 13 out of 17 
weeks
• Training Bonus: Tuition payment of 
up to £1,000 if training undertaken 
while working; if training is 
successfully completed, £8 for every 
hour of training, up to £1,000
Eligible to receive Adviser Discretion 
Fund (ADF) money ü ü• Pre-employment funds available to 
help customers obtain work
Eligible to receive Emergency 
Discretion Fund (EDF) money ü ü• In-work funds available to help 
customers stay employed
Introduction
23
Individuals assigned to the ERA programme worked with an Advancement Support Adviser for a 
maximum of 33 months over both pre-employment and in-work periods. The ERA advisers were 
drawn largely from the pool of Personal Advisers already working at Jobcentre Plus in the selected 
districts, and they were provided training on how to deliver ERA services. The goal was to enlist 
‘typical’ advisers so that the evaluation would represent a strong test of the ERA model as delivered 
by the kinds of staff who usually serve as advisers, not as delivered by the ‘best’ staff. The design 
envisioned that the 33-month service period would allow out-of-work participants about nine 
months to find a job, followed by two years of in-work support. ERA participants in the WTC group, 
who were already working, would begin receiving in-work support immediately but would still 
receive support for up to 33 months. 
ERA was designed so that, in the pre-employment stage, advisers coached their ERA participants 
to consider the advancement opportunities of a job before taking it and to try to identify work that 
would be a good fit with their skills and interests. (As previously documented, challenges were 
encountered in implementing this strategy, and it was never fully achieved in practice.)43 Once in 
work, coaching continued in order to help participants address any continuing or new barriers to 
their employment and to help them advance in their work (for example, by obtaining higher wages, 
more hours, a promotion, better pension provision, or a better job). ERA advisers not only listened 
carefully for any signs of difficulty in work, but also to help participants envision advancement even 
when they were not experiencing difficulties. 
ERA advisers could also step in to support participants in periods of stress by helping them  
re-arrange their childcare, if necessary, or advising on renewing a claim for tax credits. To guide  
their work with participants, advisers developed a personalised Advancement Action Plan with 
each of them, which set out job search, retention, and advancement steps. The plan, reviewed at 
each face-to-face meeting, was individually tailored to the participant to: (1) balance short-term 
requirements with longer-term ambitions and goals, (2) consider local labour market opportunities, 
(3) lay down steps to achieve goals, (4) connect to other services to address special barriers, and (5) 
identify appropriate education or training courses. 
ERA advisers also had access to an Emergency Discretion Fund, which was a pool of up to £300 
per participant to avert minor financial emergencies that threatened to prevent a participant from 
continuing in work, such as the need for special clothing, new tools, or car repairs, or help with 
short-term childcare problems. Monies from the fund became available only when a participant 
was employed for 16 hours or more per week. These resources were separate from the regular pre-
employment Adviser Discretion Fund, which was already available to Jobcentre Plus advisers to help 
unemployed New Deal participants cover immediate expenses that might facilitate their taking a job.
1.4.3 Financial incentives 
In addition, the ERA programme included financial incentives designed to promote work retention 
and advancement. These incentives (as well as Emergency Discretion Fund payments) were tax-free 
and did not count as income against entitlement to benefits or tax credits. 
Employment	retention	bonus	
To motivate ERA participants to enter full-time work, and to do so earlier than they might normally 
have considered, ERA offered up to six payments of £400 when participants worked 30 or more 
43 See Chapter 3 of Dorsett et	al., 2007.
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hours per week44 for 13 out of 17 weeks (or about 75 per cent of the time).45 This amounted to 
£2,400 for a participant who received all six payments.46 Participants were required to provide 
evidence of their employment and hours by showing wage slips and to come into the office to 
claim their retention bonus. This contact provided another opportunity for face-to-face interaction 
with their adviser. This feature of the model was deliberately included as one way to integrate the 
services and incentives components of the model.
Training	bonus	
ERA participants were also eligible for financial incentives to combine work with training. This was 
intended to encourage them to invest time and effort in developing skills that might promote their 
long-term career progression. While in work for at least 16 hours per week, participants qualified for 
tuition payments of up to £1,000 for approved courses that reflected the agreed goals in their own 
Advancement Action Plans and corresponded with local labour market needs. These payments were 
made directly to the training providers. 
Participants who successfully completed an approved course received an additional bonus of £8 
for every hour of training completed, up to a maximum of £1,000 (or 125 hours). It was paid only 
for training within the 33-month ERA service period, so the courses had to be completed within this 
time for participants to receive the bonus.47 
1.5 The random assignment design and the intake process 
The ERA programme, which had a limited number of available slots, was implemented as a random 
assignment demonstration, meaning that individuals in the three target groups who volunteered 
for the programme were assigned at random – regardless of their background characteristics – to a 
programme group that was enrolled in ERA or to a control group that was not enrolled in ERA. The 
control group continued to receive the standard New Deal services or to receive WTC. They could 
also receive whatever services were normally available to them. This design resulted in two groups 
that were similar at the outset; the only difference was that one group was offered ERA services 
and incentives, while the other was not (the services that the control group members were eligible 
for are represented in the non-ERA columns in Table 1.1). Thus, in comparing the outcomes of the 
two groups over time, statistically significant differences that emerge can be attributed to ERA with 
confidence.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the random assignment process, which varied somewhat between the New 
Deal and WTC target groups. Entering into the programme was voluntary for members of the three 
target groups. When they came into Jobcentre Plus offices, their basic demographic information was 
recorded and they were informed of the possible advantages of participating in the ERA programme.
44 In 1997, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) set 30 hours 
as the cut-off to delineate part-time and full-time work (OECD, 1997). In ERA, part-time work 
is tied to WTC eligibility rules, which set the threshold at a minimum of 16 hours per week and 
specify that an extra amount is to be paid for work of 30 hours or more per week.
45 This provision was intended to accommodate the likelihood that many workers might lose jobs 
and offered an incentive for quick re-employment.
46 At the currency exchange rate in effect on 11 February 2008, these retention bonus payments 
were equivalent to US$780 and US$4,680, respectively.
47 ERA participants could claim the payment after the 33-month period as long as the training 
was completed within the 33 months; this was to allow for delay in production of certificates.
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Figure 1.1 Random assignment process
They were then invited to enter the demonstration ‘lottery,’ told that they had a 50 per cent chance 
of being selected for the programme, and asked to sign an informed consent form in which they 
agreed to allow researchers access to certain types of data about them, whether they were assigned 
to the ERA programme group or to the control group.
The ERA demonstration was rolled out in six Jobcentre Plus districts (areas of varying sizes and 
populations demarcated across Britain by DWP) within six regions. Figure 1.2 shows the approximate 
locations of these six areas. One district was in Scotland, one was in Wales, and four were in 
England. The regions in England included the East Midlands, London, North East England, and North 
West England. 
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Figure 1.2 Map of the six ERA districts
SOURCE: Reproduced from Ordnance Survey map data by permission of the  
Ordnance Survey © Crown copyright 2001.
 
The random assignment process was carried out successfully. As a result, programme and control 
group members shared similar characteristics, on average. This helped ensure that the control group 
would provide unbiased estimates of how programme group participants would have progressed 
over time had they never encountered ERA. The ERA demonstration represents the first time in the 
UK that a random assignment social policy evaluation has been carried out on such a large scale. 
Over 16,000 people were successfully randomly assigned within 58 offices.
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The evaluation design was influenced by random assignment evaluations done in the US. Given 
the pioneering nature of this initiative, a special study, published in 2006, was undertaken to 
describe and capture lessons from the implementation of the random assignment process itself, 
including staff and customers’ reactions.48 The study found that, although the process was not 
without its challenges, and although it appears, with hindsight, that some procedures could have 
been implemented better, the random assignment process generally proceeded well, especially 
considering the scale of the ERA programme. Most customers and staff viewed the process as fair, 
and although some people assigned to the control group were disappointed in the outcome, there 
were no major complaints arising from the random assignment process. This experience shows that 
random assignment is practical in a UK context, which has encouraging implications, even beyond 
the ERA demonstration. It is still the case, however, that randomised trials are less frequently used in 
the UK than in the US. 
1.6 The role of Technical Advisers
To help ensure that the implementation of random assignment and of ERA services and incentives 
went as planned, the evaluation consortium recruited seven Technical Advisers – one for each 
district, plus a senior Technical Adviser manager – to work on the project. They were recruited largely 
from among Jobcentre Plus staff. Once they were selected, they were seconded to and placed on 
the payroll of the Policy Studies Institute, one of the consortium research partners. The Technical 
Advisers remained with the project for two years and worked under the direction of the evaluation 
consortium. They spent most of their two years in the district offices, setting up and monitoring 
random assignment procedures, helping to train local staff on ERA procedures, and contributing 
‘good practice’ ideas. They worked in close partnership with the DWP Project Team, which had main 
oversight and monitoring responsibility for the implementation of ERA. 
Their post outside the Jobcentre Plus management structure allowed them to contribute an 
additional perspective on how the project was progressing at a local level. At the same time, their 
experience of working in Jobcentre Plus ensured that they were able to give advice that took full 
account of operational realities, enhancing their credibility with ERA staff.
1.7 Timeline of ERA implementation
Random assignment began in October 2003 in five of the six ERA districts and in January 2004 in 
the sixth district (see Figure 1.3). Intake for the New Deal groups ended about a year later. Intake for 
the WTC group was extended until April 2005 to increase the number of participants in this group.
There were unique challenges in recruiting WTC recipients into the sample, because they were not 
already coming into the Jobcentre Plus offices for services. Additional efforts to recruit WTC sample 
members were made in the East Midlands district, and this region has by far the largest WTC sample.
Following their 33-month service period, the first participants moved off the programme beginning 
in July 2006. The last participants exited ERA in October 2007. 
48 Walker et	al., 2006.
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Several other policies affecting Jobcentre Plus coincided with the implementation of ERA. Figure 1.3 
highlights a few of these policies. In 2003 and 2004, the Pathways to Work pilot, an employment 
programme for recipients of Incapacity Benefit and disabled recipients of Income Support, began 
in three of the six ERA districts. Although this intervention did not directly affect ERA participants, 
it was a priority programme for districts and district resources. Some evidence suggests that this 
affected the senior management attention and funding dedicated to ERA within the local Jobcentre 
Plus offices during the first year of ERA operations, before DWP ringfenced49 ERA funds.
DWP also implemented important changes in staffing and performance goals for Jobcentre Plus 
while ERA was operating. These occurred near the end of the programme’s operation, but well 
within the five-year period covered by the impact evaluation. In January 2006, Jobcentre Plus 
underwent an organisational review, which resulted in staff reductions and re-organisation. Also, 
beginning in April 2006, Jobcentre Plus changed the focus of its performance goals from Job Entry 
Targets to a more varied set of Job Outcome Targets. The Job Entry Targets measured performance 
by the number of customers Jobcentre Plus staff helped enter into work. They required that 
staff demonstrate that customers began work following staff intervention. The Job Outcome 
Targets, in contrast, measured all off-flows of customers from benefits into work, including those 
for whom there had been no specific intervention. The goal of this change was to allow staff to 
encourage customers to take their own initiative to find work and to eliminate the need for staff to 
‘manufacture’ interventions in order to claim a job entry. Importantly, while the Job Entry Targets 
had linked job submissions to individual advisers, the Job Outcome Targets were measured at the 
district level. This took some of the pressure off individual ERA advisers to minimise post-placement 
support in favour of quick job placements.
As previously noted, some elements of ERA influenced the continuing evolution of welfare-to-work 
policies. In December 2007, DWP announced welfare reforms that included a national roll-out of 
ERA-style in-work adviser support as part of the Flexible New Deal.50 
1.8 Scope of the ERA evaluation 
The evaluation of ERA is divided into three main research strands:
• A process study: The purpose of this study, which relies on qualitative and quantitative data, 
is to understand how ERA was implemented ‘on the ground’ – whether it was implemented as 
envisioned in its design, what challenges staff encountered in operating the model, and how 
service delivery strategies varied across the six sites. It is intended to provide insight into possible 
reasons for the programme’s impacts or lack of impacts. 
• An impact study: This study uses administrative records data and customer surveys to compare 
the service receipt, employment, earnings, benefits receipt, and other outcomes for ERA 
participants with those of the control group members. For example, it examines whether ERA 
participants worked more than control group members during the evaluation follow-up period, 
whether the earnings of the programme group were higher than those of the control group, and 
whether reliance on government benefits was reduced. 
• A cost-benefit study: The study examines the net economic gains or losses (or net present value) 
generated by ERA by comparing the costs of the programme with the financial benefits it induces. 
It assesses these gains and losses separately from the perspectives of ERA participants; the 
Exchequer, which paid for the programme; and society as a whole (which offers a perspective by 
adding the results of the participant and Exchequer perspectives).
49 Ringfencing, as the name implies, meant setting aside staff and/or resources specifically for 
ERA.
50 Morgan, 2009.
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This report focuses on all strands of the analysis. It updates the assessment of ERA’s 
implementation provided in earlier reports, and it examines in detail ERA’s impacts, benefits, and 
costs over the five years following random assignment.
1.9 The remainder of this report
The remainder of this report is organised as follows:
• Chapter 2 sets the stage for the core analyses by describing the economic context within which 
the ERA demonstration was launched and operated. It discusses the characteristics of ERA sample 
members, showing how those characteristics varied across the three target groups and the six 
districts. It also describes in more detail the data sources used in the report.
• Chapter 3 discusses programme operations, summarising the findings from previous reports and 
exploring how programme group members coped with the end of the programme. Chapter 3 
also reports on the patterns of programme participation and service receipt and updates receipt 
of financial incentives through the end of the programme. Drawing on qualitative as well as 
quantitative data, it focuses on participants’ experiences once employed and compares patterns 
of in-work receipt of services among working participants in ERA with the experiences of workers 
in the control group.
• Chapter 4 describes the impacts of ERA on employment, earnings, and benefits receipt over the 
five years after random assignment for the NDLP and WTC lone parent target groups. It also 
focuses on the effects of ERA on training and non-economic outcomes and gives special attention 
to ERA’s effects on various measures of employment retention and advancement. 
• Chapter 5 analyses the variation in ERA’s impacts for the NDLP and WTC target groups across key 
participant subgroups and, for the NDLP sample, across local Jobcentre Plus offices. It considers 
whether the programme’s effects are broadly based or driven by particular office implementation 
features or the types of participants enrolled in their local ERA programme. The chapter also looks 
at the relationship between impacts on training and impacts on labour market outcomes. 
• Chapter 6 analyses the impacts of ERA on labour market outcomes for long-term unemployed 
participants in the ND25+ target group.
• Chapter 7 examines the benefits and costs of ERA from multiple perspectives for each target 
group. 
• Chapter 8 presents some concluding observations about ERA’s findings and reflects on policy. 
• The Afterword offers some reflections on the unique capacity-building and learning exchange 
goals of the ERA demonstration.
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2.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the economic context in which the Employment Retention and Advancement 
(ERA) demonstration was launched and operated, the types of people who enrolled in ERA, and the 
data used in the analyses. It begins with a brief discussion of recent national economic trends. It 
then discusses how the six regions in which the programme was implemented were chosen and 
provides local economic and demographic information for each of these regions, illustrating the 
wide variety of contexts in which ERA was implemented. These regional differences are important 
because a goal of the demonstration was to determine whether ERA could be effective across 
a variety of local environments. The chapter then compares the characteristics of the sample 
members in each of the three target groups that enrolled in ERA. These groups were differently 
positioned for achieving employment and advancement goals when they entered the programme, 
which could influence how the programme affected them. The chapter concludes with a discussion 
of the main data sources used in the evaluation. 
2.2 National economic context 
In order to understand broadly the economic context in which the demonstration was tested, it is 
helpful to consider the national trends in employment and benefits receipt that relate to the ERA 
target populations. Figure 2.1 presents a timeline of random assignment and data collection, as a 
reference against which these trends can be compared. As the figure shows, the follow-up period 
for the quantitative analysis presented in this report covers the first five years after each sample 
member’s random assignment date. 
The start and end dates of the five-year period vary depending on when a sample member entered 
the study. For example, sample members who were randomly assigned in November 2003 were 
followed through November 2008, whereas those who entered the study in March 2005 were 
followed through March 2010. However, earnings data for this report, which were collected on a  
tax-year basis, extend only through the 2008-2009 tax year.51
During much of the follow-up period, the employment rate in Great Britain had been increasing, 
following a trend that began in the early 1990s. However, national employment rates fell near 
the end of the ERA follow-up period. Between 1999, when the Labour Government pledged 
to decrease child poverty and increase the employment rate of lone parents, and 2004, the 
national employment rate rose from 72.6 per cent to 74.9 per cent, an increase of about 2 million 
individuals.52 It continued to increase slightly in 2005.53 The employment rate of lone parents 
increased substantially after 1997, rising by nearly ten percentage points in less than a decade.54 
51 As it turned out, for most sample members, the end of the five-year follow-up period fell 
sometime between the months of November 2008 and January 2010. This means that the 
earnings data do not cover through the end of the five-year follow-up period for most sample 
members: for about 60 per cent of the New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) sample, about 65 per 
cent of the New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+) sample, and about 85 per cent of the Working Tax Credit 
(WTC) sample.
52 Brewer and Shephard, 2005.
53 Office for National Statistics, Nomis official labour market statistics.
54 Brewer and Shephard, 2005.
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Similarly, the national unemployment rate began a downward trend in the early 1990s. It dropped 
from 7.4 per cent in 1997 to 4.8 per cent in 2004, around the time that ERA was launched. This was 
its lowest level in almost 30 years. Since 2004, however, the unemployment rate has increased, 
reaching 5.5 per cent in 2006 and increasing dramatically to 7.7 per cent during the recession of 
late 2008-2009. It reached 8.0 per cent in 2010 (see Figure 2.2). Thus, the ERA impact results were 
measured during a period in which the national labour market was strong, but then weakened. 
Figure 2.2 Unemployment rate in Great Britain, 1999-2010
Income transfer trends are also relevant for understanding the economic context in which ERA 
was implemented. In Great Britain, the Income Support caseload for adults under age 60 has been 
relatively stable since 1999 at just over two million. However, with improvements in the labour 
market, the proportion of the population claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance declined over time, from 
over six per cent in 1996 to under three per cent in 2006. The total national caseload for Jobseeker’s 
Allowance declined from over a million in 1999 to under 800,000 in 2004, but it began to rise again 
in 2005.55 
55 Department for Work and Pensions, Tabulation Tool.
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The New Deal programmes involved in the ERA demonstration have served large numbers of 
unemployed individuals. By 2004, over 700,000 lone parents had left the NDLP programme since 
its inception in 1998. The NDLP caseload increased as the programme was built up and as the total 
number of lone parents with older children in the country grew. By the end of 2004, the caseload 
had reached over 70,000,56 but it subsequently declined by the end of 2006 to approximately 
50,000.57 The ND25+ programme has served slightly more participants: 720,000 individuals had 
participated in the programme by the end of 2004. However, the ND25+ caseload declined to 
approximately 50,000 in 2004 with the improving economy.58 The number then began growing 
again, reaching 57,000 in 2006, when ERA was winding down.59 The subsequent recession caused a 
further increase in these rolls. 
2.3 The ERA sites 
The six Jobcentre Plus districts chosen to be a part of the ERA demonstration are among about 50 
Jobcentre Plus districts that were operating in 2006 throughout Great Britain. Rather than rolling ERA 
out nationally, Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) and the research consortium selected a 
limited number of specified districts in which to assess the feasibility and effectiveness of the ERA 
model. They selected districts strategically to ensure that the programme would be tested across 
diverse local settings.
The selection of districts occurred at the same time as DWP was implementing the Jobcentre Plus 
service delivery system. Launched in April 2002, Jobcentre Plus merged employment and benefit 
services that were previously located in separate agencies. This was a substantial administrative 
reform, and it was decided that the ERA districts would be drawn from the 25 districts where the 
new service delivery model had been operating for a minimum of six months before ERA began in 
October 2003. This ensured that they would be relatively stable administratively by that time. The 
consortium worked with DWP to identify six districts within the 25 that met the following criteria:
• All were to be districts with a large number of individuals expected to enter NDLP and ND25+.
• Some were to be districts with a substantial proportion of NDLP and ND25+ entrants from an 
ethnic minority background.60 
• The districts were to be spread across varied regions encompassing some urban, some semi-
urban, and some rural areas. 
Based on these criteria, one district was chosen in each of the following areas: East Midlands, 
London, North East England, North West England, Scotland, and Wales. The map in Chapter 1 (Figure 
1.2) shows the approximate location of these six areas within Great Britain. Within each of the six 
districts are a number of Jobcentre Plus offices of varying sizes. In total, ERA was operated in 58 
local offices.
2.3.1 Local economic and demographic characteristics
Each of the districts had distinctive economic and demographic characteristics. Considerable 
variation in local conditions also existed within some of the districts. Table 2.1 shows basic data 
56 Brewer and Shephard, 2005.
57 Department for Work and Pensions, Tabulation Tool.
58 Brewer and Shephard, 2005.
59 Department for Work and Pensions, Tabulation Tool.
60 Information on the number of ethnic minority participants by Jobcentre Plus district was 
obtained from the New Deal Evaluation Database.
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on the population size and characteristics, unemployment levels, and number of people receiving 
benefits in each district during ERA programme operations. Box 2.1 provides a short narrative about 
each district during the ERA period to supplement the descriptions presented below. All of this 
information can provide useful context for understanding the implementation and effects of ERA.61 
Box 2.1  Local economic and demographic trends in the six ERA districts  
  during ERA
East Midlands: The district in the East Midlands was the largest of the six ERA districts, with a 
population nearing a million in 2006. The population included large Afro-Caribbean and Eastern 
European communities, especially in the city-centre areas. The Eastern European population 
was continuing to increase, particularly from Poland. The district’s manufacturing base was 
declining and was being replaced by a growing service industry, for example, in retail and health 
care. The region had also seen an increase in construction jobs, as many new development 
projects were under way. Unemployment was relatively low, hovering between 4 and 5 per cent 
between 2004 and 2006. The Income Support and Jobseeker’s Allowance caseloads were about 
average, but the percentage of the population receiving these benefits was the lowest among 
the six ERA sites. 
London: The district in London was one of the larger districts, with a population of around 
867,000 in 2006. The district was urban and had a relatively high proportion of ethnic 
minorities. Certain areas had significant proportions of Indian, Afro-Caribbean, African, and 
Pakistani residents. There was also a growing migrant population from Eastern Europe. Much 
of the population was employed in the service sector. Manufacturing had been on the decline 
for several decades, but had been relatively stable since 2003. Unemployment in this district 
increased from about 6.3 per cent in 2004 to over 7.4 per cent in 2006. The district had the 
largest Income Support and Jobseeker’s Allowance caseloads in the study, with approximately 
40,000 Income Support recipients and 18,000 Jobseeker’s Allowance recipients in May 2006. 
However, the percentage of the population receiving these two benefits fell in the middle 
compared with the other ERA sites. 
North East England: The district in North East England was relatively small, at around 342,000 
people in 2006. The vast majority of its residents were white and were born in England; only 
a small proportion of this district was made up of recent migrants, although this percentage 
increased somewhat around 2001. Large declines in manufacturing had resulted in a broader 
economic base – including a high-tech sector, service industries, health and pharmaceuticals, 
and automotives (part of a smaller but persisting manufacturing sector) – but had left higher 
than average unemployment, at 7.9 per cent. North East England trailed only North West 
England in the percentage of the population receiving Income Support and Jobseeker’s 
Allowance. 
North West England: The population in the district in North West England fell in the middle 
relative to the other districts, at around 452,000. The district was urban and had a relatively 
high proportion of ethnic minorities. The population included a diverse migrant community of 
Eastern Europeans, Afro-Caribbeans, Asians, and Africans, particularly in some city-centre areas. 
The newer migrant population was also increasing, in particular those from Eastern Europe. The 
majority of the population in this region were employed in the service sector, and this number 
was continuing to increase. At the same time, manufacturing had declined significantly since 
Continued
61 The data in this section cover the period when ERA was operating. However, in many cases, 
the information remains broadly accurate today.
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Box 2.1  Continued 
the 1970s. Unemployment was higher than in the other districts, fluctuating between 7.4 and 
8.7 per cent between 2004 and 2006, and, similarly, the percentage of the population receiving 
Income Support and Jobseeker’s Allowance was the highest among the six districts. The 
caseloads for these benefits were also relatively high. 
Scotland: The district in Scotland was relatively large, with a population of about 785,000 in 
2006, though the district encompassed sizeable rural areas. The proportion of the population 
comprised of immigrants had increased somewhat in Scotland as a whole, and the ERA district 
had seen increases, in particular, in its recent Polish migrant community. Hospitality and 
tourism were major industries, while manufacturing had been on the decline, including during 
ERA’s implementation. Unemployment was low, at 4.4 per cent in 2006. The percentage of the 
population claiming Income Support and Jobseeker’s Allowance, as well as the caseloads for 
these benefits, were relatively low.
Wales: The district in Wales was the smallest of the six sites; the population in 2006 was 
about 319,000. Also encompassing comparatively rural areas, the vast majority of the 
population in this district were white British; only 2.1 per cent of the population were from other 
ethnic backgrounds. The service sector dominated the district’s economy, with media and 
communications, financial and business services, public administration, and manufacturing 
making up smaller sectors. Unemployment was low, but increased from about 4.6 per cent to 
just over 5.1 per cent between 2004 and 2006. The district had the smallest Income Support 
and Jobseeker’s Allowance caseloads, with approximately 13,000 Income Support recipients 
and 5,000 Jobseeker’s Allowance recipients in 2006. The proportion of the population receiving 
these benefits was also relatively low. 
Table 2.1 Population, employment rates, benefits caseloads, and take-up rates 
 in the six ERA districts
District
East 
Midlands London
North East 
England
North West 
England Scotland Wales
Local demographic and economic characteristics 
Population, 2004 980,400 858,100 341,700 436,000 782,800 317,700
Population, 2006 990,400 866,600 341,500 452,000 785,300 319,000
Population density Semi-urban Urban Semi-urban Urban Rural Rural
Unemployment rate, 2004 (%) 4.38 6.34 6.46 8.66 4.56 4.57
Unemployment rate, 2006 (%) 5.01 7.35 7.93 7.37 4.42 5.05
Caseload trends
Income Support caseload, May 2004 31,660 39,300 19,160 37,980 30,090 13,330
Income Support caseload, May 2006 30,070 39,950 17,420 36,090 28,370 12,630
Percentage of the population receiving Income 
Support, 2004 (%) 3.23 4.58 5.61 8.71 3.84 4.20
Percentage of the population receiving Income 
Support, 2006 (%) 3.04 4.61 5.10 7.98 3.61 3.96
Jobseeker's Allowance caseload, May 2004 12,220 15,350 6,920 10,500 13,420 4,020
Jobseeker's Allowance caseload, May 2006 14,740 17,990 7,860 11,160 12,520 4,940
Percentage of the population receiving Jobseeker's 
Allowance, 2004 (%) 1.25 1.79 2.03 2.41 1.71 1.27
Percentage of the population receiving Jobseeker's 
Allowance, 2006 (%) 1.49 2.08 2.30 2.47 1.59 1.55
SOURCES: UK Office for National Statistics (2007) ‘Nomis official labour market statistics’, Web site: www.nomisweb.co.uk; DWP 
tabulation tool; interviews with DWP staff. Population and unemployment data for Scotland do not include one local authority 
(Eilean Siar), for which data were not available.
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2.3.2 Population 
During the period when ERA was operating (2003-2007), the population of the districts varied 
considerably, ranging from under 320,000 in the Welsh district to nearly a million in the East 
Midlands district.62 The districts in London and Scotland were also relatively large, while those in 
North East England and North West England were somewhat smaller.
The population density also varied, as districts were chosen specifically based on this criterion. The 
districts in London and North West England were more urban; the districts in Scotland and Wales 
encompassed sizable rural areas; and the districts in the East Midlands and North East England were 
comprised of a mix of urban and rural areas. 
The more urban districts – those in London and North West England – also had relatively high 
ethnic minority populations. Comparatively, the districts in North East England and Wales had a low 
proportion of ethnic minorities. Despite these differences, new migrant communities across the ERA 
districts were generally increasing. Several had growing migrant communities from Eastern Europe. 
2.3.3 Major industries
All of the ERA districts have seen long-standing declines in manufacturing and rises in the service 
sector. Manufacturing in the UK has generally been on the decline since the 1970s. In some districts, 
such as London, manufacturing remained steady throughout the period of ERA’s implementation, 
while in other districts, such as Scotland, manufacturing declines continued during ERA’s 
implementation. The majority of the population in each district generally worked within the service 
sector, although the predominant areas of employment within this sector varied across the districts.
2.3.4 Unemployment levels and trends
As shown in Table 2.1, unemployment rates varied substantially across the six districts. 
Unemployment rates were highest in North West England (almost nine per cent in 2004). They were 
higher than average in North East England and London as well. Unemployment rates were lower in 
the East Midlands, Scotland, and Wales.
2.3.5 Benefits receipt levels and trends
Income Support caseloads for adults under age 60 varied across the districts, from a low of around 
13,000 in Wales to a high in the London district of about 39,000.63 Jobseeker’s Allowance caseloads 
were lower than Income Support caseloads overall, varying from about 5,000 in the Wales district 
to about 18,000 in the London district (see Table 2.1). The proportion of the population in each 
district receiving these benefits roughly correlated with district unemployment rates. Thus, the 
East Midlands, Scotland, and Wales districts were on the lower end of the spectrum, with less than 
four per cent of their population receiving Income Support and less than two per cent receiving 
Jobseeker’s Allowance in 2006. North West England was on the high end, with eight per cent of the 
population receiving Income Support and almost 2.5 per cent receiving Jobseeker’s Allowance. 
2.3.6 Summary of economic trends across the districts
Overall, the districts in the East Midlands and Wales generally showed stronger economic trends 
during ERA’s implementation; their unemployment rates were relatively low, smaller proportions 
of the populations claimed Income Support and Jobseeker’s Allowance, and the proportion of the 
population receiving Income Support decreased somewhat after 2004. The district in North West 
62 Office for National Statistics, Nomis official labour market statistics.
63 DWP, Tabulation Tool.
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England, by contrast, showed weaker economic trends; it had a high unemployment rate and a large 
proportion of its population claiming benefits. The London and North East England districts fell in the 
middle.
2.4 The research sample for this report 
Reflecting the diversity of the districts included in the evaluation, the ERA research sample exhibits 
considerable variation across districts in a number of important background characteristics. 
Important differences also distinguish the NDLP, ND25+, and WTC target group samples, resulting in 
part from the differences in eligibility criteria for ERA and the way in which those sample members 
were recruited. The following sections describe the sample by target group and highlight some of 
the main differences across the districts. 
2.4.1 Characteristics by target group
Between October 2003 and April 2005, 6,787 people entered the ERA research sample from NDLP, 
2,815 people entered the sample as WTC recipients, and 6,782 people entered the sample from 
ND25+ across all six districts. All were randomly assigned to participate in the ERA evaluation (as 
members of either the programme group or the control group). The three ERA target groups have 
relatively different social compositions, as the profile summarised in Table 2.2 shows.64 
NDLP	group
NDLP sample members were mostly young to middle-aged women; 95 per cent were female. Over 
80 per cent were under 40, and 15 per cent were racial/ethnic minorities. This generally aligned with 
the demographics of NDLP entrants nationwide.
NDLP sample members faced significant barriers to work. About a quarter had no educational 
qualifications, just under half had reached General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) level, 
and fewer had Advanced-level (A-level) qualifications.65 Two-thirds lived in social housing (housing 
owned by the local Government or a private housing association), and only about a quarter lived in 
privately owned or privately rented accommodation.66 Over two-thirds did not have a driving licence 
or access to a vehicle, and almost two-thirds cited barriers to work (which could include housing, 
transport, childcare, health, basic skills, or other problems). Nearly half did not work at all in the 
three years before random assignment, and just over a quarter worked 13 months or more during 
this period. The children of the NDLP sample were quite young; the youngest child of 58 per cent of 
the sample was under the age of seven, and only 16 per cent of sample members had a youngest 
child over the age of 12 at the time of randomisation.
64 A fuller list of baseline characteristics can be found in Table B.3.
65 GCSEs are the main national qualification for 14- to 16-year-olds taken in a range of academic 
and applied subjects. GCSEs constitute levels 1 or 2 on the National Qualifications Framework, 
depending on the grade achieved. GCSE’s are a lower qualification than ‘A-levels’. A-levels are 
recognised as level 3 on the National Qualifications Framework. They are normally completed 
in years 12 and 13 of secondary school (age 17 to 19 years) and follow from GCSEs. They are 
the main route into higher education.
66 The social housing sector now on the whole accommodates fewer than one in four British 
families with dependent children. Social housing provided by the Government is declining 
in the UK. However, housing subsidised by private housing associations is increasing, and 
demand for subsidised housing remains high, as the cost of private homes is rising.
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Table 2.2 Demographic profile of all customers randomly assigned between 
 October 2003 and April 2005
Characteristic NDLP WTC
New Deal 
25 Plus
Gender (%)
Male 5.0 2.6 81.1
Female 95.0 97.4 18.9
Age (%)
Under 30 41.3 17.0 16.3
30-39 39.7 47.1 36.8
40 or older 19.0 35.9 46.9
Age of youngest child (%)a
No children 1.0 1.4 84.0
Under 7 57.8 36.8 8.9
7-11 25.4 31.8 3.0
12-16 15.3 25.9 2.3
17 or older 0.5 4.1 1.8
Race/ethnicity (%)
Ethnic minority 14.8 7.8 21.5
White 85.2 92.2 78.5
Education (highest qualification obtained)b (%)
None 23.2 12.1 36.3
GCSE 47.7 45.0 26.9
A-level 21.6 30.7 23.6
Other 7.6 12.2 13.2
Housing statusc (%) 
Family 7.6 6.0 23.1
Social 66.5 37.6 45.9
Private 26.0 56.3 31.0
Number of months worked in 3 years prior to random assignment (%)
None 49.6 1.2 45.5
1-12 23.1 11.6 33.8
13+ 27.3 87.2 20.7
Cohort (%)
Early (October 2003 - May 2004) 52.1 19.1 47.8
Late (June 2004 - April 2005) 47.9 80.9 52.2
No driving licence or lack of access to vehicle (%) 67.5 33.1 77.2
Has barriers to workd (%) 65.3 68.0 62.9
Severely disadvantagede (%) 23.1 NA 20.1
Moderately disadvantagedf (%) NA 37.3 NA
Sample size 6,787 2,815 6,782
(continued)
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Table 2.2 Continued
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from baseline information forms completed by DWP staff.
NOTES: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
 Sample includes all lone parent customers and all ND25+ customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 
2005.
 aChild’s age is asked only for children who are living with the customer.
 bCustomers who have GCSE qualifications refers to those who have passed a series of examinations in a variety of subjects, 
usually taken at age 15 or 16. Those with A-level qualifications have passed a series of more advanced examinations usually 
taken around age 18 or older. Those with no qualifications have completed neither series of examinations. 
 cFamily housing refers to situations where the customer is living with his/her parents or other friends or relatives. Social
housing refers to housing in which the local authority (local government) or a private housing association is the landlord. 
Private housing refers to owner-occupied housing or housing that the customer rents privately.
 dBarriers to work include housing, transport, childcare, health, basic skills, or other problems. 
 eSeverely disadvantaged refers to those NDLP customers with GCSE qualifications or lower, no work in the three years prior to
random assignment, and at least one barrier to employment. 
 fModerately disadvantaged refers to those WTC customers with GCSE qualifications or lower and at least one barrier 
to employment. 
WTC	group
Almost all of the WTC sample members were women. The WTC sample was older than the NDLP 
sample, as nearly half were in their 30s, and another 36 per cent were age 40 or older. As would 
be expected, the youngest child of members of the WTC sample was older than that of the NDLP 
sample, with 62 per cent over the age of seven and 30 per cent over the age of 12 at the time of 
randomisation. 
The lone parents receiving WTC differed from the NDLP group in ways that underscore the 
differences between groups of people who had worked more steadily and those who had been out 
of work. Nearly 90 per cent of the WTC group reported working 13 months or more in the three years 
before random assignment. In the WTC group, very few reported no work experience in the three 
years before random assignment, as they had to be working at the time of random assignment to 
enter ERA.
This group also reported better qualifications than the NDLP group, with only 12 per cent having no 
qualifications at all and a greater percentage having qualifications beyond a GCSE. Over half lived 
in privately owned or privately rented housing, a proportion much greater than among the NDLP 
sample members. They had fewer transport barriers as well; only one-third reported no driving 
licence or access to a vehicle, compared with two-thirds of the NDLP sample members. However, 
the WTC sample members were almost as likely to report facing barriers to work; in their case, they 
seem to have overcome these obstacles. 
ND25+	group
ND25+ sample members differed in several ways from the lone parent target groups. ND25+ sample 
members were largely older men – 81 per cent were male, nearly half were age 40 or older, and 84 
per cent were age 30 or older. Sixteen per cent had dependent children at home, while more had 
children living elsewhere. Twenty-two per cent were ethnic minorities – a higher proportion of ethnic 
minorities than either of the two lone parent groups in ERA. More than a third had no educational 
qualifications at all. The largest proportion (46 per cent) lived in social housing; 31 per cent lived in 
private housing. Less than a quarter of the ND25+ sample members had a driving licence and access 
to a vehicle. Nearly two-thirds cited barriers to work, 46 per cent had no work experience in the three 
years before random assignment, and only 21 per cent said that they worked more than a year 
during that time.
Sample and sites
41Sample and sites
2.4.2 Characteristics by target group and district 
Part of the analysis in this report is conducted at the district level. In order to understand the 
characteristics of sample members across the districts, Table 2.3 presents selected data regarding 
sample members’ educational experience, housing situations, previous work experience, and other 
characteristics, broken down by target group and district. 
Table 2.3 Selected characteristics of all customers by district at the time of 
 random assignment, October 2003 – April 2005
Characteristic
East 
Midlands London
North East 
England
North West 
England Scotland Wales
NDLP (%)
Education
Highest qualification obtaineda
 None 21.9 18.8 25.0 28.2 21.3 26.7
 GCSE 48.0 48.1 53.6 43.0 43.2 46.1
 A-level 21.6 24.9 15.0 22.4 29.9 17.5
 Other 8.5 8.2 6.3 6.5 5.6 9.8
Age of youngest child
 No children 0.9 2.1 0.5 0.4 1.2 0.5
 Under 7 57.9 56.6 56.6 57.8 58.5 61.6
 7-11 26.3 25.7 25.7 26.6 23.2 22.7
 12-16 14.6 15.2 16.4 15.0 16.6 14.7
 17 or older 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.2 0.5 0.6
Social housingb 60.9 65.4 71.0 71.9 66.0 65.7
Ethnic minority 7.4 37.8 1.2 26.4 1.1 2.3
No driving licence or lack of 
access to vehicle 61.5 65.5 76.9 71.5 75.5 55.0
Has barriers to workc 77.1 59.6 61.3 64.6 61.5 61.6
Number of months worked in 3 
years prior to random assignment
 None 46.4 59.0 48.9 53.7 39.7 40.4
 1-12 22.3 19.0 23.0 23.1 26.6 31.2
 13+ 31.2 22.0 28.1 23.2 33.7 28.5
Severely disadvantagedd 25.3 23.5 24.0 25.8 16.7 17.3
Sample size 1,645 1,529 1,298 1,022 629 664
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Table 2.3 Continued
Characteristic
East 
Midlands London
North East 
England
North West 
England Scotland Wales
WTC (%)
Education
Highest qualification obtaineda
 None 11.7 6.6 11.9 18.0 14.1 12.7
 GCSE 42.9 47.8 56.5 36.6 44.1 51.3
 A-level 30.2 38.1 24.1 30.1 38.6 24.6
 Other 15.2 7.5 7.6 15.3 3.3 11.4
Age of youngest child
 No children 0.8 1.0 0.7 1.1 3.9 3.0
 Under 7 34.9 35.6 46.3 44.3 33.1 38.2
 7-11 33.2 34.6 25.9 25.7 35.2 27.9
 12-16 26.8 24.9 26.7 24.0 21.8 26.6
 17 or older 4.3 3.9 0.4 4.9 6.0 4.3
Social housingb 30.6 42.0 46.5 61.0 52.5 32.8
Ethnic minority 4.7 36.4 1.8 26.8 0.0 3.8
Has barriers to workc 71.0 68.1 59.7 80.3 50.7 70.8
Number of months worked in 3 
years prior to random assignment
 None 0.9 0.4 2.2 2.2 2.6 NA
 1-12 8.3 12.4 12.2 19.7 21.9 12.7
 13+ 90.8 87.2 85.6 78.1 75.5 87.3
Moderately disadvantagede 37.5 35.8 37.1 44.3 28.1 44.1
Sample size 1,586 226 278 183 306 236
(continued)
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Table 2.3 Continued
Characteristic
East 
Midlands London
North East 
England
North West 
England Scotland Wales
ND25+ (%)
Education
Highest qualification obtaineda
 None 37.6 34.9 32.9 40.1 34.3 35.1
 GCSE 29.9 25.4 32.9 22.0 26.2 29.7
 A-level 20.3 27.0 18.8 25.4 24.6 22.1
 Other 12.2 12.7 15.5 12.6 14.9 13.0
Age of youngest child
 No children 84.4 76.8 83.6 87.8 89.7 85.1
 Under 7 8.5 13.4 8.0 7.2 5.6 8.0
 7-11 3.8 4.0 3.5 2.2 1.2 2.9
 12-16 2.0 2.7 3.2 1.4 2.2 2.9
 17 or older 1.3 3.0 1.7 1.5 1.2 1.2
Social housingb 44.5 37.6 50.9 54.7 45.4 41.1
Ethnic minority 8.4 41.2 4.2 39.0 0.5 5.4
No driving licence or lack of 
access to vehicle 73.7 75.7 81.4 81.4 77.8 70.7
Has barriers to workc 70.7 57.2 51.9 64.0 65.1 70.1
Number of months worked in 3 
years prior to random assignment
 None 40.2 51.1 43.5 50.8 38.3 41.4
 1-12 36.8 29.5 35.3 35.8 33.2 31.8
 13+ 23.0 19.3 21.3 13.4 28.5 26.8
Severely disadvantagedd 20.8 20.4 17.3 21.5 16.5 23.5
Sample size 1,411 1,619 828 1,557 852 515
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from baseline information forms completed by DWP staff.
NOTES: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
 Sample includes all lone parent customers and all ND25+ customers randomly assigned between October 2003  
and April 2005.
 aCustomers who have GCSE qualifications refers to those who have passed a series of examinations in a variety of subjects, 
usually taken at age 15 or 16. Those with A-level qualifications have passed a series of more advanced examinations usually 
taken around age 18 or older. Those with no qualifications have completed neither series of examinations. 
 bSocial housing refers to housing in which the local authority (local government) or a private housing association is the 
landlord. 
 cBarriers to work include housing, transport, childcare, health, basic skills, or other problems.
 dSeverely disadvantaged refers to those NDLP customers with GCSE qualifications or lower, no work in the three years prior to 
random assignment, and at least one barrier to employment. 
 eModerately disadvantaged refers to those WTC customers with GCSE qualifications or lower and at least one barrier to
employment. Because all WTC customers worked in the three years prior to random assignment, none are in the severely 
disadvantaged category. This is the reason why this category is not shown for the WTC group.
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NDLP	group
The NDLP group varied somewhat across the districts in terms of their educational experience and 
housing situations, and varied more so in terms of their previous work experience. However, none 
of the districts stands out as having the most or least disadvantaged NDLP sample members. The 
Scottish district is notable for its relatively high percentage of sample members with more extensive 
work experience, while London stands out for its high percentage of sample members with little 
work experience. Sample members in Scotland and London were generally better educated, and 
sample members in North West England, North East England, and Wales were the least likely to 
have educational qualifications. A higher proportion of sample members in North East England and 
North West England lived in social housing, while a lower proportion in the East Midlands lived in 
social housing. 
WTC	group
The WTC sample is not balanced evenly throughout the districts. Because there were challenges in 
recruiting recipients of WTC to participate in the study (this target group was not previously served 
by Jobcentre Plus), WTC intake into the sample was relatively low across the districts. Various 
marketing techniques were used to increase intake, particularly in the East Midlands district. This 
district also saw the greatest response to its outreach efforts; hence, over half of the entire WTC 
sample is concentrated there.
There is wider variation in WTC sample members’ educational experience, housing status, and 
previous work experience across the districts than there is for the NDLP target group. Because the 
sample sizes were small in five of the districts, district-level analysis was not undertaken for the 
WTC target group in this report. Compared with the other districts, WTC sample members in the 
East Midlands district had somewhat more work experience, and a relatively small proportion of the 
sample lived in social housing. The proportion of sample members with no educational qualifications 
ranged from a low of seven per cent to a high of 18 per cent. 
ND25+	group
ND25+ sample members varied little across the districts in terms of their educational background, 
but varied more in their housing status and previous work experience (see Table 2.3). None of 
the districts had distinctively more or fewer disadvantaged sample members. However, sample 
members in North West England may have been slightly more disadvantaged; relatively high 
percentages lived in social housing and lacked significant previous work experience. Both North West 
England and North East England had a higher proportion of ND25+ sample members living in social 
housing (around half), while London was on the low end at around a third. North West England 
and London had high proportions of sample members who did not work any months in the three 
years before random assignment. These two districts – the more urban districts – also had higher 
concentrations of ethnic minority ND25+ sample members. Sample members in Scotland, on the 
other hand, showed relatively high levels of work experience; over a quarter of sample members 
there reported that they worked 13 months or more in the three years before random assignment.
2.5 Data sources 
The ERA evaluation uses a rich and varied set of quantitative and qualitative data to assess ERA’s 
implementation and effectiveness. 
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2.5.1 Qualitative data
Researchers conducted multiple rounds of in-depth qualitative interviews with both staff and 
programme group members from 2004 through spring 2009. These data form the bulk of the data 
used for the implementation and process analyses of ERA. Those analyses also relied on weekly 
diaries that Technical Advisers67 kept from the beginning of random assignment through June 2005, 
as well as on data collected on site visits and observations they made at various points throughout 
the course of ERA. 
2.5.2 Customer survey data
A key data source for the quantitative analysis is a customer survey administered by phone or in 
person to a sample of programme and control group members.68 A survey was administered at 
approximately 12 months after the customer’s date of random assignment (between December 
2004 and February 2006), again at their 24-month anniversary (between November 2005 and 
March 2007), and finally at their 60-month anniversary (between December 2008 and February 
2010). The survey provides a basis for assessing how much ERA programme group members used 
the services and incentives offered by ERA or Jobcentre Plus, how their service-use patterns differed 
from those of the control group, and whether the ERA group’s earnings, employment, and benefits 
receipt patterns differed from those of the control group. For the NDLP target group, 87 per cent 
of the original fielded sample responded to the 12-month survey; 77 per cent of that same fielded 
sample responded to the 24-month survey; and 62 per cent of the fielded sample responded to the 
60-month survey.69
For the WTC target group, 93 per cent of the fielded sample responded to the 12-month survey, and 
of those contacted for the 24-month survey, 79 per cent responded. However, it is important to note 
that the WTC survey sample was expanded after the 12-month survey was completed, so some 
respondents to the 24-month survey were not interviewed in that earlier wave. About 69 per cent of 
WTC sample members fielded for the 60-month survey responded to it.70 
The ND25+ group was much more challenging to locate and survey. Reflecting this difficulty, 
response rates were lower for them. In the 12-month survey, 74 per cent of the ND25+ fielded 
sample responded to the survey. By the 24-month survey, response rates had dropped to 65 per 
67 As discussed in more detail in Chapter 1, Technical Advisers assisted in monitoring random 
assignment procedures as well as in training local staff on ERA procedures.
68 Advanced consent for sample members to participate in the survey was sought in the 
background information form.
69 Sample members who did not respond to the 12-month survey were not contacted for the 
24-month survey. The response rate on the 24-month survey for the 24-month fielded sample 
(not the original fielded sample) was 88 per cent. See Appendix A for more information on 
response rates and survey response bias. As discussed in Appendix A, there is evidence of 
survey response bias, especially for the 60-month survey.
70 The decision to increase the size of the WTC 24-month fielded sample was made to 
accommodate the fact that a large portion of this target group was not recruited to participate 
in the ERA evaluation until after the 12-month survey was administered, as well as to include 
more WTC cases from outside the East Midlands. To make this change without increasing 
overall survey costs, sample points were moved to the WTC target group from the ND25+ 
target group (which had a lower response rate than the lone parent samples) after the 
12-month survey. Because of this decision, however, the WTC fielded sample is larger for the 
24-month survey than for the 12-month survey.
Sample and sites
46
cent. Because of the difficulty contacting ND25+ sample members in the first two waves (which 
would be compounded for a longer-term survey), a decision was made to forgo conducting a 
60-month survey for that target group.71 
2.5.3 Administrative records
Finally, the impact analysis uses data from DWP administrative records data. Unlike the survey 
data, the administrative records data are available for all sample members. Benefits receipt data 
available from DWP provide detailed information on the amounts and months of receipt of Income 
Support and Jobseeker’s Allowance, in particular. Employment and earnings administrative records 
data were provided to DWP by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs agency and maintained in 
DWP’s Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study (WPLS) database.72 It should also be noted that the 
WPLS earnings data cover the four tax years starting in the 2005-2006 tax year and ending in the 
2008-2009 tax year. (The tax year begins on 6 April and ends on 5 April of the following year).73 As 
discussed earlier in the chapter, for some sample members, the final tax year roughly corresponds 
to the fifth relative year after random assignment, but for many it largely covers their fourth relative 
follow-up year. 
The process study uses DWP administrative records data on bonus receipt to measure the proportion 
of ERA programme group members who received the employment retention and training bonuses. 
These data supplement those obtained through the customer survey on receipt of the financial 
incentives. 
2.6 Conclusions
ERA was launched in six regions across Great Britain during a period in which the British economy 
was relatively strong, although the economy as a whole has declined since then. The districts varied 
considerably in size, population density, and racial/ethnic composition. They also differed in their 
unemployment trends. The districts in the East Midlands, Scotland, and Wales generally showed 
stronger economic trends, while the district in North West England showed relatively weak economic 
trends. However, all of the districts faced a similar pattern of a declining manufacturing base and a 
large and increasing service sector.
71 These response rates differ slightly from the rates calculated by the Office for National 
Statistics (ONS). In ONS calculations, those deemed ineligible to respond after fielding began 
are removed from the denominator, which yield higher response rates than those reported 
here. The ONS official response rates for the 60-month surveys are 65.1 per cent for NDLP and 
70.9 per cent for WTC.
72 Unlike the second-year report, employment and earnings administrative records data are 
included in this report for the WTC group. In the previous report, these data were available 
only for those sample members who had previously received benefit payments, and there 
was concern that this could adversely affect the estimates for the WTC group. However, these 
administrative records are now available for all samples, including those not previously on 
benefit. Furthermore, an analysis found that estimated employment rates from administrative 
records are similar to those from the survey. This issue is discussed in more detail in  
Appendix A. 
73 Earnings data were not used for the 2004-2005 tax year because for many sample members 
this tax year included earnings both in the year before and the year after random assignment.
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In general, ERA sample members faced significant barriers to work, such as low educational 
qualifications and limited previous work experience. The majority of sample members in all 
target groups had no educational qualifications or only a basic qualification. The NDLP group 
had little recent work experience; half that group had not worked at all in the three years before 
random assignment. The WTC group had significantly more work experience. In addition, sample 
members in the WTC group were far more likely than those in the NDLP group to live in privately 
owned or privately rented housing. By contrast, two-thirds of the NDLP sample members lived 
in social housing. The ND25+ group was older, mostly male and childless, had lower educational 
qualifications, and had a longer history of unemployment. 
There were some similarities and some differences across the districts in the proportion of sample 
members with these barriers, but no district stood out, relative to the other districts, as having 
sample members with distinctively higher or lower proportions of barriers to employment. 
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48
3 Implementation of ERA
Box 3.1 Chapter 3 at a glance
• The Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) programme was largely implemented 
as designed, although the amount and quality of retention and advancement support 
offered to participants varied over time and across districts.
• Employed ERA participants in all three target groups experienced substantially higher levels 
of advancement-related support from Jobcentre Plus compared with employed control 
group members. 
• New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+) ERA participants had the least amount of involvement with 
Jobcentre Plus after entering work relative to the lone parent groups, and they were less 
likely to receive ERA retention and training bonuses. 
• The Working Tax Credit (WTC) target group, relative to the other two groups, was the most 
likely to receive retention and training bonuses, reflecting their greater attachment to the 
labour market and interest in training when they entered ERA. 
• Lone parents in the New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) group required more support 
when starting jobs and more time to develop new routines to balance work and family 
responsibilities before pursuing advancement opportunities. 
3.1 Introduction 
The post-employment focus of ERA challenged and stretched Jobcentre Plus’s capacity and delivery 
processes. Most significantly, ERA’s ethos required a cultural shift in the approach to employment 
support, from a focus on employability and job entry to post-employment support, employment 
retention, and progression in work. This had implications for existing Jobcentre Plus operations, 
resource use, and staff skill sets. It is thus important to ask: Did Jobcentre Plus implement the ERA 
model as envisioned and did participants who found jobs have a substantially different and deeper 
level of engagement with Jobcentre Plus while employed than they would have had in the absence 
of the programme? This chapter addresses these and related questions concerning the operation of 
ERA, the factors that influenced those operations, and participants’ experiences in the programme. 
It summarises and extends analyses presented in earlier reports74 and, in doing so, sets the context 
for later chapters that examine the effects of ERA. More generally, it highlights some of the major 
challenges of operating a post-employment intervention in Jobcentre Plus. 
Data for this process analysis are drawn from in-depth interviews with ERA management and 
Advancement Support Advisers, ERA Technical Advisers,75 the Department for Work and Pensions 
(DWP) operations team, and ERA participants. These interviews were conducted between spring 
2004 and autumn 2007.76 Additional information comes from multiple waves of customer surveys 
and various programme records. 
74 In particular, see Riccio et	al., 2008, and Miller et	al., 2008.
75 As described in Section 3.2.2., the ERA demonstration created the role of Technical Advisers 
to assist and monitor the project in each ERA district, to help ensure that random assignment 
and the programme’s key components were carried out according to the model.
76 Implementation analyses were conducted at the district level only.
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Overall, the analysis suggests that ERA was largely implemented as designed and that participants 
received a substantial post-employment intervention. However, ERA was initially quite challenging 
to incorporate into the regular Jobcentre Plus environment. Delivery improved considerably 
between the first and second years of operation, but the districts faced new challenges in the third 
year as the operational phase of the demonstration began to wind down. Some strategies and 
practices also varied across districts, offices, and staff. (For a district-by-district summary of key 
implementation features, problems and accomplishments, and significant events, see Appendix C.)  
The three target groups exhibited different perspectives towards advancement and readiness 
for advancement. In general, the ND25+ group proved the most challenging to engage. WTC 
lone parents, who were already working part time when the programme began, were easiest to 
engage and most focused on advancement. NDLP participants were also substantially involved 
with the programme, but they tended to be more hesitant to take on full-time work and viewed 
advancement as a longer-term goal. 
3.2 Operational strategies and challenges 
As previously described, ERA for the NDLP and ND25+ target groups began with the regular New Deal 
programme. During that initial stage, participants were given help preparing for and finding jobs. 
ERA then provided post-employment assistance (or ‘in-work support’) to those who obtained jobs. 
In some districts, ERA’s key frontline staff, known as Advancement Support Advisers (also referred to 
as ‘ERA advisers’), began working with participants when they entered the New Deal and continued 
assisting them throughout the post-employment stage. In other districts, the pre- and post-
employment roles were divided, with some staff focusing on pre-employment activities and others 
specialising in in-work support. The WTC target group did not participate in the New Deal, since they 
were already employed when they enrolled in ERA; for them, ERA was an entirely post-employment 
intervention.
3.2.1 Different delivery structures
Centralised	versus	decentralised	management	structures
Two models for managing ERA delivery emerged: a centralised approach, which standardised 
procedures across local offices within a Jobcentre Plus district, and a decentralised approach, which 
gave local offices more autonomy over how ERA resources were managed. Four of the six districts 
adopted at least some elements of a centralised approach. For example, two districts (East Midlands 
and Wales) assigned a single district-level manager to oversee ERA operations across all offices 
within the district. Two other districts (London and North West England) centralised their approach 
to the post-employment part of the programme by developing specialised Post-Employment Teams 
dedicated exclusively to serving ERA’s working participants and overseen by a team manager. The 
remaining two districts (North East England and Scotland) followed a decentralised management 
structure. They assigned responsibility for ERA frontline staff to Jobcentre Plus local office managers, 
who also oversaw other Jobcentre Plus services in addition to ERA. 
These different approaches to ERA’s management had implications for programme delivery. The 
centralised model made it easier to guide staff and hold them accountable for delivering ERA’s 
retention and advancement goals; ERA’s advisers were not as easily diverted by other responsibilities 
within Jobcentre Plus local offices. 
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In contrast, under the decentralised model, it was more difficult to ensure that ERA staff in local 
Jobcentre Plus offices would work only with ERA customers and give adequate attention to post-
employment support, especially in the early days of the demonstration.77 
Additionally, some districts (East Midlands and Wales) deployed peripatetic ERA advisers to cover 
a large rural area, and these advisers experienced downtime while travelling to multiple offices, 
which meant they had less time available to spend with participants. Staff shortages were another 
problem, particularly in Wales, where only two peripatetic advisers were available for members of 
the ND25+ programme group during the first year of implementation. Consequently, job placement 
and other pre-employment support was actually weaker for the ERA group than for the control 
group, for which participant-to-staff ratios in the New Deal programme were more favourable. 
This problem may have reduced the volume of ERA ND25+ participants in Wales who entered work 
during the first two years of ERA, compared with what would have been achieved normally.78
Changes in Jobcentre Plus management policies that were not specific to ERA also had significance 
for ERA’s delivery. For example, North East England and Scotland both experienced district 
reorganisation during the course of the demonstration, meaning that some local offices were 
reassigned from one Jobcentre Plus district to another, with new leadership and lines of authority. 
Changes such as these disrupted ERA’s delivery, particularly when new managers did not embrace 
the post-employment ethos of ERA, and when new staff, who were not trained for ERA, took over 
the caseloads of Advancement Support Advisers who moved off ERA. 
An	evolving	focus	on	retention	and	advancement
When ERA was operating, Jobcentre Plus usually focused exclusively on pre-employment support, 
reflecting the New Deal programme’s main goal of helping its participants enter employment. 
The agency reinforced this emphasis with a staff incentive system that primarily rewarded job 
placements. This created an environment in which ERA staff were reluctant to place a priority on 
in-work support, especially in the absence of a clear alternative performance incentive system 
that measured and rewarded post-employment success. Consequently, during the first year of 
operations, ERA staff felt strong pressure to focus on job entries, and this detracted from their 
attention to job retention and advancement goals. 
Over time, however, the districts introduced measures and monitoring practices that encouraged 
post-employment support. For example, they began to record, audit, and monitor the frequency of 
ERA advisers’ in-work contact with participants, advisers’ referrals to training, and their customers’ 
receipt of bonus payments. In addition, line managers monitored the content of Advancement 
Action Plans that were prepared with each participant, and they observed meetings the advisers 
held with participants who were employed. In spring 2005, some districts reported that they had 
established benchmarks for contacting working participants, using guidelines on the content of 
these communications. These benchmarks were described as ‘objectives’, as opposed to ‘targets’. 
Although the procedures were not standardised across districts, they illustrate the continuing 
evolution of ERA’s strategies to strengthen the programme’s critical post-employment features. 
77 As discussed in Riccio et	al., 2008, implementing ERA was complicated at the start of the 
demonstration because the special funding intended to support the programme was not 
always ‘ringfenced’ – that is, set aside exclusively for ERA. A ringfenced budget meant that a 
District Manager could not use the funds for any other Jobcentre Plus work. Likewise, an ERA 
ringfenced Advancement Support Adviser was not to undertake other non-ERA Jobcentre Plus 
tasks. A centralised delivery structure made it easier to ringfence ERA budgets and staff.
78 See Miller et	al., 2008.
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The	profile	of	ERA	within	Jobcentre	Plus
Finally, ERA’s status as a demonstration project, rather than a continuing Government policy, may 
have weakened the extent to which senior managers in the Jobcentre Plus districts supported and 
promoted the programme. Across all districts, many ERA staff felt that ERA did not have a high 
enough priority within the remit of Jobcentre Plus. Over time, the situation improved, as awareness 
of ERA spread and in response to efforts by the DWP Project and Evaluation Teams to lift the 
programme’s profile. In general, however, local Jobcentre Plus staff perceived ERA as having low 
governmental priority throughout its implementation, particularly in those districts that followed a 
decentralised management structure and in comparison with the Incapacity Benefit pilots. These 
were more traditional ‘early roll-out’ pilots, offering support to people with disabilities and/or health 
problems), which were operating at the same time in three ERA districts (East Midlands, North East 
England, and Scotland).
3.2.2 Technical support and staff training
From the outset, it was recognised that, because ERA involved a focus on in-work support, which 
was not among the services Jobcentre Plus typically offered, ERA advisers would need enhanced 
skills and guidance to deliver a strong post-employment programme. During the first two years 
of the demonstration, the project included the special role of ERA Technical Advisers, who were 
temporary staff hired by the evaluation consortium to augment the work of the initiative’s DWP 
Project Team. Each district was assigned a dedicated Technical Adviser, whose primary responsibility 
was to oversee the smooth operation of the random assignment process, but also to support the 
programme’s delivery by helping to advise ERA staff in the local offices on programme strategies 
and by coordinating peer-to-peer learning and instruction on best practices across offices and 
districts. There was broad consensus among ERA line staff and managers that the Technical 
Advisers’ support was valued and effective. 
Training and sharing best practices formed part of the districts’ continuing improvement efforts. 
In addition, specialised training to improve advisers’ techniques for delivering in-work support, 
which was adapted from the US ERA project, was provided in early 2005. ERA management and 
advisory staff alike identified this training as a significant turning point in their capacity to operate 
the programme. However, many advisers indicated that it would have been helpful to have had this 
training much sooner, rather than waiting until after they had been functioning in their ERA posts for 
approximately one year. 
3.2.3 Ending the demonstration
Across all the districts, staff enthusiasm and understanding of ERA grew substantially over time, 
although some of these improvements were fragile and varied across districts. ERA was generally 
considered to be in full operation and at optimal delivery during the year between mid-2005 and 
mid-2006. After this time, districts started to wind down operations as the first set of participants 
began to finish the programme in July 2006. As ERA neared its end, all districts reduced staff 
resources as the number of participants dropped. In addition, the structures put in place for the 
successful delivery of ERA, such as Post-Employment Teams and ringfenced staff, were gradually 
dissolved. In some cases, ERA advisers who remained had to absorb the caseloads of those who had 
left, causing their own caseloads to swell. Moreover, some advisers who had exclusively served ERA 
lone parents now had to take on ND25+ participants, who had different types of needs and were 
subject to different rules as recipients of Jobseeker’s Allowance. In these ways, the ERA programme 
suffered in its last year because it was a time-limited demonstration project. The programme 
officially ended in October 2007. 
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3.3 Pre-employment assistance
The pre-employment phase of ERA for the two New Deal participant groups (NDLP and ND25+) 
was expected to last approximately nine months. 79 During this phase, ERA’s Advancement Support 
Advisers were to address participants’ barriers to work and help them find suitable employment. 
These were the same services that non-ERA Personal Advisers offered to members of the control 
groups enrolled in the regular New Deal programmes.80 However, for the ERA group, ERA advisers 
were expected to begin focusing attention on sustainable employment and advancement goals 
right from the start. 
3.3.1 Implementing the New Deal for ERA participants versus controls
Data from in-depth qualitative interviews with staff and participants show that, in practice, ERA 
advisers’ approach to pre-employment services differed little from the approach used with the 
control group. The main difference was that the programme group was informed of ERA’s in-work 
incentives during the pre-employment phase; thus, they began their job search knowing that they 
could be rewarded for sustained employment if they chose to work full time.81 There was little other 
attention to advancement issues at this stage. ERA advisers reported that they felt it premature to 
ask participants to start thinking about advancement until they were settled into a job. Advisers said 
that, by and large, they undertook job searches for their ERA caseload in much the same way as 
they did (or had done previously) for other New Deal customer groups.
3.3.2 Engaging ERA participants in pre-employment activities
Maintaining contact with non-working participants during the pre-employment phase was 
often challenging. One obstacle with the ND25+ group was that, although they were required to 
participate in the New Deal programme (the first stage of ERA), this mandate ended once they had 
completed that programme, even if they had completed it without finding work. After that point, 
they only had to report to a Jobcentre Plus signing officer on a fortnightly basis, testifying that they 
were actively seeking work. Since many had not volunteered for the initial New Deal programme in 
the first place, many chose not to remain in contact with their ERA advisers. Also, a fair proportion of 
these long-term unemployed participants began receiving other benefits, such as Incapacity Benefit, 
and were referred to another division of Jobcentre Plus. 
For the NDLP group, the New Deal programme was voluntary. Although this usually meant 
that participants were more inclined than the ND25+ group to seek ERA advisers’ assistance, 
some participants changed their minds about wanting to work and ‘drifted away’ from the ERA 
programme, usually because family circumstances had changed. 
79 Because lone parents in the WTC programme group were employed at the start of the project, 
they did not experience a pre-employment phase through ERA. However, those who left 
employment during ERA may have received out-of-work support from their Advancement 
Support Advisers.
80 Because the two New Deal programmes are quite different, the two target groups had a 
different experience during the pre-employment ERA programme. As described in Chapter 
1, ND25+ is a mandatory programme with a prescribed timetable of structured activities 
(Gateway, Intensive Activity Period, and Follow-Through), whereas NDLP is a voluntary 
programme offering flexible guidance and services according to the needs or wishes of the 
participant. Because the WTC programme group was typically employed at the start of ERA, 
they did not experience a pre-employment phase.
81 Riccio et	al., 2008.
Implementation of ERA
53
Over time, ERA advisers developed better skills and strategies to encourage participants to think 
about advancement from the time they entered the programme and to remain in touch. But on the 
whole, the extent and patterns of support participants received when they were out of work were 
quite similar. 
3.4 Post-employment assistance
Working participants in the three ERA programme groups received a substantial in-work intervention 
relative to their control group counterparts, and staff capacity to deliver this intervention clearly 
improved over time. 
3.4.1 Types of in-work support
Intensity	of	contact
Data from the two-year customer survey show that, among respondents who had worked during 
the follow-up period, those in the programme group, on average, had substantially more contact 
with a Jobcentre-Plus adviser while working and received more help and guidance on advancement, 
compared with their counterparts in the control group (see Figure 3.1). For example, within the NDLP 
target group, 81 per cent of employed ERA participants had some in-work contact with Jobcentre 
Plus staff, compared with 42 per cent of those in the control group. Large differentials were also 
evident for the WTC and ND25+ samples. 
The quality of the contact also differed considerably, with higher proportions of ERA participants 
than control group members reporting face-to-face contact with Jobcentre Plus staff and greater 
receipt of employment retention and advancement advice. For example, among survey respondents 
who had worked, the proportion who reported having received ‘help or advice on retention and 
advancement while in work’ was between three and ten times greater for ERA participants than 
controls. Together, these findings confirm that engagement with Jobcentre Plus was much different 
for employed ERA participants than for employed individuals who were not part of ERA. 
The nature and the quality of contact with Jobcentre Plus advisers among working participants also 
varied within the ERA group, as revealed in the qualitative research. In some cases, participants 
made only very brief visits to their advisers to provide documentation or to receive their retention 
bonuses. In other cases, they had more in-depth discussions concerning employment retention and 
plans for advancement. 
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Retention-focused	support
ERA advisers reported that they gave various kinds of support to help participants remain employed, 
such as: 
• assisting with in-work benefit claims (such as the WTC) and issues arising with Housing Benefit; 
• assisting with childcare arrangements and transport to work;
• providing new job search assistance when participants wanted to change jobs (thus supporting 
both retention and advancement goals);
• providing continuing support (practical and emotional) in resolving personal problems that could 
undermine steady employment (negative work relationships, debt, housing issues, depression, or 
domestic violence);
• providing one-off ‘crisis’ support – for example, help securing financial assistance to cover time off 
from work resulting from accident or injury.
Advancement-focused	support
ERA advisers tried to promote the programme’s advancement goals in a variety of ways. According 
to participants’ responses to the two-year survey, advancement-related coaching and advice 
focused most often on the following activities: help finding education or training, determining career 
goals, increasing work hours, and getting a better job (Table 3.1). Less common were: support in 
getting a promotion, negotiating better job terms, and negotiating a pay rise.
ERA advisers recognised that the three target groups faced different types of employment 
challenges and often had different views towards advancement. In general, staff believed that 
the two lone parent groups (NDLP and WTC) were more responsive to ERA than the long-term 
unemployed group (ND25+). However, they also acknowledged some important differences within 
each target group. 
While they were sympathetic to the concerns and the importance of caring and family responsibilities, 
advisers were not opposed to the notion of lone parents working full time. In fact, in a special ERA 
staff survey administered in 2004, most advisers indicated that, as long as childcare was available, 
lone parents – even those with pre-school children – should not be discouraged from working full-time 
hours. Qualitative interviews with ERA advisers and participants indicate that many NDLP participants 
did not want to work full time, preferring, instead, employment that offered flexibility to fit work in 
with their childcare commitments and children’s school hours.82 Staff also made it clear that they 
resisted lone parents being pressed hard to undertake full-time work when the parents did not want 
to do so.83 Many advisers talked about having to proceed slowly with lone parents who had been out 
of work for a long time, suggesting that they needed to settle into work and build up their confidence 
first, even if only in part-time jobs. Advisers thus tended to perceive that employment retention 
was the first order of business for NDLP participants, expecting that this group would become more 
receptive to advancement down the line.
82 These findings are echoed in other studies that have followed lone parents in work. See 
recent studies documenting the experiences of lone parents during their first year in work, 
for example, Sims et	al., 2010. A family orientation, particularly among those with younger 
children, is also evidenced in the types of work lone parents undertake (see Philo et	al., 2009). 
This employment is characterised as low skilled and part time, with concentrations in the 
administration/secretarial and personal/caring occupations. It can be argued that these work 
sectors and working arrangements enable the flexibility to balance employment with family 
(see Casebourne et	al., 2010; Ray et	al., 2010).
83 Dorsett et	al., 2007.
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Lone parents in the WTC programme group were already in work and had stronger work histories 
on the whole. Thus, they were less likely to have job retention problems and were more receptive 
to exploring advancement opportunities. Indeed, much of the in-work support advisers provided to 
WTC participants focused on meeting the progression goals set out in their individual Advancement 
Action Plans. (See Appendix D for a further exploration of the perspectives of the NDLP and WTC 
groups towards advancement.)
ND25+ participants had the lowest rates of in-work support among the three ERA programme 
groups. About a quarter of those who were working said on the two-year survey that they had 
no contact with Jobcentre Plus staff while they were employed. In the qualitative interviews, ERA 
advisers reported great difficulty engaging these participants. They suggested a number of reasons, 
including the fact that some ND25+ participants avoided contact with their advisers due to negative 
feelings about Jobcentre Plus, a greater ethos of self-reliance, and less awareness of available 
in-work support. The advisers believed that, on the whole, participants with a history of long-term 
unemployment were more interested in securing a stable, secure job as opposed to advancing in 
work. However, there were reports of some participants in this group becoming more receptive 
to post-employment support after settling into their jobs. (The views and attitudes of ND25+ 
participants towards work advancement are further explored in Chapter 6.) 
3.4.2 Looking back: participants’ reflections on ERA support
Qualitative interviews with former programme group participants conducted in 2009, up to two 
years after ERA had ended, provided them with an opportunity to reflect on the relative contribution 
of in-work advisory support on their work journeys. Thematic analysis of these reflections identified 
three broad groups. Although not mutually exclusive, these categories offer a framework for 
understanding how ERA participants valued their advisory support: 
• Some participants were clear on the direction they wished to follow in work, but welcomed the 
extra information, guidance, and advice Advancement Support Advisers contributed to help them 
achieve these aims.
• Some individuals needed encouragement to move beyond their ‘comfort zone’ and take the risk 
to train or increase working hours. Advancement Support Advisers helped motivate them to seek 
and act on new opportunities. 
• In some cases, Advancement Support Advisers performed mostly an administrative role (e.g., 
processing retention bonus payments) for participants who believed they needed little work-
related guidance. 
Respondents talked about the practical support they received from ERA. For example, advisers 
helped to arrange childcare, addressed issues with benefits and tax credits, located training courses, 
and completed paperwork. Some of this practical help served to expedite a specific goal, such as 
training. It was also common for respondents to describe the emotional support they received. 
In particular, some pointed to the ways in which advisers helped to build their self-confidence 
to pursue training or an advancement agenda. According to one former ND25+ participant, his 
adviser helped him feel like more than ‘just	a	number	in	the	computer’. Similarly, one former NDLP 
participant credited her adviser with instilling the confidence she needed to pursue suitable training 
in order to move on to a better job. 
‘[Advancement Support Adviser]	helped	me	more	with	my	confidence	than	going	on	that	
course.	And	then	for	the	computer	course,	she	talked	through	what	my	skills	were	and	what	
was	missing…and	for	me	it	was	the	confidence	of	the	computer	and	databases	and	things	that	
frightened	me	to	death.	So	that	was	where	we	sort	of	aimed	my	training.	And	then	once	I’d	
done	that	it	came	on	leaps	and	bounds,	to	be	fair.’	
(Former participant, NDLP programme group)
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Some participants did not draw on their adviser’s support simply because they did not see a need 
to keep in touch. Many participants in this category felt that if they were not experiencing any 
employment retention issues, there was no need to engage with their adviser beyond processing 
bonus payments. This sentiment was illustrated by a former ND25+ participant who worked in the 
finance office of a wholesale business.
‘The	fact	the	job	seemed	to	be	going	so	well	and	I	was	so	happy,	I	was	feeling	great.	If	I’d	had	
problems	I	might	have	been	back	to	my	adviser	more	often	saying,	“No,	really	things	aren’t	
going	well,	I	don’t	see	this	job	is	going	to	last,	I	hate	the	job.”	But	the	job	was	fabulous.	So	while	
you’re	in	a	job	that	you	absolutely	love	every	second	of	it	and	you’ve	got	the	support	of	this	
scheme	behind	you,	which	is	making	you	feel	even	great	you	think	it’s	Christmas,	it	was	terrific.’	
(Former participant, ND25+ programme group)
Finally, some participants, especially in the ND25+ group, viewed Jobcentre Plus as an agency that 
served unemployed people and wanted to disassociate themselves from their non-working past. 
3.5 Emergency Discretion Fund 
ERA participants who were employed could receive assistance from an Emergency Discretion Fund, 
of up to £300 in total during the programme. Administered at the discretion of the ERA adviser, this 
fund allowed the programme to help participants cope with minor financial emergencies that might 
prevent them from continuing in work. 
3.5.1 Receipt and use of the fund
Financial payment records indicate that, respectively, 21 per cent, 24 per cent, and 14 per cent of 
NDLP, WTC, and ND25+ ERA participants who worked during the programme received emergency 
fund assistance (see Table 3.2). ERA advisers believed that the receipt rate was lower for the ND25+ 
group than the lone parent groups because these participants tended to view themselves as more 
self-reliant and were less likely to come to advisers for help with financial difficulties. They also did 
not have the additional expense of childcare. 
The average value of a single payment was similar for all groups, ranging between £171 and £187. 
Over a third of recipients in each of the programme groups received two or more payments. 
Lone parents (both in the NDLP and WTC groups) mainly used their payments to cover critical 
expenses like childcare and rent. ND25+ participants mostly used the payments for transport and 
work-related expenses such as tools, clothes, and equipment. Other uses of the emergency fund 
included:
• covering shortfalls in household expenses when moving from weekly benefit payments to a job 
that paid monthly,
• covering payment of two rents when moving to a new home, and
• paying for household appliance breakdowns and car repairs.
Over time, ERA advisers grew more confident about exercising discretion in distributing the funds as 
an employment retention tool. In general, participants who received the emergency funds had not 
been aware that this assistance was available until they had informed their Advancement Support 
Adviser of their financial strain. In these cases, their adviser told them that ERA could draw from a 
flexible pot of money in the event of an emergency. 
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Table 3.2 Receipt of ERA Emergency Discretion Fund (EDF) payments
Outcome NDLP WTC ND25+
Ever received EDF payments (%) 21.2 23.6 13.8
Average number of payments received among customers with any payments 1.7 1.7 1.8
Number of payments received among customers with any payments
One 59.0 63.2 58.6
Two 27.8 21.6 23.7
Three 6.9 8.4 7.4
Four or more 6.3 6.9 10.4
Average amount of each EDF payment among customers with any payments (£) 187 181 171
Average total amount of EDF payments among customers with any payments (£) 273 254 264
Sample size 3,365  1,415  3,424
SOURCE: MDRC calculations primarily from DWP financial incentives data.
NOTE: The sample for this table consists of all those randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005.
3.5.2 Role of the fund in work decisions
The role of the Emergency Discretion Fund in job retention was not straightforward. Based on the 
qualitative data, the fund was particularly important for people working in minimum-wage jobs or 
part time. For example, one NDLP participant who was working on a factory line received money 
from the fund to pay for car repairs during the first month in work. He said that it made a difference 
to keeping the job because public transport was not an option for travel to work and he did not have 
enough savings to cover the expense.
‘It	was	very	helpful	indeed	because	I	think	I	was	living	on	the	breadline	at	that	point…because	
otherwise	the	car	would	have	been	off	the	road	for	a	few	months.’	
(Former participant, NDLP programme group)
Access to other sources of financial support was also important. Some participants indicated 
that they would have borrowed money from family or friends, instead, if they had not received a 
payment from the emergency fund. However, this was an option many did not favour as it impinged 
on their independence as a working adult. For example, lone parents who relied on family for 
childcare support did not wish to approach family members for extra financial help. As one lone 
parent stated, ‘I	don’t	like	asking	people	for	money…’ On the other hand, for those participants 
who did not have family support, the availability of the fund was said to be vital to remain in 
employment. 
Others indicated that they would not have left their job, but would have simply ‘struggled’ through 
the first couple of months, if necessary. For example, one former NDLP participant explained that the 
help she received was to cover bills and expenses until her first pay cheque arrived. If she had not 
received support, her rent would have gone in arrears and she would have had trouble supporting 
her children, yet she said this would not have stopped her from working.
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Q:	‘What	do	you	think	would	have	happened	if	you	hadn’t	got	it?’
A:	‘Well,	obviously,	my	rent	would	have	gone	in	arrears	as	well.	It	would	have	been	hard	without	
it,	to	feed	my	children	and	stuff	as	well.’
Q:	‘Did	it	make	a	difference	at	all	to	you	staying	in	work	to	get	the	money,	or	would	you	have	
stayed	anyway?’
A:	‘No,	I	would	have	stayed,	because	I	didn’t	want	to	mess	that	up.	I	was	looking	forward	to	
going	back	to	work.’	
(Former participant, NDLP programme group)
Overall, participants who received financial support from the Emergency Discretion Fund were highly 
positive about their experience. For most, the modest amount of money helped to alleviate the 
burden of unbudgeted expenses that added to the stresses of work. For some, it was also a means 
to stay independent of family support. 
3.6 The ERA employment retention bonus
The employment retention bonus was a central feature of the ERA model. Each participant was 
offered £400 for staying in full-time work (at least 30 hours per week for 13 out of every 17 weeks, 
which is about 75 per cent of the time). Payments were made three times a year, and participants 
could claim a maximum of six bonus payments, totalling £2,400. ERA designers required full-
time work because full-time jobs offered a better chance than part-time jobs to escape poverty 
through employment. Full-time jobs were also more likely to come with fringe benefits. In addition, 
the designers were concerned that including a bonus for part-time work might encourage some 
participants who would have worked full time to choose part-time work instead.
3.6.1 Receipt of the retention bonus 
According to financial payment records (Table 3.3), 45 per cent of WTC participants received an ERA 
retention bonus, which was higher than the rates for the NDLP and ND25+ groups (33 per cent and 
35 per cent, respectively). WTC participants also received more payments. This pattern is consistent 
with the WTC group’s greater overall attachment to the labour force. 
It is possible that some people who were eligible for the bonus did not claim it. ERA advisers who 
were interviewed noted that some participants felt there was a ‘catch’ associated with the receipt of 
the bonus and were therefore suspicious of the extra money. Some lone parents were unsure what 
impact the bonus would have on their WTC. Some ND25+ participants may have foregone the bonus 
because they were reluctant to engage with Jobcentre Plus once they had found work. In addition, 
evidence from qualitative interviews revealed that some participants were simply not aware that 
they were eligible. 
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Table 3.3 Receipt of ERA employment retention bonuses
Outcome NDLP WTC ND25+
Ever received bonus (%) 32.9 44.6 34.8
Average number of bonuses received among customers with any bonuses 3.8 4.0 3.7
Number of bonuses received among customers with any bonuses (%)
One 15.3 11.3 18.2
Two 13.3 12.4 12.3
Three 14.4 11.1 11.1
Four 14.6 13.3 15.7
Five 20.0 30.1 22.7
Six 22.3 21.9 20.1
Sample size 3,365 1,415 3,424
SOURCE: MDRC calculations primarily from DWP financial incentives data.
NOTE: The sample for this table consists of all those randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005.
3.6.2 Use of the retention bonus 
From the qualitative evidence, ERA participants reported they used the bonuses in three main ways: 
to help them ‘get by’, as ‘treats’ or ‘extras’, and, to a lesser extent, for work-related costs. 
In instances where participants used the bonus to off-set low wages, they used it to pay regular 
household bills, childcare costs, and interest on debt. For instance, an ND25+ participant referred 
to the important contribution that his bonus made to his household income, stating ‘that	it	made	
the	difference	between	struggling	to	pay	the	bills	and	being	able	to	pay	the	bills.’ In some cases, the 
incentive was consciously used to supplement low-paid work. Participants who used it in this way 
talked about being able to accept a poorly paid job and still be better off in work. 
For some, the bonus was used as an ‘extra’ to make home improvements and enhance family well-
being – for example, going on a family holiday, taking the children out, decorating their homes, or 
buying consumer goods, such as a washing machine. NDLP and WTC lone parents emphasised the 
importance of being able to afford these ‘extras’ as justification for working longer hours and being 
away from their children. 
The bonus was also used to pay work-related costs. Some ND25+ participants used the money to 
buy or maintain a car for work travel. A few participants who had taken up in-work training had 
invested their bonus money in a computer, which they used for preparing coursework. 
3.6.3 Claiming the retention bonus
Claiming the employment retention bonus involved a visit to the Jobcentre Plus office to have 
the claim verified. This requirement was added to the design of ERA to provide an opportunity for 
Advancement Support Advisers to speak in person with participants about issues concerning their 
progress in work. Indeed, staff highlighted the unique way in which they used the bonus as a ‘hook’ 
Implementation of ERA
63
to maintain contact and promote retention and advancement services to participants. Advisers 
reported that this was useful, particularly for engaging ND25+ participants, who were more reluctant 
to maintain contact after they were employed.84 
The 2009 qualitative interviews with former participants also explored their views about the 
structure of ERA retention bonus payments, comparing the lump-sum payments to a hypothetical 
option of receiving smaller but more regular payments weekly or monthly. Almost without 
exception, respondents said that they preferred the lump sum every three months as opposed to 
a more frequent payment. The consensus perception was that a smaller, more regular, amount 
was more likely to be absorbed into everyday expenses and therefore would have less influence on 
financial well-being. It was also felt that a quarterly lump sum would serve as a greater incentive 
to remain employed, as opposed to more frequent, smaller payments. Interestingly, this sentiment 
was voiced both by those who viewed the retention bonus as a ‘treat’ for ‘luxuries’ and those who 
had used the payments for essential expenditures such as household bills and food.85 
The end of the bonus payments did not present major difficulties for participants. According to the 
2009 qualitative data, while some people used the bonus for day-to-day expenses, most said that 
they were careful not to become reliant on the extra money because they knew it would come to an 
end. So while very many people in the sample ‘missed	it’, no-one spoke about getting into financial 
difficulties when the bonus ended. A few people mentioned alternative means they had used to 
make up for the loss, such as taking out loans or using overdrafts, and some still had debts at the 
time of the interview, but all felt that these were manageable. 
3.6.4 The role of the bonus in participants’ decisions about working
Later chapters will show the programme’s impacts on participants’ decisions about work. In 
anticipation of that analysis, it is helpful to consider how participants talked about the influence of 
the bonus offer in those decisions and the extent to which participants viewed it as an incentive. 
The two-year survey data reveal considerable variety in the perceived influence of the retention 
bonus (see Table 3.4). Among ND25+ bonus recipients, about half felt that the bonus did not 
influence their decision to work full time, while nearly a third (31 per cent) said that it influenced 
their decision ‘a	lot’. When asked whether the bonus encouraged them to stay in full-time work, the 
ND25+ group gave a similar pattern of responses. 
Somewhat higher proportions of bonus recipients in the two lone parent groups credited the 
retention bonus as influencing their decision to begin and/or continue in full-time work. For example, 
39 per cent of NDLP bonus recipients and 52 per cent of WTC bonus recipients indicated that the 
bonus influenced their decision to work full time ‘a	lot’. 
84 Overall, there were rarely any problems reported with the administration of the bonus. In 
the qualitative interviews, a small number of participants noted difficulties in producing the 
evidence for the bonus (i.e., pay slips) if they were self-employed. Some reported problems 
such as pay slips being lost at the Jobcentre Plus office, and others missed out on bonuses due 
to a reported lack of awareness or lack of adviser contact, but subsequently received back-
dated payments.
85 This is supported by recent research by Ray et	al., 2010, that investigated the views of working 
lone parents about different In-Work Credit payment structures. Lone parents tended to view 
weekly payments as an earnings supplement, while lump-sum payments were treated more 
like ‘treats’ or a ‘bonus’. In the same study, Jobcentre Plus staff considered the lump-sum 
payment to be more effective for encouraging budgeting practices and ‘weaning’ lone parents 
off In-Work Credit as eligibility for the supplement came to an end. 
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WTC participants were generally working between 16 and 29 hours when they began ERA, and many 
who increased their hours were able to do so in their existing jobs. Others worked variable hours at 
the start of ERA, but strove to work at least the minimum 30 hours each week more consistently 
in order to qualify for the bonus. For some, the bonus was critical in helping them weather rough 
periods and continue working full time. For example, one WTC participant with a 12-year-old child 
had moved to a new full-time job in a bank. She described the work as ‘very	stressful’, but she was 
determined to stick it out with the promise of the extra money. Referring to the bonus, she stated:
‘And	it	kind	of	encourages	you,	it	does	make	you	stick	at	it,	and	sometimes	the	toughest	time	in	
a	job	is	the	first	six	months	to	a	year.	It’s	the	toughest	time,	and	it	takes	you	that	long	to	realise,	
“Am	I	going	to	stay	at	this?	Or	do	I	like	it?”	So	it	did	help.’	
(Former participant, WTC programme group)
Lone parents (both in the NDLP and WTC groups) felt more inclined to increase their working hours 
if they were able to secure satisfactory childcare arrangements or had older children who required 
less care. Conversely, lone parents with young children tended to be more ‘care-focused’,86 preferring 
to prioritise their family responsibilities over increased work hours. Some lone parents were unable 
to increase their hours because they lacked childcare or faced more complicated challenges in 
arranging suitable care because their children were infants or had health problems. Others simply 
wished to place a priority on their time with their children. Thus, while the bonus might have swayed 
some lone parents to take on extra hours, factors other than financial considerations kept others 
from responding to the offer. 
Participants in the ND25+ group were not encumbered by childcare responsibilities and tended 
to work full time (see Chapter 6). Still, while many attributed no influence to the retention bonus 
in their work decisions, some believed it was important. Reflecting on his time in ERA, one ND25+ 
participant said that the bonus payments helped him become more self-reliant and boosted his 
confidence. 
‘It	made	you	realise	the	benefits	of	being	back	in	work,	the	fact	that	you’re	more	independent	
financially,	as	well	as	obviously	it	makes	you	feel	better	because	you’re	not	skint	all	the	time.’	
(Former participant, ND25+group)
Others reported that the bonus acted as an ‘enabler’ to stay in work. In these instances, the 
incentive payments were used to supplement a poorly paid job. The incentive also motivated 
individuals in this group to retain their jobs when they found work difficult. Some ND25+ participants 
also stated that they were motivated to join ERA after being told about the retention bonus at the 
time of random assignment. 
86 See Hoggart et	al., 2006.
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3.6.5 Work hours after the retention bonus ended
In the five-year survey, former NDLP and WTC programme group participants were asked about their 
working hours after the retention bonus ended. Their responses indicate that the removal of the 
bonus did not result in a change in hours worked. The majority of those who had received the bonus 
said that they had continued to work the same weekly hours – 88 per cent of the NDLP group and  
93 per cent of the WTC group (data not shown). 
Qualitative research conducted in 2009 examined the work patterns of former ERA participants who 
had received the retention bonus. The sample included people who had continued to work full time 
as well as some who had reduced their hours to part time. Reasons for staying in full-time work 
varied, but common among them were positive feelings about being in work and off benefits and 
having more money.87 For example, one WTC participant, who had increased her work to 30 hours 
a week and had always intended to drop back once ERA ended, continued working those hours 
because she ‘got	used	to	the	money’ from the extra earnings. 
Although some former ERA participants interviewed in 2009 did not remain in full-time work, they 
reported that this had less to do with the incentive ending than to being made redundant or to 
changes in personal situations, such as ill health or a breakdown in childcare arrangements. For 
example, this was the case for a former WTC participant who was receiving Income Support at the 
time of the follow-up interview. During ERA, she had increased her hours working as a dental nurse 
to full time in response to the bonus, but she later became pregnant and subsequently went on 
maternity leave. She did not return to work because her child had special needs. 
3.7 The ERA training incentives
ERA offered two types of incentives to encourage the take-up of training. First, ERA would pay 
course tuition up to a maximum of £1,000 per person. Second, a training completion bonus paid 
£8 for every hour of training completed, up to a maximum of £1,000 (or 125 hours of completed 
training). The latter was paid to participants once they had successfully completed training. Both 
forms of incentive payments were to be made only for courses approved by ERA staff and could 
not include employer-provided on-the-job training. Participants could receive the completion 
bonus even for courses that did not charge a tuition fee. Additionally, to be eligible for the training-
related payments, participants had to be working 16 or more hours per week. This was intended to 
discourage participants from avoiding or leaving work to pursue training. 
The dynamics of ERA training support for lone parents were covered in a separate study, and readers 
are advised to consult this report for more details.88 This section summarises part of that analysis 
and supplements it with relevant information on the ND25+ group and with new data from the ERA 
financial payment records and the five-year customer survey. 
3.7.1 Delivery of training incentives 
Like the other post-employment services, delivery of support for training evolved over the four-
year lifetime of the programme. Initially, ERA advisers struggled to maintain contact with ERA 
participants who were in work. Moreover, they were not confident about promoting training 
as an advancement tool and took a reactive approach to matching participants with training 
opportunities. During the first year of implementation, advisers spoke of maximising training take-
87 These observations are supported by Sims et	al., 2010, regarding lone parents’ views on 
sustainable work.
88 Hendra et	al., 2011. 
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up, with little regard for what the outcomes would be. Over time, with more experience, additional 
staff training, and improved familiarity with local training providers, they became more adept at 
discussing training options and linking occupational training to advancement goals. 
Promoting training and the related financial incentives to take up training became a key way in 
which ERA advisers delivered advancement services. For example, advisers encouraged participants 
to think about their long-term goals and then helped them identify training that would address 
these goals. Some advisers encouraged participants to consider education and training as a step 
towards obtaining their ‘ideal’ or ‘dream’ job. Similarly, some advisers encouraged participants to 
accept ‘any job’ and take training to progress towards their preferred jobs. 
Participants were routinely reminded of the available financial support for training whenever they 
were in touch with Jobcentre Plus (for example, to pick up a retention bonus). Additionally, towards 
the end of ERA, some district managers advised their staff to market the unused training allowance 
actively to their participants to encourage take-up and provide greater opportunities for career 
advancement in the longer term. 
3.7.2 Participation in training
According to financial payment records, WTC programme group participants took advantage of 
training opportunities more than any other group during ERA. Their rate of receipt of training fees 
and the completion bonus was at least double that of the other target groups. About 34 per cent 
of all WTC participants received assistance with training fees, compared with 16 per cent of NDLP 
participants and 11 per cent of ND25+ participants (see Table 3.5). Average payments among those 
who received tuition payments ranged from £616 for workers in the ND25+ group to £579 and £510, 
respectively, for working lone parents in the NDLP and WTC groups. WTC participants were more 
likely than the NDLP and ND25+ groups to receive training completion bonuses and were more likely 
to receive more than one such bonus. 
As noted previously, some ERA advisers more actively promoted the training incentives towards 
the end of the programme, and this strategy is reflected in the financial payment records. Of 
participants who received training-related payments, about a third in the NDLP group, a fifth in the 
WTC group, and two-fifths in the ND25+ group received training fee payments for the first time 
within their last nine months of eligibility. Similarly, about two-fifths of NDLP bonus recipients, about 
a quarter of the WTC bonus recipients, and approximately a third of ND25+ bonus recipients received 
the training completion bonus for the first time in the last nine months.89 
89 See Table E.7 in Riccio et	al., 2008, and Table D.5 in Miller et	al., 2008.
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Table 3.5 ERA participants’ receipt of ERA training fee assistance and training 
 completion bonuses
Outcome NDLP WTC ND25+
Training/tuition fee assistance
Received tutition fee assistance (%) 15.5 33.8 10.8
Average number of payments received among participants with any payments 2.0 2.3 1.8
Number of payments received among participants with any payments (%)
One 54.7 47.1 58.0
Two 21.6 21.3 23.6
Three 10.9 13.8 10.6
Four or more 12.8 17.8 7.9
Average amount of each payment among participants with any payments (£) 383 291 431
Average total amount of payments among participants with any payments (£) 579 510 616
Training completion bonus
Received bonus (%) 14.1 34.1 7.4
Average number of bonuses received among participants with any bonuses 2.0 2.2 1.6
Number of bonuses received among participants with any bonuses (%)
One 55.3 48.1 65.5
Two 22.7 25.3 18.4
Three 11.6 12.9 10.2
Four or more 10.5 13.7 5.9
Average amount of each bonus among participants with any bonuses (£) 394 402 345
Average total amount of bonuses among participants with any bonuses (£) 586 633 492
Sample size 3,365 1,415 3,424
SOURCE: MDRC calculations primarily from DWP financial incentives data.
NOTE: The sample for this table consists of all those randomly assigned to the ERA programme group between October 2003 and 
April 2005.
Qualitative data from staff and participants suggest a variety of reasons that may explain why some 
participants who worked and enrolled in training did not receive payment for tuition fees or the 
training completion bonus. For some people, the fee payment was irrelevant because the courses 
they wanted to pursue were free of charge. This was the case either for employer-funded courses 
or college-provided/online courses that were free to people on a low income. Others did not claim 
assistance because they had lost touch with their adviser, were unaware of the incentives, or did not 
know that their training was eligible. 
A similar picture emerged for the training completion bonus. Those who had undertaken training 
independently were often not aware that they could claim a completion bonus. This also seemed 
to reflect uncertainty on the part of staff regarding which courses were eligible for bonus payments, 
particularly during the first year of the programme. In addition, the training bonus could be paid 
only after the training was successfully completed, and some participants may have dropped out 
of the course or chosen not to take an examination. Others may have completed the training after 
eligibility for the bonus had ended. 
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Analyses of administrative records and a classification of course types90 confirmed that most ERA 
participants took occupationally relevant courses as opposed to general or non-employment-related 
courses. These occupationally relevant courses most commonly related to the ‘caring’ professions91 
(health, social services, childcare, and education) and computer applications. Among the ‘general’ 
courses taken, training with a focus on workplace skills (such as first aid, health and safety, and food 
hygiene) was most common. 
3.7.3 Staff and participant views on the training incentives
Qualitative analyses reveal that there were four main ways in which ERA participants used training 
to further advance in work. These included:
• Enhancing skills for a current job role, such as taking advanced computer applications courses for 
a person in a secretarial field. 
• Achieving a ‘dream job’ (e.g., a supermarket employee who wished to become self-employed as a 
massage therapist, and an administrative assistant who pursued a career in hairdressing).
• Improving one’s general employability, such as with courses in computer applications, driving 
lessons, and basic literacy and numeracy. For example, one ND25+ participant took up driving 
lessons while working part time. Driving was viewed as a more efficient means of transport and 
would also make it possible for him to work two part-time jobs back-to-back;
• To earn the financial incentives. In some instances, the training seemed to have little relation 
to any advancement goals, counter to what the policy had intended. Some respondents also 
said that they felt compelled by their advisers to use the training money, otherwise it would be 
wasted. For example, one former WTC participant recalled being told by her ERA adviser, ‘it’s	here,	
it	needs	to	be	used,	don’t	just	leave	it’. 
ERA advisers believed that participants’ attitudes and motivations towards advancement as well 
as their previous educational experiences were key determinants of whether they took up training. 
They felt fundamentally that many participants were uninterested in advancement and, of the 
two lone-parent groups, NDLP participants were less interested in work progression. As is discussed 
further in Appendix D, many lone parents wanted to wait until they were settled in work before 
pursuing advancement. Many with younger children wished to wait until their children were older 
before considering their careers further. For such individuals, the training incentives held little appeal. 
In contrast, many participants in the WTC group said that they volunteered for ERA specifically 
because of the training opportunities. The training take-up figures reflect these differences. 
ERA advisers also felt that it was more difficult to promote training incentives among ND25+ 
participants, compared with the lone parent groups. This was primarily because many long-term 
unemployed participants were satisfied with obtaining steady work and did not place a premium on 
career advancement. ND25+ participants’ views on advancement are discussed further in Chapter 6. 
However, it also seemed to be partly because participants had difficulties combining full-time work 
with training, particularly if the work was shift work or required long hours. Some advisers also spoke 
about the prevalence of short-term contract work among their ND25+ participants, which made it 
more difficult for them to combine training with work. 
90 See Hendra et	al., 2011.
91 This reflects the higher proportion of lone parents (NDLP and WTC groups) who worked in the 
caring professions.
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3.7.4 Perceived role of the training incentives
ERA advisers and participants felt that the payment of fees was an important incentive for training. 
Some advisers felt that, while they could motivate ERA participants to take up training, the fee 
payment made it possible. Affordability of training was a prime issue for all participant groups. Most 
stated that they would not have been able to take courses if the fees had not been paid by ERA, 
while some reported that course fees were the reason why they had not independently taken up 
training in the past. 
Data from the two-year customer survey are less conclusive about the influence of the training 
bonus on work behaviour (see Table 3.4). As with their views on the retention bonus, participants 
varied in their responses when they were asked whether the training completion bonus had made 
a difference to their work behaviour. Among the lone parents, similar proportions (just under half) 
of NDLP and WTC participants felt that the bonus influenced their decision ‘a lot’ to start a course, 
while just over half felt that the bonus encouraged them ‘a	lot’ to continue the course. For ND25+ 
recipients of the training bonus, the survey data indicate that a higher proportion (50 per cent) 
felt the bonus encouraged them ‘a	lot’ to continue with a course than the proportion who said it 
influenced them ‘a	lot’ to take up training in the first place (30 per cent). However, the number of 
ND25+ survey respondents who had received the bonus was small, so these data should be treated 
with caution. 
A few respondents in the qualitative interviews referred to the incentives as a motivating force that, 
in the words of one former ND25+ participant, did ‘spur	me	on	a	little	bit	more	probably	than	I	would	
have	done’. For some NDLP and WTC participants, the training bonus also helped to justify time away 
from the family, as one WTC participant stated: 
‘…when	you	are	a	lone	parent…you	kind	of	feel	like	you	can’t	go	off	and	do	something	for	
yourself	because	there	just	isn’t	the	time	or	you	can’t	afford	to	do	it.	So	[the	training	bonus]	
made	the	course	more	enjoyable	because	you	knew	you	were	getting	paid	as	well	so	it	was	even	
better.’
(Former participant, WTC programme group)
3.7.5 Longer-term influences of in-work training
In qualitative interviews conducted in 2009, former ERA participants were asked to reflect 
on their experience of ERA training and how they saw its importance in terms of their current 
circumstances.92 Some who took up training reported that it had helped them take on greater 
responsibilities at work or get a promotion, which, in some cases, required more qualifications 
or credentials. Other respondents reported softer outcomes, such as becoming more aware of 
capabilities, more self-confident, or more assertive. 
At the same time, for many participants, training did not lead to better employment outcomes. 
Some were reluctant to put their financial stability and family life at risk by changing to a new job, 
even though they had new skills. Some lone parents wished to defer a new career or a change in 
their work patterns until their children required less care. Others lacked relevant work experience. For 
example, one WTC participant who had received ERA support to train in childcare while working as 
a hairdresser expressed frustration that all job advertisements required relevant experience. She felt 
that one drawback of ERA was a lack of practical experience for entering a new field. 
This apparent gap between acquiring new qualifications and skills and the application of these to 
the workplace also points to a limitation in the capacity of ERA advisers. Although these staff could 
92 See Hendra et	al., 2011, for more details. 
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offer general guidance on advancement, they did not have expertise in the opportunities available in 
specific occupational areas or the training they required. Nor were they linked in with local employers 
to identify the marketable skills that were in demand at particular firms and organisations. Instead, 
as generalists, ERA advisers typically encouraged participants to build their skills in whatever areas 
were of interest to them. 
3.8 Conclusions
At the time ERA was launched, the New Deal programmes and Jobcentre Plus offered customers 
who entered work little additional assistance once they found jobs. ERA was thus a radical 
departure from ‘business as usual’, and there was no guarantee that Jobcentre Plus could 
effectively implement the model. Line staff and managers alike were inexperienced in delivering 
an advancement-focused intervention, and the institutional incentives under which they operated 
offered little encouragement to focus on advancement-related outcomes.
Not surprisingly, the agency encountered many difficulties along the way, and the quality with 
which ERA was implemented varied across local Jobcentre Plus districts, offices, and staff. However, 
over time and with much effort, implementation grew stronger and Jobcentre Plus was able to 
deliver the core elements of the model. As this chapter has shown, substantially higher proportions 
of working ERA participants were engaged with Jobcentre Plus and received advancement-related 
assistance while employed, compared with their control group counterparts. 
Important differences emerged across the three target groups in how participants engaged with 
ERA and viewed advancement. Working ND25+ participants were the most reluctant to maintain 
contact with Jobcentre Plus and, consequently, received the lowest levels of in-work help, compared 
with working participants in the two lone parent target groups. Given their history of long-term 
unemployment, it appears that many in the ND25+ group were more interested in securing a stable, 
permanent position than in advancement and were guided more by an ethos of self-reliance. 
Many NDLP participants who re-entered work during ERA expressed a desire to become comfortable 
with new routines for balancing work and family responsibilities before focusing on advancement. 
Consequently, ERA advisers often focused on early work-adjustment issues like childcare 
arrangements and assistance with changes in benefits and tax credits. Lone parents with younger 
children, in particular, were more hesitant to take on full-time employment, despite the offer of 
the retention bonus for sustained full-time work. Instead, they sought employment they could 
flexibly balance with childcare and school hours. Similarly, lone parents had more challenges 
accommodating training, given their childcare and other family responsibilities, although many of 
them did take it up. 
The WTC group included lone parents who were further along in their work journeys and 
theoretically more receptive to work progression. Advisory staff noted that WTC programme 
group participants had fewer employment retention issues and were generally more receptive to 
advancement support. As a group, they were more prepared to commit to full-time work when they 
entered ERA and more interested in training. 
The different background characteristics of the NDLP, WTC, and ND25+ target groups and 
their different orientations to work, advancement, and training suggest that the effects of the 
programme on their labour market outcomes may vary as well. The next few chapters explore ERA’s 
impacts for each of the three groups separately, beginning with the two lone parent groups. 
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4 Impacts of ERA on labour  
 market and other outcomes  
 for lone parents (NDLP and  
 WTC)
Box 4.1 Chapter 4 at a glance
• For the New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) target group, the Employment Retention and 
Advancement (ERA) programme increased employment and earnings during the period of 
ERA eligibility and reduced receipt of Income Support. However, these effects did not last.
• For the Working Tax Credit (WTC) target group, ERA had no effects on employment or receipt 
of Income Support, but it increased earnings during the period of ERA eligibility. Again, these 
effects did not last. 
• ERA increased short-term earnings largely by causing participants to work longer hours, but 
it had few other effects on employment retention or advancement for either the NDLP or the 
WTC groups. 
• ERA increased participation in training during the first two years of the follow-up period for 
both target groups, especially for the WTC group, but it did not increase receipt of training-
related qualifications. 
• ERA reduced receipt of Income Support benefits among the NDLP group.
• ERA had little overall effect on most measures of child and family well-being for the two 
target groups.
4.1 Introduction
The ERA programme’s central goals were to help its participants remain employed and, over time, 
achieve better positions and compensation. This chapter shows how successful ERA was in achieving 
those goals for each of the two lone parent target groups. It should be noted that the lone parents 
included in the study were positively inclined towards work at the start of the programme. Those 
who were not employed at the time of random assignment had demonstrated their interest in 
working simply by having volunteered for the NDLP welfare-to-work programme. Those receiving 
WTC at the time of random assignment were already employed and seeking help from ERA to 
advance. 
The ERA evaluation’s report on the programme’s first-year impacts93 provided the first evidence of 
the effects of ERA on a range of outcomes that included employment, earnings, welfare benefits, 
and training. The report on second-year impacts built on those early results, covering the first two 
years after random assignment and a broader set of outcome measures.94 The main findings from 
these previous reports showed that, for the NDLP group, ERA increased earnings and employment – 
93 Dorsett et	al., 2007.
94 Riccio et	al., 2008.
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particularly full-time employment – and reduced the number of months receiving Income Support. 
For the WTC group, ERA increased hours worked, leading to an increase in earnings in the second 
year. For the WTC group, ERA had no significant effects on benefits receipt.
The findings considered in this chapter build on these earlier results, extending the period over which 
outcomes are considered to cover five years after random assignment. This allows more opportunity 
to assess the effects on employment retention95 and advancement.
These longer-term results are also important because they address, for the first time, whether ERA 
had any sustained impact beyond the period of ERA participation. Since participation could last 
for up to 33 months, the results include the effects of ERA for at least two years after participants 
exited the programme.96 This extended follow-up period makes it possible to assess whether ERA’s 
combination of financial incentives and adviser support has begun to lift people out of the ‘low-pay, 
no-pay’ cycle.
The analysis uses administrative records data to estimate key impacts on labour market and 
benefit outcomes. It also uses data from the customer surveys to reinforce and complement the 
administrative data results and to estimate effects on the receipt of relevant services and on other 
outcomes that cannot be measured with administrative data, such as impacts on child and family 
well-being. 
It is important to keep in mind the important distinctions between the NDLP and WTC groups. NDLP 
lone parents were out of work or working fewer than 16 hours per week at the time of random 
assignment. Therefore, they began ERA by receiving pre-employment services from the New Deal 
programme designed for lone parents. As Chapter 3 explained, this programme generally offered 
them the same kind of help to find work as the regular New Deal programme offered to the NDLP 
control group. Only those ERA participants who got jobs entered the post-employment phase 
(from which the control group was excluded).The WTC participants, who were already working 
16 to 29 hours per week, entered the post-employment phase immediately; consequently, ERA 
was an entirely post-employment programme for them. WTC sample members were also a more 
advantaged group than NDLP participants on a variety of background characteristics associated with 
success in the labour market, as Chapter 2 showed. Thus, ERA might affect each of these two lone 
parent target groups differently.
Throughout the chapter, the presentation focuses first on the NDLP group and then on the WTC 
group. Intuitively, there is some appeal to viewing the NDLP and WTC sample members as related, 
in the sense that one could envisage a particular trajectory for a lone parent, who would begin 
by taking the first step towards re-entering the labour market with the help of the New Deal 
programme, and then move onto a part-time job and qualify for the WTC – thus entering the 
status that the WTC participants had when they began ERA. Seen in this way, the WTC group 
might be viewed as the NDLP group slightly further down the line. This is far from being a precise 
interpretation, of course, since many in the WTC group would never have participated in the New 
Deal programme, and some New Deal participants may never work. Nevertheless, viewing the effect 
on the NDLP and WTC lone parents in tandem may offer a rough feel for how ERA might affect 
outcomes for lone parents after they become more established in work.
95 ‘Retention’ is used as shorthand for ‘employment retention’ – that is, remaining in work, 
whether or not an individual remains in the same job.
96 While the maximum period of eligibility was 33 months, eligibility for certain elements of ERA 
ended before that for some individuals. For example, some participants received all six of the 
retention bonuses to which they were entitled before the 33-month point, but they continued 
to be eligible for adviser support. In practice, however, most individuals did not receive all six of 
their bonuses, so the full 33 months of ERA eligibility applied.
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4.2 ERA’s impacts on work and earnings
This section presents ERA’s labour market effects for lone parents, first for the NDLP group and then 
for the WTC group. The main results are based on outcomes taken from administrative data, but 
these are supplemented with findings based on data from the customer surveys. The strengths and 
weaknesses of administrative data compared with survey data are outlined in Box 4.2. 
In general, the survey data are used cautiously in this analysis due to the existence of some 
response bias, especially in the year 5 survey wave.97 
Box 4.2 Comparing administrative records data and survey data
Relative to survey data, administrative records data have the advantage of being available 
for all participants in the ERA experiment and do not suffer from non-response bias or recall 
error. However, they also have some weaknesses relative to survey data. First, survey data 
are richer and permit outcomes to be considered that are not available in the administrative 
data. Prominent examples include hours worked and job characteristics. Second, survey data 
can capture a broader range of employment types. Administrative data cover only individuals 
whose employers participate in the Pay As You Earn (PAYE) system (a method of paying 
income tax whereby the employee receives wages with the tax already deducted by the 
employer). Self-employment is not captured, and many employees who earn less than the PAYE 
threshold are not covered. More information on the extent of under-coverage of employment 
in the administrative records is provided in Appendix A, but, despite these limitations, the 
administrative records are deemed a more reliable data source than survey data for measuring 
ERA’s main effects on employment and earnings. 
4.2.1 Labour market outcomes for the NDLP control group 
Outcomes for the control group are the benchmark used to judge the effects of ERA because they 
represent what would have happened to the ERA group in the absence of the programme. Figure 4.1 
shows the proportion of those in the NDLP control group who were employed in each month of the 
five years following random assignment. The proportion employed rose fairly rapidly over the first 
three months, from an initial level of 20.4 per cent. From about a year after random assignment, the 
proportion stabilised at around 40 per cent. Therefore, without ERA, two-fifths of the NDLP group 
would have worked in any given month. The fact that the proportion employed at any time during 
the follow-up period – 79 per cent – is considerably higher than the proportion in work in any given 
month indicates that many controls entered work but did not work consistently. In fact, nearly 
half of those who had worked at some point were not employed in month 60.98 This evidence is 
suggestive of the degree of employment instability within the NDLP target group.
This finding is of considerable interest, since it shows the extent to which lone parents wishing to 
enter employment are successful in achieving sustained work. This represents the baseline situation 
against which the success of ERA is measured. It captures one dimension of the ‘low pay, no pay’ 
cycle that ERA attempted to overcome. The other dimension to this cycle relates to the earnings that 
those in work are able to achieve. This is less straightforward to observe from administrative data, 
where information on earnings is available only by tax year, and hours of work are not recorded. 
Ideally, one would examine the ‘low-pay, no-pay’ cycle by considering movements in and out of 
employment alongside hourly wages when working. 
97 The response bias issue is discussed in detail in Appendix A.
98 Using the information from Figure 4.1: (.79-.415)/.79 = .475.
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It should be noted that the timing of random assignment (October 2003 to December 2004) is 
such that the five-year follow-up period encompasses the onset of the recession (second quarter 
of 2008). In view of this, it is notable that the control group employment rate remains steady over 
time, even in the later follow-up months. This may be explained, at least in part, by the fact that the 
NDLP group is predominantly (95 per cent) female. A feature of the recent recession is that, up until 
the second quarter of 2010 (the latest period for which outcomes are considered in this report), the 
reduction in the national employment rate was driven almost entirely by the fall in the proportion of 
men in work; women’s employment remained comparatively steady, as shown in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2 Employment by age and gender for all customers
4.2.2 ERA’s impacts on work and earnings for the NDLP target group
For NDLP participants, ERA’s pre-employment component in theory could differ from the pre-
employment services the control group received in two ways that could affect their employment 
outcomes. First, ERA advisers could encourage participants to hold out for better jobs that offered 
more potential for advancement. Narrowing the scope of jobs sought in this way could have delayed 
the time it took ERA participants to enter work, compared with the control group. However, the 
evaluation could find little evidence that advisers systematically offered such advice.99 
More important is the possibility that simply offering the ERA retention bonus would alter the types 
of jobs sought. Because the retention bonus was payable only for full-time work (defined as 30 or 
more hours per week), ERA would be expected to prompt individuals to favour such jobs over part-
99 Dorsett et	al., 2007, pp64-65.
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time positions. At the same time, because the bonus rewarded any type of full-time work, it might 
encourage individuals to take jobs that they might otherwise have regarded as too poorly paid. This 
would expand the pool of jobs deemed acceptable and thereby speed up the job search process.
Table 4.1 summarises ERA’s actual employment effects, based on administrative records data.
(See Box 4.3 for information on how to read the impact tables in this report.) It shows that ERA had 
no impact on the probability that NDLP lone parents would enter work in the first follow-up year, 
but that it had a small positive and statistically significant effect of 2.2 percentage points (a gain 
of about four per cent above the control group average) in year 2. This impact was not sustained; 
in later years, there were no statistically significant employment effects. Nor did ERA increase the 
number of months worked in any year. NDLP lone parents in ERA worked an average of about five 
months in each follow-up year, as did those in the control group.
Table 4.1 Effects of ERA on employment and earnings within five years  
 after random assignment, NDLP target group
Outcome
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Difference 
(impact) P-value
Ever employed during (%)
Year 1 57.1 56.5 0.6 0.618
Year 2 57.8 55.6 2.2 * 0.066
Year 3 53.7 53.8 -0.2 0.895
Year 4 53.2 54.0 -0.8 0.507
Year 5 52.9 53.9 -1.0 0.420
Years 1-5 79.0 79.0 -0.1 0.940
Average number of months employed during
Year 1 4.6 4.5 0.0 0.677
Year 2 5.1 5.1 0.1 0.555
Year 3 5.1 5.1 0.0 0.799
Year 4 5.1 5.2 -0.1 0.658
Year 5 5.1 5.2 -0.1 0.556
Years 1-5 25.1 25.0 0.0 0.969
Employed during month 24 (%) 42.5 41.4 1.1 0.334
Employed during month 36 (%) 42.8 42.6 0.2 0.893
Employed during month 48 (%) 42.7 43.0 -0.3 0.769
Employed during month 60 (%) 41.5 43.4 -1.9 0.103
Average earnings during 2005-2006 tax year (£) 3,862 3,554 308 ** 0.021
Average earnings during 2006-2007 tax year (£) 4,032 3,883 150 0.310
Average earnings during 2007-2008 tax year (£) 4,387 4,271 116 0.475
Average earnings during 2008-2009 tax year (£) 4,999 5,033 -35 0.844
Average 4-year earnings during 2005-2009 tax years (£) 17,280 16,742 538 0.325
Employed during 2005-2006 tax year (%) 54.6 52.1 2.4 ** 0.040
Employed during 2006-2007 tax year (%) 49.7 49.6 0.1 0.901
Employed during 2007-2008 tax year (%) 49.6 48.5 1.1 0.355
Employed during 2008-2009 tax year (%) 52.5 53.0 -0.5 0.659
Average number of employment spells 0.9 0.8 0.1 *** 0.004
Average number of non-employment spells 1.2 1.1 0.0 ** 0.029
Average number of months to first employment 20.1 20.6 -0.5 0.364
Average duration of first employment (months) 17.8 18.5 -0.7 0.166
(continued)
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Table 4.1 Continued
Outcome
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Difference 
(impact) P-value
Time to first employment (%)
Employed in month of RAa 25.7 25.3 0.3 0.734
1 to 6 months 24.6 22.9 1.7 * 0.094
7 to 12 months 8.1 9.1 -1.0 0.137
13 to 24 months 10.0 9.3 0.7 0.349
Greater than 24 months 10.6 12.4 -1.8 ** 0.020
Never employed in first 60 months 21.0 21.0 0.1 0.940
Sample size = 6,787 3,365 3,422
SOURCES: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment records.
NOTES: Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment characteristics of 
sample members.
 Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
 Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the control group. Statistical 
significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent.
 Includes all customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005.
 aRA refers to random assignment.
Box 4.3 How to read the impact tables in this report 
Most impact tables in this report use a similar format, illustrated below. The example below 
shows a series of employment outcomes for the ERA group and the control group for the WTC 
group. It shows how many hours members of both the ERA group and the control group worked 
at month 60. For example, about 43 (43.1) per cent of ERA group members and about 36 (36.1) 
per cent of control group members worked 30 or more hours per week at month 60. 
Because individuals were assigned randomly either to the ERA programme or to the control 
group, the effects of the programme can be estimated by the difference in outcomes between 
the two groups. The ‘Difference’ column in the table shows the difference between the two 
groups on several outcomes. These differences represent the programme’s impact on various 
outcomes. For example, the impact on working 30 or more hours per week at month 60 can be 
calculated by subtracting 36.1 from 43.1, yielding 7 percentage points. Thus, ERA increased the 
likelihood that people would work 30 or more hours per week.
Differences marked with asterisks are ‘statistically significant’, meaning that it is quite unlikely 
that the differences arose by chance. The number of asterisks indicates whether the impact is 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, or 10 per cent level (the lower the level, the 
less likely that the impact is due to chance). For example, as shown below, the ERA programme 
had a statistically significant impact of 7 percentage points at the 1 per cent level on customers 
working 30 hours or more. (One asterisk corresponds to the 10 per cent level; two asterisks, the 
5 per cent level; and three asterisks, the 1 per cent level.) The P-value indicates the probability 
that the difference arose by chance.
Some measures in Chapter 4 are shown in italics and are considered ‘non-experimental’ 
because they include only a subset of the full report sample. For example, because workers in 
the ERA group may have different characteristics than workers in the control group, differences 
in these outcomes between those workers may not be attributable to the ERA programme. 
Statistical significance tests are not conducted for these measures. 
(continued)
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Box 4.3 Continued  
Outcome ERA group Control group Difference 
(impact)
P-value
Hours worked per week at  
month 60 (%)
Did not work 17.0 16.9 0.1 0.985
1 to 15 hours 2.3 3.6 -1.3 0.107
16 to 29 hours 37.7 43.3 -5.6 ** 0.013
30 or more hours 43.1 36.1 7 *** 0.002
Average	weekly	hours	among	workers	
at	month	60 28.4 27.2
 
In interpreting the dissipation of the year 2 employment impacts, it is helpful to note that the ERA 
group and the control group each saw its employment rate drop in the subsequent year to a level 
that was roughly the same, and their rates remained similar to each other’s through to the end of 
the follow-up period. Thus, the ERA group’s early gain went away as their employment rate fell back 
to the normal trajectory demonstrated by the control group.
Turning next to ERA’s effects on earnings, it is important to note that the relationship between 
impacts on employment rates and impacts on average earnings is not necessarily straightforward. 
While an increase in employment will typically increase earnings, this may not always be true. For 
example, in theory, ERA could have caused some individuals to work more hours, but at a lower 
wage than they would have accepted otherwise. This could result if the combination of earnings 
and the retention bonus left them better off, such that they might have been willing to accept 
lower-paying full-time positions, or because the lower-paying jobs had attractive characteristics 
(e.g., perhaps they were more conveniently located or offered better employment benefits). For such 
individuals, the effect on earnings might be small or even negative. Alternatively, for individuals who 
would otherwise have worked in excess of 30 hours per week, the availability of the retention bonus 
under ERA might have allowed them to achieve the same level of income while working fewer hours 
(although still more than 30). If they chose to reduce their hours to a level closer to the retention 
bonus threshold, the effect on earnings is likely to be negative. It is also possible for a programme 
to produce positive earnings impacts with little or no effect on the rate of employment. This could 
occur, for example, if the programme caused individuals who would have worked at least some 
hours even in the absence of the programme to work more hours and/or helped them secure better-
paying jobs than they would otherwise have gotten. 
Table 4.1 also shows ERA’s actual effects on earnings. (These earnings do not include ERA retention 
bonus payments.) ERA increased earnings in the 2005-2006 tax year by an estimated £308. 
This represents an increase of about nine per cent of the control group’s average earnings and is 
statistically significant. The impact is smaller in later tax years and never statistically significant.
The impact on total cumulative earnings over the four-year follow-up period is fairly small and not 
statistically significant.
In considering these impacts, it should be noted that while the 2005-2006 tax year relates to a 
period entirely within the 33-month ERA participation period for nearly all individuals, ERA eligibility 
ended for many during the 2006-2007 tax year.100 This means that earnings in the 2005-2006 tax 
100 See Figure 2.1 for the details of how programme years and tax years compare.
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year capture impacts during ERA participation, while the 2006-2007 earnings reflect a mixture of 
post-ERA impacts and ongoing ERA participation impacts. In 2007-2008, the proportion for whom 
ERA was still continuing was smaller still, while 2008-2009 outcomes relate to a period after ERA 
eligibility in all cases.
Earnings information can also be used to examine employment effects by tax year. Here, individuals 
are regarded as employed in a tax year if they are recorded as having positive earnings in that year. 
This provides a helpful means of giving employment impacts for the same period of time for which 
the earnings impacts are estimated. Table 4.1 shows a statistically significant positive impact in 
the 2005-2006 tax year of 2.4 percentage points (4.6 per cent) but no significant effects in later tax 
years. This mirrors the pattern of impacts on earnings. 
It is in line with expectations that the earnings effects of ERA should be greatest during the 
period of eligibility. Earnings effects are of interest in their own right, but also reveal the effect of 
ERA on hours. To see this, note that earnings effects can be caused by increased employment, 
increased hours worked, or increased wages. The fact that the earnings effect in 2005-2006 was, 
in percentage terms, about double the employment effect in that same year, suggests that the 
earnings gain was driven in part by those in the ERA group working more hours or receiving a higher 
wage. It is not possible to state definitively, based on administrative data, which of these two 
explanations is likely to dominate. However, intuitively, there are reasons to believe that the higher 
hours were chiefly responsible. This is for two reasons. First, expecting ERA to have had an effect 
on advancement and the hourly wage individuals could attract as early as 2005-2006 is perhaps 
unrealistic. Second, ERA explicitly offered an incentive for increased hours, and it is plausible that 
lone parents entering work responded to this incentive. In addition, early survey data, presented in a 
previous report on ERA, show that there were increases in the proportion of the sample that worked 
full time.
In trying to understand why the 2005-2006 earnings effect disappeared, it is helpful to consider 
the year-to-year earnings trends of the programme and control groups. As Table 4.1 shows, both 
groups saw their earnings increase in each tax year over the previous tax year. In fact, for both 
groups, average earnings in tax year 2008-2009 were higher than they were in tax year 2005-
2006 by amounts that exceeded what would have been expected from inflation alone. However, 
although the ERA group earned more than the control group early on, the control group’s pace of 
improvement quickened, and the ERA group did not sustain its advantage. By the end of the follow-
up period, both groups were earning about the same on average – but still more than they had been 
previously.
4.2.3 ERA’s impacts on work and earnings for the WTC target group
Figure 4.3 shows monthly employment rates for the WTC control group. Nearly all members of the 
control group worked at some point during the five-year follow-up period, reflecting the fact that the 
tax credit is conditioned on working. (The true employment rate may have been somewhat higher; 
as previously noted, administrative records data do not capture all employment.) Furthermore, 
the proportion in work remained fairly stable at a fairly high rate, usually exceeding 60 per cent. 
Nonetheless, this rate is lower than the proportion ever in work during the follow-up period, 
indicating some movement in and out of the labour market even among this group. 
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Because all WTC participants should have been employed at the time of random assignment, it is 
not surprising that ERA did not increase the proportion ever employed during the follow-up period 
(see Table 4.2). However, ERA also had no effect on this group’s probability of being employed in any 
given month (see Figure 4.4). Nor did it increase their average number of months employed. WTC 
participants in ERA worked an average of roughly 7.5 months in each follow-up year, which is about 
the same as the average for the control group. 
Figure 4.4 ERA group and control group employment rate trends over the first  
 five years after random assignment, WTC target group
Impacts of ERA on labour market and other outcomes for lone parents (NDLP and WTC)
Statistically significant at the 10 per cent level =  ; 5 per cent or 1 per cent =  
ERA group =  Control group =  
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment records. 
NOTES: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
 Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and 
the control group. 
 A white diamond on the axis indicates that the impact is statistically significant at the 
10 per cent level. A black diamond on the axis indicates that the impact is statistically 
significant at the 5 per cent or 1 per cent level.
 These figures include some months before the time of random assignment. Months 
before random assignment are indicated with a negative sign.
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Table 4.2 also shows employment based on tax-year earnings information. As in the case of the 
NDLP group, according to this measure, individuals were regarded as employed in a tax year if they 
had any recorded earnings in that year. The results show no statistically significant effects, although 
the difference in the 2005-2006 tax year of 2.3 percentage points is close to statistical significance 
(p-value =.127).
Table 4.2 shows that ERA increased earnings in the 2005-2006 tax year by an estimated £402. This 
represents a statistically significant increase of about six per cent over the control group average. 
However, ERA produced no statistically significant earnings gains in other tax years or for the full 
follow-up period. It should be recalled that the earnings impact in the 2005-2006 tax year reflects 
impacts during ERA participation for all participants; increasing proportions of sample members 
exited the programme after that year.
The combination of no statistically significant employment effect with a positive earnings effect 
early in the follow-up period suggests that ERA either increased wage rates or hours worked for the 
WTC group. An increase in hours worked would appear to offer the more likely explanation (as is 
true for NDLP participants). The evaluation’s report on two-year impacts offers some support for this 
conclusion, with survey data showing that ERA caused a statistically significant shift from part-time 
to full-time work for the WTC group. 101
Table 4.2 Effects of ERA on employment and earnings within five years  
 after random assignment, WTC target group
Outcome
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Difference 
(impact) P-value
Ever employed during (%)
Year 1 77.0 76.6 0.4 0.780
Year 2 74.1 73.4 0.8 0.649
Year 3 71.2 69.9 1.3 0.454
Year 4 71.3 70.1 1.2 0.470
Year 5 68.6 68.2 0.3 0.849
Years 1-5 88.1 86.8 1.3 0.293
Average number of months employed during
Year 1 8.1 8.1 0.0 0.949
Year 2 7.8 7.7 0.1 0.697
Year 3 7.6 7.5 0.0 0.844
Year 4 7.6 7.5 0.0 0.815
Year 5 7.4 7.4 0.0 0.895
Years 1-5 38.5 38.3 0.2 0.860
Employed during month 24 (%) 64.2 62.9 1.3 0.460
Employed during month 36 (%) 64.1 62.2 1.8 0.315
Employed during month 48 (%) 63.2 63.5 -0.3 0.866
Employed during month 60 (%) 60.6 60.9 -0.3 0.867
Average earnings during 2005-2006 tax year (£) 7,069 6,667 402 ** 0.045
Average earnings during 2006-2007 tax year (£) 7,408 7,071 337 0.145
Average earnings during 2007-2008 tax year (£) 7,502 7,555 -53 0.840
Average earnings during 2008-2009 tax year (£) 8,636 8,401 234 0.401
Average 4-year earnings during 2005-2009 tax years (£) 30,615 29,695 921 0.279
(continued)
101 Riccio et	al., 2008.
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Table 4.2 Continued
Outcome
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Difference 
(impact) P-value
Employed during 2005-2006 tax year (%) 81.9 79.6 2.3 0.127
Employed during 2006-2007 tax year (%) 76.8 76.0 0.8 0.615
Employed during 2007-2008 tax year (%) 70.7 73.0 -2.3 0.177
Employed during 2008-2009 tax year (%) 75.6 74.7 0.9 0.562
Average number of employment spells 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.284
Average number of non-employment spells 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.669
Average number of months to first employment 11.0 11.5 -0.5 0.544
Average duration of first employment (months) 32.6 32.6 0.0 0.964
Time to first employment (%)
Employed in month of RAa 67.6 67.6 0.0 0.995
1 to 6 months 6.6 6.0 0.6 0.477
7 to 12 months 3.1 3.6 -0.5 0.462
13 to 24 months 4.1 3.3 0.8 0.243
Greater than 24 months 6.6 6.3 0.3 0.714
Never employed in first 60 months 11.9 13.2 -1.3 0.293
Sample size = 2,815 1,415 1,400
SOURCES: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment records.
NOTES: Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment characteristics of 
sample members.
 Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
 Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the control group. Statistical 
significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent.
 Includes all customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005.
 aRA refers to random assignment.
4.2.4 Alternative tests of ERA’s labour market effects using survey data
The results discussed so far are based on administrative data. This section presents complementary 
estimates based on survey data, all of which relate to the time of interview or the fifth year after 
random assignment.102 
Results	for	the	NDLP	target	group	
Table 4.3 shows that about 66 per cent of the NDLP control group respondents to the year 5 survey 
said that they had worked at some point during the fifth year following random assignment. This is a 
higher level than that observed using administrative data (Table 4.1), but the rate for the ERA group 
is similar, and ERA produced no statistically significant difference on this measure. This is consistent 
with the finding based on administrative data of no long-run employment impact. Similarly, about 
57 per cent of the ERA group and the control group said that they were employed at the time of the 
interview.
102 Outcomes referred to as relating to the 60-month point are more accurately described 
as outcomes relating to the time of the final survey, which took place on roughly the fifth 
anniversary of randomisation (i.e., about 60 months later), which was actually sooner for 
some respondents and later for others, depending on when they completed the interview.
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Nor does it appear based on the survey data that ERA substantially increased the tendency to work 
more hours per week in the long run. Among all respondents (including those working zero hours), 
participants in the ERA group worked 15.6 hours per week at the end of the five-year follow-up 
period, compared with 15.1 hours per week among the controls. A little over a quarter of both the 
ERA group and the control group worked full time (30 or more hours per week) in month 60.
Total average earnings in year 5 were about £6,000 for the control group. Although those in the ERA 
group earned on average £450 more than this in year 5, the difference is not statistically significant.
Results	for	the	WTC	target	group
There were no differences in employment rates at the time of the year 5 survey interview. 
Approximately 83 per cent of respondents were working when they were interviewed. This is nearly 
15 percentage points higher than the rates observed in the administrative records for the same time 
period.103 
As shown in Table 4.3, it appears that ERA may have had a small long-run effect on work hours 
among the WTC group. On average, those in the ERA group worked 23.6 hours per week at the time 
of the five-year survey, compared with 22.6 hours per week among the control group; a difference 
that is very close to being statistically significant.104 Looked at another way, ERA increased the 
probability of working full time (that is, 30 or more hours per week) by nearly seven percentage 
points at the time of the survey interview. While these results might seem difficult to reconcile with 
the lack of a significant effect on earnings, it may be that ERA produced a shift in work hours from 
just below 30 hours to just above the 30-hour mark. Such a minor shift might be insufficient to 
generate an impact on earnings.105 
Despite the increase in work hours, there was no evidence of an effect on weekly wages at the 
time of the survey interview. In addition, ERA had no effect on wage rates. Overall, these results are 
consistent with the results discussed in the two-year report: ERA’s effect on earnings for the WTC 
group was mostly due to the increase in the percentage of workers who worked full time, which was 
most likely driven by the ERA retention bonus, as it was contingent on full-time work. 
103 Year 5 measures are not shown in Table 4.3 for the WTC group because many WTC group 
members did not have five full years of follow-up from survey data. 
104 The p-value in Table 4.3 falls slightly below the threshold of statistical significance, but appears 
as .100 due to rounding. 
105 In considering this result, one should also bear in mind that the survey outcomes were 
measured for a sample that experienced earnings impacts, according to administrative records 
data, that were larger than the impacts measured with those same data for the full sample, as 
discussed in Appendix A.
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4.3 ERA’s impacts on employment dynamics and job  
 characteristics
The preceding analysis has shown the overall effect of ERA over the five years following random 
assignment. This section takes a closer look at ERA’s effects on a variety of measures concerning 
employment dynamics and features of jobs that are relevant to retention and advancement. These 
include the following:
• The number of employment spells, which reflects the amount of movement from job to job. 
This could signal advancement if changing jobs were motivated by progression, but it could also 
indicate employment instability.
• The number of spells of non-employment, which reflect periods when lone parents may be at 
greater likelihood of returning to benefits after having found work. 
• The amount of time taken to find employment, which is the first step towards advancement for 
unemployed lone parents. 
• The duration of first employment, which, depending on the reason for leaving the job, could 
reflect either success in keeping a job, or quicker progression to a new job with better prospects.
• The amount of time spent in continuous employment, which is a more direct measure of 
employment retention. 
• The characteristics of jobs, which can help show whether the pay and conditions of work reflect 
advancement. 
Information on job characteristics comes from survey data. All the other measures are based on 
administrative records data. 
4.3.1 ERA’s impacts on employment dynamics
Results	for	the	NDLP	target	group
Table 4.1 shows that ERA caused statistically significant, but small, increases in the number of 
employment spells and in the number of non-employment spells experienced by those in the NDLP 
group.106 Neither of these patterns suggests that the programme caused a major change in the 
likelihood of cycling in and out of work. ERA also had no statistically significant effect on the amount 
of time it took ERA participants to begin working after random assignment,107 or on the duration of 
first employment. 
Results	for	the	WTC	target	group
Retention was a less important challenge than advancement for the WTC group, compared with 
the NDLP group. Approximately 70 per cent of WTC control group members worked in any given 
year, according to the administrative data. Employment rates were highest in year 1, but did not fall 
106 Relative to someone who does not enter work, an individual who starts an employment 
spell will be recorded as having an additional employment spell. Should that spell not last, 
the individual will return to non-employment and therefore be recorded also as having an 
additional non-employment spell.
107 Table 4.1 also shows that ERA increased by 1.7 percentage points the proportion of people 
finding work within six months, but this was offset by a corresponding reduction in the 
proportion of people entering work after more than two years.
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substantially in subsequent years. Furthermore, WTC control group members were much more likely 
(by about half) to experience a spell of non-employment than were NDLP control group members.
Table 4.2 shows that ERA had no effect on the number of employment spells, the number of non-
employment spells, the number of months to first employment, or the average duration of first 
employment.108 
4.3.2 ERA’s impacts on job characteristics
Results	for	the	NDLP	target	group
Advancement is a complex concept whose interpretation is partly subjective.109 The outcomes 
considered in Table 4.4, which are based on survey data, reflect particular dimensions of job 
quality, including job stability, responsibilities, fringe benefits (broadly defined), participants’ own 
assessment of their jobs, and employment costs. The overriding impression from the results is that 
ERA had little effect on these dimensions of advancement. 
Results	for	the	WTC	target	group
Table 4.4 considers a number of aspects of individuals’ jobs. Looking at the control group outcomes, 
it is clear that most WTC group members had permanent jobs (88.8 per cent) and most worked 
during daytime hours (nearly 80 per cent). Nearly seven per cent of WTC control group members 
were self-employed. These participants’ employment records would not be captured in the 
administrative records data.
WTC control group members had better jobs compared with NDLP control group members across 
a range of job characteristics. For example, nearly 21 per cent of WTC control group members 
had supervisory positions, a majority had at least some types of employment benefits, and WTC 
control group members were nearly 20 percentage points more likely to report that they liked their 
job a great deal, compared with the NDLP control group. These differences are not surprising, as 
WTC group members entered the study with higher educational credentials, more employment 
experience, and older children, compared with the NDLP control group. 
As was the case with the NDLP group, there is little evidence that ERA improved job quality. 
Overall, it had little effect on job stability, fringe benefits, or individuals’ attitudes towards their 
jobs. One exception is that ERA increased the percentage who received a promotion or increase 
in responsibility by a statistically significant 3.8 percentage points (which represents a 16 per cent 
increase over the control group average). In addition, ERA increased the proportion of programme 
group members who had sick pay benefits by 3.7 percentage points.
108 Readers may wonder why the average months to first employment were 11.5 for WTC control 
group members when all were supposed to be working. This is because administrative records 
do not record all work. In particular, those who are working less than 16 hours each week are 
not always recorded in administrative records. Thus, for many, this measure may record the 
months until they first worked 16 hours or more each week. If sample members never worked 
in jobs covered by the administrative records, their value was set to 60: the last month of the 
five-year follow-up period.
109 Appendix D explores the question of how sample members defined advancement from a 
qualitative perspective. See also Hoggart et	al., 2006.
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4.4 ERA’s impacts on training
This section assesses whether ERA had an impact on the amount of training taken by lone 
parents and on the qualifications they acquired. The ability of ERA to influence training activity is 
important as a potential mechanism for enhancing the prospects of lone parents advancing in 
work by developing their human capital. ERA was expected to induce training through two types of 
incentives. First, ERA staff could pay for participants’ tuition for training courses, up to a maximum 
of £1,000 per person for all courses, provided that participants took the courses while they were 
working 16 or more hours per week. Second, ERA participants could receive a training completion 
bonus. This incentive paid £8 for every hour of training completed, up to a maximum of £1,000 (or 
125 hours of completed training). Again, participants had to be working 16 or more hours per week 
to be eligible for the training completion bonus.
4.4.1 ERA’s impacts on training for the NDLP target group
Table 4.5 shows that ERA increased the likelihood that NDLP sample members took training by a 
statistically significant 4.8 percentage points during the first two years (while the ERA programme 
was operating). This was from a high base: 55.7 per cent of the control group participated in training 
or education at some point during these two years, even without ERA’s assistance. Impacts were 
not confined to training while out of work, since the results in Table 4.5 show an increase in the 
probability of combining work and training of 5.8 percentage points above a control group rate of 
29.6 per cent.110 
Table 4.5 also shows that training in the first two years was often arranged by Jobcentre Plus. ERA 
increased participation in such training by 7.3 percentage points. There is no evidence of an effect of 
this increased training on qualifications gained over the two-year period. 
ERA increased by 6.7 percentage points the probability of combining training or education with 
full-time work but had no effect on the probability of combining it with part-time work (Table 
4.5). Overall, it is striking that half of full-time workers in the programme group took on education 
or training while working full-time and that 40 per cent of those working part time did so. Also 
impressive are the high rates of training among employed control group members.111
The results in Table 4.6 show that ERA caused a small, but statistically, significant increase in the 
number of courses taken. Those in the ERA group who did participate in some training courses took 
an average of just under three courses over the two years, amounting to almost 270 hours spent in 
training. 
Years 3-5 mostly relate to the period after the ERA programme had ended.112 In years 3-5, ERA did 
not have an effect on most training measures. 
110 This does not imply directly that ERA increased training for those in work. It could equally 
be the case that employees are more likely to participate in training and that the observed 
increase in training while in work is simply capturing the increase in employment due to ERA. 
However, the same pattern is observed for the WTC group, for which there is no employment 
effect, thus supporting a conclusion that the ERA did directly increase training among those in 
work.
111 Because the types of people who worked full time in the programme group may differ in 
systematic ways from those who worked full time in the control group, comparing these two 
groups of workers does not yield a pure experimental impact estimate. For this reason, the 
difference in training between these two groups is not presented as an impact in Table 4.5.
112 Roughly three-quarters of the months of follow-up in years 3-5 were in the post-programme 
period.
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4.4.2 ERA’s impacts on training for the WTC target group
In the first two years after random assignment, while the ERA programme was operational, ERA’s 
effect on training was stronger for the WTC group (compared with the NDLP group). Table 4.5 shows 
that, while the WTC control group’s participation in training or education over the two years was only 
somewhat higher (at 59.6 per cent) than the rate among the NDLP control group (55.7 per cent), 
ERA’s impact of 12.6 percentage points was considerably larger. ERA’s impact on the WTC group’s 
likelihood of combining training and employment is sizeable and statistically significant in each of 
the first two years after random assignment (13.3 percentage points in year 1, and 11.7 percentage 
points in year 2). The role of Jobcentre Plus is very strongly evident. Participation in training arranged 
by Jobcentre Plus was almost non-existent among the control group. ERA increased such training by 
nearly 20 percentage points. 
Table 4.5 also shows that ERA increased the proportion of WTC participants who combined training 
with full-time work by 14.2 percentage points. In addition, in contrast to the findings for the NDLP 
participants, it also produced a statistically significant, though small, impact on the proportion 
that combined training with part-time work (3.7 percentage points). The fact that this impact is 
found despite the marked shift away from part-time work that was brought about by ERA strongly 
suggests that ERA acted to encourage training among those in work. Further supporting this 
inference is the finding that 74.2 per cent of full-time workers in the ERA group participated in 
education or training while working full time, compared with 55.3 per cent of full-time workers in the 
control group. For part-time workers, the corresponding levels are 64.8 per cent and 55.3 per cent.
In years 3-5, which mostly represent the post-ERA programme period, ERA had no effect on training. 
This pattern strongly suggests that in the post-ERA period, without ERA’s financial supports and 
incentives to train and advisory guidance, training rates went back to their long-term averages. It is 
not surprising that impacts on training rates would eventually fade, since many had trained earlier 
in the follow-up period. In fact, one might have expected the training impacts in the late follow-
up period to have become negative, if ERA’s only effect was to train earlier those who would have 
eventually trained anyway. Since this did not happen, it implies that ERA did have a lasting effect on 
training.
Whether ERA’s effects on training improved participants’ occupational skills is uncertain. Table 
4.5 shows that, as with the NDLP group, despite the increased course-taking, ERA did not produce 
statistically significant impacts on receipt of training or education qualifications during the earlier 
or later stages of the follow-up period (although the effect on receipt of ‘other’ types of credentials, 
such as licences and certificates associated with occupationally relevant courses,is close to 
significant during the first two years of follow-up).113 It is possible that many of the additional 
courses taken by WTC programme group members did not have formal qualifications associated 
with them. Many ERA participants did obtain credentials during the follow-up period, but not at 
rates that exceeded the level for controls. Chapter 5 will discuss whether the short-term increases 
in training led to longer-term increases in earnings for certain subgroups and provide a summary of 
the ERA training report. However, based on the results presented in this chapter, it is clear that the 
increases in training experienced by the full WTC sample were not enough to lead to longer-term 
increases in earnings within the follow-up period available for this report.
113 The results concerning impacts on qualifications presented here differ from those presented 
in the ERA report on training, because the analysis in the report on training used a smaller 
sample limited to respondents who were interviewed in both of the first two survey waves.  
This was necessary due to the types of measures created for that report (Hendra et	al., 2011).
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Table 4.6 shows the effects of ERA on the number and duration of classes taken. Here again, most 
of the effects of ERA took place during the in-programme period (years 1-2). Those in the ERA group 
who undertook training enrolled in an average of three courses over the two-year period considered 
and spent an average of around 227 hours in courses. ERA increased the number of courses taken, 
but not the number of hours spent on courses. At the same time, ERA resulted in an additional 6.8 
weeks in which participants took part training. Taken together, the results appear to suggest that 
those in the WTC group reacted to ERA by taking more and shorter courses. 
The results for years 3-5 are similar to those for the NDLP target group. ERA had no effect on the 
number of courses WTC participants took or on the amount of time they spent in such courses. 
4.5 ERA’s impacts on taking steps towards advancement
In addition to assessing how much advancement participants achieved, it is useful to consider 
whether ERA influenced the particular steps individuals took to try to advance. These might include, 
for example, negotiating a pay rise or looking elsewhere for better employment. One might expect 
that advancement would be a more immediate concern for the WTC group than for the NDLP group 
and that NDLP participants would have a stronger focus on finding and sustaining employment 
(something already achieved for the most part by the WTC group). However, one might also expect 
NDLP participants to have become more interested in advancement once they had overcome the 
initial employment retention hurdle.
Chapter 3 showed that, among both the NDLP and WTC lone parents, those in the ERA group who 
worked were much more likely to receive in-work help or advice from Jobcentre Plus than those in 
the control group who worked, and that this advice was typically more frequent and provided by 
more specialised staff. The following sections consider whether, because of that assistance or any 
other programme features, ERA increased the likelihood that programme group members would 
subsequently take advancement steps (in addition to pursuing full-time work) to improve their jobs 
or earnings in the period three to five years after random assignment.114 
4.5.1 ERA’s impacts on advancement efforts for the NDLP target group
The top panel of Table 4.7 shows that among participants in the ERA group who ever worked within 
the five years following random assignment, 78 per cent reported taking at least one of a variety of 
steps to improve their work situation or earnings. Moreover, 31 per cent actively looked for another 
job while working. These rates did not differ substantially from the rates observed for workers in the 
control group (81 per cent and 27 per cent, respectively).
The bottom panel of Table 4.7 shows ERA’s impacts on the extent to which all participants in the 
programme group were in work and taking steps to advance. It was not uncommon for those in 
the ERA group to take steps to help improve their work situation or earnings; 45 per cent did so. 
However, ERA had no significant effect on this outcome. 
It is interesting to note that the ERA evaluation’s report on second-year impacts found statistically 
significant impacts of ERA on a number of advancement activities.115 The main effects in this regard 
were to increase efforts to work more hours, to negotiate better terms, to find a different type of 
employment with the same employer, or to look for a better job with another employer. With regard 
to trying to find a better job elsewhere, ERA increased the use of a range of job search channels. 
These effects are small but statistically significant. However, over the last three years after random 
assignment, no such impacts are evident. This pattern of results is consistent with the impression 
that the ERA programme had a short-term impact that subsequently faded away.
114 Riccio et	al.,2008, examines this issue for the first two years following random assignment.
115 Riccio et	al., 2008.
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4.5.2 ERA’s impacts on advancement efforts for the WTC target group
Workers in the WTC programme group were slightly more likely than those in the NDLP programme 
group to try to improve their lot in work. And, because more WTC participants overall were working, 
a higher proportion of the entire WTC group was focused on advancement. Table 4.7 (top panel) 
shows that almost 84 per cent of workers in the WTC ERA group took steps to improve their work 
situation or earnings while they were employed, and 32 per cent took steps to find another job. 
The bottom panel shows that ERA increased by a statistically significant 3.6 percentage points the 
proportion that took steps to improve their work situation or earnings. This is from a high starting 
point – two-thirds of the control group reported taking such steps. 
ERA spurred WTC participants’ efforts to increase their working hours and pay, and to find work with 
a different employer. It also increased the use of a range of job search channels, at least by a small 
amount. However, it did not increase efforts to find different work with the same employer. 
4.6 ERA’s impacts on benefits receipt
The aim of this section is to demonstrate the effect of ERA on benefits receipt based on 
administrative records data. In designing ERA, the expectation was that by encouraging lone parents 
to stay in work, work full time, and advance, over the long term they would have less need to rely on 
benefits. This section assesses whether, in the five years following random assignment, ERA actually 
had such effects. 
4.6.1 ERA’s impacts on benefits receipt for the NDLP target group
Lone parents in the NDLP group were all claiming Income Support at the time of random 
assignment. Table 4.8 shows that ERA reduced the number of months on Income Support by a small 
amount (0.3 months, which is a little over a week) in years 1 and 2 but not thereafter. Nor is the 
overall five-year effect statistically significant.
Figure 4.5 illustrates ERA’s month-by-month impacts on Income Support receipt. Monthly 
benefit receipt in the control group rate fell quickly in the first six months or so following random 
assignment and declined at a slower rate thereafter. From a starting point of 89 per cent in month 
one, 30 per cent were on benefit five years later. The ERA group followed a similar pattern but with a 
somewhat bigger reduction within the first two years, which is consistent with the pattern of ERA’s 
positive effects on full-time employment. 
ERA had a more lasting effect on the amount of benefit received. Here, significant reductions were 
seen in each of years 1, 2, and 3. Over all five years, those in the ERA group received almost £500 
less in Income Support than those in the control group, which is a statistically significant reduction 
of about five per cent relative to the control group average.
Table 4.8 also shows ERA’s effects on the receipt of other benefits. Jobseeker’s Allowance receipt 
was fairly uncommon among the NDLP group, with the average control group member receiving 
this benefit for only 1.5 months during the five-year follow-up period. ERA reduced this average 
somewhat for the programme group, yielding a statistically significant, but small, reduction of £60 
in the amount of Jobseeker’s Allowance received over five years. Incapacity Benefit was somewhat 
more common than Jobseeker’s Allowance, but ERA had no impact on receipt of this benefit. 
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Table 4.8 Continued
SOURCE:  MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study benefits receipt records.
NOTES: Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment characteristics of 
sample members.
 Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
 Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the control group. Statistical 
significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent.
 Includes all customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005.
 JSA = Jobseeker’s Allowance; IS = Income Support; IB = Incapacity Benefit.
 aBenefits refers to Income Support for NDLP customers, and a combination of Income Support and Jobseeker’s Allowance for 
WTC customers.
Figure 4.5 ERA group and control group Income Support receipt rate trends  
 over the first five years after random assignment, NDLP target group
Statistically significant at the 10 per cent level =  ; 5 per cent or 1 per cent =  
ERA group =  Control group =  
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study benefit receipt records. 
NOTES: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
 Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and 
the control group. 
 A white diamond on the axis indicates that the impact is statistically significant at the 
10 per cent level. A black diamond on the axis indicates that the impact is statistically 
significant at the 5 per cent or 1 per cent level.
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4.6.2 ERA’s impacts on benefits receipt for the WTC target group
Levels of benefits receipt were low among the WTC control group. Table 4.8 shows an average of 
one month spent in receipt of an out-of-work benefit each year, and shows this to be dominated 
by Income Support. Those in the WTC group were working 16 to 29 hours a week at the time of 
random assignment and so could not claim an out-of-work benefit at that time. Since there was no 
employment effect, it is not surprising to also see little effect of ERA on benefits for the WTC group. 
For most benefit types, there was no impact on either the average number of months in which 
benefits were claimed or on the amount claimed. This is true when considering individual years and 
when considering results across multiple years. The one exception is a reduction in the probability of 
receiving Incapacity Benefit early in the follow-up period.
4.6.3 Alternative tests of ERA’s impacts on benefits receipt and tax credits  
 using survey data
Results	for	the	NDLP	target	group
As in the case of the employment and earnings outcomes, survey data can be used to produce 
estimates of the effect of ERA on benefits receipt at the time of the five-year interview. Table 4.9 
shows that the proportion of NDLP survey respondents who reported receiving Income Support 
at the time of the interview (28.8 per cent for the control group) is similar to that recorded in the 
administrative data as receiving Income Support in month 60 (29.9 per cent for the control group). 
This provides considerable reassurance that the results based on survey data can be used in 
combination with the results based on administrative data to achieve a richer understanding of the 
effect of ERA on benefits receipt.
The survey asked respondents whether they were receiving one of a range of transfer payments: 
Income Support, Jobseeker’s Allowance, WTC, Child Tax Credit, Housing Benefit, or other benefits. In 
each case, the amount currently received was also reported. Table 4.9 shows that the differences 
between the ERA group and the control group were small for all benefits considered. By the time of 
the five-year survey interview, no statistically significant effects of ERA were found.
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Results	for	the	WTC	target	group
For the WTC group, Table 4.9 shows that the proportion of survey respondents reporting receipt of 
Income Support or Jobseeker’s Allowance at the time of the five-year interview is similar to the 
proportion recorded in the administrative data as being on one of these benefits in month 60 (as 
shown in Table 4.8), thus lending credibility to the survey data. Similarly, the analysis of survey data 
found that ERA had no effect on the receipt of these benefits at the end of the follow-up period and 
also no effect on the receipt of other benefits and tax credits. 
4.7 ERA’s impacts on well-being
This last section uses a range of outcomes collected in the survey interviews to explore the effect of 
ERA on well-being. Arguably, if one views ERA ultimately as a vehicle for improving individuals’ life 
chances by helping them achieve the kind of secure and rewarding employment that was previously 
out of reach, then the impact on well-being provides perhaps the most informative indication of the 
success of ERA.
In this section, the question of well-being is explored from a number of perspectives. Most obviously, 
individuals were asked to assess their personal well-being by answering questions about life 
satisfaction, self-esteem, levels of anxiety, and health. Being in the ERA group rather than the 
control group meant that one became eligible for help and support. At first sight, this would suggest 
that if there were any effects on personal well-being, they would be positive. However, it is possible 
to conceive of situations wherein personal well-being could be damaged by ERA. For example, 
ERA participants who were not successful in finding sustained work despite the additional support 
and encouragement available to them might have felt that they had little to offer employers and 
suffered reduced self-esteem as a result. It is conceivable then that ERA might have affected 
individuals’ subjective well-being, even though it did not have a lasting effect on economic 
outcomes.
Survey respondents were also asked about their financial well-being – whether their money situation 
was difficult and a source of worry, whether they had debt problems, and more generally, how they 
managed financially. This is particularly relevant for a low-income population.
Information was also collected on children’s well-being. This is an area of clear concern, but 
economic theory provides little guidance regarding what impact to expect.116 However, in policy 
debates about welfare-to-work programmes, concern is typically expressed that increasing parents’ 
involvement in work may come at the expense of their caring responsibilities and, in turn, their 
children’s welfare. Past evaluations of North American welfare-to-work programmes that include 
wage supplements suggest that such programmes can have positive effects for young children but 
not necessarily for adolescents.117 The results presented in this section offer an empirical contribution 
to the debate on the interaction between parental employment and child welfare in the UK.
116 Grogger and Karoly, 2007.
117 Morris et	al.,2001, in their synthesis of five evaluations, found some evidence that programmes 
that offered working parents financial incentives to work and subsequently increased their 
employment and incomes were associated with improved school achievement for younger 
children. By contrast, mandatory employment services that increased parents’ employment, 
but had no effect on income, had few effects on younger children, positive or negative. At the 
same time, findings from the Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project and Florida’s Family Transition 
Program point to the potential for small negative effects on some aspects of adolescents’ 
behaviour and school achievement, although in the one study that examined these same 
children in the long term (the Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project), there was no effect on 
adolescents’ school completion.
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Children share in the improved financial circumstances resulting from their parent’s increased 
earnings and, in this regard, their welfare is closely linked to that of their parent. The non-financial 
aspect of children’s welfare is also important. It is clear that encouraging lone parents to participate 
more fully in the labour market may have consequences for their children. As discussed previously, 
there is little theoretical or empirical evidence to inform expectations here. The most relevant studies 
– evaluations of welfare-to-work programmes in the US and Canada offering financial incentives to 
work – do appear to find some positive impacts on young children’s school performance. However, it 
does not necessarily follow that such findings will apply in the UK. 
Although positive effects on children would be welcome, it is also important to assess any 
detrimental effects associated with encouraging lone parents to increase their hours of work. Seen 
in this light, the absence of any effects on children’s welfare in the current study may be regarded 
positively, since it would indicate that children were not harmed. 
The analysis thus considers a range of outcomes relating to children’s general well-being, social 
activities, academic performance, and behaviour. It also examines the use of formal childcare, 
which other studies have suggested may have a beneficial effect on children. 118
4.7.1 ERA’s impacts on well-being for the NDLP target group
Table 4.10 shows the effects of ERA on different measures of personal well-being. No statistically 
significant effects were found. The bottom panel of the table presents results for financial well-
being. Again, no statistically significant effects were found. Table 4.11 shows that there are very 
few statistically significant long-term effects of ERA on the children of NDLP participants. It is not 
surprising that ERA did not have any effects on well-being, given that the programme did not 
generate large increases in employment or earnings. 
118 See, for example, findings from a random assignment evaluation of the New Hope 
programme, which offered a variety of work-focused financial incentives and other services to 
low-income families in Milwaukee, Wisconsin (Huston et	al., 2003).
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4.7.2 ERA’s impacts on well-being for the WTC target group
ERA also had few effects on overall personal or financial well-being among WTC group members. 
Although some impacts presented in Tables 4.10 and 4.11 suggest that ERA may have affected 
some aspects of parent, family, and child well-being negatively, the overall pattern suggests no 
clear effect.119 
For the WTC group, ERA increased the likelihood of having convenient childcare arrangements by 6.7 
percentage points. This effect may have enabled the increase in working hours seen for this group. 
It is important to point out, however, that no such effect on stable childcare was found at the two-
year follow-up point (i.e., while the programme was operating), and it is unclear why it would have 
emerged late in the follow-up period. Most WTC group members were employed when they entered 
the study, so many had presumably worked out childcare arrangements. However, Table 4.12 shows 
that over a quarter of unemployed WTC group members cited a need or desire to look after children 
as a reason why they were not working. It appears that in the longer run, an effect emerged as ERA 
group members were more likely to obtain stable childcare. 
119 For reasons that are unclear, WTC group members reported being seven percentage points 
more likely to run out of money by the end of the week or month (Table 4.10). This effect on 
financial insecurity is hard to explain, given that, if anything, ERA increased earnings among 
the WTC group earlier in the follow-up period, with no corresponding decrease in benefits 
receipt. Adding to the puzzle, this effect was rather large in percentage terms (42 per cent 
above the control group average). ERA also produced a small (in absolute terms) effect on the 
likelihood that parents reported ‘always’ being miserable or depressed. Finally, ERA reduced 
the percentage of parents who reported that their children’s lives are going very well by 5.3 
percentage points. Taken together, these negative-leaning impacts on well-being among the 
WTC group may relate to the stress of working more hours. However, these are exceptions to 
the general pattern of no impacts on most measures of well-being.
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4.8 ERA’s economic impacts across districts
When the effects of ERA are considered for individual districts, it is apparent that the programme 
had different impacts in some areas compared with others. However, smaller sample sizes at the 
district level mean that a given impact is less likely to be statistically significant. For this reason, the 
primary focus in the following analysis is not whether the impact in a given district is statistically 
significant, but whether the variation in effects across districts is statistically significant. If this 
variation is not statistically significant, then the conclusion would be that the effects observed for 
the full sample generally hold across the districts. 
All analyses in this section are based on administrative data and are limited to the NDLP target 
group. It is particularly important when considering results for districts (or offices or subgroups, as 
in the next chapter) to maximise the number of observations available for analysis. District-level 
analyses are not presented for the WTC group because sample sizes for that group in districts other 
than the East Midlands are too small to yield credible impact estimates. 
Table 4.13 summarises ERA’s impacts on employment and earnings for the NDLP group for each 
district. (Appendix B includes more detailed tables for each district.) It shows that ERA’s effects on 
participants’ number of months employed over the five-year follow-up period varied by district, and 
that this variation is statistically significant. Much of this variation was driven by large positive effects 
in North West England, where ERA led to an additional 3.6 months of employment on average (an 
increase of 15 per cent relative to the control group average), and negative impacts in Wales, where 
ERA reduced the amount of employment by 3.4 months (a reduction of 12 per cent).120 However, the 
variation across districts in ERA’s impacts on total four-year earnings over the tax years 2005-2006 
through 2008-2009 is not statistically significant. 
Interestingly, ERA had no statistically significant impact on four-year earnings in Wales, despite a 
negative effect on months employed. This seeming contradiction suggests that employed people 
in the ERA group may have worked more hours or at higher wage rates than employed people in 
the control group and that their higher earnings prevented average earnings for the overall ERA 
group from falling below those of the overall control group, even though the programme group as a 
whole worked less. If this interpretation is correct, it would imply that the ERA programme in Wales 
increased advancement outcomes for some participants.
120 From a statistical point of view, it is not surprising to see variation across districts in the effect 
of ERA, and the fact that this variation encompasses a negative result in the case of Wales 
may give little cause for concern. However, it is of interest to try to understand whether 
there may have been particular factors that combined to produce a negative effect in Wales. 
Examining the levels of employment among the control group is informative (results not 
shown in table). Control group employment levels are substantially higher in Wales than 
elsewhere. For instance, across all six districts, 79 per cent of NDLP lone parents worked at 
some point in the five years after random assignment. In Wales, the level was 88 per cent. 
Perhaps because of the operation of NDLP in Wales, control group employment was higher 
than in other districts.
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4.9 Conclusions
This chapter has presented findings on ERA’s effects on a variety of labour market, welfare, and non-
economic outcomes over a period of five years, which encompasses a time after the programme 
ended for all participants. It shows that, for the NDLP group – lone parents who entered the 
programme when they were unemployed or working fewer than 16 hours per week – ERA increased 
employment and earnings in the first year or two, largely by increasing participants’ likelihood of 
working full time. However, these effects were not sustained as participants exited the programme. 
Moreover, ERA appears to have had little effect on employment retention rather than employment 
per se, or on longer-term advancement – even though it caused an early increase in the probability 
of training while in full-time work. However, ERA did produce a more enduring reduction in the 
receipt of welfare benefits. 
For lone parents who were working part time and receiving WTC at the time of random assignment, 
ERA had no effect on employment but did increase earnings in the short run, again driven by an 
increase in the likelihood of working full time. However, the earnings effects were not sustained in 
the longer term, nor was there any indication of increased employment retention. ERA does appear 
to have increased the efforts of the WTC group to advance, as suggested by increases in training 
participation and in taking other steps to prepare for or find better opportunities. However, these 
efforts did not yield longer-term improvements in labour market outcomes.
The administrative data show that, among both target groups, earnings grew from year to year 
for ERA participants and controls alike. However, they grew at a faster pace earlier in the follow-up 
period for ERA participants. Eventually, the pace of their earnings growth slowed, and control group 
members ‘caught up’, causing the impacts to decline over time. In addition, comparing rates of 
full-time employment for both groups across survey waves shows that both groups were more likely 
to have worked full time later in the follow-up period than earlier, but that the control group closed 
the gap in full-time work over time. In sum, ERA was not powerful enough to produce effects that 
would continue to grow and outlast the normal trends experienced by the control group.121 It is also 
possible that the onset of the steep economic recession in 2008, encompassing the evaluation’s 
final year of follow-up, made it more difficult for the ERA group to capitalise further on whatever 
advantages they derived from the ERA programme. 
It should also be borne in mind that lone parents were defined at the time of random assignment. 
Five years later, circumstances would have changed for many, with re-partnering and new children, 
as well as aging children, altering individuals’ attitudes towards work. These changing circumstances 
might have encouraged some individuals to enter work and others to leave work at different times 
during the follow-up period, or to change how much they worked. 122
This chapter has focused on the impacts of ERA for the NDLP and WTC target groups overall. The 
next chapter explores whether the programme’s effects varied across different types of people in 
each of those groups and also across the local offices that implemented the programme. 
121 As discussed in Chapter 1, a number of potentially relevant policy changes were introduced 
late in the evaluation’s follow-up period that could have affected some members of the 
programme and control groups. These include the national rollout of In-Work Credit for lone 
parents, In-Work Advisory Support, and the In-Work Emergency Discretion Fund. While this 
might have reduced the contrast between the programme and control groups in ERA-like 
incentives and services, these policy changes may have come too late to affect many people 
in the ERA sample. Moreover, they were introduced after the trends of declining impacts had 
already emerged.
122 Analysis of the 60-month survey indicates that most sample members did not remarry or 
repartner by the end of the follow-up period. For example, only nine per cent of NDLP control 
group members were married at the time of the 60-month survey.
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5 ERA’s impacts on lone 
 parents across offices and  
 subgroups 
Box 5.1 Chapter 5 at a glance
• Local offices implemented the Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) model 
differently, resulting in statistically significant variation in impacts across offices on the 
number of months employed and the number of months receiving Income Support for the 
New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) target group.
• Offices that more effectively communicated the availability of the employment retention 
bonus, and offices that provided a bigger net increase in in-work retention and advancement 
assistance (relative to control group service levels), produced larger impacts on months 
employed and larger reductions in months on Income Support for the NDLP target group.
• ERA’s impacts on employment, earnings, and benefits receipt were larger for participants 
who were better educated but unemployed (i.e., NDLP lone parents with Advanced-level 
(A-level) qualifications) when they entered the programme. 
• Cross-office and cross-subgroup analyses suggest that ERA’s impacts on training 
participation were not associated with larger impacts on later earnings.
5.1 Introduction
Chapter 4 showed that ERA’s early impacts on labour market outcomes for lone parents did not 
persist through the end of the follow-up period. However, it is possible that ERA worked better for 
some types of people than others within each target group and better in some places than in others. 
Indeed, Chapter 4 indicated that, on some measures, ERA’s effects for the NDLP target group varied 
across the six Jobcentre Plus districts that operated the programme.
This chapter takes a closer look at the variation of impacts across locations by focusing on Jobcentre 
Plus offices, where programme participants received ERA services and where random assignment 
took place. Each district had multiple offices. Because local conditions, ERA staff practices, and the 
types of lone parents served varied across offices even within the same districts, and because offices 
outnumber districts, office-level comparisons may provide a better opportunity than district-level 
comparisons to assess how implementation practices and conditions may have influenced ERA’s 
effectiveness. The analysis focuses on the NDLP target group only, because of data limitations that 
affected the Working Tax Credit (WTC) and New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+) target groups. The chapter 
summarises findings from a separate report that presents the methods and results of the cross-
office analysis in more detail.123 
This chapter also explores whether ERA’s impacts varied for different subgroups of participants, 
defined according to their characteristics at the time of random assignment. The subgroup analysis 
is conducted for the NDLP and WTC target groups. (Chapter 6 examines impacts by subgroup for the 
ND25+ sample.)
123 Dorsett and Robins, forthcoming, 2011.
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Finally, the chapter presents the results of an exploratory analysis that takes advantage of subgroup 
variation in ERA’s impacts on rates of participation in training to shed light on the longer-term 
influence of those effects on labour market impacts.
5.2 ERA’s impacts on the NDLP target group across offices
ERA was implemented in 58 local offices within six districts, and because random assignment 
was administered at the local level, it is theoretically possible to estimate separate impacts for 
each office and to try to link the variation in programme practices and features across offices with 
those impacts. In the actual analysis, certain offices were grouped together based on information 
pertaining to operational procedures and sample sizes, yielding 37 distinct offices or combinations  
of offices. 
5.2.1 Variation in impacts across offices
The first question to consider in this analysis is: How much did ERA’s impacts on key outcomes 
actually vary across offices? In other words, was there enough variation in the programme’s 
effectiveness across offices to suggest that differences in office-level conditions and practices might 
matter? To answer this question, statistical tests (using a multiple regression model) were conducted 
that estimated whether each office’s impacts on a given outcome variable were statistically 
significantly different from the average impact on that variable estimated over all offices combined.
Figure 5.1 presents the estimated office-level impacts on two variables: average number of months 
receiving Income Support benefits and average number of months employed. Both variables are 
measured over the full five-year follow-up period. The figure also shows 90 per cent confidence 
intervals for each of those estimates. Generally speaking, because the impact results are only 
estimates, they may not be completely accurate. The confidence intervals are helpful because they 
show the range within which the ‘true’ impacts are highly likely to fall. If the confidence interval 
on the graph for a particular office does not cross the zero impact line, then the estimated impact 
is statistically significant at the ten per cent level, and one can be more confident that the office 
truly did affect the outcome of interest and that the estimated impact was not simply a product of 
chance. 
As Figure 5.1 indicates, impacts on months receiving Income Support range from -12 months to 
+15 months, but only five of the 37 estimates are statistically significant. The impacts on months 
employed range from -7 months to +18 months; again, only five of the estimates are statistically 
significant. It should be remembered that office-level impacts are calculated on smaller samples, 
so the impact estimates are less precise. A separate test was conducted to determine whether the 
overall variation in impact estimates across the offices is itself statistically significant. The analysis 
found this to be the case for employment (p-value = .07), but not for Income Support (p-value = 
.14). However, the variation in the Income Support impact estimates is statistically significant in 
year 2, not shown in the figure). Based on these results, it was concluded that the variation in the 
impacts across offices was sufficient to warrant a further, more sophisticated analysis to determine 
whether part of the variation could be explained by office characteristics. 
The analysis also examined the variation in impacts on earnings across offices. However, within 
each office, individuals’ earnings vary much more than their months employed, and this makes it 
more difficult to detect statistically significant impacts (unless they are quite large), especially with 
small samples. Perhaps as a result, the variation in earnings impacts across offices is not statistically 
significant and is not a focus of the analysis presented here. 
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Figure 5.1 Impacts on months receiving Income Support and months employed, 
 90 per cent confidence intervals, by office
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MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study benefits receipts and 
employment records.
NOTES:
 
Numbers next to diamonds are OLS point estimates.  The vertical lines represent 90 per 
cent confidence intervals.  Impacts that do not cross the zero impact line are statistically 
significant.
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5.2.2 A cross-office statistical model
Differences in impacts across offices can arise not only because of differences in the way ERA was 
operated, but also because of differences in the types of people it served. For example, one office 
may be more effective than another, not because it operated differently, but rather because it 
enrolled more of the types of people for whom ERA could be effective. Thus, office-level impacts are 
the product of the characteristics of individuals as well as the features of the offices themselves.124 
In order to take into account the varying characteristics of all lone parents in the research sample 
and the key features of each office, a more sophisticated statistical framework than is traditionally 
used in evaluation research is required. Specifically, the statistical framework must take into account 
the fact that there are two different units of analysis, with individual sample members nested within 
offices.125 
5.2.3 Cross-office variables
In examining variation in ERA’s impacts across offices, the cross-office analysis focuses on particular 
ERA features that are aligned with the programme’s objectives of helping participants remain 
employed and advance in work. Progress on these outcomes should be reflected in more months of 
employment during the follow-up period and less time spent receiving Income Support. 
The office-level variables were constructed from several sources, including customer surveys, 
staffing forms, staff surveys, and data used in a special ERA evaluation report examining why some 
eligible New Deal participants did not enrol in ERA.126 The analysis focuses on five office features 
that are predicted to be associated with ERA’s effectiveness. Each of these taps a separate, but 
related, dimension of operating an advancement-focused programme. Overall, these measures are 
correlated to some extent with each other (meaning that offices that rank high on one measure 
have some tendency to rank high on the other), but the correlations are modest at best. Thus, 
characteristics are treated in the analysis as separate dimensions.
• How much did an office’s advisers work with ERA participants? This dimension attempts to 
capture the extent to which each local Jobcentre Plus office devoted its staff resources and 
attention to its ERA participants relative to its non-ERA customers. It is assumed that the greater 
the share of an office’s staffing resources devoted to ERA participants, the stronger the priority 
ERA had in that office (at the adviser level), and, by implication, the greater the intensity of ERA 
services the programme group received relative to the intensity of non-ERA services the controls 
and other customers received. It is expected that in offices where more resources were devoted to 
ERA participants, the programme’s effectiveness would be greater, and ERA would have achieved 
larger reductions in the number of months ERA participants (relative to controls) received Income 
Support and larger increases in their number of months employed. 
124 Variation in impacts with respect to study participants’ personal characteristics is commonly 
referred to as ‘subgroup analysis’. Later in this chapter, results from a subgroup analysis are 
presented.
125 The analysis uses a statistical model based on the methodology developed by Bryk and 
Raudenbush, 1992, and first applied to the evaluation of social experiments by Bloom  
et	al., 2005.
126 Goodman and Sianesi, 2007. 
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• How much did an office’s advisers focus on long-term goals?127 The survey asked respondents: 
When	working,	did	you	get	any	advice	or	encouragement	from	Jobcentre	Plus	staff	on	working	
out	long-term	career	goals?	When	not	working,	did	you	get	any	advice	or	help	from	Jobcentre	Plus	
staff	with	working	out	long-term	career	goals? Their answers were used to indicate how much 
respondents had received any advice on long-term goals, either when working or when out of 
work. The difference between ERA participants and the control group on this measure within 
a given office suggests how much extra encouragement an office gave to ERA participants 
to pursue human capital development goals, compared with what it offered to controls. It is 
predicted that in offices where this differential was greater, ERA participants would have more 
prolonged stays on Income Support and reduce their total time employed in the short term, but 
would have gains in employment in the long term. However, how long it would take to recoup 
such short-term losses is uncertain. Therefore, it is not obvious whether the five-year horizon 
available for this study is adequate to capture those gains. Consequently, in this analysis, it is 
reasonable to expect that focusing on long-term goals might have either positive or negative 
overall impacts on employment and benefits receipt. 
• How much did an office’s advisers emphasise education or training as a route to advancement? 
The survey asked respondents: When	working,	did	you	get	any	advice	or	encouragement	finding	
an	education	or	training	course?	When	not	working,	did	you	get	any	advice	or	help	from	Jobcentre	
Plus	staff	with	looking	for	education	or	training	courses? Responses to these questions were used to 
indicate whether respondents had received any help finding an education or training course. The 
analysis measures how much more each office promoted education or training for the ERA group 
than for the control group. Those offices in which there was a larger differential between the ERA 
and control groups could be thought of as having delivered a bigger net increase in this form of 
skills-building assistance. It is expected that the consequences of this practice might depend 
on a participant’s employment status when receiving the assistance. Offices in which there was 
a bigger net increase in delivering assistance with training courses while participants were not 
working might be more likely to have increased participants’ months on Income Support and 
reduced their months of employment, at least in the short run. However, offices in which there 
was a greater increase in assistance with training courses while participants were working might 
not have affected ERA participants’ time on Income Support and might increase their months 
employed in the long run. 
• How much did an office’s advisers provide ‘general advancement guidance’ by encouraging 
individuals to take specific steps to advance in work, other than by enrolling in education 
or training courses? The survey asked respondents: When	working,	did	you	get	any	advice	or	
encouragement	from	Jobcentre	Plus	staff	on	how	to	negotiate	a	pay	rise,	how	to	negotiate	better	
terms	(for	example,	more	convenient	hours,	or	how	to	get	a	promotion	in	your	present	work)?	
When	not	working,	did	you	get	any	advice	or	help	from	Jobcentre	Plus	staff	with	helping	you	to	
stay	in	work	or	advance	in	future	jobs? Respondents’ answers were used to indicate whether they 
had discussed in-work advancement strategies, either when working or when out of work. How 
much a given office gave this type of ‘general advancement guidance’ to the ERA group relative 
to the control group would indicate the extent to which it provided a net increase in general 
advancement guidance to the ERA group. The expectation is that offices in which there was a 
higher net increase in the general advancement guidance they delivered would be more likely 
than other offices to have shortened participants’ stays on Income Support and increased their 
number of months of employment. 
127 This and the following four office variables are measured as the difference between ERA and 
control group participants in the receipt of the particular service from Jobcentre Plus. It is 
hypothesised that it is the differential receipt of services that drives the programme’s impact.
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• How much did an office’s advisers provide general support to individuals who were working? The 
survey asked respondents: And	how	much	support	has	this	person	[the Jobcentre Plus adviser]	
given	you	when	working?128 Respondents could choose the response ‘a lot’, and this was used to 
define the variable. The office average score was based only on the responses of those who had 
worked at some point during the follow-up period. The difference in how much the staff focused 
on in-work support for the ERA group relative to the control group varied across offices. Offices 
where the differential was larger are considered to have provided greater relative in-work support. 
The expectation is that offices where the relative provision of in-work support was greater were 
more likely to have shortened participants’ stays on Income Support and increased their months 
of employment. 
• How aware were ERA participants of the ERA work retention bonus? The survey asked participants 
in the programme group: Under	the	ERA	programme,	some	people	who	work	for	at	least	30	hours	a	
week	for	about	three	months	out	of	four	can	claim	a	bonus	of	£400.	Have	you	heard	of	this	bonus? 
The responses to this question were used to indicate whether ERA participants were aware of 
the work retention bonus, either when working or when out of work. The expectation is that in 
offices where knowledge of the bonus was greater, ERA would have reduced participants’ stays on 
Income Support and increased their months of employment.
Table 5.1 presents the means and the cross-office range of the office variables used in the analysis. 
Caseloads averaged about 29 customers for each Jobcentre Plus adviser, and about 42 per cent 
of these advisers, on average, worked with ERA participants. Adviser caseloads varied quite 
substantially across offices (from about three customers for each adviser to 109 customers for each 
adviser), as did the proportion of advisers working with ERA participants (from about 20 per cent to 
94 per cent). 
For each of the advancement-related service measures, Table 5.1 presents the average proportion 
of controls receiving the specified assistance from Jobcentre Plus, the average proportion of ERA 
participants receiving the service from Jobcentre Plus (through the ERA programme), and the 
average ERA-versus-control difference in the proportion receiving the service.129 On average across 
the entire sample of offices, for every advancement-related measure, a higher proportion of ERA 
participants than controls received the service. This is expected, although the differential is not 
always large. However, surprisingly, the control group in some offices was more likely than the ERA 
group to have received the service, as reflected in the negative minimum values of the differential 
in the cross-office ranges.130 Where the difference is negative or even close to zero, it implies that an 
office did not implement these dimensions of ERA very well. 
Across all offices, most ERA participants were aware of the employment retention bonus. In fact, in 
no office were less than three-quarters of the ERA participants aware of the retention bonuses, and 
in some offices all of the ERA participants surveyed were aware of the bonuses.
128 The kind of support received was not specified in the question.
129 The first and third of these measures (the control group value and ERA-versus-control-group 
difference) are used as variables in the multi-level model. The second measure (for the 
ERA group) is not directly included in the multi-level model (except for the retention bonus 
awareness variable) but is shown for informational purposes.
130 Specifically, there were four offices in which the proportion of customers advised to think long 
term was higher among the control group than the programme group; seven offices where the 
proportion of customers receiving help finding an education or training course was higher; six 
offices where the proportion receiving help with in-work advancement was higher; and seven 
offices where the proportion receiving support while working was higher.
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Table 5.1 Office characteristics (measured during the follow-up period)
Cross-Office Range
Office variable Mean Minimum Maximum
Caseload (per adviser) 29.47 3.27 109.99
Proportion of advisers working with ERA customers 42.1 20.4 93.6
Proportion of customers advised to think long term
Control group 30.3 0.0 73.9
ERA group 49.4 1.6 100.0
Difference 19.1 -49.4 92.5
Proportion of customers receiving help finding education course
Control group 43.0 0.0 100.0
ERA group 64.3 14.4 99.0
Difference 21.3 -17.0 54.4
Proportion of customers receiving help with in-work advancement
Control group 20.1 0.0 66.6
ERA group 40.1 0.0 100.0
Difference 20.0 -68.5 100.0
Proportion of customers receiving support while working
Control group 44.5 0.0 100.0
ERA group 65.2 20.5 100.0
Difference 20.7 -49.0 100.0
Proportion of ERA customers aware of retention bonuses 87.3 74.7 100.0
Sample size 37 37 37
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study benefits receipt records, staffing forms, and the 12- and 
24-month customer surveys.
NOTES: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
 Caseload variables taken from staffing form. All other variables taken from customer surveys. The office variables have been 
regression-adjusted to control for differences in customer characteristics across offices.
5.2.4 The correlation of office-level characteristics with office-level impacts
Table 5.2 shows how strongly the office features described above are related to (and, thus, 
may have influenced) the impacts of an office’s ERA programme on the number of months ERA 
participants received Income Support (top panel) and the number of months they were employed 
(bottom panel). More technically, the coefficients show how much bigger an office’s impact would 
be, relative to the overall impact across all offices (i.e., the ‘grand mean’), if its value on a given office 
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characteristic changed by a single unit.131 These estimates are derived after statistically controlling 
for variation in individual characteristics across offices and for cross-office differences in each of the 
other office-level variables listed in the table. Thus, the coefficients show the estimated relationship 
between the implementation measure and the impact measure independent of any influence that 
other office features and participant characteristics may have had on office impacts. The asterisks 
indicate whether the relationship is strong enough to be statistically significant – that is, unlikely to 
have occurred by chance. 
The table also presents the relationship between office characteristics and office impacts in terms 
of ‘inter-quartile’ ranges. The inter-quartile range shows how much an average office’s impact 
would vary if its ranking (relative to the other offices) on a particular feature were to change.132 It is 
an alternative way to illustrate how much a particular office characteristics matter for programme 
impacts. For example, consider the measure, ‘proportion of advisers working with ERA participants’. 
The inter-quartile range illustrates what an office’s impact on Income Support would be if that office 
ranked at the 25th percentile on the measure, and what its impact would become if its ranking 
were to rise to the 75th percentile on that characteristic. When the correlation between an office 
characteristic and an office-level impact is stronger, the range of impact estimates between the 
25th and 75th quartiles will be larger. 
In interpreting the results of this study, it is important to understand that while certain office 
characteristics may be important in explaining the cross-office differences in impacts on economic 
outcomes, the programme-control group differences in office characteristics themselves varied 
only modestly across the particular offices included in this analysis. Although this limited variation 
suggests a fair amount of consistency in implementing the ERA model across different places, it also 
means that the current evaluation provides only a limited assessment of the potential independent 
importance of these variables. It is possible that had the ‘service differential’ varied more widely 
across offices, its effects on programme impacts might have been stronger. 
Nonetheless, several office features appear to be important. As Table 5.2 shows, three of the six office 
characteristics are estimated to be related to ERA programme impacts at statistically significant 
levels for either or both of the outcome measures. These features are: (1) how much an office’s 
advisers provided ‘general advancement guidance’ (by encouraging ERA participants to take specific 
131 Because the office characteristics are measured as proportions, a change in a single unit 
is interpreted as a change between zero and 100 per cent (and not fractions of a unit, as 
proportions would imply). Thus, the coefficient indicates the effect of the office-level factor 
under the (theoretical) situation that all ERA participants and no control group participants 
received a particular service. For example, as Table 5.2 shows, if the difference between the 
ERA and control groups in the likelihood of receiving general advancement guidance were 100 
per cent, ERA in that office would have reduced ERA participants’ time on Income Support by 
a further eight months relative to the grand mean (i.e., the average impact of ERA across all 
offices). Or, to put it another way, if the ERA-versus-control differential in receiving the service 
was only ten percentage points, it would have reduced time on Income Support by 0.8 months 
relative to ERA’s overall impact on Income Support. The information on inter-quartile ranges 
is very important in this regard, because, in practice, few of the differences in receiving this 
kind of help were extremely large. Thus, an office moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile 
on the measure of general advancement guidance would see its impact on Income Support 
receipt increase by 1.2 months, and its impact on months employed by about a 1.5 months.
132 More specifically, the inter-quartile range provides an indication of how the impact varies 
across offices possessing the middle 50 per cent range of values of a particular office 
characteristic. Thus, the entire range of impacts is not reported; offices with characteristics in 
the upper and lower 25 per cent of the distribution are excluded.
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steps to advance in work, other than by enrolling in education or training courses); (2) how much an 
office’s advisers provided general support to working participants; and (3) how aware participants 
were of the ERA work retention bonus.133 Specifically, the analysis found that in offices that provided 
ERA participants with stronger general advancement advice or general support while they were 
working (relative to the control group), or did a better job helping ERA participants become aware of 
the employment retention bonus, there were larger impacts on the two outcome measures. 
It is important to note, however, that this analysis can speak only to the added value of post-
employment advisory services used in conjunction with financial incentives to retain work. Other 
studies have found little added benefit from programmes that used post-employment advisory 
support and guidance as the main intervention, without financial incentives or other kinds of 
assistance.134 With this caveat in mind, the results provide some insight into the relative importance 
of the significant office features by comparing the impacts associated with being a ‘high-intensity’ 
(i.e., 75th percentile) office rather than a ‘low-intensity’ (25th percentile) office. 
First, the results in Table 5.2 show that individuals in offices that were high intensity with regard 
to providing general guidance on in-work advancement spent, on average, 1.2 fewer months on 
Income Support and 1.5 additional months in employment than individuals in offices that were low 
intensity on this implementation measure. Second, with regard to awareness of the retention bonus, 
individuals in high-intensity offices spent 2.9 fewer months on Income Support and 1.8 additional 
months in employment relative to those in low-intensity offices. And third, individuals in office 
that were high intensity in terms of the delivery of general in-work support spent 1.4 more months 
in employment than individuals in low-intensity offices, and there is no statistically significant 
correlation between this implementation measure and months on Income Support. Overall, the 
pattern of results suggests that, while all three programme features are important, the retention 
bonus may have been somewhat more influential than the other two features, particularly when 
considering the impact on Income Support. 
The cross-office findings also point to office practices that may be inconsequential, as suggested 
by the fact that their relationships with the impact measures are not statistically significant. For 
example, it appears that ERA’s effects (at least during the five-year follow-up period) were not 
influenced by how much staff emphasised human capital development either explicitly by assisting 
participants to find education or training courses, or indirectly by encouraging general planning for 
the long term.135 Further analysis presented later in this chapter focuses on the available evidence 
on the yield from training within the follow-up period.
133 A possible concern with the bonus variable is that awareness of the retention bonus may 
have been affected by individuals’ employment status. For example, if awareness was higher 
because of being in work, attempts to examine the relationship between employment and 
awareness will encounter problems of endogeneity. There are a number of reasons why this 
problem may be mitigated, at least in part, which are explained in detail in Dorsett and Robins, 
forthcoming, 2011.
134 See Hendra et	al., 2010, and Rangarajan and Novak, 1999.
135 Though not statistically significant, the direction of the correlations suggest that in offices 
where ERA participants received more help than controls in finding education or training 
courses and thinking long term, ERA may, if anything, have caused those participants to spend 
more months on Income Support and fewer months in employment than in offices where 
ERA participants did not receive such help. Such a result may have more favourable long-term 
benefits, however, if the human capital investment stimulated by the adviser intervention 
eventually leads to more stable employment beyond the follow-up period.
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In sum, although Chapter 4 showed that ERA, on average (with all offices combined), did not have 
enduring statistically significant impacts for the NDLP target group over the full five-year follow-up 
period on months receiving Income Support and months employed, that finding masks the fact 
that some offices performed better than others. The cross-office analysis has shown that ERA may 
be more effective when certain staff practices are emphasised. This finding might be important to 
consider in any replication of an ERA-style post-employment intervention. 
5.3  ERA’s impacts on lone parent subgroups
The subgroup analysis looks at the variation in ERA’s impacts in a different way, by exploring 
whether ERA’s effects differed for particular groups of lone parents. Evaluations of similar 
programmes in the US have found that some programmes worked better for individuals with 
particular characteristics when they entered the programmes. For example, generally speaking, the 
US ERA programmes tended to have larger effects for those who had worked in some but not all 
quarters in the year before random assignment, and weaker effects for those who had previously 
worked either much more or much less. It thus appears that, overall, the programmes did not offer 
enough or the ‘right’ kind of assistance to those who were most attached or least attached to the 
labour market when they began US ERA.136 
It is easy to imagine that ERA’s effects might vary across subgroups of lone parents who have 
different skills, views of work, or family circumstances that, normally (in the absence of ERA), might 
affect their prospects in the labour market. For example, lone parents with young children and a 
care orientation may be less interested in working more hours and advancing than those with older 
children. Similarly, participants with lower educational levels may have fewer job opportunities and 
be less likely to progress on their own. Participants from ethnic minority groups, who may face a 
variety of employment barriers, may also have a more difficult time in the labour market than non-
minorities. Because these and other groups began ERA with different labour market advantages 
and disadvantages, it is reasonable to expect that how they engaged with ERA and whether the 
programme helped them may vary as well. 
The subgroup analysis thus examines the variations in ERA’s effects on participants’ receipt of ERA 
services and participation in training and the programme’s impacts on economic outcomes. Such 
an analysis is important. If such differences do exist, and ERA were replicated or a similar post-
employment initiative were implemented, policymakers might want to consider targeting the 
initiative to those who seem most likely to benefit from it. Or they might want to test new forms of 
assistance or extra efforts within the programme to try to make it more effective for the types of 
individuals who did not appear to benefit from ERA in its original form. 
The subgroup analysis that follows was done separately for the NDLP and WTC target groups. To 
estimate subgroup impacts on economic outcomes, it uses administrative data for the full random 
assignment population, rather than the survey sample, to maximise sample sizes. However, it uses 
customer survey data (and, hence, the smaller survey sample) to explore ERA’s impacts on receipt 
of post-employment services. Although the two samples are not fully aligned, the analysis gives 
priority to trying to estimate the economic impacts with more precision, which the full sample 
allows. 
The tables present information on the statistical significance of the findings from two different 
perspectives. First, they use asterisks to denote when a particular impact for a particular subgroup 
category (e.g., impact on earnings for participants who are classified as an ‘ethnic minority’) is 
136 Hamilton and Scrivener, forthcoming, 2011.
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statistically significant. But also important is whether the difference in impacts across subgroup 
categories is itself statistically significant (e.g., ‘impact for ethnic minorities’ versus ‘impact for 
whites’). A statistically significant difference in impacts is denoted by daggers. Thus, in order 
for a subgroup pattern to be given much weight, the findings must show that the impact for at 
least one of the subgroup categories is statistically significant and that the difference in impacts 
across those categories is statistically significant. In other words, one can be more confident that 
a ‘real’ subgroup difference exists where both asterisks and daggers are shown in the tables. Even 
so, subgroup analyses must be viewed more cautiously overall than the effects of a full-sample 
analysis.137 
The subgroup tables show results for all of the subgroups that were analysed. However, the 
discussion highlights only the most notable findings. 
5.3.1 Subgroup results for the NDLP target group
The subgroup analysis looks first at whether ERA achieved a bigger service differential for some 
types of NDLP lone parents than others. The service differential refers to the difference between the 
ERA group and the control group in receipt of a given type of service or participation in a given type 
of activity. The bigger the service differential overall, the more intensive the ERA treatment may 
have been for a particular subgroup.138
It is easy to imagine that different types of participants might have more or less interaction with 
the programme. As suggested by the qualitative research, for example, women with young children, 
compared with those with older children, might be less interested in advancement in the short term 
and less interested in engaging in the kinds of services ERA offers, and may be less influenced by its 
training incentives. 
Impacts	on	service	receipt	across	NDLP	subgroups	
Table 5.3 presents impacts on service receipt by subgroup for NDLP sample members. The table 
shows that for every subgroup examined, ERA increased the combined likelihood of being in work 
and receiving help and advice for Jobcentre Plus staff while working. As can be seen, the impact 
for each individual subgroup category is highly statistically significant (each with three asterisks), 
suggesting that ERA delivered a stronger post-employment intervention for the ERA group relative 
to the control group across many different types of lone parents. Nonetheless, the magnitude of the 
137 This is because the tests for differences in impacts across subgroup categories do not account 
for the fact that when multiple subgroup differences are tested, a few may be statistically 
significant simply by chance. These results should be interpreted with this caution in mind, 
and more weight should be given to those that show a pattern across outcomes measures 
and that are backed by a strong theoretical and empirical justification (based on prior studies) 
for predicting subgroup differences in the first place. The subgroup categories examined in 
this study are generally similar to the kinds of categories used in similar studies, such as US 
ERA and other welfare-to-work evaluations. They all try to capture, in one way or another, 
differences across sample members in terms of the types and levels of labour market 
advantages or disadvantages.
138 It should be borne in mind that subgroups defined on the basis of a particular characteristic 
(age, for example) will differ in numerous other regards. Examinations of how services received 
or outcomes achieved vary across subgroups reflect the combined effects of these differences 
in characteristics. The cross-office analysis discussed above uses a different approach that 
allows the extent to which individual characteristics affects impacts to be estimated. For more 
detail, see Robins and Dorsett, forthcoming, 2011.
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impacts did differ across subgroup categories (as indicated by the daggers) in a number of cases. 
For example, ERA achieved a stronger service differential for the ethnic minorities enrolled in the 
programme than for whites. 
In some cases, the differences in effects on this measure may be driven more by differences in the 
likelihood that ERA increased participants’ number of months employed than in the likelihood that 
they were served by the programme once they were employed.139 However, the more noteworthy 
finding is the broad reach of ERA’s efforts to engage working participants in advancement-focused 
assistance. 
Table 5.4 presents impacts on training by subgroup for NDLP sample members. The left-hand panel 
of the table shows ERA’s effects on the likelihood that participants engaged in training, regardless of 
their work status at the time. The right-hand panel of Table 5.4 shows ERA’s effects on the likelihood 
that participants would combine training courses with work. Looking across the subgroup categories, 
it is clear that the programme increased training among some but certainly not all subgroups. ERA 
increased training by a substantial margin among those with older children, in family housing, and 
among those with no reported barriers to employment. Notably, ERA had no effects on training 
among ethnic minorities, those with young children,140 or those with A-level credentials (all groups 
that experienced impacts on earnings). 
Regarding participation in training or education while working, a number of differences across 
subgroup categories are noteworthy. In particular, the programme seems to have increased the 
likelihood of combining training with work to a greater extent for ethnic minorities, for lone parents 
with older children, for those with no barriers to employment, for those who entered the study as 
part of a later cohort, and for those in family or social housing. The bigger effect for the later cohort 
is consistent with implementation findings indicating that the programme stepped up its marketing 
of the training incentives later in the programme. A later section of this chapter considers whether 
these subgroup impacts on service receipt contributed to differences in ERA’s economic impacts 
across NDLP subgroups.
139 For example, this may have been the case, to some extent, for the ethnicity subgroups.
140 The child age subgroups are not defined exactly the same way for the participation analysis. In 
the economic analysis, earnings impacts are clustered among those with children aged five to 
six who are a subset of the group with children under seven. 
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Table 5.3 Effects of ERA on receipt of help or advice from Jobcentre Plus  
 staff while working, NDLP target group, by subgroup  
 (survey respondents only)
Received help/advice from Jobcentre Plus staff while working (%)
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Difference 
(impact) P-value Sample size
All customers 46.5 13.3 33.3 *** 0.000 2,297
Race/ethnicity ††
White 46.8 14.6 32.2 *** 0.000 2,003
Ethnic minority 46.7 2.9 43.8 *** 0.000 289
Age of youngest child †††
Under 7 years 42.3 13.0 29.3 *** 0.000 1,317
7 to 11 years old 47.9 13.6 34.4 *** 0.000 533
12 to 16 years old 60.4 11.8 48.6 *** 0.000 338
Number of months worked in 3 years prior to 
random assignment
††
None 39.8 9.1 30.8 *** 0.000 1,128
1-12 47.0 17.7 29.3 *** 0.000 522
13+ 57.8 17.0 40.8 *** 0.000 647
Housing status
Family 50.2 16.3 33.9 *** 0.000 191
Social 44.6 12.6 32.0 *** 0.000 1,535
Private 49.4 14.6 34.7 *** 0.000 546
Qualifications †††
None 34.5 11.3 23.3 *** 0.000 510
GCSE 50.1 13.8 36.3 *** 0.000 1,076
A-level or above 52.6 14.7 37.9 *** 0.000 540
Cohort †
Early (October 2003 - May 2004) 43.8 13.4 30.3 *** 0.000 1,244
Late (June 2004 - April 2005) 49.8 13.1 36.7 *** 0.000 1,053
Number of barriers to employment ††
None 49.4 10.3 39.1 *** 0.000 785
One 45.8 14.5 31.3 *** 0.000 929
Two or more 43.5 15.6 27.9 *** 0.000 583
(continued)
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Table 5.3 Continued
In work and received help/advice from Jobcentre Plus staff (%)
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Difference 
(impact) P-value Sample size
Severely disadvantaged ††
Yes 36.3 10.7 25.6 *** 0.000 527
No 49.8 13.9 35.9 *** 0.000 1,770
Child under 7 and no work in 3 years prior to 
random assignment †††
Yes 34.5 10.0 24.5 *** 0.000 642
No 51.4 14.3 37.1 *** 0.000 1,578
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from ERA 12- and 24-month customer surveys and baseline information forms completed by DWP staff.
NOTES: Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment characteristics of 
sample members.
 Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
 Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the control group. Statistical 
significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent.
 A statistical test was performed to measure whether impacts differed significantly across subgroup categories. Statistical 
significance levels are indicated as: † = 10 per cent; †† = 5 per cent; and ††† = 1 per cent.
 The results are calculated using the equal-weighted approach of the previous report, allowing each district to contribute 
equally to the results. Data constraints prevented recalculation of the measures in this table without weighting. 
 Family housing refers to situations where the customer is living with his/her parents or other friends or relatives. Social housing 
refers to housing in which the local authority (local government) or a private housing association is the landlord. Private 
housing refers to owner-occupied housing or housing that the customer rents privately.
 Barriers to employment include transport, childcare, health, housing, basic skills, or other self-identified problems.
 Severely disadvantaged refers to those participants with GCSE qualifications or lower, no work in the three years prior to 
random assignment, and at least one barrier to employment.
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Table 5.5 presents subgroup results for receipt of bonuses (which were only available to ERA 
participants). In general, many different subgroups received employment retention bonuses, but 
the rates of receipt tended to be somewhat higher for the less-disadvantaged participants (versus 
those who were more disadvantaged), who had a greater likelihood of working, including NDLP 
participants with higher education levels, fewer work barriers, and older children. Receipt of the 
training bonus was lower overall, compared with the retention bonus, but tended to be higher for 
participants who were less disadvantaged (e.g., those who had the most work experience or the 
highest educational qualifications). 
Table 5.5 Bonus receipt rates, NDLP target group, by subgroup
Ever received 
work retention 
bonus within 24 
months follow-up 
(%)
Ever received 
training bonus 
within 24 months 
follow-up (%) Sample size
All customers 28.1 7.2 3,365
Race/ethnicity †††
White 27.0 7.3 2,833
Ethnic minority 34.7 6.5 519
Age of youngest child ††† †††
Under 7 years 23.6 5.9 1,905
7 to 11 years old 28.0 8.8 805
12 to 16 years old 44.0 9.7 476
Number of months worked in 3 years prior to random assignment ††† †††
None 22.3 4.9 1,656
1-12 31.0 7.0 774
13+ 36.2 11.7 935
Housing status † †††
Family 25.3 5.3 251
Social 27.4 6.1 2,220
Private 31.1 10.8 854
Qualifications ††† †††
None 20.0 3.5 778
GCSE 26.3 6.6 1,602
A-level or above 41.4 12.0 738
Cohort †† †††
Early (October 2003 - May 2004) 26.5 5.8 1,756
Late (June 2004 - April 2005) 29.9 8.9 1,609
Number of barriers to employment †††
None 32.0 7.3 1,197
One 26.9 7.0 1,269
Two or more 24.3 7.5 899
(continued)
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Table 5.5 Continued
Ever received 
work retention 
bonus within 24 
months follow-up 
(%)
Ever received 
training bonus 
within 24 months 
follow-up (%) Sample size
Severely disadvantaged ††† †††
Yes 15.4 2.8 769
No 31.9 8.6 2,596
Child under 7 and no work in 3 years prior to random assignment ††† †††
Yes 18.9 4.1 923
No 31.4 8.5 2,299
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from DWP financial incentives data and baseline information forms completed by DWP staff.
NOTES: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
 Includes all customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005.
 A statistical test was performed to measure whether impacts differed significantly across subgroup categories. Statistical 
significance levels are indicated as: † = 10 per cent; †† = 5 per cent; and ††† = 1 per cent.
 The results are calculated using the equal-weighted approach of the previous report, allowing each district to contribute 
equally to the results. 
 Family housing refers to situations where the customer is living with his/her parents or other friends or relatives. Social housing 
refers to housing in which the local authority (local government) or a private housing association is the landlord. Private 
housing refers to owner-occupied housing or housing that the customer rents privately.
 Barriers to employment include transport, childcare, health, housing, basic skills, or other self-identified problems.
 Severely disadvantaged refers to those customers with GCSE qualifications or lower, no work in the three years prior to random 
assignment, and at least one barrier to employment.
Impacts	on	economic	outcomes	across	NDLP	subgroups
This section examines differences in estimated impacts of ERA across particular NDLP subgroups. 
The outcomes shown in Table 5.6 are the number of months employed during the 60 months of 
follow-up (an indicator of labour market attachment and retention) and earnings during the four 
tax years 2005-2009 (which should reflect any increase in employment rates, wages, and/or work 
hours). Because these outcomes span up to five years of follow-up, impacts that occurred early in 
the follow-up period (while the programme was still active) but dissipated later, might not show up 
as statistically significant. Table 5.7 shows subgroup impacts on receipt of Income Support.
Overall, despite broad subgroup differences in ERA’s effects on the receipt of advancement-related 
assistance, the programme’s impacts on economic outcomes generally did not follow a similar 
pattern. In other words, NDLP subgroups that were more likely to receive advancement-related 
assistance through ERA were not typically more likely to experience larger impacts on economic 
outcomes. In fact, few subgroups experienced statistically significant cumulative impacts on 
employment, earnings, or benefits receipt over the five-year follow-up period. However, several 
exceptions stand out. 
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First, certain impacts are larger for ethnic minority than white participants. This is important 
because ethnic minorities have long been the focus of major policy concern, since they tend to 
suffer from more labour market disadvantages.141 ERA appears to have had a larger impact on 
months employed for ethnic minorities than for whites, and it may have increased ethnic minorities’ 
earnings to a greater extent, although the earnings impact is not statistically significant. ERA also 
substantially reduced the amount received in Income Support by over 14 per cent below control 
group levels among ethnic minorities. In sum, the overall pattern of results suggests that ERA may 
have been somewhat more successful for lone parents from ethnic minority groups. 
Second, earnings impacts are statistically significant for parents whose youngest child was five to 
six years old. This age is particularly relevant because it is the time when children are making the 
transition to regular primary school, and parents may be more available for work. It is also the age 
group for which parents, who traditionally have been exempt from a work participation requirement, 
will, under new Government proposals, become subject to work requirements in the future. The 
Coalition Government intends to require that lone parents with a youngest child aged five and over, 
and who are not employed, claim Jobseeker’s Allowance, which carries with it a mandate to actively 
seek work to maintain one’s eligibility, rather than Income Support. 
For that group, ERA increased total four-year earnings by an average of nearly £3,400. This 
represents a statistically significant gain of 25 per cent over the control group average. However, ERA 
had no impacts for this subgroup on the number of months employed. This implies that the earnings 
gain resulted from higher wage rates or, more likely, increased hours.142 
It is also noteworthy that ERA had no economic impacts for NDLP lone parents with children under 
age five when they entered the programme. This is consistent with the evaluation’s qualitative 
findings. As noted in the ERA report on training, and in Chapter 3, advisers recounted in interviews 
that participants with young children were difficult to engage in training143 and other advancement 
activities; if they had advancement aspirations, they typically deferred them until their children were 
older. In contrast, parents with children aged five or six were at a time of transition in their own work 
journeys and perhaps more open to advancement activities as their children were newly enrolled  
in school. 
Finally, ERA’s effects for the NDLP group differed considerably depending on the educational 
qualifications participants had when they entered the study. The programme had sizeable and 
statistically significant impacts on employment, earnings, and benefits receipt for those with the 
highest educational qualifications (A-level qualifications), and no effects for those without such 
qualifications. For this subgroup, ERA increased the duration of employment by roughly three 
months on average (an increase of 11 per cent relative to the control group rate), increased total 
four-year earnings by an average of about £3,500 (a gain of 15 per cent), and reduced time spent on 
Income Support by 2.3 fewer months (a ten per cent reduction). In addition, ERA reduced Income 
Support benefits by nearly £900 among those with A-level qualifications. A later section of this 
chapter takes a more in-depth look at these findings. 
141 For illustration, Table 5.6 shows that, in the control group, ethnic minorities in the NDLP control 
group worked five fewer months than whites. Table 5.7 shows that ethnic minority controls 
also spent more time on benefits. Interestingly, however, ethnic minorities who worked 
seemed to earn more than white workers, which can be seen by looking at their earnings 
levels. Adjusting for employment, ethnic minorities actually earned more than whites, but it 
appears more difficult for them to find work.
142 Analysis presented in Sianesi, 2011, suggests that an increase in working hours rather than in 
wages is responsible for this effect. 
143 Hendra et	al., 2011.
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5.3.2 Subgroup results for the WTC target group
As previously noted, the WTC target group, compared with the NDLP target group, enjoyed more 
labour market advantages and had a stronger attachment to the labour market when they 
entered the study, as they were already working 16 hours to 29 hours per week. Nonetheless, lone 
parents within the WTC group still differed from one another on a number of important background 
characteristics that could affect their levels of engagement with ERA and how much they benefited 
from the programme in economic terms. This section explores these patterns. 
Impacts	on	service	receipt	across	WTC	subgroups
Table 5.8 shows the extent to which ERA increased the likelihood that WTC lone parents would be 
employed and receive help and advice from Jobcentre Plus staff while working (relative to controls). 
The overall pattern reveals that ERA had such an effect for all major subgroup categories.144 As was 
the case for the NDLP target group, the impacts for each subgroup category are highly statistically 
significant. Moreover, those impacts do not differ across categories to a statistically significant 
degree, as is clear from the absence of daggers for most estimates (or the cross-category variation 
was generally small in absolute terms). 
Table 5.9 shows ERA’s effects on the likelihood that participants would participate in training 
(left panel) and combine training courses with work (right panel). ERA increased the likelihood of 
training and combining training and work for nearly all subgroup categories, reflecting the broad 
interest in training across the range of WTC participants. In nearly all cases, the variation in impacts 
across subgroup categories is not statistically significant. (The difference in effects by cohort is an 
exception, although for reasons that are not understood.)
Table 5.10 presents results for bonus receipt. There is less significant variation in receipt of the 
retention bonus for sustained full-time employment than for the NDLP group, probably because 
full-time work was more widespread among the WTC sample. Nonetheless, WTC lone parents with 
older children were more likely to receive the retention bonus than those with younger children. 
Receipt of the training bonus differed more by subgroup. In general, a higher proportion of parents 
in subgroups considered less disadvantaged tended to receive the training bonus, compared with 
the proportion for more disadvantaged parents. For example, bonus receipt was higher among WTC 
lone parents with older children, more recent work experience, or more education, or those living in 
private housing.
144 These effects do not seem to be due to differences in employment rates over the follow-up 
period, because employment rates did not differ much between ERA participants and controls.
144
Table 5.8 Effects of ERA on receipt of help or advice from Jobcentre Plus  
 staff while working, WTC target group, by subgroup  
 (survey respondents only)
Received help/advice from Jobcentre Plus staff while working (%)
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Difference 
(impact) P-value Sample size
All customers 74.0 6.8 67.2 *** 0.000 2,119
Race/ethnicity
White 74.4 6.7 67.8 *** 0.000 1,962
Ethnic minority 68.1 10.0 58.1 *** 0.000 154
Age of youngest child †
Under 7 years 70.1 7.4 62.7 *** 0.000 720
7 to 11 years old 75.6 6.4 69.3 *** 0.000 673
12 to 16 years old 79.6 7.7 71.9 *** 0.000 551
Number of months worked in 3 years prior to 
random assignment
1-12 72.9 9.8 63.1 *** 0.000 233
13+ 74.3 6.4 67.9 *** 0.000 1,864
Housing status †††
Family 65.8 8.2 57.6 *** 0.000 114
Social 69.4 9.3 60.0 *** 0.000 783
Private 77.7 5.4 72.4 *** 0.000 1,201
Qualifications
None 65.1 4.1 61.0 *** 0.000 251
GCSE 75.9 8.3 67.6 *** 0.000 926
A-level or above 75.7 5.9 69.8 *** 0.000 674
Cohort
Early (October 2003 - May 2004) 78.6 9.0 69.6 *** 0.000 435
Late (June 2004 - April 2005) 72.9 6.3 66.6 *** 0.000 1,684
Number of barriers to employment
None 76.9 6.2 70.6 *** 0.000 680
One 71.4 7.9 63.5 *** 0.000 956
Two or more 75.3 5.6 69.7 *** 0.000 483
(continued)
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Table 5.8 Continued
Received help/advice from Jobcentre Plus staff while working (%)
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Difference 
(impact) P-value Sample size
Moderately disadvantaged
Yes 72.3 7.4 64.9 *** 0.000 766
No 74.9 6.6 68.3 *** 0.000 1,353
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from ERA 12- and 24-month customer surveys and baseline information forms completed by DWP staff.
NOTES: Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment characteristics of 
sample members.
 Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
 Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the control group. Statistical 
significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent.
 A statistical test was performed to measure whether impacts differed significantly across subgroup categories. Statistical 
significance levels are indicated as: † = 10 per cent; †† = 5 per cent; and ††† = 1 per cent.
 Family housing refers to situations where the customer is living with his/her parents or other friends or relatives. Social housing 
refers to housing in which the local authority (local government) or a private housing association is the landlord. Private 
housing refers to owner-occupied housing or housing that the customer rents privately.
 Barriers to employment include transport, childcare, health, housing, basic skills, or other self-identified problems.
 Moderately disadvantaged refers to those customers with GCSE qualifications or lower and at least one barrier to 
employment.
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Table 5.10 Bonus receipt rates, WTC target group, by subgroup
Ever received 
work retention 
bonus within 24 
months follow-up 
(%)
Ever received 
training bonus 
within 24 months 
follow-up (%) Sample size
All customers 34.5 19.5 1,415
Race/ethnicity
White 34.4 19.8 1,295
Ethnic minority 36.1 16.0 119
Age of youngest child ††† †††
Under 7 years 29.2 15.0 498
7 to 11 years old 32.2 20.3 427
12 to 16 years old 44.0 23.3 379
Number of months worked in 3 years prior to random assignment †††
1-12 33.6 10.7 150
13+ 34.6 20.7 1,247
Housing status †††
Family 25.4 12.2 88
Social 35.7 16.1 532
Private 34.2 22.7 781
Qualifications †††
None 29.4 13.8 172
GCSE 35.5 16.6 645
A-level or above 34.7 24.9 424
Cohort ††
Early (October 2003 - May 2004) 40.4 16.4 271
Late (June 2004 - April 2005) 33.1 20.2 1,144
Number of barriers to employment
None 37.3 16.8 470
One 33.2 21.1 638
Two or more 33.1 20.6 307
(continued)
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Table 5.10 Continued
Ever received 
work retention 
bonus within 24 
months follow-up 
(%)
Ever received 
training bonus 
within 24 months 
follow-up (%) Sample size
Moderately disadvantaged †
Yes 31.3 18.0 518
No 36.4 20.4 897
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from DWP financial incentives data and baseline information forms completed by DWP staff.
NOTES: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
 Includes all customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005.
 A statistical test was performed to measure whether impacts differed significantly across subgroup categories. Statistical 
significance levels are indicated as: † = 10 per cent; †† = 5 per cent; and ††† = 1 per cent.
 Family housing refers to situations where the customer is living with his/her parents or other friends or relatives. Social housing 
refers to housing in which the local authority (local government) or a private housing association is the landlord. Private 
housing refers to owner-occupied housing or housing that the customer rents privately.
 Barriers to employment include transport, childcare, health, housing, basic skills, or other self-identified problems.
 Moderately disadvantaged refers to those customers with GCSE qualifications or lower and at least one barrier to 
employment.
Impacts	on	economic	outcomes	across	WTC	subgroups
Overall, there is little evidence that ERA’s impacts on labour market outcomes varied across 
subgroups of the WTC target group. Mirroring the full sample results, almost none of the cumulative 
measures on months employed or average earnings are statistically significant (see Table 5.11). 
However, it should be borne in mind that sample sizes for the WTC subgroup are smaller than those 
for the NDLP group, making variation in subgroup impacts more difficult to detect. 
The story is similar when looking at ERA’s impacts on benefits receipt by subgroup (Table 5.12). 
However, the findings for race/ethnicity stand out as a notable exception. These results suggest 
that ERA reduced the likelihood of receiving Income Support or Jobseeker’s Allowance and reduced 
the number of months receiving these benefits, more among ethnic minorities than among whites. 
These impacts for ethnic minorities are statistically significant (denoted by the asterisks), and they 
are larger than the impacts for whites at statistically significant levels (denoted by the daggers). 
These findings follow the pattern in Table 5.11, suggesting that ERA increased average earnings by 
a higher amount for ethnic minorities than for whites, although those earnings differences are not 
statistically significant. 
More generally, ignoring statistical significance, the overall pattern of results for the race/ethnicity 
subgroup is similar for the WTC and NDLP samples. This may lend some credibility to the possibility 
that ERA may have been somewhat more effective for ethnic minority lone parents across the two 
samples. However, sample sizes are small for the ethnic minority subgroups, so these patterns must 
be interpreted with caution.
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5.4 A closer look at the NDLP education subgroup results
This section will take a closer look at variation in the effects of ERA across NDLP lone parents who 
entered the programme with different educational qualifications. This subgroup is of particular 
interest because it is relevant to the more general question of whether post-employment 
programmes like ERA are most effective for those who begin the programme with more human 
capital. One could hypothesise, for example, that those with higher qualifications have a firmer 
foundation for further skills-building and would be more able to qualify for jobs with advancement 
opportunities, which they might be more likely to pursue and secure with ERA’s assistance. 
Alternatively, one might hypothesise that such individuals would do as well on their own and 
that the extra general support and incentives ERA provided for training and advancement were 
largely superfluous – and that they might have been much more beneficial to those with lower 
qualifications, who would otherwise have struggled more to advance on their own.
The subgroup findings already presented have shown that ERA’s effects on labour market and 
benefits receipt outcomes were stronger for the subgroup with A-level qualifications among the 
NDLP group – but not among WTC lone parents. This suggests that educational qualifications may 
not matter among lone parents generally, but, rather, only for those receiving out-of-work benefits. 
For reasons discussed below, this group may have been distinctively primed to benefit from ERA. 
5.4.1 Robustness of the education subgroup finding 
In general, subgroup findings are less certain than full-sample findings, and it is possible that the 
stronger impacts for those with A-level qualifications are simply the product of random variation. 
Every impact estimate carries with it some estimation error (which is why they are referred to as 
‘estimates’ of the ‘true’ impacts).145 As more and more statistical tests are performed, as with 
multiple subgroup comparisons, the risk rises that any particular subgroup impact finding that 
appears as statistically significant will itself be a consequence of chance variation. Thus, it is 
important to consider other patterns in the data, not just statistical significance.
One way of assessing the robustness of ERA’s impacts on the A-level subgroup is to determine 
whether the same pattern of results occurs in multiple independent samples. Thus, for this 
study, the analysis estimated these subgroup impacts separately for each of the six districts that 
operated ERA. A limitation of such an analysis is that the sample sizes become very small, making 
it more difficult for impacts to reach minimum levels of statistical significance. Thus, this analysis 
considers the pattern and direction of the effects, with less emphasis than elsewhere on statistical 
significance. 
Figure 5.2 shows ERA’s impacts on months receiving Income Support, months employed, and 
average total four-year earnings by district. The top panel shows that ERA reduced the total months 
on Income Support by more than one month in four of the six districts (however, the impacts are 
statistically significant only in North West England). The second panel shows that ERA increased 
the duration of employment by more than one month in five of the six districts (though the effects 
were significant only in North West England). The third panel shows that ERA’s impacts on earnings 
exceeded £1,000 in four of the districts and are statistically significant in two of the districts (London 
and North West England). As a whole, the results suggest that the pattern of stronger impacts for 
the A-level group is relatively consistent across districts, though one can never rule out the possibility 
that this subgroup effect is a statistical aberration.
145 In this study, the probability of any given test indicating that a result is statistically significant 
when there is no real effect is ten per cent.
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Figure 5.2 Impacts of ERA among those with A-level educational qualifications, 
 NDLP target group only
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One difficulty in interpreting subgroup differences is that individuals fall into multiple inter-correlated 
categories. It is easy to imagine, for example, that lone parents who had A-level qualifications 
when they entered the study may have also been more motivated and more likely to find and 
keep jobs and progress in work on their own, without ERA, than those without such qualifications. 
This expectation is supported in part by the data on the control group (not shown), indicating that 
controls with A-level qualifications had more labour market advantages to begin with than did lone 
parents without such qualifications. For example, among controls, 34 per cent of those with A-level 
qualifications worked in the year before random assignment, compared with less than 24 per cent 
among the no-qualifications group. Those with A-level qualifications also received less in welfare 
assistance before random assignment, compared with control group members who had lower 
educational qualifications.
In order to assess whether these types of starting advantages among those with A-level 
qualifications were the source of the larger A-level impacts, a ‘conditional subgroup analysis’ was 
conducted. That analysis controlled for the potential influence of other background characteristics 
that distinguished lone parents in this subgroup from those without such qualifications. Had the 
bigger impacts for the A-level subgroup disappeared after that test, it would imply that having an 
A-level qualification per se was not the reason this subgroup benefited more from ERA. However, 
the bigger impacts for the A-level subgroup persisted, suggesting that educational qualifications did 
matter for ERA to be effective for NDLP lone parents.146 
5.4.2 Comparisons of education subgroup results for the WTC and ND25+ 
 target groups 
The subgroup findings for the WTC target group presented earlier in this chapter do not reveal 
the same pattern of larger impacts for the A-level subgroup. Nor, as Chapter 6 will show, did ERA 
have larger effects for ND25+ participants with A-level qualifications versus those without such 
qualifications. Why would this be the case? It could be an indication that the pattern of stronger 
impacts for NDLP participants with A-levels is simply a product of chance. However, it is also possible 
that those with A-levels in the NDLP group are different from those with A-levels in the other target 
groups in ways that distinctively positioned them to benefit from ERA.
A-level lone parents in the WTC target group were, of course, already working and, hence, more 
attached to the labour market and more interested in advancing when they began ERA. Thus, they 
were a more select group of lone parents than A-level participants in the NDLP group. It may be that 
the kinds of incentives and services ERA offered mattered less to them in the long run or were simply 
not enough to help them achieve more than they could have without the programme. 
In contrast, NDLP lone parents with A-level qualifications had much less recent work experience, 
and because they were out of work and had younger children, they may have been less focused 
on advancement and more ambivalent about taking on full-time work in the absence of ERA. Still, 
because of their A-level qualifications, more employment and advancement opportunities would 
146 This involved running a series of multiple regression equations in which the ERA treatment 
variable was interacted with various other baseline characteristics in addition to educational 
level. If A-level participants had a larger impact than the other education subgroups only 
because they had more work experience or other advantages, the independent impact for 
the A-level subgroup would disappear once those other interaction terms were controlled. But 
this did not happen. Another analysis conducted as part of the cross-office analysis presented 
earlier in this chapter that controlled not only for individual-level characteristics but also for 
office-level factors similarly found that the A-level effect was resilient to numerous statistical 
controls (see Robins and Dorsett, forthcoming, 2011, for further details).
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be open to them than to those with lower or no qualifications. In this sense, they had more latent 
or reserve capacity to work and advance. It may be that ERA’s incentives, encouragement, and 
assistance tapped that capacity and effectively encouraged them and helped them pursue work, 
especially full-time work, more than they would have on their own. Thus, it may have been the 
combination of being out of work and having more qualifications, rather than simply having more 
qualifications – a combination that did not exist for the WTC target group – that mattered most. 
A-level participants in the ND25+ group were most obviously different from those in the NDLP group 
in that most were men, few were custodial parents, and all were subject to Jobseeker’s Allowance 
requirements to look for work. Those who did work, whether in the programme or control group, 
were already inclined to work full time. Thus, A-level participants in the NDLP and ND25+ groups 
differed in many other ways, and factors other than educational level may have influenced how 
those in the ND25+ group responded to the types of assistance ERA offered. 
5.4.3 Variation in service receipt by education subgroups
Another possible explanation for the larger earnings impacts among those with A-levels is that they 
may have had a different experience in the programme. For example, those with A-levels might have 
had larger earnings effects because they were much more likely to receive the full ERA package or 
certain key components of the programme.
Table 5.3 shows that although NDLP participants with A-level qualifications were more likely to 
receive this kind of help than those with no qualifications, they had similar rates of receiving in-work 
help or advice, compared with those who had General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) 
qualifications. Yet ERA had larger impacts on economic outcomes, especially average earnings and 
months on Income Support, for those with A-level qualifications. Table 5.4 shows that the variation 
in impacts across the education subgroups on training or on combining work and training is not 
statistically significant. Thus, it seems unlikely that the stronger impacts among NDLP participants 
with A-levels are due to substantially higher receipt of in-work support or in-work education and 
training. It is possible, however, that those with A-levels had a stronger reaction to a given level of 
participation, compared with the other subgroups. As suggested above, they may have been more 
positioned to benefit from the assistance offered. 147 
When considering the individual components of ERA, it is most notable that individuals with 
A-levels were substantially more likely to receive the retention bonus, compared with the other 
education subgroups. Among those with A-level qualifications, 41.4 per cent received the retention 
bonus within the first two years; this is 15 percentage points higher than the GCSE group and 21 
percentage points higher than the no-qualifications group. While it is impossible to state with 
certainty, the offer of the retention bonus may have partly contributed to the larger A-level impacts 
by encouraging more full-time employment among a group with a higher reserve capacity to work, 
as previously discussed. 
5.4.4 Secondary outcomes for the A-level subgroup
Given the large effect on total earnings, one might expect that ERA might have produced impacts 
on secondary outcomes for the A-level subgroup. However, analysis of a range of non-financial 
outcomes suggests that this was not the case. There were few impacts on secondary outcomes, 
such as the health or well-being of families and children, for the A-level subgroup, mirroring the full 
sample. 
147 It is also important in this regard to note that ERA had larger economic impacts for the NDLP 
than the WTC A-level subgroup, even though there was a much smaller impact on service 
receipt for the NDLP group.
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5.5 Correspondence between impacts on training and impacts  
 on earnings
The subgroup analysis discussed in the previous section can serve another purpose. Subgroups 
differed, not only based on impacts on labour market outcomes but also based on receipt of 
programme services and supports. This section examines variation in ERA’s effects on participation 
in training, and whether that variation seemed to generate different impacts on earnings. As 
discussed elsewhere, one of the main goals of ERA was to promote advancement through increased 
skills acquisition. ERA provided financial incentives and guidance from advisers to encourage more 
participation in education and training courses. Identifying subgroups for which ERA had particularly 
large impacts on participation in education and training can shed light on an important policy 
question: Do large impacts on key education and training outcomes lead to economic advancement 
in the longer term? This analysis will examine this question by measuring whether the effects on 
cumulative earnings correlate with impacts on training outcomes.
Figure 5.3 shows ERA’s impacts on course-taking in years 1-2 and impacts on total four-year 
earnings across the educational qualifications subgroups (the detailed estimates underlying Figure 
5.3 are shown in Table 5.13). The analysis focuses on training in the first two years in order to provide 
a sufficient amount of time for training to translate into advancement gains.148 It is reasonable to 
expect, however, that not all training courses are equally relevant for advancement. In particular, 
courses specific to occupations in which people currently work or to which they are hoping to 
transfer would be expected to lead more quickly to economic advancement. For the purposes of this 
analysis, courses were categorised as ‘trade-specific’ if they were relevant to specific occupations, 
such as nursing or business. 149 
To facilitate the comparison of impacts, all impacts are expressed in ‘percentage change’ terms (to 
do this, the impact was divided by the control group level and multiplied by 100). The purpose of 
Figure 5.3 is to measure whether impacts on training and qualifications correlate with impacts on 
earnings. For example, if subgroups that experienced a larger-than-average impact on training also 
had a larger-than-average impact on earnings, this would suggest that the additional training may 
have contributed to the larger earnings impacts. However, an important caveat to this analysis is 
that ERA did more than incentivise and support training; thus, the contribution of other features of 
the programme cannot be ruled out. However, the absence of a correspondence between training 
impacts and earnings impacts would suggest that ERA’s impacts on training did not pay off in the 
labour market, or that labour market gains were achieved without increases in training. 
148 As discussed in Chapter 4, ERA’s impact on training faded after year 2. 
149 For more information, see Hendra et	al., 2011.
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Table 5.13 Impacts of ERA on training during years 1-2, and cumulative earnings 
 from 2005-2009 by baseline level of education subgroups
Outcome
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Difference 
(impact) P-value
Percentage 
change (%)
NDLP
All customers
Took any course (%) 60.6 55.7 4.8 ** 0.017 8.7
Took trade-specific courses (%) 50.8 46.0 4.8 ** 0.019 10.4
Obtained any training qualification (%) 24.6 23.0 1.7 0.347 7.2
Earnings 2005-2009 tax years (£) 17,280 16,742 538 0.325 3.2
Sample size (total = 6,787) 3,365 3,422
Qualifications
A-level or above 
Took any course (%) 70.8 70.7 0.2 0.968 0.2
Took trade-specific courses (%) 63.0 63.0 0.0 0.996 0.0
Obtained any training qualification (%) 29.1 30.7 -1.6 0.693 -5.1
Earnings 2005-2009 tax years (£) 26,383 22,845 3,537 ** 0.018 15.5
Sample size (total = 1,465) 738 727
GCSE
Took any course (%) 60.3 53.3 7.0 ** 0.020 13.1
Took trade-specific courses (%) 50.1 44.3 5.8 * 0.057 13.1
Obtained any training qualification (%) 25.4 22.9 2.6 0.327 11.2
Earnings 2005-2009 tax years (£) 15,546 16,183 -637 0.392 -3.9
Sample size (total = 3,237) 1,602 1,635
None
Took any course (%) 49.4 45.4 4.0 0.372 8.8
Took trade-specific courses (%) 37.2 33.7 3.5 0.411 10.5
Obtained any training qualification (%) 15.7 15.8 -0.1 0.975 -0.6
Earnings 2005-2009 tax years (£) 12,289 12,923 -634 0.513 -4.9
Sample size (total = 1,572) 778 794
(continued)
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Table 5.13 Continued
Outcome
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Difference 
(impact) P-value
Percentage 
change (%)
WTC
All customers
Took any course (%) 72.2 59.6 12.6 *** 0.000 21.1
Took trade-specific courses (%) 68.0 54.5 13.5 *** 0.000 24.8
Obtained any training qualification (%) 32.6 28.0 4.5 ** 0.023 16.2
Earnings 2005-2009 tax years (£) 30,615 29,695 921 0.279 3.1
Sample size (total = 2,815) 1,415 1,400
Qualifications
A-level or above 
Took any course (%) 79.8 71.6 8.2 ** 0.014 11.5
Took trade-specific courses (%) 74.2 71.3 2.9 0.531 4.1
Obtained any training qualification (%) 39.7 34.1 5.6 0.139 16.4
Earnings 2005-2009 tax years (£) 35,699 34,575 1,124 0.515 3.3
Sample size (total = 863) 424 439
GCSE
Took any course (%) 72.9 55.6 17.4 *** 0.000 31.3
Took trade-specific courses (%) 69.0 48.3 20.6 *** 0.000 42.6
Obtained any training qualification (%) 30.4 26.2 4.2 0.162 16.0
Earnings 2005-2009 tax years (£) 29,396 27,860 1,536 0.180 5.5
Sample size (total = 1,268) 645 623
None
Took any course (%) 55.3 42.3 13.0 ** 0.042 30.7
Took trade-specific courses (%) 52.1 38.1 14.0 * 0.069 36.7
Obtained any training qualification (%) 22.8 20.2 2.6 0.626 12.9
Earnings 2005-2009 tax years (£) 22,437 23,022 -585 0.805 -2.5
Sample size (total = 340) 172 168
SOURCES: MDRC calculations from ERA 12- and 24-month customer surveys and Work and Pensions Longitudinal Survey earnings records. 
NOTES: To facilitate the comparison of impacts, all impacts in this figure are expressed in ‘percentage change’ terms. To do this, the 
impact was divided by the control group level and multiplied by 100. Statistical significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per 
cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent. 
 The sample size shown reflects the sample size of the full sample on administrative records measures.  The sample size for the 
survey-based measures (‘Took any course’, ‘Took trade-specific course’, and ‘Obtained any training qualification’) is lower.
Generally, Figure 5.3 suggests that increasing course-taking alone did not lead to increases 
in earnings during the follow-up period. But neither did the acquisition of new qualifications, 
such as training certificates, obtained by completing those courses. This is partly evident from 
the experiences of members of the NDLP subgroup who entered the programme with A-level 
qualifications. As discussed elsewhere, earnings impacts for this subgroup were more than 15 per 
cent above those of the control group, which is the largest increase among the subgroups shown 
in Figure 5.3. However, those with A-levels did not experience increases in any of the education and 
training measures shown in the figure. A closer examination of the course-taking impacts for this 
subgroup reveals very few effects of ERA on any course-taking outcomes.150 Therefore, it seems likely 
150 One exception is that ERA did increase the percentage of full-time workers with A-levels who 
trained (while in full-time work) by 11 percentage points (a non-experimental comparison). 
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that the impacts for this subgroup reflect the effectiveness of other ERA components, such as the 
employment retention bonus or adviser advancement support. As discussed above, this subgroup 
had relatively high take-up of the employment retention bonus, suggesting that the retention bonus 
was more important than the training support and training incentives, at least for this subgroup.151 
Results for NDLP participants who entered ERA with GCSEs also point to a lack of correspondence 
between increases in training and increases in earnings. This group experienced statistically 
significant impacts on taking any courses in general and in taking trade-specific courses, but no 
effect on longer-term earnings. A similar pattern is evident across the full WTC group, as well as 
each of the WTC subgroups, shown in Figure 5.3. Every subgroup of WTC sample members shown 
in the figure experienced statistically significant increases in key training outcomes in years 1-2. 
Some of the impacts on course-taking were quite large in percentage-change terms. For example, 
among WTC group members with GCSE qualifications, ERA increased trade-specific course-taking by 
over 40 per cent. Despite these large effects on course-taking, none of the subgroups experienced a 
statistically significant increase in earnings. 
Figure 5.4 shows the same analysis for the age of youngest child subgroups as Figure 5.3 does for 
the educational qualifications subgroups (the detailed estimates underlying Figure 5.4 are shown in 
Table 5.14). The patterns are very similar to those discussed above. As discussed above, among the 
NDLP youngest child age subgroups, the largest impact on earnings was among those with children 
ages five to six. Yet, this subgroup experienced no increases in any of the measures of education 
and training participation or obtaining a qualification, shown in Figure 5.4. This is consistent with 
the pattern of effects among the A-level subgroup noted above, reinforcing the conclusion that 
elements of ERA besides the training support were most likely responsible for the increase in 
earnings.
151 Another possibility is that because those with A-levels did not need to train as much in order 
to find work, they could find work more quickly than those with lower educational credentials 
(and thereby could take advantage of the ERA retention bonus).
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Figure 5.3 Percentage change impacts of ERA on training during years 1-2,  
 and cumulative earnings from 2005-2009 by baseline level of  
 education subgroups
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Figure 5.4 Percentage change impacts of ERA on training during years 1-2,  
 and cumulative earnings from 2005-2009 by age of youngest  
 child subgroups
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Table 5.14 Impacts of ERA on training during years 1-2, and cumulative earnings 
 from 2005-2009 by age of youngest child subgroups
Outcome
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Difference 
(impact) P-value
Percentage 
change (%)
NDLP
All customers
Took any course (%) 60.6 55.7 4.8 ** 0.017 8.7
Took trade-specific courses (%) 50.8 46.0 4.8 ** 0.019 10.4
Obtained any training qualification (%) 24.6 23.0 1.7 0.347 7.2
Earnings 2005-2009 tax years (£) 17,280 16,742 538 0.325 3.2
Sample size (total = 6,787) 3,365 3,422
Age of youngest child
4 or younger
Took any course (%) 61.0 54.2 6.8 * 0.052 12.6
Took trade-specific courses (%) 50.8 45.0 5.8 0.102 12.8
Obtained any training qualification (%) 20.8 20.1 0.7 0.809 3.4
Earnings 2005-2009 tax years (£) 14,217 14,760 -543 0.494 -3.7
Sample size (total = 2,745) 1,388 1,357
5 to 6
Took any course (%) 63.4 61.9 1.5 0.790 2.5
Took trade-specific courses (%) 52.7 51.5 1.2 0.843 2.3
Obtained any training qualification (%) 28.5 28.3 0.2 0.973 0.6
Earnings 2005-2009 tax years (£) 16,748 13,366 3,382 *** 0.010 25.3
Sample size (total = 997) 517 480
7 to 11
Took any course (%) 64.1 57.8 6.3 0.154 10.8
Took trade-specific courses (%) 56.8 48.7 8.2 * 0.068 16.8
Obtained any training qualification (%) 33.2 25.3 7.9 ** 0.047 31.4
Earnings 2005-2009 tax years (£) 18,963 18,385 578 0.622 3.1
Sample size (total = 1,648) 805 843
12 to 16
Took any course (%) 58.6 51.3 7.3 0.244 14.3
Took trade-specific courses (%) 45.3 42.7 2.6 0.670 6.0
Obtained any training qualification (%) 25.4 19.7 5.7 0.296 28.8
Earnings 2005-2009 tax years (£) 23,268 22,179 1,088 0.511 4.9
Sample size (total = 992) 476 516
(continued)
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Table 5.14 Continued
Outcome
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Difference 
(impact) P-value
Percentage 
change (%)
WTC
All customers
Took any course (%) 72.2 59.6 12.6 *** 0.000 21.1
Took trade-specific courses (%) 68.0 54.5 13.5 *** 0.000 24.8
Obtained any training qualification (%) 32.6 28.0 4.5 ** 0.023 16.2
Earnings 2005-2009 tax years (£) 30,615 29,695 921 0.279 3.1
Sample size (total = 2,815) 1,415 1,400
Age of youngest child
4 or younger
Took any course (%) 81.5 59.3 22.2 *** 0.000 37.4
Took trade-specific courses (%) 71.1 49.5 21.6 *** 0.000 43.7
Obtained any training qualification (%) 34.1 29.7 4.4 0.415 14.7
Earnings 2005-2009 tax years (£) 26,829 25,105 1,724 0.336 6.9
Sample size (total = 641) 329 312
5 to 6
Took any course (%) 74.9 60.9 14.0 * 0.072 23.1
Took trade-specific courses (%) 74.9 51.5 23.4 *** 0.004 45.4
Obtained any training qualification (%) 32.2 29.3 2.9 0.715 10.0
Earnings 2005-2009 tax years (£) 29,248 27,089 2,159 0.321 8.0
Sample size (total = 359) 169 190
7 to 11
Took any course (%) 71.7 64.5 7.2 0.115 11.2
Took trade-specific courses (%) 62.9 59.2 3.7 0.441 6.2
Obtained any training qualification (%) 36.2 29.1 7.1 0.132 24.2
Earnings 2005-2009 tax years (£) 31,413 31,661 -247 0.868 -0.8
Sample size (total = 864) 427 437
12 to 16
Took any course (%) 82.3 59.2 23.2 *** 0.000 39.1
Took trade-specific courses (%) 73.7 54.7 19.0 *** 0.001 34.7
Obtained any training qualification (%) 40.1 26.9 13.2 ** 0.019 49.0
Earnings 2005-2009 tax years (£) 33,016 32,004 1,011 0.562 3.2
Sample size (total = 704) 379 325
SOURCES: MDRC calculations from ERA 12- and 24-month customer surveys and Work and Pensions Longitudinal Survey earnings records. 
NOTES: To facilitate the comparison of impacts, all impacts in this figure are expressed in ‘percentage change’ terms. To do this, the 
impact was divided by the control group level and multiplied by 100. Statistical significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per 
cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent.
 The sample size shown reflects the sample size of the full sample on administrative records measures. The sample size for the 
survey-based measures (‘Took any course’, ‘Took trade-specific course’, and ‘Obtained any training qualification’) is lower.
 The ‘age of youngest child’ subgroup categorisation in this table is a proxy based on other survey variables. Although it does 
not utilise the actual subgroup measure captured at baseline (because of data constraints), the levels for this alternative 
subgroup definition are very similar to the actual baseline measure. As such, the estimates and sample sizes for this subgroup 
category may differ slightly from those presented in other tables.
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The subgroup impacts across the age of youngest child subgroups among WTC participants show 
a similar pattern. Some of the subgroups experienced very large impacts on training participation 
that did not translate into a longer-term effect on cumulative earnings. For example, among WTC 
programme group members who had children aged 12 to 16, ERA increased the attainment of 
occupational credentials by nearly 50 per cent above the control group level, but still had no effect 
on earnings.152 An analysis performed for the ERA training report suggests a possible correlation 
between impacts on attaining training qualifications and impacts on earnings. This correlation 
appears to have gone away in the long run, at least among the subgroups shown in Figure 5.4.
More information on the effects of ERA on training can be found in the ERA training report. (The 
findings from that report are summarised in Box 5.2.) The analysis in the report found that much 
of the training that ERA induced was in occupationally relevant skill areas. However, one weakness 
of ERA training may be that it tried primarily to accommodate participants’ interests in training, 
regardless of the demand for workers in occupations relevant to that training, and advisers were not 
trained or positioned to help participants who trained in a particular occupational area to make a 
direct connection to employers who were hiring people with those newly acquired skills.
Box 5.2 Summary of findings from the ERA training report
Many low-income people face skill deficits that hinder their advancement in the labour market. 
This has become an issue of central importance in the UK.153 Efforts to address the skills 
disadvantage through training have been mixed; persistence in and completion of training 
has been a continuing challenge.154 Working lone parents, in particular, find it difficult to find 
time to complete training or are reluctant to trade limited time available for their children for 
time spent in training. There are also issues of confidence. Many low-income individuals may 
have had difficulty in formal education, making the prospect of training in adulthood seem 
intimidating for some. Finally, simply taking training classes is not enough. To be effective, 
training needs to impart skills that are in demand by employers, and it is sometimes difficult 
to know which courses to take. Together, these factors create a ‘skills gap’ for many low-wage 
workers. 
One of the key goals of the ERA demonstration was to encourage human capital development 
by supporting and creating incentives for training among low-wage workers. To accomplish 
this, the programme provided adviser support and financial incentives for completing training 
and working full time. The ERA training report155 looks specifically at the delivery, take-up, and 
outcomes of the training support and incentives ERA provided. A central question is whether an 
approach that features intensive adviser support and financial incentives encourages training 
beyond what would normally occur.
Main findings
• ERA increased the proportion of people who took courses and took courses while working.
• The increase in training was concentrated in courses that were focused on occupational or 
workplace skills.
• A combination of advisory support and financial incentives was found to be important, 
although some people valued one more than the other. 
• ERA increased training among those who were at an academic disadvantage.
• The early evidence on the economic outcomes from training was mixed.
152 Hendra et	al., 2011.
153 Leitch, 2006.
154 Martinson and Holcomb, 2007.
155 Hendra et	al., 2011.
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5.6 Conclusions
This chapter has demonstrated that the full-sample impacts of ERA among lone parents mask 
significant variation in impacts among NDLP lone parents by location and across subgroups. 
Statistically significant variation in the impacts of ERA on the number of months employed and the 
number of months receiving benefits was found across offices. Impacts on these outcomes and 
cumulative earnings also varied across several important subgroups, with some positive results 
found for ethnic minorities, parents with a youngest child five to six years old, and lone parents with 
A-level qualifications. 
This variation across offices and subgroups provided an opportunity to understand which aspects of 
the multi-faceted ERA programme were most effective in improving labour market outcomes. The 
analyses in this chapter examined three components of ERA that may have been expected to drive 
the variation in economic impacts: (1) in-work advancement support and help from advisers, (2) 
the employment retention bonus, and (3) training support and incentives. The cross-office analysis 
found that participants’ receipt of in-work advancement-related support and assistance as well as 
knowledge of the employment retention bonus may have contributed to better impacts. However, 
it also found that increasing participation in training or increasing adviser encouragement or help in 
finding training had no labour market pay-off for participants during the study’s follow-up period. 
The subgroup analysis also points to the possible importance of the employment retention bonus 
and strongly supports the finding that the incremental training that ERA encouraged did not 
produce longer-term earnings impacts. This is especially notable because ERA caused a large 
increase in training and in receipt of new qualifications, such as training completion certificates, for 
some subgroups. It may be that a mismatch between the types of courses taken and available job 
opportunities, and ERA’s inability to help participants who had completed training move into jobs in 
which they could use their newly acquired skills, may have limited the returns to training in terms of 
measurable earnings gains.156 
156 A recent US-based study by Public/Private Ventures points to the effectiveness of demand-
driven, sectoral training (Maguire et	al., 2010). MDRC is currently evaluating a new programme 
called WorkAdvance, which will use a similar strategy, combined with elements of the US and 
UK ERA models.
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6 Impacts of ERA on labour 
 market and other outcomes 
 for long-term unemployed 
 (New Deal 25 Plus) 
 participants
Box 6.1  Chapter 6 at a glance
• Compared with the other two target groups in the Employment Retention and Advancement 
(ERA) evaluation, the New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+) group faced more severe labour market 
disadvantages at the time of random assignment. 
• ERA produced statistically significant increases in employment and earnings for the ND25+ 
group after the first year. These impacts persisted through the end of the follow-up period 
and were likely to continue beyond it. 
• ERA also produced persistent reductions in benefits receipt over the five-year follow-up 
period, although the reductions moderated somewhat after month 33, the point at which 
the programme formally ended.
• Some evidence suggests that ERA helped ND25+ group members find jobs more quickly and 
remain at their initial jobs longer. 
• Some districts had more success than others. In two of the six (East Midlands and Scotland) 
ERA produced large and statistically significant impacts on employment, earnings, and 
receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance. 
• ERA’s impacts were not concentrated in any particular subgroups, suggesting that even 
some more difficult-to-help members of this target group benefited from the programme.
6.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the impact findings for ERA’s third target group, ND25+ enrollees. In 
interpreting these findings, it is important to keep in mind just how different the ND25+ group is 
from the two other groups that participated in the demonstration – the New Deal for Lone Parents 
(NDLP) and Working Tax Credit (WTC) target groups. ND25+ enrollees are mostly men over the age 
of 25 (most are actually over 30 years old), whereas NDLP and WTC lone parents are mostly women. 
At the time the study began, ND25+ sample members were receiving Jobseeker’s Allowance, which 
required that they actively seek work as a condition of maintaining their eligibility for this benefit. 
In contrast, lone parents in the NDLP target group were recipients of Income Support, which carried 
no work search requirements. ND25+ sample members, because they had been unemployed and 
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receiving Jobseeker’s Allowance for at least 18 out of 21 months before random assignment,157 were 
mandated to participate in the New Deal welfare-to-work programme (which, for the ERA group, 
was the first stage of ERA). No such mandate applied to the lone parents. Those in the NDLP target 
group had volunteered for the New Deal programme, and WTC lone parents were not involved in the 
New Deal at all, because they were already working. 
Given their different route into the research sample, the ND25+ group, on average, faced greater 
labour market disadvantages than the lone parent target groups. Many lacked skills or had outdated 
skills, a short or patchy work history, and transport difficulties. Over 36 per cent had no educational 
qualifications at all, compared with 24 per cent of the NDLP group and 12 per cent of the WTC 
group (see Table 2.2). About 45 per cent (similar to the NDLP group) had not worked at all in the 
three years before they entered the demonstration. About 77 per cent said that they had no driving 
licence or lacked access to a car, compared with 68 per cent of the NDLP group and 33 per cent 
of the WTC group. About 20 per cent of the ND25+ group reported suffering from some long-term 
illness or disability. As Chapter 3 discussed, programme staff found it somewhat more challenging 
to engage ND25+ participants in services. Nationally, the ND25+ group has been found to have 
relatively low employment retention rates, with only one in four ND25+ customers leaving benefits 
for sustained work.158 It is also a group known to have more alcohol and substance abuse problems 
and involvement with the criminal justice system than lone parents.
The availability of survey data for the NDLP and WTC groups has aided in understanding the nature 
of these impacts. However, the impact analysis for the ND25+ group relies solely on administrative 
data, because less survey data are available for this group.159 
6.2 ERA’s overall impacts on the ND25+ target group
6.2.1 ERA’s impact on employment 
Table 6.1 makes it immediately clear how detached the ND25+ group normally was from the labour 
market, even during a period when it was fairly strong, as during the early years of ERA. As the 
table shows, only about 31 per cent to 35 per cent of ND25+ control group members worked in any 
given year during the five-year follow-up period, and 55.1 per cent had worked at all during those 
five years, at least in jobs covered by administrative data. ERA made a small difference in these 
employment rates. It increased the likelihood of ever working within the full follow-up period by a 
statistically significant 2.2 percentage points (a gain of about four per cent over the control group 
rate). It also had a positive and statistically significant employment effect in each year, with a peak 
impact of 3.6 percentage points occurring during the second year (an 11 per cent increase over the 
control group rate). 
In the first follow-up year, when the programme mainly provided pre-employment services through 
the New Deal programme (a version of the same programme to which the control group was 
assigned), ERA increased participants’ likelihood of being employed by 1.9 percentage points. 
157 The majority of those who commence a claim for Jobseeker’s Allowance do not continue on for 
18 or more months and are therefore not mandated to join ND25+. In 2004-2005, for example, 
only about six per cent of Jobseeker’s Allowance claims reached 18 consecutive months (Miller 
et	al., 2008). However, these numbers are increasing in the wake of the recent recession.
158 Miller et	al., 2008.
159 Surveys at 12 and 24 months were conducted for ND25+ sample members, but the samples 
were small because many customers were difficult to contact. Furthermore, the response rates 
were low, leading to insufficient sample sizes for analysis purposes. The ND25+ group was not 
surveyed at 60 months. 
Impacts of ERA on labour market and other outcomes for long-term unemployed 
(New Deal 25 Plus) participants
170
Table 6.1 Effects of ERA on employment and earnings within five years  
 after random assignment, ND25+ target group
Outcome
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Difference 
(impact) P-value
Ever employed during (%)
Year 1 37.3 35.4 1.9 * 0.098
Year 2 36.3 32.7 3.6 *** 0.001
Year 3 34.6 32.5 2.1 * 0.057
Year 4 35.0 32.1 2.9 *** 0.009
Year 5 32.8 30.9 1.9 * 0.094
Years 1-5 57.3 55.1 2.2 * 0.057
Average number of months employed during
Year 1 2.5 2.3 0.1 0.216
Year 2 2.9 2.6 0.3 *** 0.009
Year 3 3.0 2.7 0.2 ** 0.025
Year 4 3.0 2.8 0.2 ** 0.047
Year 5 2.9 2.7 0.3 ** 0.025
Years 1-5 14.3 13.2 1.1 ** 0.010
Employed during month 24 (%) 24.3 22.1 2.3 ** 0.025
Employed during month 36 (%) 25.1 23.5 1.6 0.114
Employed during month 48 (%) 25.7 23.3 2.4 ** 0.019
Employed during month 60 (%) 23.4 21.8 1.6 0.103
Average earnings during 2005-2006 tax year (£) 3,070 2,758 312 ** 0.032
Average earnings during 2006-2007 tax year (£) 3,447 3,104 342 ** 0.036
Average earnings during 2007-2008 tax year (£) 3,692 3,228 464 *** 0.007
Average earnings during 2008-2009 tax year (£) 3,954 3,591 363 ** 0.046
Average 4-year earnings during 2005-2009 tax years (£) 14,162 12,681 1,481 ** 0.012
Employed during 2005-2006 tax year (%) 37.7 33.9 3.8 *** 0.001
Employed during 2006-2007 tax year (%) 35.7 33.0 2.7 ** 0.016
Employed during 2007-2008 tax year (%) 36.2 33.5 2.7 ** 0.015
Employed during 2008-2009 tax year (%) 36.2 34.4 1.7 0.127
Average number of employment spells 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.119
Average number of non-employment spells 1.2 1.2 0.0 0.690
Average number of months to first employment 32.7 33.9 -1.2 ** 0.047
Average duration of first employment (months) 10.0 9.0 0.9 ** 0.012
Time to first employment (%)
Employed in month of RAa 10.4 10.5 -0.1 0.884
1 to 6 months 19.4 19.1 0.2 0.795
7 to 12 months 8.5 7.1 1.4 ** 0.037
13 to 24 months 8.1 7.1 1.0 0.125
Greater than 24 months 10.9 11.2 -0.3 0.730
Never employed in first 60 months 42.7 44.9 -2.2 * 0.057
Sample size = 6,782 3,424 3,358
SOURCES: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment records.
NOTES: Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment characteristics of 
sample members.
 Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
 Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the control group. Statistical 
significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent.
 Includes all customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005.
 aRA refers to random assignment.
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Because both the programme and control groups received similar services at the beginning, large 
early impacts on employment were not expected. In year 2, as more ERA participants moved into 
the post-employment (or ‘in-work’) phase, ERA’s employment impact almost doubled, reaching 3.6 
percentage points.160 Although this effect declined somewhat in year 3, possibly because of short-
lived jobs, it increased by almost a full percentage point in year 4, suggesting the possibility of some 
re-employment among those who had left their earlier jobs. But then it declined by a percentage 
point in year 5, equalling the impact in the first year. Overall, the administrative data strongly 
indicate a pattern of positive impacts on employment for the ND25+ group that rise and then fall, 
but appear to persist even after the post-employment phase of the programme (years 2 and 3) 
ended. It appears that, in contrast to the results for the two lone parent target groups, ERA had had 
a sustained impact on employment for the ND25+ group.161 
As a check on the above results, which are based on employers’ reports of individuals’ employment 
start and end dates, an alternative employment measure was constructed using employer-reported 
earnings data for each of four tax years.162 Employment effects based on these data do not cover all 
five follow-up years, but they have the advantage of being easily aligned with the earnings impacts, 
which are also based on tax years (see below). As Table 6.1 shows, ERA’s employment impact 
for tax year 2005-2006 is 3.8 percentage points, which is slightly larger than the 3.6 percentage 
point impact in the second year after random assignment. The tax-year employment impacts are 
statistically significant in each of those first three tax years.
The monthly employment rate is low for the control group throughout the follow-up period, 
starting out at less than ten per cent, but never reaching more than 25 per cent (Figure 6.1). This is 
considerably lower than the rate for the NDLP control group (which was usually over 40 per cent) 
and the rate for the WTC control group (which was usually over 60 per cent), reflecting the more 
severe labour market disadvantages faced by the ND25+ sample. After the initial rise in the first six 
160 These pooled results differ from the results for the ND25+ group presented in Miller et	al., 2008, 
which gave equal weight to all six districts regardless of their sample sizes. As discussed in 
Appendix A, the results presented in this report are not weighted by district. Consequently, the 
pooled impact estimates presented here are larger than previously reported for the first two 
years of follow-up. The difference is primarily because Wales has a relatively small sample, 
but relatively large negative impacts. When Wales is given less weight (in accordance with 
its smaller size), the pooled impact estimates are larger than when Wales is given the same 
weight as the other districts (allowing its negative impacts to have a bigger influence on the 
pooled estimates). This change in weighting strategy did not have a large effect among the 
NDLP group. The WTC impacts were never weighted by district.
161 Paralleling the impacts on ever being employed in a given year are positive impacts in all 
five years on the number of months employed. As in the case of ever being employed, the 
peak impact on the number of months employed occurs in year 2 and is about .3 months, 
representing about an 11 per cent impact. However, after declining in years 3 and 4 to about 
.2 months, it again increases to .3 months in year 5, strengthening the conclusion that ERA has 
permanently increased employment for the ND25+ group. Over all five years, the impact is 1.1 
months (about an eight per cent impact) and is statistically significant. 
162 Programme years and tax years are not the same, but they do overlap (see Figure 2.1). 
The employment variable from the tax-year data was defined as one if tax-year earnings 
were greater than zero, and zero if there were no earnings in the tax year. The follow-up 
period based on tax years begins with 2005-2006, because the prior tax year would capture 
some employment and earnings for some sample members that occurred before random 
assignment.
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months after random assignment, employment rates are remarkably stable throughout the five-
year follow-up period – even after the onset of the steep recession in 2009. Furthermore, controls 
who became employed had low earnings. For example, in the 2005-2006 tax year, earnings among 
employed ND25+ controls averaged just over £8,100.163 This pattern of employment and earnings 
illustrates the ‘low-pay, no-pay’ cycle the vast majority of ND25+ participants faced. Over the entire 
five-year follow-up period, the trend in employment among the ND25+ control group remained 
virtually flat. Although 55 per cent of ND25+ controls were employed at some time during the five 
years, the fact that no more than 25 per cent were employed in any given month is indicative of 
considerable ‘churning’ in and out of employment for this group.
Figure 6.2 shows that there are positive impacts on employment for almost all of the months of the 
follow-up period, with about three-fifths of them being statistically significant. While the impacts 
faded somewhat late in year 3, they re-emerged in year 4. Though the employment impacts are not 
statistically significant in the last couple of months of year 5, the balance of evidence still strongly 
suggests that ERA had a long-run impact on employment for the ND25+ group. 
Over the five-year follow-up period, ERA had no impact on the number of spells of employment or 
non-employment. However, it did reduce the average amount of time it took participants to find 
their first jobs by a statistically significant 1.2 months (a reduction of four per cent). It also increased 
by .9 months (or ten per cent) the average duration of the first employment spell. These patterns 
suggest that the ERA programme had somewhat more success in helping ND25+ participants enter 
work and retain their jobs than the services normally available to this group through Jobcentre Plus 
and other providers. 
It is also worth highlighting the greater propensity of workers in the ND25+ group than the lone 
parent groups to work full time. As previous chapters have discussed, many lone parents who 
were interested in working were hesitant to take on full-time employment because of their family 
responsibilities, especially if they had younger children, despite ERA’s incentives for full-time work. 
In contrast, if ND25+ participants did work, they were highly likely to work full time. Indeed, earlier 
survey data show that about 71 per cent of ND25+ individuals in ERA who were working at the time 
of the year 2 survey were employed at least 30 hours per week,164 whereas this was true for only 46 
per cent of ERA participants in the NDLP group and 44 per cent of those in the WTC group.165 Because 
most ND25+ participants were men without custodial responsibility for children, childcare problems 
were not an important deterrent to full-time work.166 
163 This estimate is derived by dividing £2,758 in earnings by the .339 employment rate for that 
tax year (Table 6.1). 
164 Table 4.4 in Miller et	al., 2008.
165 Table 5.2 in Riccio et	al., 2008.
166 In a forthcoming report on the impact of ERA on workers’ outcomes, Sianesi notes that only 
four per cent of the ND25+ worker sample reported a childcare problem, compared with 51 per 
cent for the NDLP and WTC groups.
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Figure 6.2 ERA group and control group employment rate trends over the first  
 five years after random assignment, ND25+ target group
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SOURCE: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment records. 
NOTES: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
 Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and 
the control group. 
 A white diamond on the axis indicates that the impact is statistically significant at the 
10 per cent level. A black diamond on the axis indicates that the impact is statistically 
significant at the 5 per cent or 1 per cent level.
 These figures include some months before the time of random assignment. Months 
before random assignment are indicated with a negative sign.
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6.2.2 ERA’s impact on earnings
Earnings impacts are available for the four tax years 2005-2006 through 2008-2009 (Table 6.1). Over 
those years, ERA participants earned a total of £14,162 on average (an estimate that includes zero 
earnings for participants who did not work).167 This reflects an increase of £1,481 over the £12,681 
earned by the controls (or a gain of 12 per cent). 
Following the pattern exhibited by the employment impacts, the earnings impacts increase and 
then decrease over time, but they are statistically significant in each year. The largest increase 
occurs from the 2006-2007 tax year to the 2007-2008 tax year, when the impact jumps by £122, 
from £342 to £464. The earnings impacts are substantial in percentage terms and larger than the 
employment impacts, ranging from 11 per cent in tax year 2005-2006 to 14 per cent in tax year 
2007-2008. This suggests the possibility that ERA also increased hours worked, hourly wage rates, or 
both. 
The sustained employment and earnings impacts of ERA for the ND25+ group, although modest in 
an absolute sense, are quite impressive in light of the fact that this long-term unemployed group 
was so severely disadvantaged upon entering the programme and is widely understood to be a 
difficult-to-help population. 
6.2.3 ERA’s impacts on benefits receipt
ERA’s positive labour market effects also generated some reductions in reliance on welfare benefits. 
As Table 6.2 shows, in year 1, when ERA participants and the control group were receiving pre-
employment New Deal services, ERA had essentially no impact on the number of months that 
participants received Jobseeker’s Allowance. However, it produced statistically significant reductions 
in receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance during years 2 through 5, although the reductions decreased 
in magnitude over time from about .5 months in year 2 to about .3 months in year 5. Over all five 
years, ERA reduced the number of months on Jobseeker’s Allowance by a statistically significant 1.5 
months (or about six per cent relative to the control group average).
Table 6.2 also shows that ERA reduced Jobseeker’s Allowance payment amounts for the programme 
group in each year. After year 1, all annual reductions are statistically significant. Over all five years, 
ERA reduced Jobseeker’s Allowance payments by a total of £426 per participant (a drop of six per 
cent relative to the control group average). 
Figure 6.3 shows the proportion of control group members receiving Jobseeker’s Allowance each 
month. That rate declined quickly in the first year after random assignment and then continued to 
decline, although more slowly, over the next four years. Only 31 per cent of controls were receiving 
that benefit by the end of the follow-up period.
167 To calculate impacts properly, the analysis must include all ERA participants and all control 
group participants.
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Table 6.2 Effects of ERA on benefits receipt within five years after random  
 assignment, ND25+ target group
Outcome
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Difference 
(impact) P-value
Average number of months receiving JSA in
Year 1 7.8 8.0 -0.1 0.230
Year 2 5.4 5.8 -0.5 *** 0.000
Year 3 4.6 5.0 -0.4 *** 0.001
Year 4 3.7 4.0 -0.2 * 0.050
Year 5 3.4 3.7 -0.3 ** 0.027
Years 1-5 24.9 26.4 -1.5 *** 0.001
Receiving JSA in month 24 (%) 42.2 45.5 -3.3 *** 0.005
Receiving JSA in month 36 (%) 34.1 36.1 -2.0 * 0.082
Receiving JSA in month 48 (%) 29.0 31.9 -2.9 *** 0.008
Receiving JSA in month 60 (%) 28.3 30.7 -2.4 ** 0.025
Average JSA payment received in (£)
Year 1 2,359 2,406 -48 0.221
Year 2 1,457 1,581 -124 *** 0.002
Year 3 1,244 1,358 -115 *** 0.002
Year 4 1,038 1,099 -61 * 0.086
Year 5 970 1,048 -78 ** 0.026
Years 1-2 3,816 3,987 -171 ** 0.015
Years 1-3 5,060 5,346 -286 *** 0.004
Years 1-4 6,098 6,445 -347 *** 0.005
Years 1-5 7,067 7,493 -426 *** 0.003
Number of months received IS in years 1-5 7.5 7.5 0.1 0.835
Average total IS received in years 1-5 (£) 2,289 2,287 2 0.988
Number of months received IB in years 1-5 8.3 8.3 0.0 0.953
Ever received IB in years 1-2 (%) 22.5 24.1 -1.6 0.125
Ever received IB in years 1-3 (%) 28.1 30.2 -2.1 * 0.058
Ever received IB in years 1-4 (%) 32.5 34.0 -1.5 0.175
Ever received IB in years 1-5 (%) 33.8 35.6 -1.8 0.118
Sample size = 6,782 3,424 3,358
SOURCES: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment records.
NOTES: Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment characteristics of 
sample members.
 Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
 Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the control group. 
 Statistical significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent.
 Includes all customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005.
 JSA = Jobseeker’s Allowance; IS = Income Support; IB = Incapacity Benefit.
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Figure 6.4 illustrates the time trends in ERA’s impact on receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance. It shows 
that the programme group largely followed the same pattern of declining receipt rates over time, 
but there was a somewhat larger decline after the first year. All of the impacts from month 11 to 
month 36 are statistically significant, and all but one of the impacts from month 43 to month 60 
are statistically significant. In month 60, the last month of follow-up, the impact is -2.4 percentage 
points, suggesting the possibility that ERA’s impacts on benefits receipt for the ND25+ target group 
persisted beyond the period of the evaluation.
Figure 6.4 ERA group and control group Jobseeker’s Allowance receipt rate  
 trends over the first five years after random assignment, ND25+  
 target group
Impacts of ERA on labour market and other outcomes for long-term unemployed  
(New Deal 25 Plus) participants 
Statistically significant at the 10 per cent level =  ; 5 per cent or 1 per cent =  
ERA group =  Control group =  
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study benefit receipt records. 
NOTES: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
 Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and 
the control group. 
 A white diamond on the axis indicates that the impact is statistically significant at the 
10 per cent level. A black diamond on the axis indicates that the impact is statistically 
significant at the 5 per cent or 1 per cent level.
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Table 6.2 shows that ERA had no statistically significant impacts on the number of months ND25+ 
participants received Income Support or on the amount of Income Support they received. (On 
average, both groups received this benefit only for about 7.5 months out of 60 months.) Receipt 
of Incapacity Benefit grew substantially over time for both groups, with over a third receiving that 
benefit sometime during the five-year follow-up period. However, ERA reduced the use of Incapacity 
Benefit by a statistically significant 2.1 percentage points (or about seven per cent relative to the 
control group rate) during the first three follow-up years. 
6.3 ERA’s impacts for the ND25+ target group by district
Table 6.3 summarises the district-level impacts of ERA. Comparing districts can show whether ERA’s 
effects were similar regardless of differences in the people served, local conditions, and programme 
strategies, or whether they varied. The table presents estimates for two summary measures: 
average number of months over the full five-year follow-up period and average total earnings 
over the four available tax years (2005-2009). (See Appendix B for more detailed findings for each 
district.) 
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6.3.1 District-level impacts on number of months employed
ERA’s effect on the duration of employment varied considerably across districts. It had a positive 
and statistically significant impact on this measure in the East Midlands and Scotland, but its 
effects in the other districts are not statistically significant. The impacts in the East Midlands and 
(especially) Scotland are sizeable. In the East Midlands, ERA increased participants’ employment by 
1.8 months (or about 12 per cent relative to the control group average), and in Scotland it increased 
employment by 3.7 months (or about 32 per cent). The impacts are positive but smaller and not 
generally statistically significant in North West England and London; they are negative but not 
statistically significant in Wales and North East England. 
Overall, the cross-district variation in impacts on the number of months employed over the five-year 
follow-up period is statistically significant. This variation undoubtedly arises because of the large and 
statistically significant positive impacts in Scotland (and to some extent the statistically significant 
positive impacts in the East Midlands) and the negative, though not statistically significant, impacts 
in Wales.
The year-by-year district impacts (see Appendix Tables B.10 to B.15) indicate that over the five 
years of follow-up, ERA’s impact in Scotland on the number of months employed is statistically 
significant in each year and grows steadily from years 1 to 5. No systematic pattern exists over time 
for the impact on the number of months employed in the East Midlands. In North West England, the 
impacts on the number of months employed are relatively constant over time, but are statistically 
significant only in year 2.168 
In Wales, ERA’s impacts on months employed are negative, although not statistically significant. 
However, as Table B.15 shows, ERA’s impact on the likelihood of working during the first follow-
up year was -6.7 percentage points and very close to statistical significance (p-value = -.102). 
The negative employment impacts in Wales appear to stem, in part, from early staff shortages in 
delivering ERA’s pre-employment New Deal services. This meant that the control group was likely to 
receive more intensive pre-employment assistance through the regular New Deal programme, which 
was better staffed and could thus provide controls with more assistance in finding work than the 
New Deal component of ERA. Consequently, the control group had higher rates of job entry than the 
ERA group.169 
The Wales results highlight the importance of not losing sight of the pre-employment component, 
even with a programme that is largely directed towards post-employment services. This is 
particularly relevant for the ND25+ sample, for whom retention and advancement depend on 
receiving adequate support to find employment in the first place. At the same time, there is little 
evidence to suggest that the negative results in Wales reflect negative consequences of ERA’s post-
employment component. 170 
168 The impacts on ever being employed are generally similar to the impacts on the number of 
months employed.
169 As documented in Miller et	al., 2008, during the first year of implementation, there were only 
two peripatetic advisers available for members of the ND25+ programme group in Wales. 
And in March 2007, there was only one adviser peripatetically serving all 132 working ERA 
customers.
170 Theoretically, ERA could have produced such a result, for example, if it had substantially 
increased the programme group’s participation in training courses in lieu of employment 
(relative to the control group), but without that training leading to offsetting labour market 
gains in the longer term. 
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6.3.2 District-level impacts on earnings
Earnings impacts were estimated in each district for the four available tax years (2005-2009). As 
can be seen in Table 6.3, ERA’s earnings impacts are generally consistent with its impacts on the 
number of months employed. It had large positive and statistically significant impacts in the East 
Midlands and Scotland, while the effects are not statistically significant in the other four districts. In 
the East Midlands, ERA increased participants’ earnings by £2,846 (or about 23 per cent above the 
control group average), and in Scotland by £4,247 (or about 34 per cent). The percentage impact 
on earnings in the East Midlands is almost double the percentage impact on number of months 
employed, suggesting the possibility that hourly wage rates and/or hours of work also increased 
for participants in that district. In Scotland, the impacts on the number of months employed and 
earnings are more similar to each other, suggesting that ERA probably produced no statistically 
significant increases in hours of work or the hourly wage rate for participants in that district. 
Over time, ERA’s earnings impacts in Scotland are statistically significant in each year and exhibit 
a strong upward trend, mirroring the impacts over time on the number of months employed (see 
Table B.10). The earnings impact more than doubles from the 2005-2006 tax year to the 2008-2009 
tax year. In percentage terms, Scotland’s earnings impact is quite large, reaching almost 50 per cent 
in tax year 2008-2009. The earnings impacts are statistically significant in the first three tax years 
in the East Midlands, but there is no pattern of growth over time. The effect declines and becomes 
statistically insignificant in the last tax year (2008-2009), although it is still positive.
Overall, the cross-district variation in ERA’s four-year earnings effects is statistically significant. 
As is true for employment, this was undoubtedly driven mostly by the large impacts in the East 
Midlands and Scotland and the negative (although not statistically significant) impacts in Wales. 
The estimated impacts in all of the remaining districts are positive but small and not statistically 
significant. 
The negative earnings impact in Wales is most likely attributable to the previously mentioned fact 
that, early in the demonstration, the regular New Deal programme was better staffed than the pre-
employment New Deal component that served ERA participants. This unintended staffing differential 
may have resulted in less-intensive and lower-quality pre-employment services for the ERA group 
and may explain why ERA participants had worse employment outcomes than the control group. It 
may also explain why the ERA’s group’s average earnings were also lower, especially earlier in the 
follow-up period. (The earnings loss for the ERA group of £886 in the 2005-2006 tax year, or 28 per 
cent of the control group average, is statistically significant.) 
Because the negative effects in Wales are most likely due to an unintended pre-employment service 
differential between the programme and control groups, it is instructive to consider what ERA’s 
overall impacts for the ND25+ target group would be if Wales were excluded from the calculation. 
When that is done, ERA’s impact on earnings is about 19 per cent higher: £1,767 when Wales is 
excluded versus £1,481 when Wales is included. Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that the 
impacts of ERA would have been modestly more positive for ND25+ customers if Wales had been 
excluded from the demonstration. Nonetheless, as previously mentioned, the negative effects 
in Wales are an important reminder about the importance of the pre-employment phase of a 
programme focused on retention and advancement. 
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Sufficient data were not available to conduct a thorough assessment of why the impacts on 
earnings varied across the other five districts. However, the implementation strand of the evaluation 
did not detect any dramatic or obvious differences in the quality of delivery of ERA services across 
those districts that would explain why, for example, Scotland and the East Midlands had much 
larger effects than the other districts. 
6.4 ND25+ impacts by subgroup
Tables 6.4 and 6.5 indicate that, although some subgroups exhibited larger impacts than others, 
these differences in impacts are not statistically significant from each other. Thus, it appears unlikely 
that ERA had stronger or weaker effects on participants depending on their race/ethnicity, age of 
youngest child, number of months worked in the three years before random assignment, housing 
status, qualifications, random assignment cohort, number of barriers to employment, or whether 
the participant was ‘severely disadvantaged’ at the time of random assignment.171 Instead, it 
appears that the impacts of ERA for the ND25+ group were broadly based, positively affecting many 
different types of ERA participants.
171 Though not significantly different, Table 6.4 reveals that the employment and earnings 
impacts for severely disadvantaged ERA participants (about 20 per cent of the sample) 
were larger than the impacts for those not severely disadvantaged, suggesting that part 
of ERA’s impacts for the ND25+ group occurred among the severely disadvantaged group. 
Additionally, social housing residents experienced statistically significant increases in months 
of employment and earnings compared with private or family residents. But neither of these 
subgroup differences is statistically significant.
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6.5 ND25+ attitudes to advancement
The 60-month survey was not administered to the ND25+ group, but the qualitative data provide 
some insights into their attitudes about advancement. It should be recalled that a smaller 
percentage of ND25+ participants than lone parent participants ever entered employment during 
the five-year follow-up period and became eligible for in-work support. 
In-depth qualitative interviews with participants and ERA advisers reveal the myriad of ways 
that working ND25+ participants defined advancement. Some of them were positive about work 
progression, with a clear idea of what they wanted to achieve in the ERA programme, and many in 
this group were able to use ERA support to effectively meet their goals. For example, in a qualitative 
interview conducted in 2009, one former ND25+ programme group participant reflected positively 
about the financial and advisory support he had received through ERA: 
‘…whenever	we	met	we	would	go	through	the	training	courses	I	could	go	on,	we	discussed	
how	my	current	job	was	going,	she’d	give	me	any	advice	on	how	to	progress.	So	it	was	a	two-
way	conversation.	I’d	given	her	an	idea	of	what	I	was	interested…so,	you	know,	it’s	okay	I’d	
been	out	of	work	two	and	a	half	years	and	it	just	gave	me	a	reminder	of	how	to	progress	within	
companies.’	
(Former participant, ND25+ programme group)
However, the qualitative research also identified other ND25+ participants in ERA who were happy 
with just having a ‘steady job’ and indifferent to advancing any further. These included individuals 
with complex barriers to work, such as older participants, many of whom had worked all their lives 
in a particular industry and were not interested in learning new skills, as well as some younger, 
less-experienced participants who simply wanted to work. It is not surprising that these ND25+ 
participants, who had unstable, intermittent work histories and whose work journeys were often 
interrupted, defined advancement in terms of job security and steady employment. Other (non-ERA) 
evidence supports this finding, showing that some longer-term unemployed individuals are resistant 
to the idea of progression in work due to fatalism about future prospects, low confidence, and trade-
offs with other aspirations or motivations.172 For this particular working group of ND25+ participants, 
employment retention itself was an important achievement. 
The challenges ERA advisers faced in engaging working ND25+ participants were reflected in the 
survey data. For example, a quarter of ERA participants had no contact with Jobcentre Plus staff 
while in work, and only a third had been contacted proactively by their advisers. Statistics on the use 
of ERA training incentives also point to low receipt rates. As discussed in Chapter 3, ERA advisers also 
identified a culture of self-reliance among ND25+ participants that may have made some reluctant 
to accept ERA help. Additionally, some longer-term unemployed people wished to disassociate 
themselves from Jobcentre Plus once they left benefits for employment. This may partly explain the 
lower rates of ERA engagement for ND25+ workers relative to lone parent participants. 
Over time, ERA advisers developed more nuanced approaches to engaging working participants who 
saw ‘progression’ in such different ways. On the other hand, advisers perceived that advancing in 
work was not important or relevant to some people and therefore did not ‘push’ this goal. A case in 
point is reflected in this adviser’s account of a conversation with a working ND25+ participant:
172 See Ray et	al., 2010. 
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‘He	comes	in	and	sees	me	every	time	his	work	retention	bonus	is	due,	and	I	talk	to	him	about,	
‘How’s	things	in	the	job?	You	doing	any	more	hours?’	‘No,	everything’s	just	the	same.’	‘Would	you	
not	like	to	do	some	training?	Would	you	not	like	to	change	your	job	to	do	something	different?’	
No,	he’s	quite	happy…but	he’s	been	unemployed	for	a	long,	long	time,	and	I	think	even	for	him	
to	have	a	job	is	an	achievement	in	itself,	and	he’s	quite	happy	with	that.’	
(Advancement Support Adviser)
In sum, compared with the other programme groups, ND25+ participants faced greater barriers 
in achieving advancement as envisioned by the ERA programme and were more focused on job 
retention. But a subset of ND25+ workers, who were more established in their work, embraced the 
programme’s advancement ethos and experienced fewer barriers to work progression. 
6.6 Conclusions
This chapter has shown that ERA produced sustained improvements in employment and earnings, 
and reductions in reliance on welfare benefits for the ND25+ target group. These are impressive 
findings in light of the widespread view that this group of long-term unemployed people, most of 
whom are men,173 generally has a very difficult time in the labour market and is a harder group 
for welfare-to-work programmes to help. Indeed, they were more difficult than lone parents for 
ERA advisers to engage in post-employment assistance, with many of them resisting continued 
involvement with Jobcentre Plus after entering work. 
Not surprisingly, in the absence of ERA, the ND25+ control group had worse labour market outcomes 
and relied more on government transfer benefits than did either of the lone parent target groups. 
Yet, ERA’s impacts for the ND25+ group were stronger. Why this is the case is uncertain, but it 
may have to do with differences across the groups in the attitudes and expectations about work 
that participants brought with them when they entered the programme, and how ERA’s offer of 
incentives for full-time work and post-employment support may have influenced those attitudes 
and expectations. Chapter 8 takes a closer look at this issue.
173 An analysis of economic impacts by subgroup confirmed that the positive results for the 
ND25+ group were not driven by the relatively few women in this target group.
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7 The economic costs and  
 benefits of ERA
Box 7.1 Chapter 7 at a glance
• The cost-benefit results vary considerably among the three Employment Retention and 
Advancement (ERA) target groups. The best results were achieved for the New Deal 25 Plus 
(ND25+) target group.
• Findings for the ND25+ group:
– ERA moderately increased the disposable incomes of ND25+ participants and also 
markedly improved the Government’s budgetary position. As a consequence, ERA 
appears to have had a positive and sizeable effect on society as a whole (that is, on ERA 
participants plus the taxpayers who support the Government).
– These conclusions appear highly robust to the assumptions that underlie them.
• Findings for the New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) group:
– ERA appears to have resulted in negligible effects on the disposable incomes of NDLP 
participants and had a small negative effect on the budgetary position of the Exchequer 
and on society as a whole.
– A separate cost-benefit analysis for the NDLP subgroup with Advanced-level (A-level) 
qualifications suggests that ERA for this subgroup increased the disposable incomes of 
those participants and improved the Government’s budgetary position. However, the 
opposite effects are likely to have occurred as a result of ERA for NDLP participants with 
lower or no qualifications. 
• Findings for the Working Tax Credit (WTC) group:
– The cost to the Government of operating ERA for the WTC group was over twice as much 
for each participant as that of providing ERA to the two New Deal groups.
– ERA may have very modestly increased the disposable incomes of WTC participants.
– Because ERA for the WTC target group was costly to operate, it seems to have noticeably 
worsened the Exchequer’s budgetary position and, as a consequence, resulted in an 
overall loss from the societal perspective.
– The latter two conclusions appear quite robust to various sensitivity tests.
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7.1 Introduction
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 examined some of the benefits of ERA – for example, whether the programme 
increased earnings and whether it reduced payments of Income Support and Jobseeker’s Allowance. 
It is natural to ask next, as is done in this chapter, whether these economic benefits exceeded the 
costs of operating the programme. Who paid the costs of ERA and who received the benefits? The 
approach used to answer these questions is cost-benefit analysis, which uses a variety of techniques 
to determine whether the benefits or the costs of ERA are larger. 
This chapter presents findings from separate cost-benefit analyses for ERA’s three target groups: the 
NDLP group, ND25+ group, and the WTC group. To conduct these cost-benefit analyses, it was first 
necessary to determine the programme’s costs. A study of ERA’s costs was previously conducted. 
Although the findings of that study are presented in detail elsewhere,174 this chapter briefly 
summarises them before presenting the full cost-benefit analyses. 
7.2 The ERA cost analysis
The objective of the ERA cost analysis is to determine the costs resulting from the programme, in 
particular, Jobcentre Plus’s expenditures on providing services and making incentive payments to 
ERA participants during their 33 months of eligibility for ERA. In addition to being used in the cost-
benefit analyses of ERA, the cost information also provides important insights into how greater 
programme efficiency and enhanced cost-effectiveness can be achieved if expenditures on some 
features of ERA or among one or more of the target groups appear unreasonably high. It may also 
be of value for budgeting purposes when planning for implementation of similar programmes. 
7.2.1 The elements of ERA costs
The elements of ERA costs are described in Figure 7.1. A distinction is made in this figure between 
gross and net costs. Gross costs are the total outlays incurred in operating ERA. Net costs are those 
that remain after deducting for expenditures that would have been made even in the absence of 
ERA – i.e., the Government’s costs of serving controls in alternative programmes. Members of the 
control group were eligible for alternative services that were normally available apart from ERA, such 
as the regular New Deal programmes for the NDLP and ND25+ target groups. Thus, ERA’s net costs, 
the incremental costs that resulted from implementing the demonstration, are costs that are over 
and above those of existing provisions for the control group. 
Figure 7.1 has three panels. The first, and by far the most important, pertains to expenditures 
by Jobcentre Plus. Two major kinds of costs are borne by Jobcentre Plus: staff costs in serving 
participants and various types of payments to participants. In addition, costs were incurred outside 
the demonstration districts in centrally administrating ERA, but these were minor. Staff costs can be 
further divided between those occurring before participants find jobs (pre-employment costs) and 
those resulting after they are employed (post-employment costs). The second panel in Figure 7.1 
refers to Government expenditures on training that were not directly paid for by ERA but indirectly 
resulted from the programme because ERA participants were induced to enrol in more Government-
funded training than controls. The third panel refers to out-of-pocket costs that individuals in 
the programme and control groups pay. The remainder of this section will focus on the costs 
represented in the first panel of Figure 7.1 – that is, costs resulting directly from the provisions of ERA 
and paid for by Jobcentre Plus. Non-ERA Government expenditures on training and the out-of-pocket 
costs of individuals (i.e., the costs represented in the second and third panels, respectively) are not 
174 Greenberg et	al., 2009.
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further discussed in this section, but are instead covered later in the chapter in discussing the cost-
benefit analysis.
As shown below, pre-employment costs apply only to the NDLP and ND25+ target groups and, on 
average, were very similar for ERA participants and controls, because those groups received fairly 
similar pre-employment services. Thus, although ERA generated gross pre-employment staff costs 
(box 1 in Figure 7.1), the net pre-employment staff costs are approximately equal to zero (i.e., 
net pre-employment staff costs = box 1 – box 2 ≈ 0). Once ERA participants found employment, 
however, they were actively encouraged to continue to have contact with their ERA advisers 
(also known as Advancement Support Advisers). Some control group members also had post-
employment contact with Jobcentre Plus Personal Advisers, but this was much rarer and those 
contacts were less intensive. Thus, post-employment gross staff costs for the control group were 
quite small relative to those for the programme group. As a result, post-employment programme 
net staff costs for the programme group are smaller than their post-employment gross staff costs 
(i.e., gross cost = box 3 > net post-employment staff costs = box 3 – box 4, where box 3 > box 4), but 
not much smaller.
As can be seen in box 5 of Figure 7.1, ERA participants were eligible for five different types of 
payments, whereas, as shown in box 6, control group members were eligible for only one of these 
(from the Adviser Discretion Fund) at the time ERA was operating (September 2003 to October 
2007). Thus, in the case of four of these payment types – the employment retention bonus, the 
training bonus, the Emergency Discretion Fund, and tuition fees – the gross and net payment 
amounts are equal. They will not be equal in the case of Adviser Discretion Fund payments, however, 
as programme and control group members were both eligible for them. 
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Figure 7.1 Major elements of gross and net ERA operating costs
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7.2.2 Data and methods
In estimating the cost of ERA, data from a variety of sources were used, including:
• data from administrative records on individuals’ employment status and payments to 
participants,
• customer survey data on the use of non-reimbursed services and contacts with Jobcentre Plus 
advisers, 
• time diaries kept by ERA advisers over a one- or two-week period, in which advisers recorded when 
each participant contact and each administrative activity began and ended,
• staffing form data on the number of staff involved in serving the ERA target groups, and
• salary tables listing the annual salaries of Jobcentre Plus staff by grade. 
The methods used to estimate the individual cost items appearing in Figure 7.1 are detailed in the 
cost study report.175 Thus, only a brief overview is provided here. 
• ERA provided job-related assistance both before participants found jobs and afterwards. Thus, 
a key component of the cost analysis involves determining the cost of the ERA advisers who 
provided these services. The salary cost of those staff was estimated using the advisers’ time 
diaries and staffing form data. These were also used to determine the salary cost of the ERA 
advisers’ supervisors and the clerical personnel who assisted the advisers. 
• The estimates of staff salary cost were then used to compute overhead costs (i.e., outlays 
for facilities and equipment needed to support the ERA staff). Separate overhead rates were 
computed for each of the six districts participating in the demonstration, and within each district, 
overhead rates were computed separately for ERA advisers, supervisors, and clerical workers. 
Overhead costs were then computed by multiplying these rates by the salary costs of ERA 
advisers, supervisors, and clerical workers in each of the demonstration districts. 
• The estimation of the staff cost of serving the ERA programme group was calculated by summing 
the estimates of Advancement Support Adviser, supervisor, and clerical worker salary and 
overhead costs. 
• Similar steps were followed in estimating the staff cost of serving the ERA control group, including 
the cost of Personal Advisers for controls.
• Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) provided data allowing direct measurement of 
payments to participants. 
In estimating the costs of ERA to Jobcentre Plus, an attempt was made to determine what it cost 
to provide 33 months of services and financial incentives to a typical participant in each of the three 
target groups once ERA was running smoothly and had reached a steady state of operation. The cost 
estimates are pooled over the six demonstration districts and represent an average ERA participant 
from each of the three target groups. Hence, the cost estimates provide an approximation of what 
each-participant programme costs would be if ERA were a regular, continuing programme in the six 
demonstration districts. Moreover, because programme benefits – for example, impacts on earnings 
and benefits payments – are also measured on an each-participant basis, costs and benefits can be 
readily compared.176
175 Greenberg et	al., 2009.
176 It is also assumed that extra costs incurred during a programme’s ‘start-up’ phase do not 
directly contribute to a programme’s impacts, and, therefore, the cost-benefit analysis focuses 
on estimates of steady-state costs.
The economic costs and benefits of ERA
195
For the two New Deal target groups, separate estimates were made for costs incurred during 
the pre-employment phase (before programme participants first became employed) and the 
post-employment phase, as well as total costs over the entire 33 months of ERA eligibility. The 
distinction between the pre- and post-employment phases is important, because the key difference 
between ERA and the programmes that existed in the UK before ERA was implemented is that ERA 
emphasised a commitment to offering job coaching and financial incentives to participants after 
they found jobs, even if they later lost their jobs. Because ERA participants in the WTC group were 
already employed at the time they were randomly assigned, they incurred only post-employment 
costs; there were no pre-employment costs for them.
The cost for each sample member for each activity or service is determined by three factors: 
the unit cost, which is the cost of serving one person in an activity for a specific unit of time (for 
example, one month); the amount of service received, measured in the same units as the unit 
cost (for example, the average number of months those participating in an activity spend); and the 
participation rate for each activity. Multiplying these three variables yields the cost incurred for each 
sample member for the specified activity or service. Information at this level of detail may be useful 
for budgeting purposes to administrators planning to operate similar programmes. 
7.2.3 The cost findings177
Table 7.1 presents estimates of gross costs incurred by Jobcentre Plus for both the ERA programme 
group and the control group for each of the demonstration’s three target groups. In the case of the 
two New Deal control groups, these are the costs of operating the regular NDLP and ND25+ welfare-
to-work programmes. Net costs for the three ERA programme groups also appear in Table 7.1. As 
previously discussed, these net costs are the costs to Jobcentre Plus that directly result from the 
provision of ERA; non-ERA training costs and participants’ out-of-pocket costs are not included in the 
estimates appearing in the table, but they are presented later with the cost-benefit findings. The key 
implications of Table 7.1, as well as some findings from the cost analysis that are not reported in the 
table, appear below.
• For ERA participants in the NDLP and ND25+ target groups, gross costs during the post-
employment period are much larger than gross costs during the pre-employment period. For the 
control groups, the opposite is true.
Over 70 per cent of the gross costs attributable to the two New Deal programme groups were 
incurred during the post-employment phase. The key reason for this is that these groups could 
receive financial incentive payments once they went to work but not before. In contrast, about 70 
per cent of the gross cost of the NDLP control group and nearly 80 per cent of the total gross cost 
of the ND25+ control group occurred during the pre-employment phase. This is because controls 
were not eligible for ERA financial incentive payments and because they had relatively little contact 
with Jobcentre Plus after they began working. Almost all members of both the WTC programme 
group and the WTC control group were working at the time they were randomly assigned. Thus, they 
incurred negligible costs during the pre-employment period.
177 Since Greenberg et	al., 2009, was published, the cost estimates have been updated with newly 
available survey and administrative data. In addition, in the earlier publication each of the 
six demonstration districts was given equal weight in computing costs for the two New Deal 
target groups, while in this chapter each ERA participant is given equal weight in computing 
costs. Thus, the estimates that appear in this chapter differ somewhat from those in the earlier 
report, but the general pattern of findings is the same.
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Table 7.1 Total net and gross costs to Jobcentre Plus of operating ERA  
 for each customer, by target group (in 2005-2006 pounds)
Target group  
and cost component
Gross cost per ERA 
group member (£)
Gross cost per control 
group member (£)
Net cost per ERA 
group member (£)
NDLP
Pre-employment
Staff costs 497 497 0
Payments to customers 54 47 7
Central administrative costs NAa NAa 0
Subtotal 552 544 7
Post-employment
Staff costs 699 223 476
Special training for replacement 
Advancement Support Advisers NAa NAa 2
Payments to customers 728 0 728
Central administrative costs NAa NAa 22
Subtotal 1,427 223 1,229
Total 1,979 768 1,236
ND25+
Pre-employment
Staff costs 468 468 0
Payments to customers 22 21 1
Central administrative costs NAa NAa 0
Subtotal 490 489 1
Post-employment
Staff costs 713 127 586
Special training for replacement 
Advancement Support Advisers NAa NAa 1
Payments to customers 658 0 658
Central administrative costs NAa NAa 15
Subtotal 1,370 127 1,260
Total 1,860 616 1,261
WTC
Pre-employment
Staff costs 0 0 0
Payments to customers 0 0 0
Central administrative costs 0 0 0
Subtotal 0 0 0
Post-employment
Staff costs 1,467 52 1,415
Special training for replacement 
Advancement Support Advisers NAa NAa 4
Payments to customers 1,172 4 1,168
Central administrative costs NAa NAa 38
Subtotal 2,640 56 2,625
Total 2,640 56 2,625
(continued)
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Table 7.1 Continued
SOURCES: MDRC calculations from Advancement Support Adviser time diaries, ERA 12-, 24-, and 60-month customer surveys, Work and 
Pensions Longitudinal Survey employment records, DWP financial incentives data, and DWP fiscal data.
NOTES: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
 NA = Not available. 
 aGross cost estimates are not available. As a result, the total net cost estimates reflect the difference between gross costs for 
the ERA and control groups, plus the net costs for special training for replacement Advancement Support Advisers and net 
costs for central administration.
• The total net costs of ERA, virtually all of which accrued during the post-employment phase (see 
below), are £1,236, £1,261, and £2,625, respectively, for a typical participant in the NDLP, ND25+, 
and WTC target groups. 
As previously discussed, these estimates pertain to the full 33-month ERA eligibility period and 
are the additional costs that resulted from implementing ERA. If net costs are annualised by first 
dividing by 33 and then multiplying by 12, they fall to £449, £459, and £955, respectively. 
• Depending on the target group, most of the total net costs of ERA are attributable to the 
salary and overhead expenditures of employing ERA’s Advancement Support Advisers and the 
employment incentive payments. The net costs of employing ERA’s advisers range from 31 
per cent to 43 per cent of the total net cost, and employment retention incentive payments 
represent from 27 per cent to 41 per cent of total net costs. In addition, the two lone parent 
target groups took advantage of provisions in ERA that were intended to encourage participation 
in training; training incentive payments and reimbursement for tuition payments accounted for 
about 15 per cent of the total net costs of each group.
Viewed in somewhat greater detail, the net cost of employing ERA advisers accounts for over 
four-fifths of net staff costs for each of the three target groups (the remaining net staff costs are 
attributable to employing supervisors and clerical workers who work with the advisers), and over 
three-fifths of the payments made to participants in each programme group are accounted for by 
employment retention incentive payments. 
• Net pre-employment staff costs are approximately equal to zero.
For NDLP and ND25+ ERA participants, ERA began with job placement and other pre-employment 
assistance, largely following the same procedures as the regular New Deal programmes. That is, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, before they obtained jobs, members of the New Deal ERA programme and 
control groups were treated virtually identically. Consequently, gross pre-employment staff costs 
were very similar for programme and control group members, on average, and net pre-employment 
costs for ERA participants in the NDLP and ND25+ target groups were close to zero. Because the WTC 
programme group was in the post-employment phase during the entire 33-month ERA eligibility 
period, their net pre-employment staff costs were also zero.
• Net post-employment staff costs ranged from £476 to £1,415 for each ERA group member, 
depending on the target group.
Once they obtained employment, programme group members were actively encouraged to 
continue to have contact with their ERA advisers. Some control group members also had contact 
with Jobcentre Plus Personal Advisers, but this was much rarer and the contacts were less intensive. 
More specifically, contact minutes (i.e., the product of the number of contacts with Jobcentre Plus 
staff and the length in minutes of a typical contact) while working were less than 25 per cent as high 
for the two New Deal control groups and less than five per cent as high for the WTC control group as 
for the corresponding programme groups. 
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• Net post-employment payments to ERA participants ranged from £658 to £1,168 per participant.
As previously mentioned, four types of payments (employment incentives, training incentives, 
reimbursement for tuition, and Emergency Discretion Fund dispersals) were available only during the 
post-employment phase and available only to ERA participants. 
• During the post-employment phase, ERA’s net costs for the WTC target group were over twice the 
size of net costs for ERA participants in the two New Deal groups.
Net staff costs for ERA participants in the WTC target group were markedly greater during the post-
employment phase than they were for either the NDLP or the ND25+ groups (£1,415 versus £476 
and £586). ERA participants in the WTC group also received considerably larger payments (£1,168 
versus £728 and £658), reflecting the fact that they were employed when they entered the study 
and were in the post-employment phase during the entire follow-up period. In addition, costs for 
WTC control group members were low because they had very little contact with Jobcentre Plus. 
Thus, net ERA costs for the WTC group were over twice as large as those for the two New Deal 
groups. As will be seen in Section 7.5.3, this has important implications for the cost-benefit findings.
7.3 Overview of the cost-benefit analysis
Table 7.2 indicates the expected direction of the effects of ERA’s costs and benefits if the 
programme had its intended effects. The costs and benefits that are expected to be of special 
importance are highlighted in bold. The table is limited to only financial benefits and costs – that is, 
to only those that change the income received by ERA participants or the Exchequer’s budgetary 
position and, hence, can be readily measured in pounds. Non-financial benefits and costs (for 
example, possible programme effects on health status or the quality of life) will be discussed later in 
this chapter. 
The first three columns in Table 7.2 (the fourth column is discussed below) show benefits and costs 
from three different perspectives: that of participants who enrolled in ERA, that of the Exchequer, 
and that of society as a whole. For purposes of the table, participants and the Exchequer (i.e., the 
Government or taxpayers) make up the whole of society. Thus, benefits for participants that are 
offset by costs to the Exchequer (e.g., ERA retention bonuses), or costs to participants that are 
offset by benefits to the Government (e.g., reductions in Housing Benefit), have a zero effect on 
society as a whole. Plus signs in Table 7.2 indicate anticipated sources of economic gains from each 
perspective, and minus signs indicate anticipated sources of losses from each perspective, if ERA 
has its intended effects. In reporting findings from the cost-benefit analyses later in the chapter, the 
pluses and minuses will be replaced by values that are estimated in pounds.
Total net benefits (or losses), for which space is allotted in the bottom row of each column, are 
computed as the algebraic sum of the individual benefit and cost pound amounts in that column. 
These ‘bottom-line’ estimates, which can be either positive or negative, are intended to indicate 
whether ERA is cost-beneficial from each perspective, at least in terms of those gains and losses 
that can be readily valued in pounds.
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Table 7.2 Benefits and costs of the ERA programme that are valued in pounds
Customers Exchequer Society Source of estimate
Earnings and benefits
Earnings + 0 + Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study
Employer National Insurance  
contributions
+ 0 + Based on National Insurance tax rate  
for employers
Employer pension contributions + 0 + Customer survey; employer pension 
survey by Mercer Ltd
Taxes
Income taxes - + 0 Based on income tax rates
Employee National Insurance contributions - + 0 Based on National Insurance tax rate  
for employees
Employer National Insurance contributions - + 0 Based on National Insurance tax rate  
for employers
Indirect taxes - + 0 Based on indirect tax rate of 20.4%
Transfer payments
Jobseeker’s Allowance - + 0 Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study
Income Support - + 0 Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study
Incapacity Benefit - + 0 Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study 
for Incapacity Benefit receipt indicator; 
published data
WTC + - 0 Customer survey
Child Tax Credit + - 0 Customer survey
Housing Benefit - + 0 Customer survey; published data
Council Tax Benefit - + 0 Customer survey; published data
ERA operating costs, net of indirect taxes
Staff costs 0 - - Diaries, staffing forms, survey data, 
salary tables, Work and Pensions 
Longitudinal Study
Special training for replacement 0 - - Staffing forms, salary tables
Advancement Support Advisers
Payments to Liberata 0 - - Payments per transaction
Central administrative costs 0 - - Specially collected data
Non-ERA training expenditures 0 - - Customer survey; published data
Programme-related customer costs
Emergency Discretion Fund 0 - - Records of Personal Adviser requisitions
Retention bonus + - 0 Records of Personal Adviser requisitions
Training bonus + - 0 Records of Personal Adviser requisitions
Tuition payment reimbursement + - 0 Records of Personal Adviser requisitions
Adviser Discretion Fund 0 ? ? DWP data systems
Employment-related costs
Out-of-pocket education and training costs - 0 - Customer survey
Out-of-pocket child care cost - 0 - Customer survey
Out-of-pocket commuting cost - 0 - Customer survey
Net gain or loss (benefits-costs) ? ? ?
SOURCES:  MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment and benefit receipt records, ERA 12-, 24- and 
60-month customer surveys, DWP financial incentives data, DWP fiscal data, Advancement Support Adviser time diaries,  
and published data.
NOTE: Costs and benefits shown in bold face are expected to be key components affecting the bottom line, net gain or loss, estimate.
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7.4 Cost-benefit methods
This section describes the methods used in conducting the cost-benefit analysis. These methods are 
briefly summarised in Box 7.2, which appears at the end of the section.
7.4.1 Data sources
The fourth column in Table 7.2 indicates the sources of the key data used in estimating each of 
the benefit and cost components. As can be seen, the analysis uses a considerable variety of data 
sources. Moreover, as indicated, some benefit and cost components required the use of more than 
one data source. The key data source used in estimating ERA’s impacts on the amounts of Income 
Support and Jobseeker’s Allowance received, on the receipt of Incapacity Benefit, and on earnings 
is the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study, described in Chapter 2 of this report. The customer 
survey, which is described in Chapter 2, was also used in determining ERA’s impact on a number 
of benefit and cost components, including WTC, Child Tax Credit, Housing Benefit, and Council Tax 
Benefit. The various data sources used to estimate ERA’s operating costs were described earlier 
in this chapter. Information on ERA-related payments to programme participants, such as the 
retention and training bonuses, were available from a requisition system in which advisers logged 
requests for these payments. Estimates of the effect of ERA on income taxes and employee and 
employer National Insurance Contributions are based mainly on the rules that were in effect at 
the time of the ERA demonstration. Estimates of the effect of ERA on employers’ contributions to 
pensions is based on a 2006 survey of 600 defined contribution plans by Mercer UK, which found 
that the average contribution for those who had such a plan was 6.8 per cent of earnings.178 Finally, 
the treatment of indirect taxes (mostly the VAT, but also including excise taxes on fuel, alcohol, and 
tobacco) in the cost-benefit analysis is based on an estimated indirect tax rate of 20.4 per cent.179
7.4.2 Methods used to estimate the cost-benefit components
Because ERA-related payments to programme participants (i.e., retention and training bonuses, 
payments from the Emergency Discretion Fund, and training fees) were unique to ERA, records 
of the amounts of these payments could be used directly in the cost-benefit analysis. Most of 
the remaining costs and benefits were not unique to ERA, and consequently it was necessary to 
estimate ERA’s impact on them by determining differences in outcomes between the programme 
and control groups. For example, as described in Section 7.2, this was done in estimating ERA’s net 
operating costs. ERA’s impacts on a number of other cost-benefit components – including impacts 
on earnings, out-of-pocket commuting costs and childcare costs, Jobseeker’s Allowance, and 
Income Support payments – were readily estimated using the same approach as that used in the 
impact analysis described in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. These impact estimates were used regardless 
of their level of statistical significance because they provide the best available estimates of ERA’s 
true effects. In interpreting the cost-benefit findings, it is important to keep in mind that impact 
estimates are averaged over the entire research sample, including individuals who had zero values 
for each outcome of interest (e.g., zero earnings or zero benefit payments). 
Sixty monthly estimates were available for impacts on Jobseeker’s Allowance and Income Support 
payments. Impacts on annual earnings were available for from four to five years, varying, as 
explained below, among individuals who were randomly assigned at different points in time. 
Impacts on commuting and childcare costs, and WTC, Child Tax Credit, Housing Benefit, and Council 
Tax Benefit were estimated using survey data collected at one, two, and five years following random 
assignment for the NDLP and WTC groups, and one and two years after random assignment for 
178 See Mercer UK, 2007.
179 The estimate of the indirect tax rate was obtained from Adam et	al., 2008. 
The economic costs and benefits of ERA
201
the ND25+ group.180 After being converted to 2005-2006 prices by using the Consumer Price Index 
whenever necessary,181 the monthly or annual values for each impact were summed over the period 
for which they were available in order to derive a single estimate for each cost-benefit component.
ERA’s remaining impacts – which include impacts on income taxes, National Insurance 
Contributions, employer contributions to pensions, and indirect taxes – had to be inferred from 
those impacts that were directly estimated, especially ERA’s impacts on earnings. The remainder 
of this subsection describes how these inferences were made and also describes in greater detail 
how certain other impacts that are based on survey data – for example, Housing Benefit, Council 
Tax Benefit, WTC, and Child Tax Credit – were estimated, and non-ERA training expenditures were 
determined.
Housing Benefit, Council Tax Benefit, WTC, and Child Tax Credit. The surveys collected information 
about whether WTC and Child Tax Credit were received, as well as the amount of the credits. 
Because recipients may not always know the value of their Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit, 
the surveys collected information only about whether they were received, not the amount of the 
benefits. Benefit levels for Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit among those who received them 
were estimated using data for 2005-2006 from DWP’s Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit 
Quarterly Summary Statistics report, using separate values reported for beneficiaries in receipt of 
other state benefits and for those not in receipt of other state benefits. 
National Insurance Contributions. National Insurance Contributions were estimated by simply 
applying the tax rate rules that existed at about the time ERA was in operation. The National 
Insurance Contribution tax rates in 2007-2008 for employees were 11 per cent of all weekly earnings 
above £100 and up to (and including) £670 and one per cent of all weekly earnings above £670. The 
National Insurance Contribution rates in 2007-2008 for employers were 12.8 per cent of all weekly 
earnings above £100.182 For both employee and employer National Insurance Contributions, all 
weekly earnings below £100 were exempt. The computations of National Insurance Contributions 
were made separately for each of the three ERA target groups and separately within each target 
group for those assigned to the programme group and the control group. Impacts for each target 
group were then estimated as differences between the programme and control groups. 
180 For purposes of the cost-benefit analysis, it was also necessary to extrapolate ERA’s impacts to 
time periods not covered by the data. The methods used in doing this are described later.
181 See Office for National Statistics, Consumer Price Index.
182 Considerable research indicates that payroll taxes such as the employer National Insurance 
Contributions are mostly or entirely paid by workers in the form of reduced wages. For 
purposes of the ERA cost-benefit study, therefore, it is assumed that all of employers’ National 
Insurance Contributions are paid by employees. Thus, the employer contribution appears twice 
in Table 7.2. It is first treated as if it is received by ERA participants as part of their increase in 
compensation resulting from ERA. It then appears again as an increase in the taxes paid by 
participants to the Exchequer. Taking these two lines together, an increase in the employer 
National Insurance Contribution resulting from ERA is treated in the cost-benefit analysis as 
if it accrues as benefits to the Exchequer and to society as a whole, but does not affect the 
incomes of participants. Society gains because increases in employer National Insurance 
Contributions, like increases in earnings, are made possible by increases in the output produced 
by workers. The value of this increased output is of value to society regardless of whether it is 
captured by workers or the Government, or by other groups or institutions.
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Employer contributions to pensions. As mentioned above, employer contributions to the pensions 
of their employees averaged 6.8 per cent of the earnings of those workers who have pensions. 
However, many workers do not have pensions. Fortunately, the percentage of persons in the 
ERA sample who have pensions can be obtained from the customer survey. This percentage was 
computed separately for persons in the programme group and the control group in each of the three 
ERA target groups and then multiplied by .068 times the average earnings of the individuals in each 
group. To compute ERA’s impact on employer contributions to pensions, the resulting figure for the 
control group within each target group category was then subtracted from the corresponding figure 
for the programme group.
Income taxes. The analysis assumes that individuals with earnings below the income tax threshold 
did not pay income taxes. These computations, which were based on applying the income tax rate 
rules, were done separately for each of the three ERA target groups and separately within each 
target group for those assigned to the programme group and the control group. Impacts for each 
target group were then estimated as differences between the programme and control groups.
Non-ERA training expenditures. The customer survey collected information about participation in 
education and training activities.183 The verbatim information provided on type of course taken was 
used to divide courses into those for ‘general’ education versus training for ‘trade-specific’ skills. This 
information was combined with estimates of the costs of further education course-taking, derived 
from information on Learning and Skills Council (LSC) funding allocations for courses offered as part 
of Basic Skills and Adult Learning Service programs. 
Indirect taxes. As mentioned above, at the time ERA operated, the indirect tax rate in the UK was 
20.4 per cent. Thus, to calculate the amount of indirect taxes, the total amount in the participant 
column, excluding indirect taxes, is multiplied by 0.204. The rationale is that the total in the 
participant column is the change due to ERA in the amount available to participants to spend. 
Slightly less than 80 per cent of this amount represents their actual change in purchasing power, 
and the remaining 20 per cent is ultimately received by the Government. Viewed slightly differently, 
of a £100 increase in earnings attributable to ERA, £20.40 would be passed on to the Government 
and the remainder would increase a participant’s disposable income. Similarly, of a £100 increase in 
(say) Income Support or in retention bonuses paid by the Government, £20.40 would ultimately flow 
back to the Government as indirect tax payments (in other words, the net cost to the Government 
would be only £79.60). As just indicated, the indirect tax amount can be viewed as a cost to ERA 
participants and a benefit to the Exchequer. Because indirect taxes are a transfer from participants 
to the Government, there is zero effect on society as a whole.
7.4.3 Treating the gap between random assignment and the first full tax year  
 of Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study data
As indicated in Table 7.2, the source of the estimates of the impact on earnings is the Work and 
Pensions Longitudinal Study file. The earnings data in the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study 
file are obtained from information employers provide to Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs at the 
end of the tax year. This causes a problem because earnings data, unlike the remaining data in the 
study file, are available only for tax years – that is, from 6 April of one year to 5 April of the following 
year. Consequently, they dovetail poorly with the estimates of operating costs and the estimates 
of the remaining benefits and costs that are used in the cost-benefit analysis, all of which follow 
183 This information was not available for the ND25+ group. Thus, it was not possible to determine 
non-ERA training expenditures for this group. However, in general, ERA seemed to have little 
impact on the training received by the ND25+ group. Hence, non-ERA training expenditures are 
probably small for them.
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the sample population from random assignment onwards. In particular, there is a gap between the 
month of random assignment and first full tax year. For instance, the gap would be six months long 
for an individual who was randomly assigned in October 2004. Because individuals were randomly 
assigned during different months, the gap between random assignment and the first full tax year 
varies among individuals in the sample.
To address this problem, the cost-benefit analysis uses estimates of earnings during tax years 2005-
2006 through 2008-2009, all of which occurred after random assignment was completed,184 and 
follows a two-step procedure to fill the gap in earnings data between random assignment and the 
first full tax year. The first step involved computing average monthly earnings during the 2004-2005 
tax year for each sample member who worked during some or all of that tax year. This was done by 
dividing individuals’ earnings during the 2004-2005 tax year by the number of months they worked 
during that tax year.185 The second step was to multiply the resulting estimate of average monthly 
earnings by the number of months each individual worked between random assignment and the 
first full tax year.186 This provided an estimate of earnings during the gap period. This was used to 
obtain estimates of ERA’s impacts on earnings that correspond to the other estimates of benefits 
and costs used in the cost-benefit study.
7.4.4 Projecting benefits and costs into the future
As previously discussed, the data used to estimate the various benefits and costs resulting from ERA 
were available for five years after random assignment.187 However, in the absence of information 
indicating that these benefits and costs completely ended before the end of the period during which 
they could be observed, they would be expected to persist beyond this observation period. Thus, 
for purposes of the cost-benefit analysis, it is important to project benefits and costs beyond the 
observation period.
Because uncertainty increases the further into the future benefits and costs are projected, 
much of the cost-benefit analysis is limited to a time horizon of ten years. Hence, given a five-
year-long observation period for a particular benefit or cost (e.g., the impact on Jobseeker’s 
Allowance payments for the ND25+ group), the benefit or cost is projected over a further five years. 
Because setting the time horizon at ten years is necessarily rather arbitrary, sensitivity analyses 
184 Some individuals in the ERA sample were randomly assigned before April 2004. For these 
persons, the cost-benefit analysis also uses estimates of impacts on earnings for the  
2004-2005 tax year. 
185 Like the earnings data for the 2005-2006 through 2008-2009 tax years, the earnings data for 
the 2004-2005 tax year were obtained from the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study file. 
However, the 2004-2005 data were not used in the impact analyses reported in Chapters 4-6 
because many individuals in the ERA sample were randomly assigned during this tax year.
186 Although the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study file does not contain monthly earnings 
data, it does indicate whether individuals worked during each month.
187 As indicated in Section 7.4.3, earnings data are actually available for between four and five 
years for different individuals, depending on the month an individual was randomly assigned. 
More specifically, earnings data are available for four full tax years for all members of the 
research sample. In addition, as explained in Section 7.4.3, it was necessary to fill the gap 
between random assignment among individuals in the sample and the first tax year. On 
average, doing this added ten months of follow-up earnings data for the ND25+ group, nearly 
11 months for the NDLP group, and nearly seven months for the WTC group. For expositional 
clarity and simplicity, the remainder of this chapter refers to the observation period as being 
five years in length.
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are conducted using two alternative time horizons: one of five years and one of 20 years. It is 
important to recognise that whatever the length of the time horizon, it is implicitly assumed that no 
programme benefits exist after it ends. Because the operating costs of ERA all occurred within 33 
months after random assignment, if benefits from ERA do, in fact, continue to exist beyond the end 
of the time horizon, then programme benefits will be understated relative to programme costs.
To project benefits and costs, it is necessary to take account of how they may change over the 
period during which they are projected. It is often assumed that while programmes such as ERA 
initially may give participants a competitive advantage in the labour market, this advantage declines 
or decays over time. ERA’s impacts on earnings and benefits payments would decay over time, for 
example, if ERA participants worked more weeks or more hours while the programme’s retention 
bonus and help from ERA advisers were available, but ceased doing so after the programme ended. 
However, ERA also encouraged training, and this could cause programme impacts to continue to 
grow after the programme ended.
Annual decay rates during the projection period were determined on the basis of trends for each 
target group during the observation period. Separate decay rates were established for each 
programme impact that was estimated with data from the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study 
or the customer survey, and then applied to the measured impact during the last year of the 
observation period, its ‘base period’, to produce the projected impact estimates. As explained next, 
somewhat different approaches were used in determining decay rates for ERA’s impacts on benefits 
payments and its impacts on earnings. 
Determining decay rates for impacts on benefits payments involved examining the impact trend 
following the end of the 33-month ERA programme period. The monthly impact estimates for the 
last year and, alternatively, the last two years of the observation period were graphed for each type 
of benefit payment, and the decay (or growth) rate was calculated using the exponential trend line 
with the best fit, as based on the R-squared values. For outcomes for which the impacts were very 
small near the end of observation period, a 100 per cent decay rate was assumed. In other words, it 
was assumed that there was no impact on benefits payments beyond the observation period.
The annual decay rates that were determined on the basis of this procedure are shown in Table 7.3.  
As also shown in the table, Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit are assumed to decay at the 
same rate as ERA’s impact on benefits payments (from either Income Support or Jobseeker’s 
Allowance). These decay rates are applied to the benefit and cost estimates for the final year of the 
observation period.
A less formal approach was used in determining decay rates for impacts on earnings, mainly 
because monthly estimates of these impacts are not available, as they rely on annual data from 
the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study. For example, as shown in Chapter 4, earnings impacts 
for the NDLP target group evaporated before the end of the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study 
observation period. Thus, it is assumed that the decay rate is 100 per cent for this group, which is 
tantamount to assuming zero impact on earnings during the projection period. 
The moderate annual earnings impacts realised by the ND25+ group are mainly attributable to 
an impact on employment, which first increased over time and then began to slowly decline 
(see Chapter 6). However, the annual earnings impact itself appears, if anything, to have slightly 
increased over time. Thus, it is assumed that the earnings impacts for the ND25+ target group 
would be unchanged during the projection period – a zero decay rate. However, as seen later, this 
assumption is subjected to sensitivity tests by alternatively assuming an annual decay rate of 20 per 
cent and an annual growth rate of 20 per cent. 
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For the WTC group, it is assumed that the annual decay rate in the earnings impact during the 
projection period is 17 per cent. This figure is consistent with the annual rate of decay in the 
estimated earnings impacts that was observed to occur for the group between the 2005-2006 and 
the 2008-2009 tax years (see Chapter 4). Nonetheless, there is considerable uncertainty about the 
decay rate, because the estimated earnings impact for the group disappeared in the 2007-2008 
tax year, but then seemed to reappear in the 2008-2009 tax year (although it was statistically 
insignificant in that year). Thus, the 17 per cent assumption is subjected to sensitivity tests by 
alternatively assuming a lower-bound decay rate of zero (i.e., no decay) and an annual upper-bound 
decay rate of 34 per cent.
As shown in Table 7.3, it is further assumed in conducting the cost-benefit analysis that the decay 
rates on ERA’s impacts on earnings are also applicable to the programme’s impacts on income 
taxes, National Insurance Contributions, WTC, and Child Tax Credit. This is necessary because 
separate time series do not exist for these impacts. However, all these items are tied to employment 
and earnings and, hence, they should follow a similar path to changes in impacts on earnings.
Table 7.3 Base-case decay rate assumptions for various benefit and cost  
 components
Component ND25+ NDLP WTC
Earnings(£) 0.0% 100.0% 17.0%
Income tax “ “ “
National Insurance contributions – employee “ “ “
National Insurance contributions – employer “ “ “
WTC “ “ “
Child Tax Credit “ “ “
Jobseeker's Allowance amount (£) 0.0% 7.2% 50.7%
Income Support amount (£) 10.1% 5.9% 11.4%
Any benefit amount (£) 0.0% 5.9% 27.1%
 Housing Benefit “ “ “
 Council Tax Benefit “ “ “
Any benefit receipt rate (0-100%) 0.7% 2.4% -0.68%a
Incapacity Benefit receipt rate (0-100%) 13.4% -1.79%a 100.0%
SOURCES: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment and benefit receipt records, ERA 12-, 24- and 
60-month customer surveys, DWP financial incentives data, DWP fiscal data, Advancement Support Adviser time diaries, and 
published data.
NOTES: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums. 
 aA negative decay rate implies growth, rather than decay.
7.4.5 Discounting
In general, a given sum of money is worth more today than later. People are impatient. Thus, they 
would usually prefer using a given amount of money for consumption earlier, rather than later. If 
the money is used for investment, rather than for consumption, the return on the investment, such 
as interest accrued in a savings account, will be larger the sooner the investment is made. 
Because ERA’s impacts and, hence, benefits occur over a number of years, and benefits received 
later are of less value than similar amounts received sooner, a discount rate is used to convert the 
streams of benefits resulting from ERA into what they were worth in the first follow-up year. This 
is standard practice in cost-benefit analysis. Otherwise, costs and benefits that occur at different 
points of time are not comparable. For example, programme operating costs in ERA were all incurred 
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during the 33 months after random assignment, while, as seen earlier, programme impacts on 
earnings could persist well after the 33 months on ERA were over. Once benefits and costs during 
each time period are converted into their value in the first year following random assignment, total 
programme benefits can be computed by simply summing these values.
Although there is considerable debate about the appropriate discount rate, several recent 
assessments recommend using an annual rate of 3.5 per cent in discounting the values of the 
benefits from programmes such as ERA.188 To take account of the debate and, hence, the uncertainty 
concerning the exact value of the discount rate, one of these assessments further suggests using an 
upper bound of six per cent and a lower bound of two per cent for sensitivity analysis.189 Following 
these recommendations, the cost-benefit analysis uses 3.5 per cent for the central estimates of net 
benefits and tests the sensitivity of these estimates to using two and six per cent, instead.
Box 7.2 Steps required to produce the cost-benefit estimates
Step 1. As described in Section 7.4.2, an impact analysis was conducted to estimate most of 
the key benefits and costs, such as ERA’s impacts on earnings and on various benefit payments, 
including Income Support and Jobseeker’s Allowance payments, during the observation period.
Step 2. The impact estimates were used to populate a spreadsheet.
Step 3. The values in the spreadsheet were all converted to 2005-2006 pounds using the 
Consumer Price Index in order to adjust for inflation. 
Step 4. As described in Section 7.4.2, formulas were applied to the impacts estimates, especially 
the estimated impact on earnings, in order to determine some of the remaining benefits and 
costs listed in the table – for example, ERA’s effects on indirect taxes, National Insurance 
Contributions, and pensions. 
Step 5. Based on the estimated impacts during the last year of the observation period and the 
assumed decay rates appearing in Table 7.3, the benefits and costs during the projection period 
were predicted.
Step 6. The benefits and costs were discounted to convert them to their value in the first 
follow-up year.
Step 7. The discounted benefit and cost values for each year during the time horizon were 
summed.
7.5 Cost-benefit findings
This section presents findings from the cost-benefit analysis of the ERA demonstration. Because they 
differ considerably, findings for the three ERA target groups are presented separately in the following 
order: first the ND25+ group, then the NDLP group, and finally the WTC group. As discussed in the 
previous section, the cost-benefit analysis requires that certain assumptions be made – for example, 
in order to predict benefits and costs beyond the time during which they are directly observed and to 
discount benefits and costs. Thus, the section for each target group first reports detailed ‘base-case 
findings’ – that is, findings based on the set of assumptions that were judged to be most plausible 
and hence produce what arguably might be called the ‘best estimates’. It then presents findings 
that are based on alternative assumptions to determine how robust the conclusions are that rely on 
the base-case results. 
188 See HM Treasury, 2003; Boardman et	al., 2011; Moore et	al., 2004.
189 Boardman et	al., 2011.
The economic costs and benefits of ERA
207
7.5.1 ND25+ group
Base-case	findings
Table 7.4 reports base-case estimates of the benefit and cost components used in the cost-benefit 
analysis of the ND25+ group that were not previously presented in the cost analysis section of this 
chapter. These estimates have all been discounted using a 3.5 per cent discount rate and have all 
been adjusted to 2005-2006 pounds. There are three major things to recognise about this table. 
First, most of the listed outcomes were observed over a five-year period. These outcomes, which are 
aggregated over the five-year observation period and reported separately for the ERA programme 
group and the control group, appear in the first two columns of the table. Second, benefits and 
costs for the five-year observation period are estimated as the difference in outcomes between 
the programme group and the control group.190 The resulting impact estimates appear in the third 
column of the table. Third, as discussed in Section 7.4.4, the impact estimates are projected over the 
next five years. The most important of these projections is for ERA’s impact on earnings, which for 
the ND25+ group is assumed to neither decay nor grow after the observation period ends; instead, 
the earnings impact in each succeeding year is assumed to equal the earnings impact that occurred 
in the fifth year of the observation period. These projections, which are first discounted and then 
summed over the five-year projection period, appear in the fourth column of Table 7.4.
The full base-case cost-benefit findings appear in Table 7.5, which is similar in format to Table 7.2.  
Unlike Table 7.2, however, Table 7.5 reports estimates of the value of the benefit and cost 
components. These values are taken from the cost analysis and from Table 7.4. Whether an impact 
appearing in Table 7.4 is a benefit or cost depends on the perspective that is germane. For example, 
as shown in Table 7.4, ERA, as expected, increased the taxes paid by ND25+ participants, but 
decreased the Jobseeker’s Allowance payments they received. The increase in tax payments and the 
decrease in Jobseeker’s Allowance payments both appear in Table 7.5 as a cost to participants (i.e., 
with a minus sign), but as a benefit to the Exchequer.
190 As shown in Table 7.4, according to the customer survey, commuting costs were a little larger 
for the ND25+ control group than the ND25+ programme group. This also occurred for NDLP 
recipients (but not for WTC recipients). This is the opposite of what was anticipated. However, 
these differences are not statistically significant. If they do exist, one possible explanation is 
that ERA caused participants to take jobs that were located more conveniently to their homes, 
but there is no way to know if this occurred.
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Table 7.4 ND25+: estimated impacts on financial outcomes during the  
 observation period, the projection period, and within ten years  
 after random assignment (in 2005-2006 pounds)
Observed Projected
Observed and 
projected
Type of payment or cost (£)
ERA 
group
Control 
 group
Difference 
(impact)
Projected 
impact
Ten-year 
impact
Earnings and benefits
Earnings 14,462 13,056 1,406 1,500 2,906
Pension contributions 114 93 21 11 32
Taxes
Income taxes 1,129 961 168 196 364
Employee National Insurance contributions 685 590 95 107 202
Employer National Insurance contributions 778 671 108 121 229
Transfer payments
Jobseeker’s Allowance (with OPTIONS) 6,644 7,101 -457 -383 -840
Income Support 2,091 2,121 -29 -19 -48
Incapacity Benefit 2,731 2,736 -6 -7 -13
WTC 1,143 1,462 -320 -148 -468
Child Tax Credit 1,809 1,756 54 16 69
Housing Benefit 7,574 7,842 -268 -306 -574
Council Tax Benefit 1,810 1,885 -76 -148 -224
Employment-related costs
Out-of-pocket child care cost 15 0 15 0 15
Out-of-pocket commuting cost 382 478 -97 0 -97
SOURCES: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment and benefit receipt records, ERA 12-, 24- and 
60-month customer surveys, DWP financial incentives data, DWP fiscal data, Advancement Support Adviser time diaries, and 
published data.
NOTE: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums. 
The key finding in Table 7.5 is that ERA resulted in average net gains of about £725 for each ND25+ 
participant it served and a little over £1,800 for each participant for the Exchequer. This yields a 
net gain of over £2,500 each participant for society as a whole. As will be seen in Section 7.6.2, the 
improvement in the Government’s budgetary position is somewhat unusual among programmes 
that, like ERA, provide financial incentives. Viewed somewhat differently, the figures in Table 7.5 
imply that for each pound Jobcentre Plus expended in operating ERA (the £603 amount in the 
Exchequer column in the ERA operating costs row), participants reaped £1.20 in increased income, 
the Government saved £4.01, and society received £5.22 in benefits.191
For ERA participants, these net gains occurred because their increases in earnings as a result of the 
programme and their receipt of the ERA retention bonuses, when combined, were considerably 
larger than the increases in their tax payments and the losses in their receipt of Jobseeker’s 
191 The returns for each pound of operating costs were calculated as follows: £726/£603 = £1.20 
for participants; [£1,816 – (-£603)]/£603 = £4.01 for the Exchequer; and [£2,542 – (-£603)]/ 
£603 = £5.22 for society. Note that because a negative value for the £603 in operating costs 
is included in computing the net gain to the Exchequer and society (but not the net gain to 
participants), it was necessary to net it out of the numerator of the ratio; otherwise it would  
be included in both the numerator and the denominator.
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Allowance payments and other benefit payments that were caused by ERA. The Exchequer gains 
resulted because the increase in tax receipts and the reduction in Jobseeker’s Allowance and other 
benefit payments resulting from ERA substantially exceeded ERA’s operating costs and programme-
related payments to participants (mostly retention bonuses).
Table 7.5 ND25+: ten-year estimated benefits and costs, by accounting  
 perspective (in 2005-2006 pounds)
Type of payment or cost (£) Participants Exchequer Society
Earnings and benefits
Earnings 2,906 0 2,906
Employer National Insurance contributions 229 0 229
Pension contributions 32 0 32
Taxes
Income taxes -364 364 0
Employee National Insurance contributions -202 202 0
Employer National Insurance contributions -229 229 0
Indirect taxes -186 186 0
Transfer payments
Jobseeker’s Allowance (with OPTIONS) -840 840 0
Income Support -48 48 0
Incapacity Benefit -13 13 0
WTC -468 468 0
Child Tax Credit 69 -69 0
Housing Benefit -574 574 0
Council Tax Benefit -224 224 0
Programme operating costs
ERA operating costs 0 -603 -603
Programme-related payments to ERA participants
Emergency Discretion Fund 0 -36 -36
Retention bonus 518 -518 0
Training bonus 37 -37 0
Tuition payment reimbursement 66 -66 0
Adviser Discretion Fund 0 -1 -1
Employment-related costs
Out-of-pocket education and training cost -66 0 -66
Out-of-pocket child care cost -15 0 -15
Out-of-pocket commuting cost 97 0 97
Measured net gain or net loss (net value) 726 1,816 2,542
SOURCES: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment and benefit receipt records, ERA 12-, 24- and 
60-month customer surveys, DWP financial incentives data, DWP fiscal data, Advancement Support Adviser time diaries, and 
published data.
NOTE: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums. 
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Sensitivity	analysis
Table 7.6 examines the robustness of the base-case findings by presenting findings from a number 
of sensitivity analyses that rely on assumptions that differ from those used in obtaining the base-
case estimates. For example, the first two sensitivity tests are based, respectively, on a two per cent 
discount rate and a six per cent discount rate, instead of the 3.5 per cent discount rate used in the 
base-case. Although total net gains increase when the smaller discount rate is used and decline 
when the larger rate is used, these changes are small because the time horizon is fairly short. Cost-
benefit findings are usually sensitive to the choice of discount rates only when the time horizon is 
relatively long.
The next two sensitivity tests are based on decay rates for earnings that differ from the zero rate 
used in obtaining the base-case estimates. More specifically, it is first assumed that ERA’s impact on 
earnings during the last year of the observation period grows by 20 per cent during each succeeding 
year; and then it is alternatively assumed that the impact on earnings decays by 20 per cent during 
each succeeding year. As expected, the assumption of a declining impact on earnings causes the 
estimated net gain resulting from ERA to shrink, while the assumption that the impact on earnings 
grows after the observation period ends causes the estimated net gain to grow. The net gain 
estimates change considerably as a result of the alternative decay rate assumptions, but remain 
well in excess of zero, even when the impact on earnings is assumed to shrink over time. 
As an additional sensitivity test, net gains are computed over a five-year and a 20-year time horizon, 
rather than the base-case ten-year time horizon. Under the first of these alternative assumptions, 
rather than projecting program impacts over five years, it is not necessary to project impacts at all. 
In other words, it is assumed that programme impacts suddenly become zero after only five years, 
even though non-zero impacts are observed during the fifth year after random assignment. Under 
the second alternative assumption, rather than projecting programme impacts over five years, they 
are instead projected over 15 years. As shown in Table 7.6, net gains increase considerably with 
the longer time horizon. Based on a five-year time horizon, ND25+ participants, the Exchequer, and 
society as a whole all still enjoy positive net gains, albeit at a lower level than in the base-case. In 
interpreting the findings based on the five-year time horizon, it is important to keep in mind that the 
assumption is implausible because it is highly unlikely that ERA’s impacts would abruptly disappear 
at the end of the five-year observation period. Thus, the true net effects are almost certainly larger 
than the ones shown in the five-year time horizon row in Table 7.6. The 20-year time horizon is 
plausible because ERA’s impact on earnings for the ND25+ group did not seem to diminish at the 
end of the five-year observation period. Nonetheless, it is highly speculative because it is impossible 
to know whether the impact will actually continue for 15 years. 
Based on the sensitivity tests, it appears very likely that ERA increased the incomes of the ND25+ 
group and also improved the Government’s budgetary position. However, because some benefits 
and costs that potentially resulted from ERA are non-financial and, hence, have so-far been ignored, 
it is not as apparent that the sum of financial and non-financial benefits and costs that resulted 
from ERA is positive. Those benefits and costs that are omitted from the formal cost-benefit analysis 
are discussed in Section 7.6.3. As will be seen there, the conclusion that ERA is cost-beneficial for 
ND25+ participants appears to stand up. 
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Table 7.6 ND25+: sensitivity tests of estimated net gains to alternative  
 assumptions, by accounting perspective (in 2005-2006 pounds)
Sensitivity test Participants Exchequer Society
Base estimate 726 1,816 2,542
Alternative discount rate
2.0% 709 1,959 2,668
6.0% 744 1,602 2,345
Alternative earnings decay rate
20% growth 1,386 2,402 3,788
20% decay 329 1,473 1,802
20-year time horizon 1,002 4,049 5,050
5-year time horizon 557 353 911
SOURCES: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment and benefit receipt records, ERA 12-, 24- and 
60-month customer surveys, DWP financial incentives data, DWP fiscal data, Advancement Support Adviser time diaries, and 
published data.
NOTE: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums. 
7.5.2 NDLP group
Base-case	findings
Table 7.7 shows many of the base-case impact estimates used in the cost-benefit analysis for the 
NDLP target group. The table is obviously similar to Table 7.4, which reports the same estimates for 
the ND25+ group. The major difference between the two tables is that, unlike the earnings impact 
estimates for the ND25+ group, the estimates appearing in Table 7.7 for the NDLP group are not 
projected beyond the five-year observation period. The reason for this, as discussed earlier, is that 
the positive impacts of ERA on the earnings of the NDLP group appear to disappear before the end 
of the observation period. This means that impacts for the NDLP group that depend on earnings 
impacts (e.g., impacts on income taxes, National Insurance Contributions, and WTC and Child Tax 
Credit) are also not projected beyond the five-year observation period.
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Table 7.7 NDLP: estimated impacts on financial outcomes during the  
 observation period, the projection period, and within ten  
 years after random assignment (in 2005-2006 pounds)
Observed Projected
Observed and 
projected
Type of payment or cost (£)
ERA 
group
Control 
 group
Difference 
(impact)
Projected 
impact
Ten-year 
impact
Earnings and benefits
Earnings 18,002 17,204 799 0 799
Pension contributions 328 305 23 0 23
Taxes
Income taxes 1,062 967 96 0 96
Employee National Insurance contributions 704 648 56 0 56
Employer National Insurance contributions 800 737 63 0 63
Transfer payments
Jobseeker’s Allowance (with OPTIONS) 303 350 -47 -21 -67
Income Support 8,850 9,254 -404 -12 -416
Incapacity Benefit 904 834 69 150 219
WTC 5,285 5,318 -33 0 -33
Child Tax Credit 10,366 10,606 -240 0 -240
Housing Benefit 8,956 9,470 -514 -23 -537
Council Tax Benefit 2,001 2,135 -134 -9 -143
Employment-related costs
Out-of-pocket child care cost 759 572 187 0 187
Out-of-pocket commuting cost 870 976 -107 0 -107
SOURCES: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment and benefit receipt records, ERA 12-, 24- and 
60-month customer surveys, DWP financial incentives data, DWP fiscal data, Advancement Support Adviser time diaries, and 
published data.
NOTE: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums. 
Base-case findings for the NDLP group are presented in Table 7.8. The findings indicate that ERA 
caused a negligible net loss to occur for ERA participants in the NDLP group and resulted in a 
very small net loss for the Exchequer. Hence, the effect on society as a whole is a small net loss. 
Viewed in terms of the return on the £501 that Jobcentre Plus expended on ERA’s operating costs, 
participants lost seven pence per expended pound; the Exchequer obtained a return of 75 pence per 
pound expended; and society as a whole acquired a return of 68 pence on each pound expended.
The negligible overall net loss for NDLP participants occurred because the increases in earnings 
attributable to ERA and the retention payments they received were more or less counteracted by 
reductions in various benefit payments, especially Income Support receipts, Housing Benefit, and 
Child Tax Credit payments. The very small estimated effect on the Government’s budget mostly 
resulted because these same reductions in benefit payments were more or less sufficient to offset 
ERA’s rather small operating costs and the cost to the Exchequer of funding ERA retention bonuses 
and non-ERA training expenditures.
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Table 7.8 NDLP: ten-year estimated benefits and costs, by accounting  
 perspective (in 2005-2006 pounds)
Type of payment or cost (£) Participants Exchequer Society
Earnings and benefits
Earnings 799 0 799
Employer National Insurance contributions 63 0 63
Pension contributions 23 0 23
Taxes
Income taxes -96 96 0
Employee National Insurance contributions -56 56 0
Employer National Insurance contributions -63 63 0
Indirect taxes 10 -10 0
Transfer payments
Jobseeker’s Allowance (with OPTIONS) -67 67 0
Income Support -416 416 0
Incapacity Benefit 219 -219 0
WTC -33 33 0
Child Tax Credit -240 240 0
Housing Benefit -537 537 0
Council Tax Benefit -143 143 0
Programme operating costs
ERA operating costs 0 -501 -501
Non-ERA training expenditures 0 -309 -309
Programme-related payments to ERA participants
Emergency Discretion Fund 0 -58 -58
Retention bonus 497 -497 0
Training bonus 83 -83 0
Tuition payment reimbursement 90 -90 0
Adviser Discretion Fund 0 -7 -7
Employment-related costs
Out-of-pocket education and training cost -90 0 -90
Out-of-pocket child care cost -187 0 -187
Out-of-pocket commuting cost 107 0 107
Measured net gain or net loss (net value) -37 -124 -161
SOURCES: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment and benefit receipt records, ERA 12-, 24- and 
60-month customer surveys, DWP financial incentives data, DWP fiscal data, Advancement Support Adviser time diaries, and 
published data.
NOTE: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums. 
The negligible estimated reduction in the disposable income of ERA participants in the NDLP group 
that is implied by Table 7.8 is unusual among programmes such as ERA that provide financial 
incentives (see Section 7.6.2) and is somewhat surprising. After all, these persons volunteered to 
participate in ERA and decided to increase their hours and earnings by their own free will. Under 
such circumstances, why would they do so unless they could increase their income? One possible 
explanation is that when they decided to increase their hours of work, they did not initially realise 
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that their benefit payments would fall by around as much as their earnings and that ERA bonus 
payments would increase. Such prediction errors are consistent with the fact that the increase in 
earnings for the NDLP group disappeared after only a few years, suggesting that members of this 
group soon learned that their incomes failed to rise. 
Table 7.8 is consistent with evidence presented elsewhere in this report that ERA induced some 
members of the NDLP group to seek training. The Exchequer directly paid £309 in non-ERA 
expenditures per ERA participant for this increase, and the participants themselves initially paid 
an average of £90.192 As the table shows, however, the £90 outlay by participants was ultimately 
entirely reimbursed by ERA’s tuition payment reimbursement provision. Thus, ERA did not result in 
any increase in expenditures on education and training by programme participants from the NDLP 
group. The increase in training cost was instead borne entirely by the Exchequer.
Sensitivity	analysis
Because ERA’s impacts on earnings and earnings-related benefit and cost components do not 
appear to extend beyond the five-year observation period for the NDLP group, sensitivity tests 
that are based on alternative decay rates and alternative time horizons are not relevant for this 
group. Moreover, because the five-year observation period is short, the base-case findings are little 
changed when alternative discount rates are used. Therefore, based on such sensitivity tests, there 
is little reason to modify the base-case conclusions that ERA for the NDLP group hardly affected the 
disposable incomes of participants and had small negative effects on the budgetary position of the 
Exchequer and on society as a whole. 
Cost-benefit	findings	for	the	A-level	subgroup	
Chapters 5 and 6 analyse whether the impacts of ERA varied among various subgroups. Perhaps the 
most striking findings from this analysis were for those among the NDLP target group who entered 
ERA with A-level qualifications. ERA for this subgroup was found to have considerably larger impacts 
on earnings and time on Income Support than ERA for individuals with lower education credentials. 
Similar subgroup differences by educational attainment were not found for the WTC and ND25+ 
target groups. Thus, a separate cost-benefit analysis was conducted for the A-level subgroup within 
the NDLP target group, but not for the other two target groups. The findings from this analysis are 
presented in this subsection. These findings should be interpreted with some care, however, as 
there is always a risk that estimated impacts for a single subgroup are a statistical aberration. The 
fact that ERA’s impacts on earnings and on time on Income Support were both larger for the NDLP 
A-level subgroup than for other NDLP educational subgroups is reassuring. The fact that similar 
findings were not obtained for this subgroup in the WTC and ND25+ samples is less reassuring – 
although, as Chapter 5 explains, the NDLP A-level subgroup differed in important and relevant ways 
from people with similar qualifications in the WTC and ND25+ target groups.
There is some evidence (not shown here) that ERA’s impacts on the A-level subgroup still existed 
at the end of the five-year observation period, suggesting that these impacts likely persisted 
beyond the end of this period. Thus, the cost-benefit findings are based on a ten-year time horizon. 
However, the earnings impacts appear to tail off considerably over the last two years of the 
observation period. Consistent with the observed decline, an annual earnings decay rate of 60 per 
cent is assumed in projecting the earnings impact beyond the observation period. Table 7.9 shows 
192 While these outlays may seem modest, it is important to keep in mind that they are computed 
by averaging over those in the NDLP programme group who received training and those who 
did not. The expenditures for those in the programme group who actually received training are 
much larger.
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the estimated impacts of ERA during both the observation period and the projection period. Partially 
because of the high assumed decay rate for earnings, the table implies that most of the impact of 
ERA occurred during the observation period.
Table 7.9 NDLP A-level subgroup: estimated impacts on financial outcomes  
 during the observation period, the projection period, and within ten  
 years after random assignment (in 2005-2006 pounds)
Observed Projected
Observed and 
projected
Type of payment or cost (£)
ERA 
group
Control 
 group
Difference 
(impact)
Projected 
impact
Ten-year 
impact
Earnings and benefits
Earnings 27,314 23,545 3,768 302 4,071
Pension contributions 654 573 81 0 80
Taxes
Income taxes 2,517 2,027 490 47 537
Employee National Insurance contributions 1,498 1,218 280 26 306
Employer National Insurance contributions 1,702 1,384 318 29 347
Transfer payments
Jobseeker’s Allowance (with OPTIONS) 277 327 -49 -21 -70
Income Support 6,712 7,573 -860 -38 -899
Incapacity Benefit 716 700 16 212 228
WTC 5,323 5,545 -222 -369 -591
Child Tax Credit 10,758 10,555 203 476 679
Housing Benefit 6,926 7,698 -772 45 -727
Council Tax Benefit 1,544 1,731 -187 8 -180
Employment-related costs
Out-of-pocket child care cost 759 572 187 0 187
Out-of-pocket commuting cost 870 976 -107 0 -107
SOURCES: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment and benefit receipt records, ERA 12-, 24- and 
60-month customer surveys, DWP financial incentives data, DWP fiscal data, Advancement Support Adviser time diaries, and 
published data.
NOTE: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums. 
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Based on the estimates in Table 7.9, Table 7.10 presents the base-case cost-benefit findings for the 
NDLP A-level subgroup. The table indicates that ERA resulted in average net gains of nearly £2,100 
for each person for programme participants, about £1,500 for each person for the Exchequer, and 
over £3,500 for each person for society as a whole.193 The return on the £506 that Jobcentre Plus 
expended on ERA operating costs for the A-level subgroup was £4.10, £3.92, and £8.02, respectively. 
The gains for participants and society resulted largely from earnings gains, although the retention 
bonuses also made an important contribution to the gains of participants. The gains by the 
Exchequer are attributable in large measure to increases in tax receipts and reductions in benefits 
payments, especially payments for Income Support, WTC, and Housing Benefit.
According to Table 7.8, ERA for the NDLP target group as a whole resulted in very small net losses 
for the Exchequer and society, while having a negligible effect on the incomes of participants; but 
Table 7.10 implies that ERA for the A-level subgroup resulted in net gains from all three perspectives. 
Therefore, although separate cost-benefit findings are not presented for NDLP participants with 
lower education credentials than A-levels, it is apparent that ERA for such persons resulted in net 
losses from all three perspectives. 
Table 7.11 presents sensitivity findings for the NDLP A-level subgroup and indicates that the base-
case findings change relatively little when alternative discount rates, decay rates, and time horizons 
are used in computing net gains. A key reason for this is that most of the impacts of ERA for the 
NDLP A-level subgroup are predicted to occur during the observation period, regardless of the size of 
the decay rate or length of the time horizon.
193 As mentioned in Section 7.2.2, the estimates of ERA’s operating costs rely on time diaries 
maintained by Advancement Support Advisers. In filling in these time diaries, advisers were 
asked to record each contact with a participant, and in doing this, to indicate the target group 
to which each participant belonged. However, they were not asked to indicate the participant’s 
educational subgroup. In estimating ERA’s operating costs, it was therefore necessary to 
assume that the diary information for NDLP participants pertains to all members of the target 
group, regardless of educational subgroup. In other words, it is assumed that time spent with 
advisers was the same regardless of educational subgroup. This is a reasonable assumption, 
because data not shown here indicate that there is relatively little difference in the number 
of contacts with Jobcentre Plus staff between the NDLP participants with and without A-level 
credentials. The estimates of operating costs also depend on estimates of the average length 
of the pre- and post-employment phases, and separate estimates by educational level are 
available for this variable. Thus, the estimates of operating costs that appear in Table 7.8 and 
Table 7.10 differ. However, this difference is slight because the average lengths of the pre- and 
post-employment phases were fairly similar for NDLP participants with and without A-level 
credentials.
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Table 7.10 NDLP A-level subgroup: ten-year estimated benefits and costs,  
 by accounting perspective (in 2005-2006 pounds)
Type of payment or cost (£) Participants Exchequer Society
Earnings and benefits
Earnings 4,071 0 4,071
Employer National Insurance contributions 347 0 347
Pension contributions 80 0 80
Taxes
Income taxes -537 537 0
Employee National Insurance contributions -306 306 0
Employer National Insurance contributions -347 347 0
Indirect taxes -532 532 0
Transfer payments
Jobseeker’s Allowance (with OPTIONS) -70 70 0
Income Support -899 899 0
Incapacity Benefit 228 -228 0
WTC -591 591 0
Child Tax Credit 679 -679 0
Housing Benefit -727 727 0
Council Tax Benefit -180 180 0
Programme operating costs
ERA operating costs 0 -506 -506
Non-ERA training expenditures 0 -125 -125
Programme-related payments to ERA participants
Emergency Discretion Fund 0 -82 -82
Retention bonus 793 -793 0
Training bonus 144 -144 0
Tuition payment reimbursement 145 -145 0
Adviser Discretion Fund 0 -7 -7
Employment-related costs
Out-of-pocket education and training cost -145 0 -145
Out-of-pocket child care cost -187 0 -187
Out-of-pocket commuting cost 107 0 107
Measured net gain or net loss (net value) 2,074 1,479 3,553
SOURCES: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment and benefit receipt records, ERA 12-, 24- and 
60-month customer surveys, DWP financial incentives data, DWP fiscal data, Advancement Support Adviser time diaries, and 
published data.
NOTE: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums. 
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Table 7.11 NDLP A-level subgroup: sensitivity tests of estimated net  
 gains to alternative assumptions, by accounting perspective  
 (in 2005-2006 pounds)
Sensitivity test Participants Exchequer Society
Base estimate 2,074 1,479 3,553
Alternative discount rate
2.0% 2,158 1,511 3,669
6.0% 1,944 1,426 3,370
Alternative earnings decay rate
40% decay 2,300 1,605 3,905
80% decay 1,941 1,408 3,349
20-year time horizon 2,348 1,208 3,556
5-year time horizon 1,643 1,587 3,230
SOURCES: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment and benefit receipt records, ERA 12-, 24- and 
60-month customer surveys, DWP financial incentives data, DWP fiscal data, Advancement Support Adviser time diaries, and 
published data.
NOTE: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums. 
7.5.3 WTC group
Base-case	findings
Table 7.12 presents estimates of ERA’s impacts on various outcomes that are used in conducting 
the benefit-cost analysis of WTC recipients who participated in ERA. As in the case of the ND25+ 
and NDLP groups, a ten-year time horizon is used for the analysis. In keeping with the decline of the 
WTC earnings impact estimates over the observation period, in computing the base-case estimates, 
it is assumed that the earnings impact decays from its level during the last year of the observation 
period by 17 per cent during each year of the projection period. 
Findings from the base-case cost-benefit analysis for WTC recipients appear in Table 7.13. As will 
be seen in section 7.6.2, programmes for low-wage workers that provide financial incentives often 
increase the incomes of these workers, but have a negative effect on the Government’s budgetary 
position. This pattern is observed in Table 7.13, which indicates that ERA produced small net 
gains for programme participants from the WTC group, but that the programme’s effect on the 
Exchequer’s budgetary position was negative and much larger in magnitude. Thus, society as a 
whole suffered noticeable net losses. More specifically, while participants gained 16 pence for each 
of the £1,457 that Jobcentre Plus expended on operating costs to run ERA, the Exchequer lost 26 
pence per pound expended. Hence, society as a whole lost ten pence for every pound that Jobcentre 
Plus expended on operating costs. 
Although increases in hours and earnings appear to have resulted from ERA for participants from the 
WTC group, this meant that they also paid more in taxes, commuting costs, and childcare costs and 
received less in benefits payments that, together, more than offset their earnings gains. However, 
a typical WTC participant also received over £700 in retention bonuses and over £200 in training 
bonuses. Without these payments, the disposable income of the typical WTC participant would have 
declined as a result of ERA instead of modestly increasing. 
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Table 7.12 WTC: estimated impacts on financial outcomes during the  
 observation period, the projection period, and within ten years  
 after random assignment (in 2005-2006 pounds)
Observed Projected
Observed and 
projected
Type of payment or cost (£)
ERA 
group
Control 
 group
Difference 
(impact)
Projected 
impact
Ten-year 
impact
Earnings and benefits
Earnings 30,675 29,781 893 677 1,571
Pension contributions 1,214 1,154 60 11 71
Taxes
Income taxes 2,649 2,457 192 90 282
Employee National Insurance contributions 1,685 1,581 104 51 155
Employer National Insurance contributions 1,915 1,797 118 58 176
Transfer payments
Jobseeker’s Allowance (with OPTIONS) 157 141 17 1 17
Income Support 892 916 -24 -4 -28
Incapacity Benefit 467 522 -54 0 -54
WTC 3,739 3,833 -94 -7 -101
Child Tax Credit 4,983 4,847 136 -522 -387
Housing Benefit 1,302 1,521 -219 -10 -229
Council Tax Benefit 945 1,088 -143 -3 -146
Employment-related costs
Out-of-pocket child care cost 856 565 291 0 291
Out-of-pocket commuting cost 2,018 1,382 635 0 635
SOURCES: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment and benefit receipt records, ERA 12-, 24- and 
60-month customer surveys, DWP financial incentives data, DWP fiscal data, Advancement Support Adviser time diaries, and 
published data.
NOTE: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums. 
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Table 7.13 WTC: ten-year estimated benefits and costs, by accounting  
 perspective (in 2005-2006 pounds)
Type of payment or cost (£) Participants Exchequer Society
Earnings and benefits
Earnings 1,571 0 1,571
Employer National Insurance contributions 176 0 176
Pension contributions 71 0 71
Taxes
Income taxes -282 282 0
Employee National Insurance contributions -155 155 0
Employer National Insurance contributions -176 176 0
Indirect taxes -59 59 0
Transfer payments
Jobseeker’s Allowance (with OPTIONS) 17 -17 0
Income Support -28 28 0
Incapacity Benefit -54 54 0
WTC -101 101 0
Child Tax Credit -387 387 0
Housing Benefit -229 229 0
Council Tax Benefit -146 146 0
Programme operating costs
ERA operating costs 0 -1,457 -1,457
Non-ERA training expenditures 0 -809 -809
Programme-related payments to ERA participants
Emergency Discretion Fund 0 -60 -60
Retention bonus 721 -721 0
Training bonus 216 -216 0
Tuition payment reimbursement 172 -172 0
Adviser Discretion Fund 0 1 1
Employment-related costs
Out-of-pocket education and training cost -172 0 -172
Out-of-pocket child care cost -291 0 -291
Out-of-pocket commuting cost -635 0 -635
Measured net gain or net loss (net value) 230 -1,836 -1,606
SOURCES: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment and benefit receipt records, ERA 12-, 24- and 
60-month customer surveys, DWP financial incentives data, DWP fiscal data, Advancement Support Adviser time diaries, and 
published data.
NOTE: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums. 
Relative to the two New Deal groups, providing ERA to WTC recipients was much more costly to 
the Exchequer because of larger expenditures on bonus payments, much larger expenditures 
on non-ERA training, and much larger operating costs. These costs were offset, but only in small 
part, by increases in tax payments that were made by WTC recipients who participated in ERA and 
reductions in their benefit payments.
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Table 7.13 implies that losses to the Exchequer resulting from ERA far exceed gains by WTC 
participants, and, as a consequence, society as a whole is worse off. However, because WTC 
participants have lower incomes than the average taxpayer, they are likely to value a given change 
in income more highly. A considerable literature exists suggesting that this difference in marginal 
utility should be dealt with in benefit-cost analysis by giving each pound of gain or loss by individuals 
with relatively low incomes greater weight than each pound of gain or loss by persons with relatively 
high incomes (see Boardman et	al., 2011, Chapter 19, for a summary). For example, after examining 
the relevant literature, one recent analysis provisionally suggests that the estimated ‘value for net 
economic benefit per individual should be multiplied by a weight of 2.5’.194 If this weight is applied 
to the net gains of WTC participants, they increase from £230 to £575. However, the estimate of the 
net loss incurred by the Exchequer, £1,836, is still much larger than this weighted gain. Hence, ERA’s 
estimated effect on society for WTC remains negative.
Table 7.13 indicates that although ERA resulted in a considerable increase in training expenditures by 
both WTC recipients and the Government, the recipients were entirely reimbursed for their increased 
expenditure of £172 by ERA’s tuition payment reimbursement provision.
Sensitivity	analysis
Sensitivity findings for the WTC group are presented in Table 7.14. The table indicates, as expected, 
that when either a two per cent or a six per cent discount rate replaces the 3.5 per cent discount 
rate used in the base-case, rather trivial changes result for the net gains or losses from all three 
perspectives. Hence, the base-case findings of a modest net gain in the incomes of participants and 
the negative effect on the Exchequer’s budgetary position remain intact.
The findings for WTC participants also exhibit little sensitivity to assumptions concerning the decay 
rate and the length of the time horizon.195 However, the Exchequer’s estimated net loss displays 
considerably greater sensitivity. Nonetheless, regardless of whether it is assumed that the decay 
194 Fujiwara, 2010. The 2.5 weight is applicable to typical low-income participants in benefit 
programmes. Of course, beneficiaries in different programmes differ from one another. Thus, 
Fujiwara (p 61) notes that in order to use this weight, it is necessary to assume that one can 
‘use the same welfare weight for all programmes’. However, the weight would need to be 
almost eight for there to be a net gain for society as a whole. A weight of this size seems 
implausible.
195 A perhaps surprising finding in Table 7.14 is that the estimated net benefits for WTC 
participants become smaller as the time horizon becomes longer, although they do not shrink 
by much. This occurs even though ERA’s positive impact on the earnings of WTC participants 
is predicted to increase as the time horizon becomes longer. One reason is that as earnings 
increase, the taxes that participants pay are also predicted to increase, and this offsets 
part of the earnings increase. A more important factor is that while ERA’s estimated impact 
on Child Tax Credit is positive for WTC participants when summed over the entire five-year 
observation period (see Table 7.12), it becomes negative by the end of the period. This is due 
to the structure of the Child Tax Credit – families with income up to £15,000 are eligible for 
the maximum credit, but the credit decreases as earnings increase for families with greater 
incomes. The income increases produced by ERA resulted in decreased Child Tax Credit in the 
fifth year of the observation period. Hence, ERA’s impact on Child Tax Credit is predicted to 
be negative during the projection period and to become more negative the longer the time 
horizon and, thus, the projection period. In combination with the increase in taxes, the decline 
in Child Tax Credit was sufficient to cause the estimated net income of WTC participants in ERA 
to fall as the time horizon increased in length.
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rate is zero or 34 per cent or that the time horizon is 20 years or five years in length, the estimated 
effect on the Exchequer’s budgetary position remains clearly negative and sizable in magnitude. 
Thus, the conclusions from the base-case results for ERA for WTC participants appear robust to 
various sensitivity tests. 
Table 7.14 WTC: sensitivity tests of estimated net gains (or losses) to alternative 
 assumptions, by accounting perspective (in 2005-2006 pounds)
Sensitivity test Participants Exchequer Society
Base estimate 230 -1,836 -1,606
Alternative discount rate
2.0% 198 -1,759 -1,560
6.0% 274 -1,953 -1,679
Alternative earnings decay rate
0% decay 283 -1,451 -1,169
34% decay 188 -2,074 -1,885
20-year time horizon 188 -1,514 -1,326
5-year time horizon 229 -2,581 -2,353
SOURCES: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment and benefit receipt records, ERA 12-, 24- and 
60-month customer surveys, DWP financial incentives data, DWP fiscal data, Advancement Support Adviser time diaries, and 
published data.
NOTE: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums. 
7.6 Assessing the cost-benefit findings
This section first summarises and compares the key findings from the separate cost-benefit analyses 
conducted for each of ERA’s three target groups. It then attempts to provide some context for 
the findings for ERA by reporting on findings from cost-benefit analyses of other welfare-to-work 
programmes that were evaluated through random assignment. Because, as mentioned earlier, the 
cost-benefit findings for ERA, like those for other programmes, are based on only those benefits and 
costs that could readily be estimated in pounds, the section then explores the implications for the 
findings of taking into consideration the omitted benefits and costs. The section concludes with a 
discussion of some of the key limitations of the cost-benefit analysis.
7.6.1 Key findings
The base-case findings for the ND25+ group indicate that ERA resulted in net financial gains for both 
participants and the Exchequer of £726 for each ERA participant and £1,816 for each participant, 
respectively, and, hence, net gains of £2,542 for each participant for society as a whole. In contrast, 
the estimated base-case net financial gains for participants in the WTC group, while positive, 
were only £230 for each participant; and the estimated effects of ERA for the WTC group on the 
Exchequer’s budgetary position and on society as a whole were negative and sizable, -£1,836 
and -£1,606 for each participant, respectively. The base-case findings for the NDLP target group 
indicate that ERA caused average net losses of £37 for participants, £124 for the Exchequer, and 
£161 for society as a whole. These findings were largely driven by ERA’s impact on the earnings 
of participants. Increases in earnings obviously directly increased the disposable income available 
to ERA participants. They often also meant that participants were working more hours or more 
regularly, thereby increasing their eligibility for ERA’s retention bonuses. Earnings improvements 
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not only resulted in gains for programme participants, they also tended to improve the Exchequer’s 
budgetary position by increasing the inflow of tax revenue from participants and reducing the 
outflow of benefits payments to participants.
ERA seems to have resulted in earnings improvements for all three of its target groups during the 
five-year period in which they could be directly observed. As suggested by comparing Tables 7.4, 7.7, 
and 7.12, much of the variation in the base-case cost-benefit findings for the three target groups 
is attributable to different assumptions as to whether these positive impacts on earnings would 
continue beyond the observation period, and if they would, the rate at which the impacts would 
decay. The earnings impact for the ND25+ group did not appear to diminish during this observation 
period. Thus, in conducting the base-case cost-benefit analyses for this group, it was assumed that 
the earnings impacts would continue at the level they were at in the final year of the observation 
period during each of the remaining years of a ten-year time horizon (that is, over the next five 
years). The earnings impacts for the WTC group did clearly diminish during the observation period. 
However, although the estimated impacts on earnings for the WTC group were still positive at the 
end of the period, they were small and statistically insignificant. Still, it seemed plausible that they 
remained positive beyond the observation period. Thus, consistent with the decay that occurred 
over the observation period for the WTC group, it was assumed that their earnings impacts would 
diminish by 17 per cent over each of the five remaining years of the ten-year time horizon. In 
contrast to the ND25+ and WTC groups, ERA’s impact on the earnings of the NDLP group appeared 
to evaporate by the end of the observation period. Hence, in conducting the cost-benefit analysis 
for this group, it was assumed there were no impacts on earnings beyond the five-year observation 
period.
Because the base-case assumptions concerning the decay rate and time horizon for the ND25+ and 
WTC groups are inevitably subject to some uncertainty, they were subjected to several sensitivity 
tests. These sensitivity tests involved using alternative decay rates and time horizons in computing the 
net gains or net losses resulting from ERA. The findings for the ND25+ and the WTC groups appeared 
quite robust to these sensitivity tests – that is, there continued to be strong positive net gains in the 
case of the ND25+ target group. The conclusion from the base-case that the disposable incomes of 
WTC recipients were very modestly improved by ERA and that the Exchequer and society as a whole 
were negatively affected by the participation of this group in ERA also appeared to stand up.
7.6.2 How cost-beneficial have other welfare-to-work programmes been?
Except for ERA, only limited information that relies on random assignment exists about the costs 
and benefits of welfare-to-work programmes in the UK. However, there is a considerable body of 
cost-benefit evidence for US welfare-to-work programmes that is based on random assignment 
evaluations. The following discussion concentrates mostly on the evidence for lone parents, the 
group that has been the focus of the majority of the US random assignment studies. Because the 
design of US welfare-to-work programmes differs in important ways from ERA in the UK, as does 
the context in which they operate, cost-benefit findings for these programmes are not directly 
comparable with those for ERA. However, the US findings do, perhaps, provide a benchmark that can 
be used in assessing the ERA cost-benefit results. 
The US findings that are most pertinent to ERA in the UK come from the recently completed US 
Employment Retention and Advancement project. Cost-benefit studies were conducted of three of 
the 16 programmes that were tested by US ERA: one in Texas, one in Chicago, and one in Riverside, 
California.196 In the case of the Texas programme, separate analyses were conducted for two sites: 
Corpus Christi and Fort Worth. Similar to UK ERA, these three programmes emphasised retention 
196 Redcross et	al., 2010.
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and advancement after participants obtained jobs. Moreover, in addition to services, like UK ERA, 
the programmes in Texas and Chicago (but not in Riverside) used financial incentives to help achieve 
their objectives, and, like UK ERA, the programme in Texas tied these financial incentives to sustained 
employment. All three programmes enrolled lone parents who were or had been on welfare.
Estimates of the total net gains (or losses) from the four cost-benefit studies appear in Table 7.15. 
To enhance their comparability with the cost-benefit findings for UK ERA, these estimates were first 
adjusted to 2006 dollars using the Consumer Price Index and then transformed into pounds using 
the 2006 UK-US exchange rate, which averaged about $1.85 for each pound over the year. 
As shown in Table 7.15, the three cost-benefit studies of US ERA programmes that provided financial 
incentive resulted in net gains for participants and net losses for the Government. It is important 
to emphasise, however, that cost-benefit analyses were not conducted of the remaining 13 
programmes tested in the US ERA project, because they did not have positive statistically significant 
effects on employment and earnings. (The US project evaluated a wide variety of retention and 
advancement models, not a single model, as in the UK ERA demonstration). Moreover, the Houston 
site of the Texas programme was also excluded because of a lack of positive effects on employment 
and earnings that appeared to result from a weak implementation of the Texas ERA model. Thus, 
the findings in the table are almost surely for the most cost-beneficial of the programmes tested in 
the US ERA project.
Table 7.15 Estimates of net gains and losses by accounting perspective from  
 the US ERA project
Programme Participants (£) Government (£) Society (£)
Corpus Christi 1,866 -529 1,200
Fort Worth 1,666 -1,207 375
Chicago 1,789 -1,284 418
Riverside PASS 2,233 36 2,096
SOURCE: Redcross, Deitch, and Farrell (2010).
Many more cost-benefit analyses have been conducted of welfare-to-work programmes that 
focused on the pre-employment period than of those, like the US ERA and UK ERA programmes, that 
emphasised the post-employment period. A recent meta-analysis (i.e., statistical synthesis) was 
based on 50 such studies.197 These 50 studies all relied on random assignment, and they all were 
of mandatory welfare-to-work programmes run during the 1980s and 1990s. Of the 50 studies, 
39 were of programmes that targeted lone parents on welfare, and 11 were of programmes that 
targeted the mostly male, long-term unemployed heads of two-parent families on welfare. Just 
over half of the 50 cost-benefit studies (28) found that participants were better off as a result of 
the evaluated programmes, and a little over half (29) determined that the Government’s budgetary 
position was improved. (Of the 11 programmes that targeted unemployed male heads, three 
resulted in net gains from the participant perspective, and six had net gains from the Government 
perspective.). However, only 14 found that the evaluated programmes produced net gains from both 
perspectives, while eight concluded that there were net losses from both perspectives. (For the 11 
programmes that targeted unemployed male heads, only one had net gains from both perspectives, 
and three resulted in net losses from both perspectives.) Thus, mixed findings were typical. 
197 Redcross et	al., 2010.
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Table 7.16 presents the mean and median net gains and losses that are computed from the 
estimates obtained from the 50 cost-benefit studies and are again converted into 2006 pounds. 
As the table shows, when means are computed for those 50 studies, their standard deviations are 
much larger than the means themselves, suggesting that there were some impressively successful 
pre-employment welfare-to-work programmes and some notable failures. Indeed, the net gains 
across the programmes ranged from a low of -£1,677 to a high of £6,982 from the participant 
perspective, and from -£8,242 to £3,342 from the Government perspective. 
Table 7.16 Summary statistics by accounting perspective for estimates of net  
 gains and losses from cost-benefit studies of 50 US welfare-to-work  
 programmes
Participants (£) Government (£) Society (£)
All studies (N = 50)
Mean 654 -397 276
Standard deviation 1,961 2,311 1,446
Median 123 53 278
Programmes with financial incentives (N = 12)
Mean 2,971 -2,614 301
Median 1,743 -2,697 278
Programmes without financial incentives (N = 38)
Mean -122 463 268
Median -86 276 256
SOURCES: Adapted from Tables 3 and 4 of Greenberg and Cebulla (2008).
One key reason for the considerable variation in net gains and losses is that 12 of the cost-benefit 
analyses were for programmes that tested financial incentives designed to encourage work, while 
the remaining 38 were for programmes that did not test these incentives. However, only one of 
the 11 studied programmes that targeted long-term unemployed males incorporated financial 
incentives. As shown in the table, the findings for programmes with and without financial incentives 
differed greatly. Specifically, and similarly to the finding for the US ERA project, programmes with 
financial incentives tended to produce net gains for participants and net losses for the Government, 
while the opposite was true for programmes without financial incentives. These findings occurred 
because, by definition, financial incentives result in income being transferred from the Government 
to programme participants. The same mechanism existed in the UK ERA programme, although 
that programme’s financial incentives were more modest than those provided by some of the 
programmes included in the meta-analysis. This may help explain why, with the exception of the 
WTC target group (a group that did receive somewhat larger incentive payments), UK ERA did 
not follow the pattern observed for US programmes with financial incentives. In this context, the 
substantial positive results achieved for the ND25+ group from both the participant and Government 
perspectives are especially noteworthy. 
7.6.3 Assessing the omitted benefits and costs
So far, the cost-benefit analysis has focused only on those benefits and costs that can readily 
be measured in pounds. Other potential benefits and costs have thus far not been considered. 
These omitted benefits and costs are listed in Table 7.17, which also indicates the direction of 
their anticipated effects from each perspective. The ‘third parties’ column in the table pertains to 
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individuals other than ERA participants who might potentially be affected by ERA (e.g., workers who 
compete in the labour market with ERA participants, taxpayers, and the general public). Not all the 
omitted benefits and costs that might possibly have resulted from ERA are listed in Table 7.17, just 
those that appear potentially important. This section examines whether consideration of each of the 
listed items implies that the conclusions reached in Section 7.6.1 should be modified. 
Table 7.17 Unmeasured benefits and costs
Type of benefit or cost Participants Exchequer Third parties Society
Loss of non-market time - 0 0 -
Changes in health status ? 0 0 ?
Other changes in quality of life ? 0 0 ?
Changes in tax and benefit compliance costs - 0 0 -
Changes in tax and benefit administration costs 0 ? 0 ?
Changes in National Health Service utilisation 0 ? 0 ?
Indirect effects on employment outcomes 0 0 -a -
Changes in crime rate 0 0 +b +
Value placed on reductions in Income Support and 
Jobseeker's Allowance rolls 0 0 +b +
Deadweight costs of taxation 0 0 +c +
NOTES: aPotential cost accruing to workers who compete in job markets with ERA participants.
bPotential benefit accruing to the general public.
cPotential benefit or cost accruing to taxpayers. 
Loss in non-market time. Tables 7.5, 7.8, and 7.13 indicate that ERA improved the earnings of 
participants from all three ERA target groups. These earnings increases appear attributable to 
improvements in the likelihood that they were employed and to increases in weekly hours of work, 
rather than to higher hourly wage rates. The time that ERA participants gave up to increase their 
employment and hours may have been of considerable value to those relinquishing it. Thus, this 
lost non-market time is a cost to those who gave it up, although because they gave it up voluntarily, 
the benefits to them of working more must have exceeded the value of their lost non-market time. 
Thus, the net benefits to participants should remain positive once lost non-market time is taken into 
account.
Lost non-market time is obviously difficult to value. Nonetheless, there is at least some previous 
research that suggests that the value of this lost time is substantial, probably not less than a quarter 
of the increase in disposable income obtained by affected families and quite likely more.198 If one 
assumes for illustrative purposes that the loss of non-market time should be valued at 25 per cent 
of the increase in disposable income, then this would imply that the base-case estimates for ND25+ 
ERA participants should be reduced from £726 to £545, and the base-case estimate of social net 
benefits for this group would fall from £2,542 to £2,361. Similarly, the base-case estimates for WTC 
ERA participants should be reduced from £230 to £173, and the estimate of social net benefits for 
this group would fall from -£1,606 to -£1,549. These changes are modest in magnitude and suggest 
little reason to change the previous conclusions drawn for these two groups. Because the base-case 
findings did not indicate that ERA resulted in an increase in disposable income for the NDLP group, 
an illustrative estimate of the value of lost non-market time for this group is not provided.
198 Bell and Orr, 1994; Greenberg, 1997; and Greenberg and Robins, 2008.
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Changes in health status. It is possible that ERA had an effect on the health of some participants, 
although this was not a direct motivation for ERA. These effects could be either negative (e.g., if 
the stress of working more hours or acquiring additional training aggravated a health problem) 
or positive (e.g., if ERA helped participants obtain a better job). Moreover, there is evidence that 
employment itself has positive effects on health,199 and ERA increased employment among ND25+ 
participants. Thus, the health of this group might have improved as a result. 
Some evidence on the effects of ERA on health status is provided by the customer survey that was 
conducted five years after random assignment. Unfortunately, this information is limited to the two 
lone parent target groups. The survey findings suggest that, if anything, ERA may have had a small 
negative effect on health status. For example, 66.5 per cent of the NDLP control group, but only 64.6 
per cent of the NDLP programme group, indicated that they were either in good health or in very 
good health. The comparable responses for the WTC control and programme groups were 73.2 per 
cent and 71.6 per cent, respectively. In addition, among NDLP sample members, 33.3 per cent of 
controls, but 34.7 per cent of ERA participants, stated that they had a long-standing illness. Among 
WTC sample members, 32.7 per cent of controls, but 34.3 per cent of the ERA participants, said that 
they had a long-standing illness. Although these differences between the control and programme 
groups seem small and none are statistically significant, they all point in the same direction. At the 
least, they appear to suggest that ERA did not result in improvements in health.
Changes in quality of life. In addition to possibly influencing health status, ERA could have affected 
participants’ quality of life in a variety of other ways. Some of these operate through ERA’s effects 
on work – for example, increased hours of work might be stressful and unpleasant, or they could 
improve one’s self-esteem or outlook on life. The interaction with ERA advisers might also have 
affected the quality of life of participants.
The year 5 survey again provides some information on the effects of ERA on quality of life for the 
NDLP and WTC target groups, although in this case, the questions are necessarily rather subjective. 
As in the case of health status, the findings again suggest a possible negative effect, or at least 
the likely absence of a positive effect. For example, 62 per cent of the NDLP control group ,but only 
57.6 per cent of the NDLP programme group, and 71.1 per cent of the WTC control group, but only 
66.6 per cent of the WTC programme group, replied that they were either satisfied or very satisfied 
with their life. Similarly, 68.7 per cent of the NDLP control group, but only 66.4 per cent of the NDLP 
programme group, stated that they felt positive or very positive about themselves. However, slightly 
more members of the WTC programme group, than the WTC control group felt positive or very 
positive about themselves – 73.7 per cent versus 72.1 per cent. Moreover, 66 per cent of the NDLP 
control group, but only 64.1 per cent of the NDLP programme group, and 56.2 per cent of the WTC 
control group, but only 55 per cent of the WTC programme group, indicated that they spent a lot 
of time worrying about things. Thus, the findings suggest that ERA’s effects on different measures 
of the quality of life are mixed, with the strongest and most negative effect being the one on life 
satisfaction. While the last four differences are not statistically significant at conventional levels, the 
first two are, but only marginally at the ten per cent level.
Changes in tax and benefit compliance costs. ERA caused some Income Support and Jobseeker’s 
Allowance benefit participants to exit the rolls. It also caused some participants to become entitled 
to new benefits, especially the ERA retention bonus. In addition, members of the ND25+ group who 
would not have worked in the absence of ERA became subject to income tax and National Insurance 
Contributions. Moreover, in order to receive retention bonuses, workers had to provide evidence 
to their ERA advisers that they worked full time for at least 13 months during a 17-month period. 
All of this took time and effort, and may have been stressful. To some extent, various changes in 
199 Fujiwara, 2010.
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entitlements and liabilities tend to offset one other; but the biggest costs to ERA participants are 
likely to have been one-off costs associated with moving into a new situation, rather than continuing 
costs of being in any particular position. Indeed, change in general is more likely to increase than 
reduce costs to those affected by the change. The evidence presented above that ERA may have 
a negative effect on the health status of NDLP and WTC participants and possibly on their life 
satisfaction is consistent with this possibility, although it seems unlikely that this cost is very large.
Changes in use of the National Health Service (NHS). ERA could potentially either increase or 
decrease use of the NHS, resulting, respectively, in decreases or increases in programme net benefits 
from the perspective of the Exchequer. For example, the use of the NHS could have increased if, as 
discussed above, ERA had a negative effect on individuals’ health status. Alternatively, it could have 
decreased if those participants who worked more as a result of ERA felt less need or simply had less 
time to avail themselves of the NHS. The five-year customer survey suggests, in fact, that ERA may 
not have had much effect on NHS use. According to the survey, the NDLP and WTC programme and 
control groups had a similar number of contacts (i.e., number of talks) with doctors during the three 
months prior to the survey – an average of 2.5 contacts for the NDLP programme group and 2.3 
contacts for the NDLP control group, and an average of 2.0 contacts for the WTC programme group 
and 2.1 contacts for the WTC control group.
Changes in tax and benefits administration costs. As discussed above, ERA’s effects on the 
benefits payments to which people were entitled and the taxes for which they were liable could 
potentially have changed the cost to individuals of claiming their entitlements or complying with 
their obligations. Those same changes also have implications for the cost to the Government of 
administering the tax and benefits system: processing claim forms, sending out payments, issuing 
tax codes, and so on. As with the costs to individuals, ERA had many offsetting effects on these 
administrative costs, and it is not clear whether the overall effect on the net benefits of ERA was 
positive or negative. Nonetheless, they seem unlikely to be large. This is partially because they 
tend to be offsetting and partially because, if measured on a per-participant basis, the size of 
the individual components of administrative costs is likely to be small. To illustrate this last point, 
consider the Income Support programme. The Government’s annual savings in administrative costs 
from removing someone from the Income Support rolls is about £40, or a little over £3 a month.200 
During the five years after random assignment, a typical NDLP claimant was off the Income 
Support rolls for a little less than a month as a result of participating in ERA. Thus, the savings in 
administrative costs was around £3 per ERA participant.
Indirect effect of employment outcomes. As previously mentioned, much of the impact of ERA 
on the earnings of the ND25+ target group seems to have resulted from the programme’s impact 
on their likelihood of working (rather than from effects on advancement). Some of this additional 
employment might have come at the expense of others competing for the same jobs. This effect, 
which is often called a ‘substitution effect’, is unlikely to be permanent because the number of jobs 
available is not fixed, and firms would eventually expand production to absorb the increase in labour 
supply. In the short run, however, the increased competition for jobs could have made a difference, 
particularly during recessionary periods or in areas where unemployment was high. 
While the possibility of substitution effects resulting from ERA seems much more germane to the 
ND25+ target group than to the two lone parent groups, there is relatively little evidence upon 
which to base a judgment as to the size of the effect engendered by ERA participants from this 
group. However, there has been a recent study of displacement caused by a program in the UK 
that provided fiscal incentives and job counselling to unemployment persons receiving disability 
200 Greenberg and Davis, 2007.
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payments.201 The study used econometric tools and a plausible methodological approach to 
estimate the magnitude of the program’s substitution effect; the findings are consistent with the 
possibility of a small short-run effect in some geographic areas. However, while the treatment was 
somewhat similar to that used in ERA, the programme focused on helping out-of-work individuals 
enter employment, rather than on aiding persons who were already working. In addition to the 
study just described, five other econometrically-based studies of substitution effects that focus on 
training programmes in Sweden are available. All of these studies found that the substitution effect 
resulting from such programmes is small or non-existent.202 However, a somewhat similar 2001 
study of training programmes in East Germany did find evidence of sizable substitution effects.203 
Overall, it seems likely that ERA resulted in no more than small short-run substitution effects, and 
then only for workers who competed for jobs with the ND25+ target group.
Changes in the crime rate. If ERA increases the incomes of participants, it might also decrease 
criminal activities among ERA participants. Indeed, there is considerable evidence that is consistent 
with this possibility.204 Daniel Fujiwara suggests a method that can be used to provide rough order 
of magnitude estimates of the monetary value of this effect.205 In applying Fujiwara’s procedure, 
this discussion focuses on the ND25+ target group, because ERA resulted in much larger increases 
in the disposable income of this group than that of the two lone parent target groups and because, 
as mentioned by Fujiwara, 86 per cent of those arrested in the UK in 2004 were men. Thus, ERA’s 
effects on crime reduction should be much larger for this group than for the other two groups. 
Based on findings from a US study,206 Fujiwara suggests first multiplying the percentage increase in 
income resulting from a programme by 0.6 to obtain an estimate of the percentage point decrease 
in the probability of committing a crime. ERA increased the disposable income of the ND25+ 
group by about two per cent,207 implying a reduction of 1.2 percentage points in the probability 
of committing a crime. Fujiwara then suggests multiplying this figure by £26, his estimate of the 
reduction in cost of property crime resulting from a one percentage point reduction in the probability 
of committing a crime by an average individual aged 25 and above. Doing this implies that the 
savings per member of the ND25+ group would be £31 (1.2 x £26). As mentioned above, the 
effects on the two lone parent groups would likely be far smaller. Fujiwara acknowledges that his 
procedure is subject to many limitations. For example, it misses savings from reductions in crimes 
other than property crimes, and it relies on a study that uses data from the US rather than the UK.208 
Nonetheless, the estimate for ND25+ participants suggests that the benefits from ERA that result 
from reductions in crime are likely to be rather minor.
Value placed on reductions in the Income Support and Jobseeker’s Allowance rolls. In general, ERA 
appears to have had positive effects on employment and on the number of months participants 
were off benefits, especially for the ND25+ target group. If the general public values reductions 
in Jobseeker’s Allowance rolls and increases in employment in and of itself – that is, beyond any 
tax savings they may receive – then this was a benefit of the programme, albeit one that is very 
201 Adam et	al., 2008.
202 These studies are reviewed by Greenberg et	al., 2010.
203 This study is also reviewed by Greenberg et	al., 2010.
204 See Fujiwara, 2010, who summarises evidence from various studies that indicate that 
increases in income reduce the crime rate.
205 Fujiwara, 2010.
206 Grogger, 1997.
207 This calculation is based on information on the control group reported in Table 7.4 and on the 
increase in disposable income reported in Table 7.5.
208 Grogger, 1997.
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difficult to measure. This benefit could accrue to friends and relatives of the individuals concerned 
or to members of the general public pleased to read about it in the newspapers. Although there is 
virtually no evidence that can be used to assess the possible importance of this benefit, it should be 
borne in mind that ERA’s impacts on employment and benefits receipt were rather modest, even for 
the ND25+ group, and thus perhaps not sufficiently dramatic to evoke much of a response among 
the public.
Deadweight cost of taxation. Table 7.5 indicates that ERA for the ND25+ target group improves the 
Government’s budgetary position. If this ultimately were to result in correspondingly lower taxes, 
economic distortions that are caused by taxes would be reduced. For instance, taxes on earnings 
reduce incentives to work, and taxes on investment reduce incentives to invest. These distortions 
(usually called ‘deadweight losses’ or ‘excess burden’ by economists) result in losses in economic 
efficiency. Thus, the possibility of reducing deadweight losses in the case of the ND25+ group by 
using Exchequer savings to cut tax rates (or equivalently, to increase valuable public spending 
without the need for additional distortionary taxes) is a potentially important addition to the net 
benefits of ERA. On the other hand, as shown in Table 7.13, ERA for the WTC target group seemed to 
worsen the Government’s budgetary position, suggesting that it would increase the need for taxes 
and, hence, costs resulting from deadweight losses. 
Determining the size of the effect of ERA on deadweight losses requires an estimate of the 
efficiency savings if taxes are reduced by one pound, an estimate that is sometimes referred to 
as the ‘marginal excess tax burden’ (METB). The value of this variable can be multiplied by the 
Government’s net gains or net losses to determine the social cost of Exchequer finance (SOCEF) 
resulting from ERA – that is, the value of an increase or a decrease in deadweight losses. Based on 
a recent review of the relevant literature, one author suggests that .2 is a reasonable value to use 
for the METB.209 Using this value and the base-case estimates reported in Tables 7.5, 7.8, and 7.13 
implies that the SOCEF is £363 for ND25+ ERA participants, -£25 for NDLP participants, and -£367 for 
WTC participants. Thus, the changes in deadweight resulting from ERA increase the social net gains 
for the ND25+ group from £2,542 to £2,905, increase the social net loss for the NDLP group from 
-£161 to -£186, and increase the social net loss for the WTC group from -£1,606 to -£1,973. None 
of these changes are large relative to the originally estimated net social gains and losses and none 
appear to warrant modifying the earlier conclusions about the effects of ERA on society as a whole – 
that is, that they were positive for the ND25+ group and negative for the NDLP and WTC groups.
To summarise, none of the costs and benefits that were omitted from the formal cost-benefit 
analysis appear likely to change an estimated net gain in the formal analysis into a net loss, or 
vice-versa. Indeed, most seem likely to be relatively small in magnitude. Hence, the conclusions 
implied by the base-case estimates appear robust to consideration of the omitted costs and 
benefits. Perhaps the greatest uncertainty concerns possible effects on health and the quality of 
life that resulted from ERA. This uncertainty occurs because the existence of such effects is difficult 
to establish, let alone value in pounds. Nonetheless, as discussed above, an attempt was made 
to see whether such effects existed, and the results suggest that ERA probably did not result in 
improvements in either health or the quality of life. Substitution effects may possibly also be of 
some importance in the case of ERA for ND25+ participants, but probably only in the short run. 
209 Fujiwara, 2010.
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7.6.4 Limitations
The cost-benefit analyses that have been presented in this chapter are subject to three potential 
major limitations:
• some of the estimates of impacts that are used in determining benefits and costs may not be 
accurate,
• a number of potential benefits and costs were omitted from the analysis, and
• because ERA’s impacts can be observed for only five years, the cost-benefit analysis must rely on 
predictions of impacts that occur beyond this point.
As indicated in Table 7.2, data from the customer survey were used in estimating some of ERA’s 
benefit and cost components. Unfortunately, after the first year following random assignment, 
survey data were collected only for a small and apparently unrepresentative subgroup of the full 
ND25+ sample (those who were randomly assigned in the four-month period from December 
2003 to March 2004). In addition, as discussed in Chapter 2, there is also some indication that the 
survey data are subject to response bias. Fortunately, the most important of the problems with the 
customer survey data were avoided by using data from the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study 
to estimate earnings impacts and impacts on Jobseeker’s Allowance and Income Support. While 
the survey was the only available source of data for estimating ERA’s impacts on Incapacity Benefit, 
WTC payments, Child Tax Credit, non-ERA training expenditures, and out-of-pocket employment 
costs, it is nonetheless important to keep in mind that these impact estimates play a much less 
important role in the cost-benefit analyses than the estimates of ERA’s impact on earnings.
The benefits and costs that were omitted from the cost-benefit analysis are listed in Table 7.17, 
and their likely magnitude is assessed in the previous subsection. None of the omitted cost-benefit 
components appear likely to overturn the conclusions summarised near the beginning of this 
section. 
An important source of uncertainty in the cost-benefit findings resulted from the need to project 
ERA’s impacts beyond the period over which they could be directly observed. However, it was 
possible to reduce this uncertainty to a considerable degree by making alternative assumptions in 
conducting these projections and determining whether the findings were robust to these alternative 
assumptions. Overall, they appeared to be very robust.
The economic costs and benefits of ERA
232
8 Conclusions
When the Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) programme was being designed about 
ten years ago, US and Canadian randomised experiments had shown that job placement assistance 
and financial work incentives could each increase employment rates and earnings among non-
employed recipients of cash welfare benefits. In addition, some evidence suggested that combining 
job services and incentives might produce larger and longer-lasting effects. Interest was also 
growing in strategies to build occupational skills, in recognition that workers with more human 
capital would enjoy much better opportunities for advancement. 
These findings helped shape the theory and design of the ERA model and its multi-component 
approach. ERA was premised on the idea that coupling incentives for sustained full-time 
employment with continuing staff efforts to educate and support low-income workers regarding 
steps they could take to stay employed and move on to better positions would be more effective 
than either incentives or in-work job coaching alone. In addition, recognising that occupational 
skills training could help participants qualify for better jobs, the model incorporated financial 
incentives to encourage them to enrol in and complete approved training courses. It also required 
that programme staff assist with referrals and approve training courses that participants selected. 
Funds were made available to cover tuition costs for those courses and to help workers deal with 
emergencies that could cause them to lose their jobs (e.g., short-term childcare or transport crises). 
The ERA study is thus a test of a comprehensive strategy to promote employment retention and 
advancement. But although its design was informed by theory and by empirical evidence, little of 
that evidence came from interventions that included extensive job coaching and advancement 
support after people began working. Consequently, ERA, like similar demonstration programmes in 
the US, was charting new territory. 
The findings presented in this final report and from related experiments in the US underscore how 
difficult it is for labour market programmes to improve low-income adults’ employment retention 
and advancement in work. Many innovative and carefully tested approaches have produced 
relatively few of the hoped-for effects. Over five years, ERA in the UK had no lasting overall effects 
for lone parents in the New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) and Working Tax Credit (WTC) target 
groups. Similarly, although three models tested in the ERA demonstration in the US achieved 
important positive effects, nine of the 12 models were not successful. 
In the case of lone parents in the UK, it is noteworthy that ERA boosted their performance soon after 
their entry into the programme. This may be important, because as government policy has sought to 
get more lone parents on benefits working, and although it has expanded work search requirements, 
it has not required or strongly encouraged them to seek full-time employment. ERA showed that 
lone parents could be helped to enter full-time work sooner and to earn more than they would have 
otherwise. ERA also generated longer-lasting positive impacts for unemployed lone parents (in the 
NDLP group) who were better educated when they entered the programme. These patterns suggest 
that ERA’s strategies offer something for future government policy to learn from and build on as it 
strives to deepen lone parents’ involvement in work. 
More importantly, UK ERA produced substantial positive results for long-term unemployed men in 
the New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+) target group, who are traditionally the most difficult-to-help group 
apart from people who are receiving out-of-work disability benefits (whose ranks many of the 
ND25+ group joined before ERA was completed). These gains were enough to generate a net saving 
for the Government’s budget for that group. They are not a large group overall, but they remain an 
intractable and costly challenge for the Government. These findings suggest at least a basis for a 
new policy of in-work support and outreach that could provide important benefits to people who are 
returning to work as well as to public funds. 
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This concluding chapter reviews the major findings and lessons from the ERA experiment. In doing 
so, it offers a number of observations about the populations ERA tried to help, some insights on 
why ERA might have been more effective for some groups than others, and some ideas for how the 
model might be strengthened. An Afterword, which follows this chapter, offers some reflections 
on the distinctive features of the ERA demonstration as a randomised control trial, an innovative 
piloting strategy, and the centerpiece of a transatlantic learning exchange with the goal of building 
evaluation capacity. 
8.1 Lessons about the target populations from the control   
 groups’ experiences 
• In the absence of ERA, how difficult was it for the target populations to remain employed and 
advance over the five years of follow-up? 
In general, very little data exist on the long-term labour market experiences of low-income groups 
in the UK. Consequently, when ERA was designed, it was expected that the groups targeted would 
struggle to remain employed and advance, but by how much and in what ways were unclear. 
ERA’s findings on the control groups help refine the picture for at least three important segments 
of the low-income population, and these findings may be useful in their own right for designing 
future government programmes to reduce overall poverty and child poverty through work-focused 
interventions. 
For the ERA evaluation, the control group data were used to determine how well the types of people 
who enrolled in ERA would have performed in the labour market over a five-year period if they 
had not received any help from ERA. These patterns thus serve as benchmarks for assessing the 
success of ERA. They show the normal outcome levels that ERA had to surpass to be considered 
effective. They also provide some context for answering the question: In retrospect, how much was 
a programme like ERA warranted? In other words, how serious were the problems of employment 
retention and advancement it was trying to address for the people it enrolled?
The control group patterns show that those problems were indeed substantial, especially for 
the long-term-unemployed members of the ND25+ target group, which was made up mostly of 
men 25 years of age or older. Importantly, as long-term benefit claimants, because this group 
was mandated to participate in the New Deal welfare-to-work programme, they may have been 
less committed to working than the lone parent groups and also had to contend with more work 
impediments. As expected, this group struggled the most. For example, according to administrative 
records data, just over half (55 per cent) of the ND25+ controls had worked at all during the five-
year follow-up period, and on average, they worked only about 13 out of the 60 months in that 
period (about 22 per cent of the time), despite their participation in the New Deal programme. Their 
earnings also remained low, averaging only £3,591 for each control group member in the final year 
of follow-up and £10,438 for each person who ever worked in that year. 
Lone parents in the WTC control group performed best. This is not surprising, as they were already 
working between 16 and 29 hours per week and receiving WTC payments when they entered the 
study. They were not involved with Jobcentre Plus or the New Deal and were recruited from lists 
of eligible tax credit recipients. They had to come to Jobcentre Plus offices only for the purpose of 
applying to be in the demonstration. Qualitative data suggest that many of them were especially 
attracted by the programme’s offer to help them gain access to training. Thus, they were a more 
self-selected and highly motivated group than the two New Deal groups. This helps explain why 
their employment retention remained comparatively high throughout the follow-up period. 
Nonetheless, this group still experienced considerable job loss. On average, the WTC controls worked 
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38 out of 60 months (or 64 per cent of the time), and their earnings levels remained relatively low, 
averaging only about £8,401 for each control group member in the final year of follow-up and 
£11,246 for each person who ever worked in that year. 
Unemployed lone parents in the NDLP control group were receiving Income Support and were not 
working or were working less than 16 hours per week when they enrolled in the study. (This target 
group most resembles the lone parents receiving Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, or TANF – 
the ‘welfare’ population – in the US, although the NDLP control group’s participation in the New Deal 
welfare-to-work programme was entirely voluntary.) The labour market performance of the NDLP 
control group fell in between that of the ND25+ and WTC control groups (although it was closer to 
the WTC group’s performance). Most NDLP controls (79 per cent) worked at some point during the 
five-year follow-up period, but on average, they worked only about 25 out of the 60 months (42 per 
cent of the time), indicating that they experienced substantial job turnover. Moreover, their earnings 
levels remained low, averaging in the final follow-up year only about £5,033 overall and £9,496 per 
person who ever worked in that year. 
Within each of the three control groups, average earnings actually grew over time, even though 
annual employment rates held steady or declined somewhat. Some of this earnings growth can 
be attributed to cost-of-living increases among those with jobs, but the magnitude of the earnings 
increases suggests that some advancement occurred as well (e.g., in the form of more hours worked 
per week, more weeks worked, and/or higher wages), even in the absence of ERA. 
In summary, the experiences of the control groups make it clear that although some advancement 
occurred naturally, it was not widespread or particularly large. In general, the three control groups 
generally saw limited gains in the absence of ERA over the course of the evaluation. Overall, these 
findings help to confirm the rationale behind the ERA intervention. 
• In the absence of ERA, how much did the target groups continue to rely on transfer benefits 
during the five years of follow-up? 
The control groups’ reliance on various welfare benefits and tax credits changed substantially during 
the five-year follow-up period. Lone parents in the NDLP target group experienced the biggest 
changes. All were recipients of Income Support at the time of random assignment, yet by the end of 
the five-year follow-up period, only about 29 per cent were receiving this benefit. Some undoubtedly 
exited Income Support as their children aged out of eligibility. Some married or partnered and no 
longer needed support. Some may have also left the rolls as they worked more and began receiving 
WTC payments. Indeed, by the end of the follow-up period, 42 per cent of the NDLP controls were 
receiving WTC (which requires working at least 16 hours per week). Nearly half (47 per cent) were 
receiving Housing Benefit at that time. 
Among the controls in the WTC group, although all were receiving the tax credit when they entered 
the study, just over half (54 per cent) were receiving it by the final survey interview – a substantial 
decline. About 18 per cent were receiving Housing Benefit. 
Among the ND25+ controls, although all were receiving Jobseeker’s Allowance at the beginning 
of the study, only 31 per cent were receiving it at the end. At the same time, receipt of Incapacity 
Benefit grew from two per cent to 15 per cent. (Data are not available on WTC and Housing Benefit 
for this group because they were not included in the later survey waves.) 
The fact that each group’s use of the main transfers they were receiving when they entered the 
study fell sharply over the subsequent five years illustrates that ‘long-term dependency’ on those 
particular transfers was not the norm. Still, most controls did not earn enough money to become 
‘free and clear’ of benefits. This, too, helps validate the continuing policy importance of trying to 
address advancement in work.
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• In the absence of ERA, how much post-employment assistance did the target populations 
receive? 
ERA intended to add a new set of incentives and services to the normal provision of welfare-to-work 
assistance that Jobcentre Plus offered through the New Deal programme. This meant that once New 
Deal participants were placed into jobs, and as long as they were working, they were expected to 
have little additional formal contact with Jobcentre Plus concerning employment issues. Jobcentre 
Plus made no regular provision for staff other than those assigned to ERA to provide continuing 
in-work job coaching. Nor did it offer ERA-like incentives.210 However, New Deal Personal Advisers 
could make referrals in some cases to training activities, and, of course, participants could enrol 
themselves in training courses or other employment-related activities at any time during or after 
their tenure in the New Deal programme. Recipients of the WTC did not normally have access to 
Jobcentre Plus Personal Advisers, so any alternative services they received in the absence of ERA 
would have been self-initiated. 
Given that post-employment services were not a focus of the Government’s welfare-to-work 
policies, ERA’s designers expected that receipt of such services by the ERA target groups in the 
absence of ERA would be rather limited. But they could not know this for certain at the time. 
The evaluation’s survey data reveal that, indeed, employed members of the control group were 
substantially less likely to receive in-work advisory support through Jobcentre Plus than employed 
members of the ERA group. For example, as Chapter 3 showed, within the first two years after 
random assignment, 19 per cent of NDLP controls had received any help or advice from Jobcentre 
Plus staff on retention or advancement issues while employed. Although this was somewhat higher 
than expected, it was well below the 61 per cent rate for the programme group. The control group’s 
rates of engagement were much lower for those in the ND25+ and WTC target groups (12 per 
cent and seven per cent, respectively). Furthermore, much of the post-employment support that 
Jobcentre Plus staff provided to the controls was provided informally and, at best, episodically, not 
as part of a continuing advisory relationship. 
More surprising were the high rates at which controls engaged in training activities while they were 
employed – and especially while working full time. For example, as Chapter 4 showed, among all 
NDLP controls, 56 per cent took an education or training course within the first two years after 
random assignment, and 44 per cent of those who had worked full time during that period reported 
taking a course while working. The rates among the WTC controls were even higher, at 60 and 55 
per cent, respectively. Part-time workers in each control group also took up training, but at much 
lower rates. (The data on ND25+ controls are less reliable, but indications are that these individuals 
received less training while employed than did the two lone parent groups.) 
These and other findings on the control groups indicate that many ERA participants who worked and 
took training courses would have done so even in the absence of ERA. Many would have pursued at 
least some skills-building for advancement on their own. Still, ERA increased training rates for the 
programme group beyond those levels, especially for the WTC group. However, that increase was 
relative to a high control group benchmark and was not nearly as large as the increase in the receipt 
of post-employment advancement assistance from advisers.
210 A different DWP pilot study explored the use of in-work credits – another form of employment 
retention incentives – for lone parents in several Jobcentre Plus districts, but the areas and 
samples did not overlap those involved in the ERA evaluation while the ERA programme was 
operating. See Pritchard, 2011.
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8.2 Lessons about the ERA intervention
It is important to keep in mind that the ERA intervention varied in some ways across the target 
groups. For the two New Deal target groups, the evaluation tested the effects of attaching a two-
year post-employment component to the existing New Deal welfare-to-work programme. ERA 
participants thus began ERA as New Deal participants, receiving a pre-employment treatment that 
was similar to what the control group received. The main difference was that the programme group 
was informed of ERA’s post-employment incentives and support while participating in the New 
Deal, providing them with further encouragement to work (particularly full time) and to think about 
their longer-term goals. But both the programme and control groups received similar job placement 
assistance from advisers. In contrast, for the WTC group, which was already employed at the start, 
ERA was not attached to the New Deal. It was an entirely post-employment intervention, and 
neither the ERA group nor the control group was otherwise involved with Jobcentre Plus when they 
enrolled in the study. 
Given these very different starting points and differences in the types of people who made up each 
of the target populations, the demonstration’s designers recognised that ERA’s effects might differ 
across the three groups. This turned out to be the case.
• For whom did ERA work best?
Comparing the experiences of the controls in each of the three target groups (as previously 
described) makes it clear that the ND25+ group had the most difficulty working and advancing in the 
absence of ERA. However, ERA had its strongest results overall for this group. In fact, it was the only 
group to experience sustained positive earnings impacts in each of the four tax years in the follow-
up period. This resulted in a cumulative four-year earnings gain of £1,481, or an increase of almost 
12 per cent above the control group mean (see Table 8.1).211 ERA reduced this group’s reliance on 
Jobseeker’s Allowance over five years by £426, or about six per cent relative to the controls. These 
effects were substantial enough to help generate positive benefit-cost results. The estimated gain 
to participants (in the form of a net present value estimate over a ten-year time horizon) was £726. 
To the Exchequer, it was £1,816 for each participant. From the perspective of society as a whole 
(the combination of estimates for the other two perspectives), it was £2,542 for each participant. Or 
to state the findings differently, the cost to the Government of operating ERA for the ND25+ group 
was £603 for each participant, and every £1 the Government invested in ERA yielded an extra £1.20 
in income for participants and £4.01 in net savings for the Exchequer.212 The results for the ND25+ 
group are also noteworthy because very little else is known about what works to help this group 
(partly because there is an absence of reliable evaluation evidence). 
In contrast, ERA had no sustained positive earnings impacts for the WTC group, even though it was 
the least disadvantaged of the three target groups and had the best programme group outcomes. 
This group had most fully embraced ERA and, because its members had no need for New Deal pre-
employment services, they were eligible to receive the maximum of 33 months of in-work support 
along with the two-year incentives offer. ERA had its biggest impacts on training receipt for this 
group, and, overall, the Government spent more on this group than on the two New Deal groups. 
Nonetheless, ERA produced no last impacts on the WTC group’s earnings. It did generate earnings 
211 See also Chowdry and Sianesi, 2011, and Goodman and Sianesi, 2007, for an analysis 
suggesting that ERA’s impacts may have been even larger for the ND25+ group had more 
individuals enrolled who could have participated in the evaluation.
212 See Chapter 7 for an explanation of the calculations behind these estimates. The estimates 
were subjected to sensitivity tests, including assumptions of shorter and longer time horizons, 
and the general pattern of results did not change.
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gains while the programme was operating, but these effects subsequently faded away. The cost-
benefit analysis reveals little net economic gain to participants, and it estimates a net loss to the 
Government’s budget. ERA for this group proved not to be a good economic investment. 
Table 8.1 Summary of ERA’s impact and cost-benefit results, by target group
A. Impacts
Target group and outcome measure
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Difference 
(impact) P-value
NDLP
Average earnings during 2005-2006 tax year (£) 3,862 3,554 308 ** 8.7
Average four-year earnings during 2005-2009 tax years (£) 17,280 16,742 538 3.2
Ever worked, years 1-5 (%) 79.0 79.0 -0.1 -0.1
Average number of months employed, years 1-5 25.1 25.0 0.0 0.1
Average total amount of benefitsa received (£), years 1-5a 9,349 9,848 -499 ** -5.1
WTC
Average earnings during 2005-2006 tax year (£) 7,069 6,667 402 ** 6.0
Average four-year earnings during 2005-2009 tax years (£) 30,615 29,695 921 3.1
Ever worked, years 1-5 (%) 88.1 86.8 1.3 1.5
Average number of months employed, years 1-5 38.5 38.3 0.2 0.4
Average total amount of benefitsa received (£), years 1-5a 1,190 1,149 40 3.5
ND25+
Average earnings during 2005-2006 tax year (£) 3,070 2,758 312 ** 11.3
Average four-year earnings during 2005-2009 tax years (£) 14,162 12,681 1,481 ** 11.7
Ever worked, years 1-5 (%) 57.3 55.1 2.2 * 4.0
Average number of months employed, years 1-5 14.3 13.2 1.1 ** 8.4
Average total amount of benefitsa received (£), years 1-5a 7,067 7,493 -426 *** -5.7
B. Cost-benefit results
Net present value (£) 
Target group Participants Exchequer Society
NDLP -37 -124 -161
WTC 230 -1,836 -1,606
ND25+ 726 1,816 2,542
SOURCES: MDRC calculations from Tables 4.1, 4.2, 6.1, 7.5, 7.8, and 7.13.
NOTE:  aBenefits refers to Income Support for NDLP customers,  a combination of  Income Support and Jobseeker’s Allowance for 
WTC customers, and Jobseeker’s Allowance for ND25+ customers.
Similarly, the NDLP target group experienced positive earnings gains early on that faded over time. 
ERA did cause some reductions in receipt of Income Support and other benefits. However, according 
to the cost-benefit analysis, these and other effects were not large enough to generate an overall 
economic gain for participants or a non-trivial return on the Government’s investment. 
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But this is not the whole story. Further analysis of the NDLP group presented in Chapter 5 reveals 
that ERA’s effects were not uniform across different types of lone parents within that target group. 
One noteworthy finding – given the Government’s steps over the last decade to expand work 
requirements to lone parents with younger and younger children – is that ERA produced a large 
positive earnings gain for NDLP lone parents whose children were five- or six-years-old at the time 
they entered the study. This is the age at which those children were beginning school – an important 
point of transition in family life – and ERA’s incentives and supports may have helped convince some 
of those parents, who would now have more time free of caring responsibilities, to pursue full-time 
work.213
Also striking is the variation in impacts according to parents’ levels of educational qualifications 
when they entered the study. ERA had no lasting impacts on employment, earnings, or benefits 
for those without any secondary school qualifications or for those with only a General Certificate 
of Secondary Education (GCSE). In contrast, it had substantial and longer-lasting effects for those 
with Advanced-level (A-level) qualifications.214 For example, for that subgroup, ERA produced a 
cumulative four-year earnings impact of £3,537, representing a 16 per cent increase relative to the 
mean earnings of control group members with A-level qualifications (see Table 8.2). It also reduced 
their reliance on welfare benefits and generated positive cost-benefit results as well. In fact, the 
cost-benefit analysis found that ERA had positive results from all three perspectives for the A-level 
subgroup: it produced a net gain in disposable income for these participants, net savings for the 
Exchequer, and a net benefit for society as a whole.
Table 8.2 ERA’s impact and cost-benefit results for the NDLP subgroup with  
 A-level qualifications, at the time of random assignment
A. Impacts
Outcome measure
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Difference 
(impact) P-value
Average earnings during 2005-2006 tax year (£) 5,851 5,051 800 ** 3.2
Average four-year earnings during 2005-2009 tax years (£) 26,383 22,845 3,537 ** 15.5
Ever worked, years 1-5 (%) 84.6 80.8 3.8 * 5.2
Average number of months employed, years 1-5 30.3 27.2 3.1 *** 11.5
Average total amount of Income Support received (£) years 1-5 7,102 7,992 -890 * -11.1
B. Cost-benefit results
Net present value (£) 
Participants Exchequer Society
2,074 1,479 3,553
SOURCES: MDRC calculations from Tables 5.3, 5.4, and 7.11. Some calculations are not displayed.
213 Parents with children in that age group were not subject to a work requirement during the 
period of the ERA programme, but they would be subject to such a mandate under the current 
coalition Government’s 2011 welfare reform bill.
214 Participants who have GCSE qualifications have passed a series of examinations in a variety of 
subjects, usually taken at age 15 or 16. Participants with A-level qualifications have passed a 
series of more advanced examinations usually taken around age 18 or older. Those with no 
qualifications have completed neither series of examinations.
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The reasons for the better results for the A-level subgroup are not obvious. Of course, compared with 
the full-sample analyses, subgroup analyses run a higher risk that particular results are a statistical 
aberration. But if the differential in impacts is true, it seems not to be driven by other measurable 
background characteristics associated with educational qualifications, because the pattern persists 
even after statistically controlling for other characteristics. It also seems unlikely to reflect simply 
differences across the educational subgroups in the likelihood of receiving in-work assistance from 
ERA, because those differences were small. 
Alternatively, one might speculate that participants with A-level qualifications might have been in 
a relatively better position to respond to ERA’s push to work full time (which drove much of ERA’s 
early impacts on earnings for lone-parents) and to advance. Having entered the programme with 
no recent work experience (like all NDLP participants), but with more human capital than those 
with lower qualifications, perhaps they were more interested in full-time work, more likely to qualify 
for better jobs (which were likely to be full time), and more capable of overcoming potential work 
impediments that might otherwise have held them back (e.g., childcare responsibilities or transport 
problems). Perhaps ERA’s incentives and support encouraged them to act on their interests more 
than they would have in the absence of the programme, and being more skilled already, they 
had more success. (There is no evidence that ERA raised their actual skill levels.) In short, this 
‘unemployed-but-more-skilled’ subgroup may have had a greater ‘reserve capacity’ to succeed in 
work that ERA effectively tapped. In contrast, perhaps ERA’s offer of incentives and support was not 
enough to motivate or help those with lower qualifications to pursue full-time work (which generally 
imposed more complicated childcare burdens on lone parents) more than they would have without 
the programme’s intervention, or to qualify for better jobs than they otherwise could have got.
ERA did not produce positive effects for the WTC lone parents with A-level qualifications. This 
may be because, despite similar educational levels, A-level lone parents in the WTC sample were 
already working when they entered the study. They were thus enrolled in ERA already more intent 
on pursuing (and keeping) full-time jobs and advancing and were more able to do so even without 
ERA. Indeed, it is noteworthy that WTC controls with A-level qualifications earned 50 per cent 
more over the four years of follow-up than did the controls in the NDLP A-level subgroup (£34,575 
versus £22,845), a difference that was driven by the WTC controls having more consistent work and 
more full-time work. Clearly, A-level participants in the WTC group had more earnings capacity and 
deeper attachment to the labour force from the start than did their NDLP A-level counterparts. The 
incentives and kinds of advancement-related assistance that ERA offered were simply not enough to 
help them accomplish more than they could have accomplished on their own. 
In general, perhaps the NDLP A-level group’s combination of being unemployed when they first 
encountered ERA and having more human capital may help explain why they experienced positive 
impacts while their A-level counterparts in the WTC sample did not. It would be valuable for future 
studies to try to test this idea further.
The analysis for the ND25+ target group finds that ERA’s positive effects were spread across 
educational subgroups, including, but not limited to, the A-level group.215 Why did ERA increase 
earnings among ND25+ participants with lower qualifications but not among NDLP participants 
with lower qualifications? Part of the reason may be that the long-term unemployed men had a 
less difficult choice to make than lone parents about full-time versus part-time work because they 
were not encumbered by childcare considerations. Whereas educational qualifications might have 
differentiated lone parents’ interest in and capacity for full-time work, the long-term unemployed 
men who sought work were generally inclined to work full time, regardless of their educational 
215 The subgroup analysis found that the earnings impacts across the three qualification levels 
were not statistically significantly different from each other.
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level.216 Their educational qualifications might have mattered less in shaping their interest in or 
ability to work full time. Consequently, long-term unemployed men with lower qualifications were 
perhaps no less open to or no less able to respond to ERA’s efforts to encourage and reward full-
time employment than were those with higher qualifications. 
Another striking finding concerns the differences in ERA’s impacts for ethnic minorities versus whites 
within the two lone parent samples. Within the NDLP sample, ethnic minority participants appear 
to have experienced bigger increases in the average number of months employed and in average 
earnings, and larger reductions in the duration and amount of Income Support received. A similar 
pattern is evident in the WTC sample. Not all of these estimates are statistically significant (within 
and across subgroup categories). However, taken as a whole, the general pattern of findings from 
the two independent samples suggests that ERA may have benefited ethnic minority lone parents 
more than white lone parents. 
Why would this be? In this regard, it is worth noting that, although ethnic minority lone parents in 
the control group had average earnings similar to those of their white control group counterparts, 
they were less likely to work and remained on benefits longer. Perhaps the ethnic minority subgroup, 
compared with the white subgroup, included more people whose labour force participation was 
lower for reasons having to do, at least in part, with lower expectations about their opportunities to 
find work or to take on full-time work, rather than less interest in or capacity for work. It may be that 
for the programme group, ERA’s financial incentives and extra encouragement and support helped 
to counteract those lower expectations, which may have been holding back some minority lone 
parents. This may be a topic worth further exploration. 
Finally, it is worth noting that although the impacts for the ND25+ target group were by no means 
transformative, they were substantial in percentage terms, and they appeared to be widespread. 
The study found no clear pattern of statistically significant differences in impacts across a 
broad range of subgroup categories. Rather, it found some positive effects (although not always 
statistically significant) for most subgroup categories and no instances where the differences in 
impacts across categories were themselves statistically significant. The programme even appears to 
have helped some ND25+ participants who faced substantial barriers to employment and were least 
likely to work at the start of the study to remain employed or advance on their own. 
These results for the long-term unemployed men, along with the findings that ERA produced at 
least short-term earnings gains for the NDLP and WTC lone parent groups overall and more lasting 
effects for certain NDLP subgroups, suggest that ERA offers strategies to build on in designing future 
initiatives to improve employment retention and advancement among low-income groups. Perhaps 
there are ways to make these strategies stronger. 
• Why did ERA achieve better results overall for long-term unemployed men than for lone parents? 
Although speculative, part of the answer may have to do with the fact that the ND25+ group was 
required to participate in the New Deal welfare-to-work programme, unlike the lone parents, who 
were volunteers for the New Deal (in the case of the NDLP group) or were already working (in the 
case of the WTC group). This distinction meant that the ND25+ group (relative to the lone parents) 
may have included more individuals who – even if they wanted to work – had less confidence in 
their ability to find and hold on to steady work. They may have also believed (probably correctly) 
that they were less attractive to employers because of their long-term unemployment and other 
impediments. 
216 For example, 71 per cent of ND25+ participants who were working when interviewed for the 
two-year survey were working at least 30 hours per week (Miller et	al., 2008). In contrast, only 
46 per cent of NDLP participants who were working at the time of that survey were working at 
least 30 hours per week (Riccio et	al., 2008.)
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Perhaps ERA was effective for such individuals (and, hence, the target group as a whole) because 
it addressed these constraints better than the regular New Deal programme for long-term 
unemployed individuals. For example, at the initial pre-employment stage, ERA’s unique financial 
incentives may have given them more reason than the regular programme to pursue work despite 
their lower expectations or confidence; in other words, it may have counteracted factors that 
were holding back some men in this group. Furthermore, they could readily take on full-time work 
because they generally had no childcare responsibilities. And because ERA’s incentives and staff 
support continued after participants entered work, the programme may have helped them stay 
employed longer (as suggested by the positive impact on duration of participants’ first jobs). 
In contrast, NDLP and WTC lone parents from the start may have had higher expectations about 
working, but greater hesitancy about working full time. If they were to work (even with the help of 
the regular New Deal programme), they were more likely to work part time, in large part because 
of their family responsibilities. As Chapter 4 showed, ERA’s incentives and adviser support changed 
this in the short term to some extent, by getting more lone parents to pursue full-time work. But this 
effect dissipated after the programme ended as more controls worked full time as well. Thus, for 
the lone parents, ERA may have helped address shorter-term attitudes towards full-time work more 
than it affected other factors that shaped their longer-term work trajectories; whereas for some 
participants in the generally more disadvantaged ND25+ group, it may have addressed longer-term 
impediments arising from their lower expectations, confidence, and, perhaps, desire to work. 
• Did the way local staff implemented ERA’s in-work support component influence the 
programme’s degree of effectiveness?
One way to address this question is to compare ERA’s impacts across districts and local offices, 
where different staff operated the programme under different local conditions and, undoubtedly, 
with somewhat varying approaches. Table 8.3 summarises the results across districts for the 
NDLP and ND25+ groups. (For the WTC group, the sample sizes within districts other than the East 
Midlands were too small to permit reliable district-level impact estimates.) 
The table reveals some important variations. In several districts, there were moderate or large 
cumulative effects on earnings and other outcome measures, while in other districts there was 
little impact. Scotland had the largest effects for the ND25+ group, and North West England had 
the largest effects for the NDLP group. Wales had the worst effects for the ND25+ group; its ERA 
programme appears to have produced a large (though not statistically significant) reduction in 
earnings for the programme group. As Chapter 6 explained, this negative impact seems largely 
owing to serious understaffing early on in ERA for the programme group, so that the control group 
actually received more intensive New Deal job placement assistance. This resulted in quicker job 
entry rates for the control group than for the ERA group. This support appears to have allowed 
the control group to achieve a lasting earnings advantage; there is little evidence that ERA’s post-
employment components had a depressing effect on the programme group’s earnings. 
Importantly, the overall ranking of districts according to the magnitude of their impacts is not 
the same for each of these target groups, suggesting that there is no overall ‘district effect’. 
Furthermore, the process study was not able to distinguish major differences in staff practices that 
might account for the overall pattern of differences in district-level results. Nor are the differences 
explained by variation in the performance of the control group – in other words, it is not the case 
that the larger impacts tended to be in districts where the control group had the lower outcomes 
and thereby left more room for improvement.217
217 Cross-district differences in control group outcomes can capture important differences in 
the types of people enrolled in the sample, the availability of alternative services, and/or 
differences in labour market conditions.
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It may be difficult to explain variations in performance across districts partly because districts are 
large conglomerations of local offices, and ERA practices, types of customers, and local context 
could vary substantially across offices within a given district. Therefore, as reported in Chapter 5, an 
attempt was made to explore more closely the variation in results across local Jobcentre Plus offices, 
using the NDLP sample, to learn more about the possible relationship between implementation 
practices and ERA’s impacts.218
That analysis suggests that certain practices may have indeed mattered, at least to some degree. 
For example, after controlling for differences across offices in important participant characteristics 
and various office-level features, offices with stronger implementation of in-work advancement 
support from advisers (relative to any such support received by controls outside of ERA) tended to 
produce somewhat larger positive impacts on employment rates and somewhat larger reductions in 
benefits receipt.219 In other words, it was not simply a matter of ‘whom’ the local ERA office served 
that determined its effects, but, rather, how much the office delivered advancement-related support 
to their participants who were working. Their success in marketing the employment retention 
bonuses may have also contributed independently to more positive impacts, as the next section 
discusses. 
• How important were ERA’s financial incentives in producing the positive effects that were 
observed, and why did they not produce larger overall effects?
An important question is how much ERA’s financial incentives – especially its work retention 
bonus, which offered participants £400 every three months for two years for sustaining full-time 
employment – contributed to any positive labour market effects that were observed. Unfortunately, 
it is not possible to answer this question definitively. By design, ERA’s incentives were bound up with 
the provision of advancement-related support. For example, programme advisers were expected 
to remind participants about the incentives offer when they discussed job search or advancement-
related options and efforts. Moreover, the programme required that participants who earned 
retention bonuses pick up their bonus checks in person from their ERA advisers. Thus, the bonus 
checks were partly intended to function as inducements for participants to have continued contact 
and discussions with their ERA advisers about advancement. 
Although these design features make it difficult to disentangle definitively the influence of incentives 
from adviser assistance, some patterns in the data lend some support to the idea that the incentives 
did matter. For example, ERA’s early impacts on earnings for the two lone parent groups (and for 
the NDLP A-level subgroup) were driven primarily by increases in full-time work – a pattern that 
lines up with the condition that had to be met to receive the employment bonus. In addition, the 
office-level analysis showed that, controlling for other factors, offices where more participants 
were aware of the retention bonus (perhaps because marketing was better) tended to have larger 
impacts on employment rates and bigger reductions in Income Support. But the cross-office analysis 
also indicated that more in-work advancement support from advisers was correlated with larger 
office-level impacts, so it is difficult to conclude that any positive effects were caused only by the 
incentives.
218 This analysis could not be done for the ND25+ group because of the lack of adequate survey 
data, or for the WTC group because of very small sample sizes for that group in most offices.
219 As discussed in Chapter 5, the variation in ERA’s impacts on earnings across offices is not 
statistically significant. Thus, the cross-office analysis does not focus on earnings.
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Even if ERA’s incentives component was important, why did it not produce larger and more 
widespread impacts for the lone parent groups, given the more positive effects observed for 
incentives in some other welfare-to-work programmes in the US and Canada?220 On this question, 
one can only speculate. Perhaps the size of the rewards was too small to overcome the reasons 
some lone parents had for not working full time or for sustaining full-time work, including, possibly, 
an anticipated loss of welfare benefits or a desire to limit work to focus more on family life. Or, 
perhaps the incentives were paid too infrequently to have a strong motivating effect on those who 
were not already inclined to work full time. This is a topic worthy of further investigation. 
• What were the strengths and limitations of ERA’s in-work adviser support component?
The ERA demonstration has shown that it is feasible to attach a post-employment component to 
the New Deal welfare-to-work programme and operate it out of Jobcentre Plus. However, as the 
evaluation’s process analysis found, this was a complicated endeavour. Among other things, it called 
for implementing an advancement-focused intervention within an institution that gave top priority 
to maximising job entries and had clear placement targets. The normal Jobcentre Plus reward 
structure offered few rewards or benchmarks to encourage staff to help their customers to remain 
in work or advance. In this sense, ERA was an awkward fit within Jobcentre Plus. This was a defining 
impediment for ERA, especially during the first year of the programme’s implementation, although 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) and the districts made impressive strides in addressing 
the problem over time. 
Adviser skill sets were another problem. Understandably, because ERA was a major departure 
from the regular New Deal programme for which advisers were trained, many were ill prepared 
to deliver a compelling advancement-focused intervention. For example, advancement goals 
raised fundamental issues that line staff and programme managers did not confront as New Deal 
Personal Advisers, including the question of what constitutes ‘advancement’. Creating benchmarks 
to assess line staff performance against advancement goals and equipping staff with techniques 
that could achieve positive advancement outcomes was not easy. In some cases these challenges 
were magnified by the young age of many advisers; many had not experienced much career 
advancement themselves, and some had worked little outside Jobcentre Plus. 
Another limitation may have been that staff were not expected to be deeply knowledgeable about 
the most productive career pathways available in the labour market or about employers’ needs 
for particular types of skills. Advisers were best prepared to offer general support, encouragement, 
and advice to ERA participants on possible ways to advance, while marketing the programme’s 
incentives as an additional inducement. Most did not bring to the job a deep labour market expertise 
that might have added value to their advancement-related guidance.
• Why did ERA’s impacts on training not lead to better labour market outcomes?
A striking finding from the ERA evaluation is the disconnect between impacts on training receipt and 
impacts on labour-market outcomes. For example, although ERA caused a large increase in training 
receipt for the WTC target group, it did not improve that group’s earnings or other employment 
outcomes; thus, the training had no pay-off in the labour market, at least within the available 
follow-up period. Conversely, for the NDLP A-level subgroup, ERA produced a substantial impact on 
earnings, but no effect on that group’s receipt of training; thus, that group’s earnings gains most 
likely came from some combination of the programme’s adviser support and employment retention 
bonuses. This also appears true for the ND25+ sample. Overall, these patterns suggest that ERA’s 
approach to increasing training – i.e., offering tuition assistance and incentives for completing 
approved training and making referrals to training courses – did not work.
220 Although the effects of these incentive programmes also tended to decline over time, some 
produced a net gain over the follow-up period in total cumulative earnings (Michalopoulos, 2005).
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The problem may have been that many participants would have taken training courses even in the 
absence of ERA (as the control group results show), and those additional participants who took 
training only because of ERA may not have been well positioned to benefit from it. Perhaps they 
enrolled in training courses that did not have much market value for career advancement, or they 
were not able to find job opportunities in which they could apply their new skills. Furthermore, they 
may not have received good training guidance from ERA. For example, the programme’s advisers 
were expected to try to accommodate participants’ own training interests rather than to steer them 
towards what may have been the most productive training choices – that is, training for jobs for 
which there was employer demand and opportunity for advancement. In some cases (as a separate 
ERA evaluation report on training showed)221, the training options participants chose were not 
directly occupationally relevant. Some may even have been undertaken as part of a hobby or out 
of general interest. But most were occupationally relevant, and even in those cases advisers were 
not especially well prepared to help participants translate the new skills they acquired into better 
employment opportunities. Participants’ training interests were wide ranging, and advisers could 
offer little special expertise regarding any particular occupational sectors. Perhaps preparing advisers 
to provide more occupationally specific advice and guidance to participants on training and career 
opportunities within a more limited and clearly defined range of promising occupational sectors 
– and helping advisers establish more direct relationships with employers who hire within those 
sectors – might have helped boost the effectiveness of ERA’s training component.222
• How do the results of ERA compare with those of related programmes in the US?
Viewed through a wide lens, the results of the ERA evaluation in the US support the findings of the 
UK ERA evaluation in demonstrating the difficult challenge of improving employment retention 
and advancement among low-income groups. In the US, as previously mentioned, nine of the 12 
different retention and advancement models tested did not help participants achieve earnings 
beyond what control group members were able to attain on their own with the existing services 
and supports available in their local communities. However, three US ERA programmes, each of 
which served a distinct population, generated positive effects on labour market outcomes. One 
(in Riverside, California) served working lone parents who had recently exited the welfare rolls 
(TANF); a second programme served unemployed lone parents receiving welfare (in two cities in 
Texas); and a third programme served lone parents who were working (at very low wages) while 
receiving welfare (in Chicago, Illinois). Each of these programmes offered some form of adviser help 
with advancement issues, along with other types of assistance, including, in one case, financial 
incentives for sustained employment, and, in another case, more direct job development assistance 
in particular occupational areas. All three programmes produced increases in participants’ earnings 
over a three-to-four year follow-up period (see Chapter 1). Although not dramatic, these effects, 
like those produced by UK ERA, offer at least some evidence that employment retention and 
advancement programmes can make a difference for certain groups and are something on which to 
build. 
Of the three US programmes mentioned here, the Texas ERA programme was the most similar 
to UK ERA, in that it was the only one that offered financial incentives tied to sustained full-time 
employment.223 These incentives took the form of a monthly bonus of $200 for working at least 
221 Hendra et	al., 2011.
222 A recent US-based study by Public/Private Ventures points to the effectiveness of demand-
driven, sectoral training (Macguire, 2010). MDRC is currently evaluating a new programme 
called ‘WorkAdvance’, which will incorporate a similar strategy, along with ERA-like post-
employment services.
223 The UK ERA and Texas ERA models are compared in Lundquist and Homonoff, 2010.
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30 hours per week, and they were offered in addition to other pre- and post-employment services. 
Taking into account exchange rates, the bonus was roughly similar in generosity to the UK ERA 
employment retention bonus, although it was paid more frequently. 
In the city of Corpus Christi, the Texas ERA programme had consistent effects on employment 
retention and earnings. In that site, the programme increased average annual earnings by 
approximately 15 per cent relative to control group earnings. Moreover, the largest impacts (18 per 
cent) occurred in the fourth and final year of follow up. This suggests that the programme’s effects 
may continue in the longer term. The Texas ERA programme in Fort Worth also produced earnings 
gains, but the effects were concentrated in the second and third years of follow up. In that city, 
ERA increased earnings in the third year by 17 per cent compared with the control group level. The 
implementation of ERA in Fort Worth started out weak and improved over time, which may have 
diluted the strength of the observed impacts because many programme group members were part 
of an early cohort of participants who completed the programme before implementation had fully 
improved. ERA was also implemented in Houston, Texas. However, the evaluation’s process study 
found that the programme there was poorly implemented, and it did not achieve impacts on labour 
market outcomes. 
• What implications do the ERA findings have for the current Government’s welfare-to-work 
reforms?
The earlier sections of this chapter that focused on the experiences of the control groups over the 
five-year follow-up period make it clear that employment retention and advancement remain 
difficult challenges for many of the low-income people DWP serves. ERA was designed to address 
those challenges, but its success was mixed. For some groups, ERA caused employment and 
earnings to increase more than they would have without the programme – in some cases, by a lot – 
and it also yielded some positive cost-benefit results, both for participants and the Treasury. But for 
other groups, ERA did not improve participants’ economic outcomes, and the Government’s budget 
incurred a net loss.
These results suggest that ERA, in the form it was designed and delivered in the demonstration, is 
not appropriate for across-the-board replication and scaling up. At best, the evidence would offer 
a basis for a more limited, targeted scaling up. For example, taking a benefit-cost perspective, the 
analysis suggests that scaling up might be justified for the ND25+ target group. Although the results 
for the NDLP A-level subgroup are impressive, without further confirmation they do not carry the 
same level of certainty as the full-group effects, and from a practical or political standpoint, it may 
be difficult to target assistance on the basis of qualifications. At the same time, the A-level results do 
raise important questions about the extent to which the potential for some groups to benefit from 
work incentives and in-work adviser support depends on their educational qualifications. This issue 
deserves further investigation.
More generally, the evidence suggests that ERA’s strategies, although uneven in their effects, clearly 
hold some promise. In particular, future efforts to promote employment retention and advancement 
should consider testing whether certain changes in the design and delivery of ERA’s incentives and 
in-work support and in the types of skills required of advisers could help sustain and increase the 
programme’s early impacts for unemployed and part-time employed lone parents (which faded 
after the programme ended). They could also increase the magnitude of the effects (which were 
sustained) for long-term unemployed men. In addition, ERA increased training completion for some 
groups without producing subsequent labour market gains, while it produced positive labour market 
effects for other groups without increasing training. This suggests that it is important to re-think how 
to deliver training in the context of a programme like ERA that aims to promote advancement and 
improve incomes by building occupational skills. 
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Afterword
Reflections on UK evaluation and piloting practices 
The Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) demonstration was an experiment in evidence-
based policymaking of a kind unfamiliar in the UK, at least on such a large scale. The idea for it grew 
out of several years of learning exchanges that MDRC helped organise with HM Treasury and the 
Rockefeller Foundation on welfare-to-work and employment policies, and on improving evaluation 
practices and evidence-based policymaking. Treasury officials had identified a need to strengthen 
evaluation capacity in the UK and hoped to learn from, and build on, advances in the US, particularly 
in the ability to conduct large-scale randomised trials in social policy. While the UK is no stranger to 
randomised trials, their use in the past had been limited to small-scale trials, such as tests of rival 
interventions in penal reform. Out of these exchanges grew interest in launching a large-scale British 
randomised trial focused on issues of employment retention and advancement, which, at the time, 
were of growing concern to welfare reformers in both countries. After several years of exploration 
and design work involving British and American experts, the Treasury allocated funding for the ERA 
demonstration in the UK, which paralleled the US project of the same name. 
• The ERA demonstration versus traditional pilots 
Traditionally, many UK social pilots have tested policies to which the Government has already 
made a commitment and have tended to use evaluation methods that rely on area comparisons. 
Such pilots typically build evidence during an early roll-out period in a limited number of areas and 
compare the results with similar areas yet to benefit from the new policy. The main aim of such 
comparisons is typically to help the Government improve a policy before it is rolled out nationally. 
However, there is less tradition of testing a new policy idea before a commitment is made, having 
a long-enough follow-up period to draw proper conclusions about its effectiveness, or using an 
evaluation method that provides a conclusive verdict on the effects –intended and unintended – of 
the new policy.224 The ERA demonstration stands out in that regard, addressing these three issues: 
1. it tested an idea that the Government had not yet committed to incorporating into national 
policy; rather, that decision was to be informed by the evaluation results, in a kind of ‘try before 
you buy’ approach; 
2. it committed to a five-year follow-up period; and
3. it would use a randomised control trial that would test and provide conclusive evidence of the 
programme’s effectiveness. 
As it turned out, had the Government invested in ERA as a full-scale national policy without having 
mounted this rigorous test of its effectiveness in advance, that investment would not have achieved 
all the hoped-for positive results. The overall findings show that ERA produced important positive 
effects on certain labour market outcomes for some participants and under some circumstances. 
In addition, in some cases, it produced a positive return on the Government’s investment. But it 
did not succeed broadly for all the target groups. Thus, the evidence does not support a wholesale 
replication and scaling up of the programme in the form in which it operated for all target groups in 
the demonstration. 
224 See Jowell, R., 2003.
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• The scope of the evaluation
The ERA evaluation itself was also distinctive. Its design, comprehensiveness, scale, and length 
of follow-up period were all departures from usual evaluation practices. When it was launched, it 
was, by far, the largest randomised control trial ever undertaken to test a social policy in the UK, 
and its success as a social experiment was not at all guaranteed. Indeed, in its early design phase 
many concerns were raised about whether such a large-scale trial was feasible, and considerable 
unease was expressed about random assignment and the likely responses of people assigned to the 
control group. Although important operational challenges were encountered along the way, the fact 
that over 16,000 individuals were successfully randomly assigned across six regions of the UK and 
58 local offices, nearly without incident is a testament to the feasibility of conducting large-scale 
randomised trials in the UK.225 It is worth adding that all this was achieved using existing resources 
within Jobcentre Plus.
Having a relatively long follow-up period also proved essential. It allowed the evaluation to 
determine that ERA’s early large positive labour market effects for lone parents faded, falling in 
value below significant levels, although with longer-lasting effects for certain subgroups, such as 
unemployed, but better-educated, lone parents. Disappointingly, too, the early impacts on training 
for the Working Tax Credit (WTC) group never translated into subsequent labour market gains. In 
contrast, the smaller but significant benefits experienced by the long-term unemployed men were 
largely sustained over five years. Had the follow-up period ended, say, after only two years, very 
different – and incorrect – conclusions about ERA’s effectiveness would have been reached.
• A transatlantic partnership
As Chapter 1 noted, the ERA evaluation involved a unique US-UK partnership. MDRC was the lead 
evaluation contractor, but it worked closely with four UK organisations: the Policy Studies Institute, 
the Institute for Fiscal Studies, the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, and the 
Office for National Statistics. This arrangement reflected the important ‘technology transfer’ goal 
of the initiative. The demonstration was intended not only to produce a rigorous field test of the 
ERA model, but also to serve as a vehicle for UK researchers within the evaluation consortium, 
along with researchers and project leaders within the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), to 
learn evaluation practices from an American organisation with deep expertise in conducting large-
scale randomised trials. With this goal in mind, the US and UK partners worked hand-in-hand on 
all aspects of the project. For example, they collaborated on the design of the ERA model; on the 
provision of training and technical assistance to Jobcentre Plus line staff on ERA’s strategies and 
evaluation procedures; on the establishment of random assignment protocols and procedures; 
on the collection, processing, and analysis of administrative records and survey data; on the 
execution of analyses within each strand of the evaluation (process, impact, cost-benefit, and 
non-experimental analyses); and on the preparation of evaluation reports. After the launch of ERA, 
and drawing on experiences acquired in that project, DWP planned a number of other possible 
randomised trials of innovative pilots, attesting to the growing capacity in the UK to apply this 
rigorous method of social policy evaluation.
225 Walker et	al., 2006.
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A special grant from the Rockefeller Foundation helped make possible the UK-US learning exchange 
built around ERA. These resources, with supplementary funding from the British Consulate, allowed 
the evaluation partners and DWP to bring together from time to time British and American 
administrators, managers, and front-line staff from organisations that were operating retention 
and advancement programmes in the US and the UK for common training and peer learning. The 
Rockefeller Foundation resources also supported dissemination in the US of research findings from 
UK ERA and dissemination in the UK of evaluation findings from the US projects.
This partnership was beneficial to evidence-building for both the US and the UK. UK ERA became an 
important part of a portfolio of MDRC projects focused on employment retention and advancement, 
and it created special learning opportunities relevant to US policymaking. In part, it provided an 
additional location and context for learning about similar strategies that were being tried in the US; 
in other cases it provided an opportunity to test a different approach for achieving similar goals. In 
these ways, the US-UK learning exchange benefited evidence-building in both countries. 
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Appendix A 
Data sources, weighting, and 
survey response bias
This appendix describes a variety of technical details about the data and process used to create 
outcomes for the Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) final impacts report. Specifically, it 
discusses the quality and coverage of the administrative and survey data used in this report as well 
as the strategy used to weight impacts in this report compared with previous reports. As discussed in 
this appendix, improvements in the coverage of administrative records and concerns about response 
bias in the wave 3 (five-year) survey resulted in more emphasis on administrative records as a data 
source for measuring economic impacts in this report, compared with earlier reports about the UK 
ERA demonstration. 
A.1 Data sources
This section of the appendix describes the results of quality checks performed on the administrative 
records used to measure earnings outcomes. This report places more emphasis on administrative 
records than has been the case in previous reports about the ERA demonstration. Past reports 
made less use of administrative records because of concerns related to under-reporting among two 
segments: (1) those who never received public benefits (for the most part affecting the Working 
Tax Credit (WTC) group) and (2) part-time workers. The results shown in this appendix support the 
decision to make more extensive use of administrative records. 
A.1.1 Administrative records for the WTC group
For the WTC group, outcomes from Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) employment and 
earnings administrative records are included in this report (unlike previous reports). In the previous 
reports, HMRC data were made available only for those sample members who were currently, or 
had previously been, Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) customers. There was concern that 
this could adversely affect the impact estimates for the WTC group, as unlike the New Deal for Lone 
Parents (NDLP) and New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+) groups, some WTC recipients may never have been 
DWP customers. However, for this report, data were made available for all WTC recipients, regardless 
of their benefits history. The final report uses HMRC administrative records for all three target groups, 
and these records have been analysed to determine the data’s appropriateness for measuring the 
effects of ERA. Results of this analysis are described below. 
A.1.2 Employment rates from the survey versus administrative records
Survey respondents were asked about their current employment status as well as their employment 
status since random assignment. This latter question, specifically, asked respondents to recall the 
date when a job started and/or ended. 
Administrative records on employment rates were provided to DWP by HMRC and maintained 
in DWP’s Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study (WPLS) database. Employment is derived from 
the P45 and P46 forms that employers use to inform HMRC when an individual enters or leaves 
employment. Thus, the data provides, in principle, the start date and end date for each job, thereby 
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allowing comparisons with the survey data. In practice, the precise start or end dates are not always 
provided. Where it is known that a job started (or ended) in a given tax year, but not the precise 
date, this is recorded on the system as 6 (or 5) April, the first (or last) day of the tax year. (For tax 
purposes, income is assessed on a financial-year basis, so that this information is not operationally 
essential for HMRC).
To address this issue, dates were randomly imputed within that tax year as part of the cleaning of 
the data.226 The range for the imputed date was further narrowed by other available data on record, 
such as file date and start of benefit spell. 
In comparing survey and administrative data, it should be noted that the administrative records 
do not cover all employees, as there is no requirement for employers to supply information on 
individuals earning below Pay As You Earn (PAYE) tax thresholds and who are not going to be 
claiming new tax credits through the employer.227 However, some employers send in details for all 
employees, and these are captured in the system. 
Contrary to the survey data, the employment information available from administrative records, 
therefore, has the following coverage gaps:
• it excludes, although not uniformly, work paid below the PAYE threshold;
• it excludes informal work;
• it excludes self-employment.
Consequently, employment outcomes taken from survey data are not directly comparable with 
employment outcomes taken from administrative data. Since the types of employment captured by 
the administrative data represent a subset of all types of employment, one would expect the level of 
employment observed in the administrative data to be lower than that observed in the survey data.
Overall, employment rates match fairly well between the two sources, with the NDLP group 
matching slightly better than the WTC group. Table A.1 shows comparisons of HMRC administrative 
employment records with survey records in the fourth year after random assignment. The table 
shows that 78.3 per cent of NDLP respondents match (that is, they have the same employment 
status from both sources), and 74.0 per cent of WTC respondents match. Critically, there is little 
variation in match rates between the programme and control group. Both the magnitude of the 
match rate for the WTC group and the relative similarity in match rates between the NDLP and WTC 
groups suggest that the administrative data for the WTC group are of sufficient quality to include in 
the analysis.228
Because administrative records may not record employment paid below the PAYE threshold, it is 
expected that employment rates between the two sources will match better for those in full-time 
employment according to the survey, as opposed to part-time employment. Full-time and part-
226 It should be noted that the administrative employment data require extensive cleaning before 
they can be used for analytical purposes. This increases the uncertainty associated with 
analyses based on these data.
227 PAYE is a method of paying income tax whereby the employer deducts taxes from the 
employee’s wages and pays it to HMRC. The PAYE threshold for 2008-2009 is £116 weekly (or 
£503 monthly). 
228 As noted earlier, while precise start and end dates are not always available, an indication of 
starting or ending employment in a given tax year is generally available. Thus, because this 
analysis is done over one tax year, the effect of the uncertainty in start and end dates within 
the tax year is mitigated.
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time employment can be distinguished only for those jobs held at the time of the wave 3 survey 
interview. Among those in the WTC group currently employed at the wave 3 survey interview,  
68.6 per cent were employed in that month, according to administrative records (not shown). As 
Table A.1 shows, employment rates match better for those in full-time employment than for those 
in part-time employment. For those working 30 or more hours at the time of the survey, 71.6 per 
cent were employed in that month, according to administrative records. For those working 16-29 
hours, 67.4 per cent were employed in that month, according to administrative records. For those 
working 15 or fewer hours, 44.4 per cent were employed in that month, according to administrative 
records. The low match rate among those working 15 or fewer hours is less worrisome, considering 
that this group constitutes only 2.1 per cent of the respondent sample. The NDLP group had similar 
results for those in full-time and part-time employment.
Table A.1 Employment rates and match rates for lone parents, estimated using  
 administrative records and survey data
NDLP Group WTC Group
Outcome
ERA 
group
Control 
group Total
ERA 
group
Control 
group Total
Ever employed in year 4 (%)
Survey employment 63.5 62.5 63.0 90.1 90.0 90.0
WPLS employment 55.1 55.2 55.1 70.8 69.7 70.2
Match rate in year 4 (%) 78.3 78.3 78.3 73.7 74.2 74.0
Employed in both survey and WPLS 48.5 48.0 48.2 67.3 66.9 67.1
Employed in neither survey nor WPLS 29.9 30.3 30.1 6.4 7.3 6.8
Employed in survey only 15.0 14.5 14.8 22.8 23.1 22.9
Employed in WPLS only 6.6 7.2 6.9 3.5 2.8 3.1
Match rate among those employed at interview (%)
Full time 74.6 73.7 74.2 70.3 73.3 71.6
Part time, 16-29 hours 67.2 73.0 70.0 69.1 65.8 67.4
Part time, 1-15 hours 42.4 50.0 46.6 38.1 48.5 44.4
Sample size 951 903 1,854 948 911 1,859
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment records and ERA 60-month customer survey.
NOTE: Includes only those customers interviewed for the 60-month survey.
 Match rate refers to the percentage of survey respondents who have the same employment status from both data sources.
A.1.4 Employment versus earnings from administrative records
Administrative data from employment and earnings are derived from two different sources that do 
not always correspond. As detailed in section A.1.2, DWP’s WPLS database contains employment 
spells derived from the P45 and P46 forms, which provide the start date and end date for each job. 
Also contained in the WPLS data are details of tax-year earnings derived from the P14 forms that 
employers use to report total earnings for an individual in any given tax year.229
It should be noted that employment rates from the two sources shown in the main body of the 
report cannot be directly compared. For example, the employment rate from year 4 does not 
necessarily correspond to the 2007-2008 tax year. However, because start and end dates are 
available from the employment data, an analysis can be conducted comparing them directly with  
 
 
229 The UK tax year runs from 6 April to 5 April the following calendar year.
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the 2007-2008 tax year data. Since the tax year data provide earnings from 6 April 2007 through  
5 April 2008, the employment data can be analysed over this period as well and compared with the 
employment rate generated from the earnings data.230
It might be assumed that these two sources would show a consistent picture of employment for an 
individual. However, any time data come from two different sources (in this case, data derived from 
two different forms, filled out during different periods of an individual’s employment period), it is 
expected that there will be some differences. 
Overall, these two data sources match fairly well for the 2007-2008 tax year. Table A.2 shows that 
83.5 per cent of NDLP respondents match and 76.0 per cent of WTC respondents match.231 The 
match rates are similar between programme and control groups.
Table A.2 Employment rates and match rates for lone parents during the  
 2007-2008 tax year, estimated using administrative records
NDLP Group WTC Group
Outcome
ERA 
group
Control 
group Total
ERA 
group
Control 
group Total
Ever employed (%)
According to WPLS employment 54.7 55.5 55.1 69.1 70.1 69.6
According to WPLS earnings 53.1 49.6 51.4 73.4 73.7 73.6
Match rate (%) 84.5 82.4 83.5 75.0 77.0 76.0
In both employment and earnings 46.2 43.7 45.0 58.8 60.4 59.6
In neither employment nor earnings 38.4 38.6 38.5 16.2 16.6 16.4
On employment file only 8.5 11.7 10.1 10.3 9.7 10.0
On earnings file only 6.9 5.9 6.4 14.7 13.3 14.0
Sample size 951 903 1,854 948 911 1,859
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment records.
NOTE: Includes only those customers surveyed for the 60-month survey.
 Match rate refers to the percentage of survey respondents who have the same employment status from both data sources.
A.2 Weighting versus non-weighting
The results presented in this report follow a different weighting scheme from that used to produce 
results in earlier reports. These earlier results essentially regard each district as a separate ‘test’ of 
ERA and give results for the full sample that are a simple average of the six tests. This is referred to 
as the ‘equal-weighted’ approach, since the results for all districts are given the same weight.
Rather than weighting each district equally, an alternative approach used in this report is not to 
weight the data at all.232 While each district result can still be viewed as a separate test of ERA, 
estimating the pooled results without weights allows estimates that are representative of the six 
pilot areas as a whole to be produced. Findings can be interpreted as the impact for the average 
treatment group member in the overall sample.
230 Recently, HMRC has attempted to systematically integrate the two databases by using start/
end dates sometimes available from the P14 to make dates on the P45 employment data 
more accurate. However, because there were complications in this database integration, MDRC 
continued to analyse the P45 employment data prior to when the integration changes were 
introduced.
231 This analysis was conducted only among the wave 3 survey sample.
232 The decision to change the weighting strategy was made before the data for this report were 
analysed.
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The main advantage of not using weights is that it avoids the situation that arises with the equal-
weighting scheme whereby smaller districts disproportionately influence the pooled results. If ERA 
were to be implemented permanently in the six districts tested, the unweighted pooled estimates 
from the demonstration would provide the best estimate of what would happen under a permanent 
programme in these districts. In other words, the unweighted estimates represent internally valid 
estimates of the likely effects of a permanent ERA-type programme implemented in the six districts 
participating in the demonstration. The same cannot be said of the equal-weighted estimates. 
An analysis was conducted to determine whether the impact results were sensitive to the weighting 
scheme used. The choice of weighting scheme seems to have only marginally affected the results 
for the NDLP group. In contrast, the choice of weighting scheme to derive aggregate employment 
and earnings impacts for the ND25+ group matters, with the unweighted impacts being more 
positive than the equally weighted impacts.233 The differences are due primarily to the large negative 
impacts in Wales and the relatively smaller size of the ERA sample in that district. These two factors 
result in Wales receiving less weight in deriving the unweighted pooled estimates than in deriving 
the equal-weighted pooled estimates. This issue is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.
A.3 Non-response analysis for the ERA customer surveys
Over the five-year follow-up period, three waves of surveys were carried out. The first wave covered 
the 12 months after random assignment, and the second wave covered the subsequent 12 
months. The first two waves were administered to sample members in all three target groups in 
the ERA study: NDLP, WTC, and ND25+. The third wave covered the final three years after random 
assignment but was administered only to the NDLP and WTC groups. 
Survey waves
Wave 1: at 12 months/1 year after random assignment (RA) 
Wave 2: at 24 months/2 years after RA 
Wave 3: at 60 months/5 years after RA
The analysis in this report focuses on the 16,384 Jobcentre Plus customers who were randomly 
assigned to the programme or control group between October 2003 and April 2005. This group is 
referred to as the full sample in the following tables. This appendix summarises the non-response 
analyses for waves 1 and 2 of the survey, which were published previously234. It also introduces the 
non-response findings for the wave 3 survey. For the wave 3 survey, it assesses the extent to which 
the respondent sample is representative of the full sample and the applicability of the impacts 
estimated using the survey responses to the full sample. 
A subset of the full sample was randomly selected to participate in the surveys and represent the 
larger group. This subset came from a group of individuals randomly assigned within a narrower 
range of random assignment dates than the full sample. This group is referred to as the fielded 
sample. However, several individuals selected to participate in the surveys could not be located, 
refused to participate, or could not be interviewed; those sample members are referred to as non-
respondents. Conversely, individuals who completed the survey are referred to as respondents. 
233 This issue does not affect the WTC group, as the WTC impact results were never weighted 
equally by district.
234 Riccio et	al., 2008; Miller et	al., 2008.
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A.3.1 Survey administration and response rates
NDLP	response	rates
Table A.3 shows that there are 6,787 NDLP sample members in the full sample. Of those, 2,995 
were selected to be in the fielded sample in the first survey wave. These individuals were randomly 
selected from a pool of those randomly assigned between December 2003 and November 2004.  
In the first wave, 2,604 responded, yielding a 87 per cent response rate. For the second wave survey, 
the response rate is 77 per cent. For the third wave survey, a total of 1,854 individuals responded, 
yielding a 62 per cent response rate.235
Table A.3 Survey response rates, NDLP target group
Total
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Full sample size 6,787 3,365 3,422
Wave 1 (12-month survey)
Fielded sample size 2,995 1,482 1,513
Respondent	sample	size 2,604 1,317 1,287
Non-respondent sample size 391 165 226
Response rate (%) 86.9 88.9 85.1
Wave 2 (24-month survey)
Fielded sample size 2,995 1,482 1,513
Respondent sample size 2,297 1,188 1,109
Non-respondent sample size 698 294 404
Response rate (%) 76.7 80.2 73.3
Wave 3 (60-month survey)
Fielded sample size 2,992 1,481 1,511
Respondent sample size 1,854 951 903
Non-respondent sample size 1,138 530 608
Response rate (%) 62.0 64.2 59.8
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from customer surveys.
WTC	response	rates
Table A.4 shows that there are 2,815 WTC target group members in the full sample. Of those, 1,447 
were selected to be in the fielded sample in the first survey wave. These individuals were randomly 
selected from a pool of those randomly assigned between December 2003 and November 2004. 
Of these, 1,344 responded, yielding a response rate of 93 per cent. The wave 2 fielded sample was 
augmented to include a total of 2,686 sample members (the original 1,447, plus 1,239 who were 
235 The fielded samples changed across the survey waves. For the second-wave survey, the fielded 
sample included the same 2,995 who were originally fielded; however, only the 2,604 who 
responded to the first wave were asked to participate. As such, the 391 who did not respond 
in the first wave were technically not fielded in the second wave. However, since the definition 
of the fielded sample remained the same, the response rate at the second wave was 77 per 
cent. By the third wave, the fielded sample remained largely intact (excepting three sample 
members who were ineligible), with 2,992 of the original 2,995 fielded sample. Unlike the 
second-wave survey, all of those in the fielded sample were attempted for the third-wave 
survey.
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added).236 The response rate in that wave was 78.9 per cent. The wave 3 fielded sample includes the 
same 2,686 sample members in the wave 2 fielded sample. A total of 1,858 individuals responded, 
yielding a response rate of 69 per cent.237
Table A.4 Survey response rates, WTC target group
Total
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Full sample size 2,815 1,415 1,400
Wave 1 (12-month survey)
Fielded sample size 1,447 722 725
Respondent sample size 1,344 679 665
Non-respondent sample size 103 43 60
Response rate (%) 92.9 94.0 91.7
Wave 2 (24-month survey)
Fielded sample size 2,686 1,342 1,344
Respondent sample size 2,119 1,082 1,037
Non-respondent sample size 567 260 307
Response rate (%) 78.9 80.6 77.2
Wave 3 (60-month survey)
Fielded sample size 2,686 1,342 1,344
Respondent sample size 1,858 948 910
Non-respondent sample size 828 394 434
Response rate (%) 69.2 70.6 67.7
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from customer surveys.
ND25+	response	rates
Table A.5 shows that there are 6,782 ND25+ target group members in the full sample. The wave 1 
fielded sample included 2,970 individuals, with a respondent sample of 2,213 and a response rate of 
75 per cent. Because of the lack of success in contacting individuals in the ND25+ group, a decision 
was made to reallocate survey resources for the wave 2 survey and field a larger sample for the WTC 
group – a group with a smaller first-year fielded sample but with a much higher response rate than the 
ND25+ group. As a result, the ND25+ fielded sample in wave 2 was smaller and represented an early 
cohort of individuals randomly assigned between December 2003 and March 2004. The wave 2 fielded 
sample included 1,016 individuals, of whom 661 responded, yielding a 65 per cent response rate. 
Those who did not respond to the first wave of the survey were not contacted for the second wave.
236 Since a large proportion of WTC sample members were not recruited into the sample until 
after the 12-month survey was administered, the first wave of the WTC fielded sample was 
relatively small. Therefore, a second sample was fielded from the WTC target group members 
who were randomly assigned between December 2004 and January 2005 and added to the 
original fielded sample for the second wave of the survey. The 1,239 additional individuals 
who were added to the fielded sample in wave 2 were asked to provide historical information 
back to random assignment to provide a full two years of follow-up for all respondents to the 
second wave. In addition, it should be noted that 103 individuals who did not respond to the 
first wave were not contacted to respond to the second wave; thus, they were not technically 
fielded, although they are included in the definition of the fielded sample in wave 2.
237 A total of 189 of the wave 3 respondents did not respond to wave 2 or both of the previous 
waves and were asked to provide historical information back to the first wave or random 
assignment to provide a full five years of follow-up for all wave 3 respondents.
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Table A.5 Survey response rates, ND25+ target group
Total
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Full sample size 6,782 3,424 3,358
Wave 1 (12-month survey)
Fielded sample size 2,970 1,486 1,484
Respondent sample size 2,213 1,121 1,092
Non-respondent sample size 757 365 392
Response rate (%) 74.5 75.4 73.6
Wave 2 (24-month survey)
Fielded sample size 1,016 507 509
Respondent sample size 661 340 321
Non-respondent sample size 355 167 188
Response rate (%) 65.1 67.1 63.1
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from customer surveys.
A.3.2 Summary of non-response analyses in survey waves 1 and 2
For the lone parent samples, there were no major problems noted for the wave 1 or wave 2 samples. 
The surveys achieved high response rates, and the available evidence suggests that the impact 
estimates based on the respondents’ sample were similar to the results for the full sample. As 
expected, some characteristics differ between respondents and non-respondents, but this does not 
necessarily indicate bias.238
For the ND25+ sample, there were survey response problems, particularly for the wave 2 sample. 
The wave 2 survey achieved a response rate within expectations, given the population in 
question, though rather low when compared with the other groups. The available evidence from 
administrative data suggests that the economic impact estimates based on the respondent sample 
are not similar to the full sample. Also, the respondent sample size for the ND25+ group was too 
small to use for the estimation of economic impacts. Therefore, the survey data were not used for 
evaluating the economic impacts for the ND25+ group. However, the survey was deemed adequate 
to measure non-experimental participation outcomes.239
A.3.3 Comparison of programme and control group respondents on baseline  
 characteristics for the wave 3 survey
As mentioned in the introduction, due to response bias, the wave 3 survey data are used less 
intensively than the prior waves of the survey were used in previous reports. The first set of tests 
assess whether there is bias due to differences in background characteristics measured at the 
time of random assignment between programme and control group respondents. In a randomised 
controlled trial, such as the ERA demonstration, it is critical to determine whether the characteristics 
of surveyed programme group members are similar to the characteristics of surveyed control group 
members. If there are differences, the benefits of random assignment can be lost. This is done by 
testing for differences in background characteristics between the programme group and the control 
group among survey respondents only. Regression analysis was used to determine whether baseline 
characteristics could predict whether a respondent was a member of the programme group (among 
wave 3 respondents only). Table A.6 shows that baseline characteristics are not different between 
238 See Riccio et	al., 2008.
239 See Miller et	al., 2008.
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programme and control group respondents in either target group. Although some associations 
shown in Table A.6 are statistically significant, the logistic regression models are not statistically 
significant as a whole (not shown). Thus, from this perspective, the wave 3 sample looked 
representive of the full sample. 
Table A.6 Baseline characteristics as a predictor of treatment status,  
 among respondents
NDLP Group WTC Group
Characteristic
Odds 
ratio
(Standard 
error)
Odds 
ratio
(Standard 
error)
District (%)
East Midlands 0.997 0.161 0.953 0.191
North East England 0.997 0.157 1.001 0.233
North West England 1.169 0.164 1.001 0.262
Scotland 1.034 0.165 1.098 0.233
Wales 1.158 0.178 0.991 0.256
Date of random assignment (RA) (%)
January 2004 - March 2004 0.872 0.275 0.638 0.467
April 2004 - June 2004 0.937 0.278 0.782 0.469
July 2004 - September 2004 1.019 0.277 0.598 0.463
October 2004 - December 2004 0.841 0.295 0.685 0.458
January 2005 - April 2005 NA NA 0.736 0.475
Female (%) 0.736 0.221 0.681 0.310
Single (%) 1.033 0.108 0.991 0.099
Number of children (%)
One 0.713 0.371 3.773 0.406 ***
More than one 0.829 0.372 3.284 0.406 ***
Education (%)
O-level 1.124 0.125 0.951 0.155
A-level or above 0.977 0.146 0.859 0.163
Other 0.755 0.202 1.019 0.193
Number of months worked in three years prior to RA (%)
12 or fewer 1.089 0.155 0.813 0.161
13-24 0.941 0.182 0.741 0.148 **
Worked in the past year (%) 1.262 0.164 1.101 0.347
Weekly earnings in the past year for current/most recent job (£) 0.999 0.001 1.000 0.001
Number of months on benefits in the two years prior to RA 0.995 0.007 0.996 0.008
Sample size 1,854 1,858
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from baseline information forms completed by DWP staff, 60-month customer surveys, and Work and 
Pensions Longitudinal Survey benefits receipt records. 
NOTES: Table includes only the fielded sample.
 Benefits refers to Income Support for NDLP customers and a combination of Jobseeker’s Allowance and Income Support for 
WTC customers.
 Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
 Statistical significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent.
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A.3.4 Comparison of baseline characteristics for the wave 3 survey
It is also important to check whether those who responded to the survey were similar to those 
who did not respond. If those who responded to the survey were very different from those who 
did not respond, the impact results might not generalise to the full sample. This can be explored 
by comparing the characteristics of respondents with those of non-respondents. This analysis 
compares the baseline characteristics of survey respondents with those of all non-respondents in 
the full sample to test the generalisability of the results. 
Tables A.7 and A.8 present means of selected baseline characteristics by target group for the full 
sample, the fielded sample, and for respondents and non-respondents to the survey. Statistically 
significant differences between the characteristics of respondents and non-respondents are denoted 
by asterisks in the table. Overall, respondents and non-respondents are statistically significantly 
different in a number of regards. This is common in surveys and may have a variety of explanations. 
For example, members of the fielded sample who have ties to a community through family are 
easier to locate for survey participation than those who do not; thus, it is not surprising that 
response rates are higher among married, as opposed to unmarried, sample members. 
Since some of these characteristics may be correlated – for example, education and weekly 
earnings – logistic regression is used to determine which characteristics differ across respondents 
and non-respondents while taking all other characteristics into account. Table A.9 shows the results 
of regressing an indicator of response status on the characteristics shown in Tables A.7 and A.8, as 
well as an indicator of research group, to better understand the process affecting response. The 
‘Odds Ratio’ column captures the effect of each characteristic on the probability of responding to the 
survey; asterisks denote the significance level of these relationships.
Table A.9 shows that for both the NDLP and WTC groups, respondents differed from non-
respondents on several characteristics. For the NDLP group, those from Wales, those who were 
unmarried and living alone, and those with no qualifications at baseline were less likely to respond. 
For the WTC group, those in North East and North West England were more likely to respond, and 
those who were unmarried and living alone were less likely to respond. Conversely, WTC group 
members with A-level qualifications, higher earnings at baseline, and lower benefits receipt prior 
to random assignment were more likely to respond. These differences suggest that the survey 
sample may not be representative of the full study sample. For both target groups, the survey 
sample is more representative of those with higher levels of education at baseline, as well as for 
WTC respondents with higher earnings and lower benefit receipt at baseline. As such, the most 
disadvantaged sample members are not as well represented by the respondent sample.240
240 For both target groups, treatment group status is also statistically significant. In both cases, 
this indicates that programme group members were more likely to respond to the survey 
than control group members, which is not necessarily a problem unless it affects types of 
programme and control group members who responded.
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Table A.7 Comparison of the baseline characteristics of the full sample and the  
 survey sample, NDLP target group
Characteristic
Full 
sample
Fielded 
sample
Respondents 
to 60-month 
survey
Non-
respondents 
to 60-month 
survey
District (%)
East Midlands 24.2 16.8 17.7 15.3 *
London 22.5 17.4 16.3 19.2 **
North East England 19.1 17.4 20.1 12.8 ***
North West England 15.1 16.8 17.3 15.9
Scotland 9.3 16.1 16.1 16.3
Wales 9.8 15.5 12.5 20.5 ***
Date of random assignment (RA) (%)
October 2003 - December 2003 9.6 3.7 3.2 4.6 *
January 2004 - March 2004 29.4 34.4 33.5 35.8
April 2004 - June 2004 20.7 24.5 24.8 23.9
July 2004 - September 2004 24.2 25.8 26.3 24.9
October 2004 - December 2004 13.9 11.7 12.1 10.9
January 2005 - April 2005 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Female (%) 95.0 94.5 95.0 93.7
Single (%) 71.8 72.9 71.4 75.4 **
Number of children (%)
None 1.1 1.1 1.4 0.7 *
One 52.7 54.2 53.1 55.9
More than one 46.2 44.7 45.5 43.4
Education (%)
O-level 47.7 47.2 49.1 44.2 ***
A-level or above 21.6 22.1 22.6 21.3
Other 7.6 7.2 7.3 6.9
None 23.2 23.5 21.0 27.6 ***
Number of months worked in three years prior to RA (%)
12 or fewer 72.7 71.9 72.2 71.5
13-24 12.7 13.0 12.2 14.2
More than 24 14.6 15.1 15.6 14.3
Worked in the past year (%) 29.2 29.1 29.5 28.7
Weekly earnings in the past year for current/most recent job (£) 27.3 27.5 27.0 28.4
Average number of months on benefits in the two years prior to RA (%) 17.5 17.2 17.2 17.0
Sample size 6,787 2,992 1,854 1,138
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from baseline information forms completed by DWP staff, 60-month customer survey, and Work and 
Pensions Longitudinal Survey benefits receipt records. 
NOTES: Benefits refers to Income Support.
 Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
 Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the respondent group and the non-respondent group. 
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent.
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Table A.8 Comparison of the baseline characteristics of the full sample and the  
 survey sample, WTC target group
Characteristic
Full 
sample
Fielded 
sample
Respondents 
to 60-month 
survey
Non-
respondents 
to 60-month 
survey
District (%)
East Midlands 56.3 58.9 57.1 63.0 ***
London 8.0 7.3 7.1 7.7 ***
North East England 9.9 9.2 10.8 5.7
North West England 6.5 6.7 6.7 6.5
Scotland 10.9 9.9 10.5 8.6
Wales 8.4 8.1 7.9 8.5
Date of random assignment (RA) (%)
October 2003 - December 2003 2.7 1.1 1.2 1.0
January 2004 - March 2004 10.7 11.0 11.8 9.2 **
April 2004 - June 2004 9.2 9.6 11.0 6.5 ***
July 2004 - September 2004 14.1 14.7 16.9 9.8 ***
October 2004 - December 2004 37.1 38.6 39.2 37.2
January 2005 - April 2005 26.2 24.9 19.8 36.4 ***
Female (%) 97.4 97.3 97.5 96.9
Single (%) 45.1 44.3 42.8 47.7 **
Number of children (%)
None 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.6
One 50.0 49.4 49.8 48.6
More than one 48.4 49.1 48.8 49.8
Education (%)
O-level 45.0 44.3 43.5 46.3
A-level or above 30.7 30.7 32.5 26.7 ***
Other 12.2 12.4 12.0 13.4
None 12.1 12.5 12.0 13.7
Number of months worked in three years prior to RA (%)
12 or fewer 12.8 12.0 11.8 12.4
13-24 12.9 12.7 12.3 13.4
More than 24 74.4 75.3 75.8 74.2
Worked in the past year (%) 97.4 97.7 97.8 97.3
Weekly earnings in the past year for current/most recent job (£) 116.7 117.1 118.4 114.1 **
Average number of months on benefits in the two years prior to RA (%) 3.7 3.7 3.4 4.5 ***
Sample size 2,815 2,686 1,858 828
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from baseline information forms completed by DWP staff, 60-month customer survey, and Work and 
Pensions Longitudinal Survey benefits receipt records. 
NOTES: Benefits refers to a combination of Jobseeker’s Allowance and Income Support.
 Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
 Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the respondent group and the non-respondent group. 
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent.
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Table A.9 Treatment/control status as a predictor of survey response
NDLP Group WTC Group
Characteristic
Odds 
ratio
(Standard 
error)
Odds 
ratio
(Standard 
error)
Treatment status 1.206 0.077 ** 1.158 0.087 *
District (%)
East Midlands 1.387 0.131 ** 1.116 0.170
North East England 1.935 0.134 *** 1.816 0.233 **
North West England 1.380 0.132 ** 1.754 0.234 **
Scotland 1.227 0.132 1.209 0.215
Wales 0.756 0.132 ** 0.830 0.226
Date of random assignment (RA) (%)
January 2004 - March 2004 1.388 0.206 1.251 0.444
April 2004 - June 2004 1.514 0.210 ** 1.723 0.451
July 2004 - September 2004 1.529 0.209 ** 1.514 0.443
October 2004 - December 2004 1.450 0.227 1.105 0.434
January 2005 - April 2005 NA NA 0.607 0.445
Female (%) 1.278 0.169 1.457 0.259
Single (%) 0.792 0.091 ** 0.775 0.091 ***
Number of children (%)
One 0.666 0.328 1.068 0.333
More than one 0.722 0.330 1.022 0.333
Education (%)
O-level 1.514 0.098 *** 1.019 0.137
A-level or above 1.481 0.116 *** 1.366 0.147 **
Other 1.538 0.164 *** 1.117 0.170
Number of months worked in three years prior to RA (%)
12 or fewer 0.954 0.131 0.996 0.145
13-24 0.795 0.147 0.902 0.133
Worked in the past year (%) 1.246 0.137 1.574 0.300
Weekly earnings in the past year for current/most recent job (£) 0.998 0.001 1.002 0.001 *
Number of months on benefits in the two years prior to RA 1.005 0.005 0.979 0.007 ***
Sample size 2,992 2,686
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from baseline information forms completed by DWP staff, 60-month customer surveys, and Work and 
Pensions Longitudinal Survey benefits receipt records. 
NOTES: Data include only the fielded sample.
 Benefits refers to Income Support for NDLP customers and a combination of Jobseeker’s Allowance and Income Support for 
WTC customers.
 Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
 Statistical significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent.
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A.3.5 Comparison of impact estimates from administrative records for  
 the wave 3 survey
The previous two sections examined the characteristics of sample members to determine whether 
the survey results are representative. This section looks more directly at the consequences of 
differences in the respondent and non-respondent samples by examining whether the impact 
estimates from the survey sample are similar to those from the full sample. 
It is possible that impact estimates for the group for which survey data are available may not agree 
with impact estimates based on the full sample. Although survey data are not available for the full 
sample, administrative records provide data on employment, earnings, and benefits outcomes for 
all sample members (including those who did not respond to the survey). Using these administrative 
records, estimates based on the full and fielded samples can be compared with estimates based 
on the survey respondent sample. This provides an insight into whether estimates based on the 
smaller (respondent) sample can be regarded as unbiased estimates for the full sample. Should this 
be the case for the outcomes measured by administrative records, one can be more confident that 
the impact estimates for the outcomes available only in the survey data also generalise to the full 
sample.
Tables A.10 and A.11 contain employment, earnings, and benefits impact estimates from 
administrative records data for the NDLP and WTC target groups. For both groups, employment rate 
outcomes and impacts are similar between the respondent and full samples. However, earnings 
levels for programme group respondents in both target groups are considerably higher than for 
corresponding programme group members in the full sample. As a result, impact estimates for 
programme group respondents in both target groups are also more positive than the full sample 
estimates. For example, during the 2007-2008 tax year, ERA increased earnings by £605 among 
the NDLP survey respondent sample. This result is statistically significant. For the full NDLP sample, 
ERA did not have a statistically significant effect on 2007-2008 earnings (the impact estimate was 
only £116). However, by the most recent tax year (when the survey was mostly fielded), the impact 
estimates were closer for the NDLP group across the two samples. For the WTC group, the earnings 
impacts were larger for the survey respondent group in each tax year. In the case of the WTC group, 
the impacts on earnings are still statistically significant for the survey respondent sample in the 
2008-2009 tax year (when the survey was mostly fielded). In that year, ERA increased earnings by 
£650 among WTC survey respondents but only by £234 among the full WTC sample. 
Numerous weighting strategies were attempted to resolve the observable response bias. None of the 
strategies were able to weight sample member characteristics in such a way that achieved the goals 
of reducing the difference in earnings impacts across the samples while maintaining the integrity of 
the experimental estimates.241
241 One strategy was able to correct for differences in impacts, but because it involved weighting 
the samples based on post-random assignment outcomes, this strategy was not used.
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A.3.6 Conclusions
For the lone parent target groups, the survey achieved high response rates in the first two waves, 
and the available evidence suggests that the surveys are sound for estimating the effects of the 
programme and generalising to the full samples. However the wave 2 survey, in particular, was 
problematic for the ND25+ group. Individuals were hard to track down, leading to low response 
rates, and the survey sample was biased for several measures. For this reason, the wave 3 survey 
was not implemented for the ND25+ group.
The wave 3 survey includes the two lone parent target groups: NDLP and WTC. While the wave 
3 survey sample was somewhat different than the full sample, the differences were not large 
enough to raise questions about the validity of the wave 3 survey data. However, comparisons of 
impact estimates for the respondent and full samples revealed more serious problems regarding 
the generalisability of the survey results. Particularly of concern for the wave 3 survey is that 
administrative records earnings levels and impacts are stronger for survey respondents than for 
non-respondents. For the NDLP group, this pattern of stronger impacts on earnings among the 
respondent sample faded by the time the survey was fielded. Therefore, outcomes measured five 
years after the survey are less affected by bias than outcomes measured over time. For the WTC 
group, the impacts remained somewhat stronger for the respondent sample through the end of the 
follow-up period. 
Because of the response bias detected in the wave 3 survey, administrative records estimates of 
employment and earnings impacts over time are given more weight and prominence in this report 
compared with estimates from survey data. It is also important to note that the pattern of response 
bias is limited to the wave 3 survey. This report relies heavily on participation estimates, which were 
estimated in the first two survey waves and capture a large portion of the programme period.
Finally, this response analysis highlights the critical importance of collecting multiple data sources 
to measure the quality and representativeness of survey data. The data on the baseline information 
form suggested no serious response bias issues. It was only the administrative records that revealed 
that the respondent samples experienced much larger earnings impacts from ERA. The longitudinal 
survey earnings outcomes (not shown in this report) indicated more positive long-term impacts from 
ERA than was the case. This would have been taken as the correct story had the administrative data 
not been collected. 
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vi
ce
 o
n 
tr
ai
ni
ng
 a
nd
 in
cr
ea
si
ng
 s
ki
lls
• 
Jo
b 
se
ar
ch
 e
xp
en
se
s 
pa
id
 b
y 
an
 A
dv
is
er
 
Di
sc
re
tio
n 
Fu
nd
 (m
ax
 £
30
0)
• 
N
ew
 W
or
ki
ng
 T
ax
 C
re
di
t (
W
TC
) a
nd
 C
hi
ld
 
Ta
x 
Cr
ed
it 
be
gi
n 
sa
m
e 
ye
ar
.
• 
M
an
da
to
ry
 W
or
k 
Fo
cu
se
d 
In
te
rv
ie
w
s 
(W
FI
s)
 e
xt
en
de
d 
to
 n
ew
 a
nd
 re
pe
at
 lo
ne
 
pa
re
nt
 c
la
im
an
ts
 o
f I
nc
om
e 
Su
pp
or
t 
w
ith
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
un
de
r 3
 a
nd
 to
 e
xi
st
in
g 
cl
ai
m
an
ts
 o
f I
nc
om
e 
Su
pp
or
t w
ith
 
yo
un
ge
st
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
ag
ed
 5
-8
 y
ea
rs
. T
he
se
 
ar
e 
vi
ew
ed
 a
s 
a 
ro
ut
e 
in
to
 N
DL
P.
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1 
Co
nt
in
ue
d
N
DL
P 
ER
A 
pr
og
ra
m
m
e 
gr
ou
p
N
DL
P 
co
nt
ro
l g
ro
up
M
ai
n 
po
lic
y 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
ts
20
04
• 
Al
l l
on
e 
pa
re
nt
 c
la
im
an
ts
 o
f I
nc
om
e 
Su
pp
or
t r
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 a
tt
en
d 
a 
m
an
da
to
ry
 
W
or
k 
Fo
cu
se
d 
In
te
rv
ie
w
 o
n 
an
 a
nn
ua
l 
ba
si
s.
 
• 
Im
pr
ov
ed
 J
ob
 G
ra
nt
 o
f £
25
0 
fo
r l
on
e 
pa
re
nt
s 
w
ho
 h
av
e 
be
en
 in
 re
ce
ip
t o
f 
be
ne
fit
 fo
r 2
6 
w
ee
ks
 a
nd
 w
ho
 a
re
 m
ov
in
g 
in
to
 w
or
k 
of
 1
6 
ho
ur
s 
or
 m
or
e 
pe
r w
ee
k 
w
he
n 
th
e 
jo
b 
is
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
to
 la
st
 a
t l
ea
st
 
5 
w
ee
ks
.
• 
N
DL
P 
an
d 
W
or
k 
Fo
cu
se
d 
In
te
rv
ie
w
s 
lin
ke
d 
to
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t i
m
pr
ov
em
en
ts
 in
 
lo
ne
 p
ar
en
t l
ab
ou
r m
ar
ke
t p
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n 
(E
va
ns
 e
t	a
l.,
 2
00
4)
. 
20
05
• 
Lo
ne
 p
ar
en
ts
 o
n 
N
DL
P 
el
ig
ib
le
 fo
r h
el
p 
w
ith
 re
gi
st
er
ed
 c
hi
ld
ca
re
 in
 th
e 
w
ee
k 
be
fo
re
 s
ta
rt
in
g 
w
or
k.
 
• 
Lo
ne
 p
ar
en
ts
 c
la
im
in
g 
In
co
m
e 
Su
pp
or
t 
fo
r 1
2 
m
on
th
s 
or
 m
or
e 
w
ith
 y
ou
ng
es
t 
ch
ild
 a
ge
d 
14
 y
ea
rs
 o
r o
ve
r r
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 a
tt
en
d 
a 
m
an
da
to
ry
 W
or
k 
Fo
cu
se
d 
In
te
rv
ie
w
 e
ve
ry
 3
 m
on
th
s 
.
• 
N
ew
 D
ea
l P
lu
s 
fo
r L
on
e 
Pa
re
nt
s 
(N
D+
fL
P)
 
be
gi
ns
 in
 p
ilo
t J
ob
ce
nt
re
 P
lu
s 
di
st
ric
ts
 in
 
En
gl
an
d.
 T
hi
s 
pr
ov
id
es
 e
nh
an
ce
d 
se
rv
ic
es
 
fo
r l
on
e 
pa
re
nt
s 
an
d 
ex
tr
a 
fle
xi
bi
lit
y 
an
d 
su
pp
or
t t
o 
pe
rs
on
al
 a
dv
is
er
s.
 In
cl
ud
es
 
in
-w
or
k 
ad
vi
so
ry
 s
up
po
rt
 a
nd
 in
-w
or
k 
fin
an
ci
al
 a
ss
is
ta
nc
e:
 a
n 
In
-W
or
k 
Cr
ed
it 
of
 
£4
0 
pe
r w
ee
k 
fo
r u
p 
to
 5
2 
w
ee
ks
 a
nd
 a
n 
In
-W
or
k 
Em
er
ge
nc
y 
Fu
nd
 fo
r a
dd
re
ss
in
g 
un
ex
pe
ct
ed
 fi
na
nc
ia
l e
m
er
ge
nc
ie
s 
th
at
 
m
ay
 th
re
at
en
 jo
b 
re
te
nt
io
n.
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d
N
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ER
A 
pr
og
ra
m
m
e 
gr
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p
N
DL
P 
co
nt
ro
l g
ro
up
M
ai
n 
po
lic
y 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
ts
20
06
• 
N
ew
 D
ea
l P
lu
s 
fo
r L
on
e 
Pa
re
nt
s 
pi
lo
t 
ex
te
nd
ed
 to
 S
co
tla
nd
 a
nd
 W
al
es
20
07
La
st
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
 le
av
e 
ER
A 
O
ct
ob
er
 2
00
7
• 
In
 N
ew
 D
ea
l P
lu
s 
fo
r L
on
e 
Pa
re
nt
s 
pi
lo
t a
re
as
, m
an
da
to
ry
 Q
ua
rt
er
ly
 W
or
k 
Fo
cu
se
d 
In
te
rv
ie
w
s 
(e
ve
ry
 3
 m
on
th
s)
 
ex
te
nd
ed
 to
 lo
ne
 p
ar
en
ts
 c
la
im
in
g 
In
co
m
e 
Su
pp
or
t f
or
 1
2 
m
on
th
s 
or
 m
or
e 
w
ith
 y
ou
ng
es
t c
hi
ld
 1
1-
13
 y
ea
rs
.
• 
Al
l l
on
e 
pa
re
nt
s 
cl
ai
m
in
g 
In
co
m
e 
Su
pp
or
t 
an
d 
w
ith
 a
 y
ou
ng
es
t c
hi
ld
 5
-1
3 
ye
ar
s 
re
qu
ire
d 
to
 a
tt
en
d 
a 
m
an
da
to
ry
 W
or
k 
Fo
cu
se
d 
In
te
rv
ie
w
 e
ve
ry
 6
 m
on
th
s.
• 
W
or
k 
Fo
cu
se
d 
In
te
rv
ie
w
s 
fo
un
d 
to
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
 in
cr
ea
se
 th
e 
nu
m
be
rs
 o
f 
lo
ne
 p
ar
en
ts
 v
ol
un
te
er
in
g 
fo
r t
he
 N
DL
P 
(T
ho
m
as
, 2
00
7)
.
Po
lic
y 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
ts
 p
os
t-
ER
A
20
08
• 
In
 a
 s
yn
th
es
is
 o
f fi
nd
in
gs
, N
DL
P 
w
as
 fo
un
d 
to
 in
cr
ea
se
 th
e 
lik
el
ih
oo
d 
th
at
 a
 lo
ne
 p
ar
en
t w
ou
ld
 le
av
e 
ou
t-
of
-w
or
k 
be
ne
fit
s 
by
 2
0 
to
 2
5 
pe
r c
en
t (
Ce
bu
lla
 e
t	a
l.,
 2
00
8)
. H
ow
ev
er
, r
es
ul
ts
 w
er
e 
ba
se
d 
on
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
 w
ho
 v
ol
un
te
er
ed
 fo
r N
DL
P 
on
ly
, w
ith
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s 
su
ch
 a
s 
w
or
k 
re
ad
in
es
s 
an
d 
at
tit
ud
es
 to
 w
or
k 
lik
el
y 
to
 d
iff
er
 fr
om
 th
e 
w
id
er
 lo
ne
 p
ar
en
t p
op
ul
at
io
n.
 
• 
Al
l l
on
e 
pa
re
nt
s 
cl
ai
m
in
g 
In
co
m
e 
Su
pp
or
t r
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 a
tt
en
d 
a 
m
an
da
to
ry
 W
or
k 
Fo
cu
se
d 
In
te
rv
ie
w
 e
ve
ry
 6
 m
on
th
s.
• 
In
-W
or
k 
Cr
ed
it 
ro
lle
d 
ou
t n
at
io
na
lly
, p
ro
vi
di
ng
 a
 w
ee
kl
y 
pa
ym
en
t o
f £
40
 (£
60
 in
 L
on
do
n)
 to
 lo
ne
 p
ar
en
ts
 w
ho
 h
av
e 
be
en
 c
la
im
in
g 
be
ne
fit
s 
fo
r a
t l
ea
st
 o
ne
 y
ea
r a
nd
 w
ho
 e
nt
er
 a
 jo
b 
of
 1
6 
pl
us
 h
ou
rs
 p
er
 w
ee
k.
 
• 
In
-W
or
k 
Em
er
ge
nc
y 
Di
sc
re
tio
n 
Fu
nd
 ro
lle
d 
ou
t n
at
io
na
lly
 to
 lo
ne
 p
ar
en
ts
 w
ho
 e
nt
er
 w
or
k 
th
ro
ug
h 
N
DL
P.
• 
In
-w
or
k 
ad
vi
so
ry
 s
up
po
rt
 b
ec
om
es
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
to
 a
ll 
lo
ne
 p
ar
en
ts
 w
ho
 e
nt
er
 w
or
k 
th
ro
ug
h 
N
DL
P.
• 
Lo
ne
 P
ar
en
t O
bl
ig
at
io
ns
 b
eg
in
. L
on
e 
pa
re
nt
s 
w
ith
 a
 y
ou
ng
es
t c
hi
ld
 1
2 
or
 o
ld
er
 n
o 
lo
ng
er
 e
lig
ib
le
 fo
r I
nc
om
e 
Su
pp
or
t s
ol
el
y 
on
 th
e 
gr
ou
nd
s 
of
 b
ei
ng
 a
 lo
ne
 p
ar
en
t. 
In
st
ea
d,
 th
es
e 
lo
ne
 p
ar
en
ts
 m
ay
 c
la
im
 J
ob
se
ek
er
’s
 A
llo
w
an
ce
 a
nd
 b
e 
su
bj
ec
t t
o 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
co
nd
iti
on
s 
as
 o
th
er
 J
ob
se
ek
er
’s
 A
llo
w
an
ce
 c
la
im
an
ts
.
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1 
Co
nt
in
ue
d
Po
lic
y 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
ts
 p
os
t-
ER
A
20
09
• 
Lo
ne
 p
ar
en
ts
 w
ith
 a
 y
ou
ng
es
t c
hi
ld
 1
0 
or
 o
ld
er
 n
o 
lo
ng
er
 e
lig
ib
le
 fo
r I
nc
om
e 
Su
pp
or
t s
ol
el
y 
on
 th
e 
gr
ou
nd
s 
of
 b
ei
ng
 a
 lo
ne
 p
ar
en
t. 
In
st
ea
d,
 th
es
e 
lo
ne
 p
ar
en
ts
 m
ay
 c
la
im
 J
ob
se
ek
er
’s
 A
llo
w
an
ce
 a
nd
 b
e 
su
bj
ec
t t
o 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
co
nd
iti
on
s 
as
 o
th
er
 J
ob
se
ek
er
’s
 A
llo
w
an
ce
 
cl
ai
m
an
ts
. 
20
10
• 
Lo
ne
 p
ar
en
ts
 w
ith
 a
 y
ou
ng
es
t c
hi
ld
 7
 o
r o
ld
er
 n
o 
lo
ng
er
 e
lig
ib
le
 fo
r I
nc
om
e 
Su
pp
or
t s
ol
el
y 
on
 th
e 
gr
ou
nd
s 
of
 b
ei
ng
 a
 lo
ne
 p
ar
en
t. 
In
st
ea
d,
 th
es
e 
lo
ne
 p
ar
en
ts
 m
ay
 c
la
im
 J
ob
se
ek
er
’s
 A
llo
w
an
ce
 a
nd
 b
e 
su
bj
ec
t t
o 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
co
nd
iti
on
s 
as
 o
th
er
 J
ob
se
ek
er
’s
 A
llo
w
an
ce
 
cl
ai
m
an
ts
.
20
11
• 
W
or
k 
Pr
og
ra
m
m
e 
ex
pe
ct
ed
 to
 b
e 
in
tr
od
uc
ed
 n
at
io
na
lly
. I
t w
ill
 s
tr
ea
m
lin
e 
ba
ck
-t
o-
w
or
k 
as
si
st
an
ce
 (i
nc
lu
di
ng
 N
DL
P)
 in
to
 o
ne
 
pr
og
ra
m
m
e 
de
liv
er
ed
 b
y 
Jo
bc
en
tr
e 
Pl
us
 in
 p
ar
tn
er
sh
ip
 w
ith
 p
riv
at
e 
an
d 
vo
lu
nt
ar
y 
se
ct
or
 p
ro
vi
de
rs
. I
n-
w
or
k 
ad
vi
so
ry
 a
nd
 fi
na
nc
ia
l 
su
pp
or
t w
ill
 v
ar
y 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 d
el
iv
er
y 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n.
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25
+ 
pr
og
ra
m
m
e 
an
d 
co
nt
ro
l g
ro
up
 s
er
vi
ce
s 
al
on
gs
id
e 
po
lic
y 
ch
an
ge
s
N
D2
5+
 E
RA
 p
ro
gr
am
m
e 
gr
ou
p
N
D2
5+
 c
on
tr
ol
 g
ro
up
M
ai
n 
po
lic
y 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
ts
O
ct
ob
er
 2
00
3 
ER
A 
be
gi
ns
Pr
e-
em
pl
oy
m
en
t s
up
po
rt
:
• 
Jo
b 
pl
ac
em
en
t a
ss
is
ta
nc
e.
• 
Ad
vi
ce
 o
n 
tr
ai
ni
ng
 a
nd
 in
cr
ea
si
ng
 s
ki
lls
.
• 
Jo
b 
se
ar
ch
 e
xp
en
se
s 
pa
id
 b
y 
an
 A
dv
is
er
 
Di
sc
re
tio
n 
Fu
nd
 (m
ax
 £
30
0)
.
• 
M
an
da
to
ry
 p
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n 
in
 N
ew
 D
ea
l 
pr
e-
em
pl
oy
m
en
t a
ct
iv
iti
es
 a
ft
er
 c
la
im
in
g 
Jo
bs
ee
ke
r’s
 A
llo
w
an
ce
 fo
r 1
8 
m
on
th
s 
(s
ee
 n
ex
t c
ol
um
n)
.
Po
st
-e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t a
dv
is
or
y 
su
pp
or
t:.
• 
Co
ac
hi
ng
 o
n 
ad
va
nc
em
en
t i
n 
cu
rr
en
t 
po
si
tio
n 
an
d/
or
 fi
nd
in
g 
a 
be
tt
er
 jo
b.
• 
Ra
pi
d 
re
-e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t s
er
vi
ce
s 
w
he
n 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y.
Po
st
-e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t fi
na
nc
ia
l s
up
po
rt
:
• 
Re
te
nt
io
n	
bo
nu
s:
 U
p 
to
 s
ix
 p
ay
m
en
ts
 o
f 
£4
00
 fo
r e
ac
h 
pe
rio
d 
w
he
n 
cu
st
om
er
s 
w
or
k 
30
 o
r m
or
e 
ho
ur
s 
pe
r w
ee
k 
fo
r 1
3 
ou
t o
f 1
7 
w
ee
ks
.
• 
Tr
ai
ni
ng
	b
on
us
: T
ui
tio
n 
pa
ym
en
t o
f 
up
 to
 £
1,
00
0 
if 
tr
ai
ni
ng
 u
nd
er
ta
ke
n 
w
hi
le
 w
or
ki
ng
; i
f t
ra
in
in
g 
is
 s
uc
ce
ss
fu
lly
 
co
m
pl
et
ed
, £
8 
fo
r e
ve
ry
 h
ou
r o
f t
ra
in
in
g,
 
up
 to
 £
1,
00
0.
• 
Em
er
ge
nc
y	
Di
sc
re
tio
n	
Fu
nd
: I
n-
w
or
k 
fu
nd
s 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
to
 h
el
p 
cu
st
om
er
s 
st
ay
 
em
pl
oy
ed
.
Pr
e-
em
pl
oy
m
en
t s
up
po
rt
:
• 
Jo
b 
pl
ac
em
en
t a
ss
is
ta
nc
e.
• 
Ad
vi
ce
 o
n 
tr
ai
ni
ng
 a
nd
 in
cr
ea
si
ng
 s
ki
lls
.
• 
Jo
b 
se
ar
ch
 e
xp
en
se
s 
pa
id
 b
y 
an
 A
dv
is
er
 
Di
sc
re
tio
n 
Fu
nd
 (m
ax
 £
30
0)
.
• 
M
an
da
to
ry
 p
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n 
in
 N
ew
 D
ea
l 
pr
e-
em
pl
oy
m
en
t a
ct
iv
iti
es
 a
ft
er
 c
la
im
in
g 
Jo
bs
ee
ke
r’s
 A
llo
w
an
ce
 fo
r 1
8 
m
on
th
s:
 
– 
In
iti
al
 in
te
rv
ie
w
 a
nd
 b
as
ic
 n
ee
ds
 
as
se
ss
m
en
t.
– 
4-
m
on
th
 G
at
ew
ay
 p
er
io
d 
th
at
 
co
m
bi
ne
s 
jo
b 
se
ar
ch
, a
dv
ic
e,
 a
nd
 
tr
ai
ni
ng
 o
r o
th
er
 s
pe
ci
al
is
t h
el
p
– 
13
-w
ee
k 
In
te
ns
iv
e	
Ac
tiv
ity
	P
er
io
d 
(I
AP
) 
of
 tr
ai
ni
ng
, w
or
k 
pl
ac
em
en
t, 
an
d 
jo
b 
se
ar
ch
.
– 
6-
w
ee
k 
Fo
llo
w
	T
hr
ou
gh
 o
f c
on
tin
ui
ng
 
ad
vi
ce
 a
nd
 s
up
po
rt
.
N
ot
e:
 J
ob
se
ek
er
’s
 A
llo
w
an
ce
 c
la
im
an
ts
 a
ge
d 
50
+ 
w
er
e 
on
ly
 re
qu
ire
d 
to
 p
ar
tic
ip
at
e 
in
 th
e 
Ga
te
w
ay
 p
ha
se
, a
ft
er
 w
hi
ch
 p
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n 
in
 
N
D2
5+
 w
as
 v
ol
un
ta
ry
.
• 
N
ew
 W
TC
 a
nd
 C
hi
ld
 T
ax
 C
re
di
t b
eg
in
.
• 
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t Z
on
e 
(E
Z)
 p
ilo
ts
 ru
nn
in
g 
co
nc
ur
re
nt
ly
 in
 a
re
as
 w
ith
 h
ig
h 
le
ve
ls
 o
f 
lo
ng
-t
er
m
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t a
m
on
g 
th
os
e 
ag
ed
 2
5+
. D
el
iv
er
ed
 b
y 
pr
iv
at
e 
se
ct
or
 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
ns
, E
Zs
 o
ffe
re
d 
ba
ck
-t
o-
w
or
k 
gu
id
an
ce
 a
nd
 a
dv
ic
e 
w
ith
in
 a
 fr
am
ew
or
k 
th
at
 w
as
 m
or
e 
ta
ilo
re
d 
an
d 
fle
xi
bl
e 
th
an
 
th
e 
pr
es
cr
ib
ed
 s
tr
uc
tu
re
 o
f t
he
 N
D2
5+
. 
M
or
eo
ve
r, 
it 
in
cl
ud
ed
 fi
na
nc
ia
l i
nc
en
tiv
es
 
to
 p
ro
vi
de
rs
 fo
r a
ch
ie
vi
ng
 s
us
ta
in
ab
le
 
jo
b 
ou
tc
om
es
 (a
t l
ea
st
 1
3 
w
ee
ks
). 
To
 
su
pp
or
t t
hi
s,
 p
ro
vi
de
rs
 o
ffe
re
d 
‘a
ft
er
ca
re
’, 
co
ns
is
tin
g 
of
 a
dv
is
or
y 
an
d 
fin
an
ci
al
 
su
pp
or
t, 
fo
r E
Z 
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
 w
ho
 e
nt
er
ed
 
w
or
k.
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La
st
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
 le
av
e 
ER
A 
O
ct
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er
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00
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Th
e 
In
te
ns
iv
e	
Ac
tiv
ity
	P
er
io
d	
of
 N
D2
5+
 
be
ca
m
e 
m
an
da
to
ry
 fo
r J
ob
se
ek
er
’s
 
Al
lo
w
an
ce
 c
la
im
an
ts
 a
ge
d 
50
-5
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• 
Ev
al
ua
tio
n 
ev
id
en
ce
 s
ug
ge
st
s 
th
at
 
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t Z
on
es
 w
er
e 
m
or
e 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
at
 g
et
tin
g 
m
an
da
to
ry
 2
5+
 c
us
to
m
er
s 
in
to
 
su
st
ai
na
bl
e 
w
or
k 
th
an
 s
im
ila
r c
us
to
m
er
s 
in
 th
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Table B.4 Effects of ERA on employment, earnings, and benefits receipt within  
 five years after random assignment, NDLP target group, Scotland
Outcome
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Difference 
(impact) P-value
Ever employed during (%)
Year 1 66.1 62.4 3.7 0.323 †††
Year 2 65.6 60.9 4.7 0.220 †
Year 3 57.4 59.3 -1.8 0.638 †
Year 4 60.4 57.6 2.8 0.472 †
Year 5 58.8 58.9 -0.1 0.988
Years 1-5 83.3 84.5 -1.2 0.676 ††
Average number of months employed during
Year 1 5.6 5.2 0.5 0.253 †††
Year 2 5.9 5.6 0.3 0.543 ††
Year 3 5.6 5.7 -0.1 0.891 †
Year 4 5.7 5.5 0.2 0.694
Year 5 5.5 5.7 -0.2 0.625
Years 1-5 28.3 27.7 0.6 0.723 ††
Average earnings during 2005-2006 tax year (£) 4,208 3,607 601 0.166
Average earnings during 2006-2007 tax year (£) 4,413 3,929 484 0.311
Average earnings during 2007-2008 tax year (£) 4,740 4,455 286 0.588
Average earnings during 2008-2009 tax year (£) 4,890 5,625 -735 0.198
Average 4-year earnings during 2005-2009 tax years (£) 18,252 17,616 636 0.719
Average number of months receiving IS in
Year 1 6.7 7.1 -0.4 0.293  
Year 2 4.8 5.1 -0.3 0.470  
Year 3 4.2 4.5 -0.3 0.496  
Year 4 4.0 4.1 -0.1 0.811  
Year 5 4.0 3.5 0.5 0.253  
Years 1-5 23.6 24.2 -0.6 0.714  
Average total amount of IS (£) received in
Year 1 2,354 2,559 -205 0.231  
Year 2 1,517 1,753 -236 0.172  
Year 3 1,326 1,557 -231 0.175  
Year 4 1,235 1,374 -139 0.398  
Year 5 1,198 1,178 19 0.899  
Years 1-5 7,631 8,422 -791 0.265  
Number of months received JSA in years 1-5 1.5 1.2 0.3 0.457  
Average total JSA received in years 1-5 (£) 382 326 57 0.539  
Ever received IB in years 1-5 (%) 24.4 21.8 2.6 0.443  
Sample size 312 317
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment and benefits records.
NOTES:  Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment characteristics of 
sample members.
 Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
 Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the control group. Statistical 
significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent.
 Includes all customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005.
 JSA = Jobseeker’s Allowance; IS = Income Support; IB = Incapacity Benefit.
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Table B.5 Effects of ERA on employment, earnings, and benefits receipt  
 within five years after random assignment, NDLP target group,  
 North East England
Outcome
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Difference 
(impact) P-value
Ever employed during (%)
Year 1 55.4 58.0 -2.5 0.350 †††
Year 2 55.9 55.9 0.0 0.993 †
Year 3 54.1 54.8 -0.8 0.784 †
Year 4 51.5 54.6 -3.1 0.265 †
Year 5 52.2 52.1 0.1 0.961
Years 1-5 78.1 78.8 -0.7 0.741 ††
Average number of months employed during
Year 1 4.4 4.4 0.0 0.891 †††
Year 2 5.0 5.0 0.0 0.887 ††
Year 3 5.1 5.0 0.0 0.946 †
Year 4 5.0 5.3 -0.3 0.404
Year 5 5.0 4.9 0.1 0.794
Years 1-5 24.5 24.7 -0.1 0.900 ††
Average earnings during 2005-2006 tax year (£) 3,529 3,652 -123 0.670
Average earnings during 2006-2007 tax year (£) 3,583 3,821 -238 0.427
Average earnings during 2007-2008 tax year (£) 3,743 4,076 -332 0.291
Average earnings during 2008-2009 tax year (£) 4,803 4,978 -175 0.631
Average 4-year earnings during 2005-2009 tax years (£) 15,659 16,528 -869 0.436
Average number of months receiving IS in
Year 1 7.1 7.4 -0.2 0.347  
Year 2 5.1 5.4 -0.2 0.416  
Year 3 4.6 4.7 0.0 0.865  
Year 4 4.3 4.1 0.2 0.575  
Year 5 3.9 3.8 0.1 0.804  
Years 1-5 25.0 25.3 -0.3 0.805  
Average total amount of IS (£) received in
Year 1 2,877 2,865 13 0.919  
Year 2 1,964 1,937 27 0.838  
Year 3 1,629 1,614 14 0.910  
Year 4 1,451 1,394 56 0.634  
Year 5 1,263 1,279 -16 0.889  
Years 1-5 9,184 9,090 94 0.856  
Number of months received JSA in years 1-5 1.5 2.2 -0.7 ** 0.042  
Average total JSA received in years 1-5 (£) 401 571 -170 * 0.050  
Ever received IB in years 1-5 (%) 19.8 17.0 2.8 0.195  
Sample size 645 653
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment and benefits records.
NOTES: Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment characteristics of 
sample members.
 Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
 Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the control group. Statistical 
significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent. 
 Includes all customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005.
 JSA = Jobseeker’s Allowance; IS = Income Support; IB = Incapacity Benefit.
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Table B.6 Effects of ERA on employment, earnings, and benefits receipt  
 within five years after random assignment, NDLP target group,  
 North West England
Outcome
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Difference 
(impact) P-value
Ever employed during (%)
Year 1 67.5 56.7 10.7 *** 0.000 †††
Year 2 63.9 54.4 9.6 *** 0.002 †
Year 3 59.3 50.8 8.5 *** 0.006 †
Year 4 56.4 51.0 5.4 * 0.081 †
Year 5 54.4 51.5 2.9 0.348
Years 1-5 86.0 79.9 6.2 *** 0.008 ††
Average number of months employed during
Year 1 5.5 4.5 1.1 *** 0.000 †††
Year 2 5.6 4.6 1.0 *** 0.002 ††
Year 3 5.5 4.7 0.9 ** 0.011 †
Year 4 5.4 4.9 0.5 0.159
Year 5 5.1 4.9 0.2 0.544
Years 1-5 27.1 23.5 3.6 *** 0.005 ††
Average earnings during 2005-2006 tax year (£) 4,222 3,329 893 *** 0.007
Average earnings during 2006-2007 tax year (£) 4,064 3,682 382 0.316
Average earnings during 2007-2008 tax year (£) 4,551 4,235 316 0.458
Average earnings during 2008-2009 tax year (£) 4,830 4,628 202 0.641
Average 4-year earnings during 2005-2009 tax years (£) 17,668 15,875 1,793 0.189
Average number of months receiving IS in
Year 1 7.1 8.1 -1.0 *** 0.000  
Year 2 5.3 6.2 -0.9 *** 0.009  
Year 3 4.5 5.3 -0.8 ** 0.015  
Year 4 4.0 4.4 -0.4 0.186  
Year 5 3.9 4.1 -0.3 0.407  
Years 1-5 24.9 28.2 -3.4 *** 0.009  
Average total amount of IS (£) received in
Year 1 2,748 3,148 -401 *** 0.004  
Year 2 1,876 2,228 -352 ** 0.019  
Year 3 1,564 1,855 -291 ** 0.046  
Year 4 1,364 1,529 -165 0.245  
Year 5 1,305 1,389 -84 0.554  
Years 1-5 8,857 10,149 -1,292 ** 0.038  
Number of months received JSA in years 1-5 1.1 1.3 -0.1 0.602  
Average total JSA received in years 1-5 (£) 323 348 -25 0.740  
Ever received IB in years 1-5 (%) 17.5 17.0 0.5 0.834  
Sample size 515 507
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment and benefits records.
NOTES:  Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment characteristics of 
sample members.
 Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
 Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the control group. Statistical 
significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent.
 Includes all customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005.
 JSA = Jobseeker’s Allowance; IS = Income Support; IB = Incapacity Benefit.
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Table B.7 Effects of ERA on employment, earnings, and benefits receipt  
 within five years after random assignment, NDLP target group,  
 East Midlands
Outcome
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Difference 
(impact) P-value
Ever employed during (%)
Year 1 55.4 56.1 -0.8 0.743 †††
Year 2 57.5 55.1 2.4 0.323 †
Year 3 54.0 54.6 -0.6 0.805 †
Year 4 54.0 57.2 -3.3 0.176 †
Year 5 54.2 55.7 -1.5 0.527
Years 1-5 78.4 78.7 -0.4 0.851 ††
Average number of months employed during
Year 1 4.4 4.6 -0.2 0.362 †††
Year 2 5.1 5.2 -0.1 0.762 ††
Year 3 5.2 5.3 -0.1 0.682 †
Year 4 5.2 5.4 -0.2 0.544
Year 5 5.4 5.6 -0.3 0.353
Years 1-5 25.3 26.1 -0.8 0.439 ††
Average earnings during 2005-2006 tax year (£) 3,483 3,370 114 0.658
Average earnings during 2006-2007 tax year (£) 3,819 3,703 116 0.677
Average earnings during 2007-2008 tax year (£) 4,206 4,278 -72 0.818
Average earnings during 2008-2009 tax year (£) 4,810 4,879 -68 0.840
Average 4-year earnings during 2005-2009 tax years (£) 16,319 16,229 90 0.933
Average number of months receiving IS in
Year 1 7.4 7.5 -0.1 0.532  
Year 2 5.3 5.5 -0.2 0.373  
Year 3 4.3 4.4 -0.1 0.746  
Year 4 3.9 4.0 0.0 0.886  
Year 5 3.7 3.4 0.2 0.363  
Years 1-5 24.6 24.9 -0.3 0.795  
Average total amount of IS (£) received in
Year 1 2,935 3,103 -168 0.127  
Year 2 1,969 2,135 -166 0.169  
Year 3 1,550 1,728 -178 0.137  
Year 4 1,395 1,502 -107 0.353  
Year 5 1,243 1,259 -16 0.884  
Years 1-5 9,092 9,727 -635 0.196  
Number of months received JSA in years 1-5 1.4 1.2 0.1 0.610  
Average total JSA received in years 1-5 (£) 369 345 24 0.710  
Ever received IB in years 1-5 (%) 11.9 12.7 -0.8 0.633  
Sample size 812 833
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment and benefits records.
NOTES: Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment characteristics of 
sample members.
 Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
 Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the control group. Statistical 
significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent.
 Includes all customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005.
 JSA = Jobseeker’s Allowance; IS = Income Support; IB = Incapacity Benefit.
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Table B.8 Effects of ERA on employment, earnings, and benefits receipt within  
 five years after random assignment, NDLP target group, London
Outcome
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Difference 
(impact) P-value
Ever employed during (%)
Year 1 47.1 48.2 -1.1 0.671 †††
Year 2 50.2 49.8 0.4 0.882 †
Year 3 46.0 48.4 -2.3 0.361 †
Year 4 49.3 48.4 0.8 0.746 †
Year 5 50.0 50.4 -0.4 0.862
Years 1-5 72.4 73.1 -0.7 0.742 ††
Average number of months employed during
Year 1 3.7 3.9 -0.2 0.381 †††
Year 2 4.4 4.6 -0.2 0.398 ††
Year 3 4.5 4.6 0.0 0.923 †
Year 4 4.7 4.6 0.1 0.702
Year 5 5.0 4.8 0.2 0.490
Years 1-5 22.3 22.5 -0.2 0.883 ††
Average earnings during 2005-2006 tax year (£) 4,112 3,840 272 0.410
Average earnings during 2006-2007 tax year (£) 4,437 4,111 326 0.385
Average earnings during 2007-2008 tax year (£) 4,905 4,431 474 0.247
Average earnings during 2008-2009 tax year (£) 5,702 5,439 263 0.553
Average 4-year earnings during 2005-2009 tax years (£) 19,156 17,821 1,335 0.339
Average number of months receiving IS in
Year 1 8.5 8.6 -0.1 0.810  
Year 2 6.5 6.7 -0.2 0.405  
Year 3 5.7 5.9 -0.2 0.517  
Year 4 4.9 5.2 -0.3 0.262  
Year 5 4.3 4.4 -0.1 0.716  
Years 1-5 29.9 30.8 -0.9 0.422  
Average total amount of IS (£) received in
Year 1 3,464 3,512 -48 0.682  
Year 2 2,472 2,604 -131 0.316  
Year 3 2,058 2,202 -144 0.270  
Year 4 1,720 1,901 -180 0.151  
Year 5 1,510 1,588 -78 0.517  
Years 1-5 11,224 11,806 -582 0.276  
Number of months received JSA in years 1-5 1.2 1.8 -0.6 ** 0.031  
Average total JSA received in years 1-5 (£) 331 504 -172 ** 0.023  
Ever received IB in years 1-5 (%) 10.4 8.3 2.1 0.163  
Sample size 755 774
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment and benefits records.
NOTES:  Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment characteristics of 
sample members.
 Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
 Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the control group. Statistical 
significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent.
 Includes all customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005.
 JSA = Jobseeker’s Allowance; IS = Income Support; IB = Incapacity Benefit.
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Table B.9 Effects of ERA on employment, earnings, and benefits receipt within  
 five years after random assignment, NDLP target group, Wales
Outcome
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Difference 
(impact) P-value
Ever employed during (%)
Year 1 62.6 67.5 -4.9 0.190 †††
Year 2 62.4 66.5 -4.1 0.276 †
Year 3 56.5 62.3 -5.8 0.135 †
Year 4 51.4 59.9 -8.6 ** 0.028 †
Year 5 49.6 59.5 -9.9 ** 0.011
Years 1-5 81.9 87.9 -6.1 ** 0.032 ††
Average number of months employed during
Year 1 4.8 5.2 -0.4 0.256 †††
Year 2 5.7 6.1 -0.4 0.317 ††
Year 3 5.2 6.0 -0.7 * 0.082 †
Year 4 4.8 5.8 -1.0 ** 0.026
Year 5 4.8 5.7 -0.9 ** 0.045
Years 1-5 25.3 28.7 -3.4 ** 0.041 ††
Average earnings during 2005-2006 tax year (£) 3,951 3,481 470 0.222
Average earnings during 2006-2007 tax year (£) 4,031 4,249 -218 0.603
Average earnings during 2007-2008 tax year (£) 4,211 4,250 -38 0.933
Average earnings during 2008-2009 tax year (£) 4,512 4,723 -211 0.663
Average 4-year earnings during 2005-2009 tax years (£) 16,705 16,703 2 0.999
Average number of months receiving IS in
Year 1 6.6 7.0 -0.4 0.256  
Year 2 4.9 4.7 0.2 0.692  
Year 3 4.6 3.8 0.7 * 0.073  
Year 4 4.4 3.7 0.7 * 0.080  
Year 5 4.0 3.5 0.4 0.268  
Years 1-5 24.4 22.7 1.6 0.293  
Average total amount of IS (£) received in
Year 1 2,479 2,564 -85 0.624  
Year 2 1,724 1,601 123 0.496  
Year 3 1,595 1,266 330 * 0.073  
Year 4 1,425 1,238 187 0.294  
Year 5 1,299 1,226 73 0.689  
Years 1-5 8,522 7,894 628 0.419  
Number of months received JSA in years 1-5 0.7 0.8 -0.1 0.591  
Average total JSA received in years 1-5 (£) 193 217 -24 0.684  
Ever received IB in years 1-5 (%) 17.8 17.7 0.2 0.959  
Sample size 326 338
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment and benefits records.
NOTES:  Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment characteristics of 
sample members.
 Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
 Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the control group. Statistical 
significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent.
 Includes all customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005.
 JSA = Jobseeker’s Allowance; IS = Income Support; IB = Incapacity Benefit.
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Table B.10 Effects of ERA on employment, earnings, and benefits receipt within  
 five years after random assignment, ND25+ target group, Scotland
Outcome
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Difference 
(impact) P-value
Ever employed during (%)
Year 1 43.1 33.6 9.5 *** 0.004 ††
Year 2 38.0 30.9 7.1 ** 0.030
Year 3 37.3 31.4 5.9 * 0.070
Year 4 39.1 31.9 7.2 ** 0.028
Year 5 36.6 28.5 8.1 ** 0.012
Years 1-5 62.7 54.6 8.1 ** 0.016
Average number of months employed during
Year 1 2.5 2.1 0.5 * 0.063
Year 2 2.9 2.3 0.6 ** 0.039
Year 3 3.3 2.5 0.8 *** 0.010
Year 4 3.4 2.6 0.8 ** 0.012
Year 5 3.2 2.3 1.0 *** 0.002 †
Years 1-5 15.3 11.7 3.7 *** 0.002 ††
Average earnings during 2005-2006 tax year (£) 3,536 2,768 767 ** 0.048 †
Average earnings during 2006-2007 tax year (£) 4,164 3,172 991 ** 0.025
Average earnings during 2007-2008 tax year (£) 4,143 3,301 842 * 0.062
Average earnings during 2008-2009 tax year (£) 4,978 3,332 1,646 *** 0.001 †
Average 4-year earnings during 2005-2009 tax years (£) 16,820 12,574 4,247 *** 0.007 †
Average number of months receiving benefits (JSA) in
Year 1 8.6 8.7 -0.2 0.498 †††
Year 2 5.5 5.9 -0.4 0.216 †††
Year 3 4.2 4.8 -0.6 * 0.065 †††
Year 4 3.3 3.7 -0.4 0.220 ††
Year 5 3.1 3.7 -0.6 * 0.073  
Years 1-5 24.8 26.9 -2.1 * 0.070 †††
Average total amount of benefits (£) (JSA) received in
Year 1 2,303 2,489 -186 ** 0.041 ††
Year 2 1,424 1,500 -76 0.443 †††
Year 3 1,094 1,213 -119 0.187 †††
Year 4 848 969 -121 0.165 ††
Year 5 842 1,019 -177 * 0.056  
Years 1-5 6,511 7,190 -679 ** 0.047 †††
Ever received IB in years 1-5 (%) 41.2 44.5 -3.3 0.338  
Sample size = 852 431 421
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment and benefits records.
NOTES: Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment characteristics of 
sample members.
 Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
 Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the control group. Statistical 
significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent.
 Includes all customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005.
 JSA = Jobseeker’s Allowance; IS = Income Support; IB = Incapacity Benefit.
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Table B.11 Effects of ERA on employment, earnings, and benefits receipt  
 within five years after random assignment, ND25+ target group,  
 North East England
Outcome
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Difference 
(impact) P-value
Ever employed during (%)
Year 1 39.1 44.5 -5.4 0.0 0.108 ††
Year 2 41.4 39.5 1.9 0.0 0.576
Year 3 38.8 40.0 -1.2 0.0 0.719
Year 4 40.2 39.0 1.2 0.0 0.711
Year 5 36.5 37.6 -1.1 0.0 0.742
Years 1-5 60.7 64.0 -3.3 0.0 0.313
Average number of months employed during 
Year 1 2.7 3.0 -0.3 0.0 0.252
Year 2 3.2 3.2 0.1 0.0 0.831
Year 3 3.4 3.3 0.1 0.0 0.850
Year 4 3.4 3.7 -0.3 0.0 0.415
Year 5 3.1 3.4 -0.3 0.0 0.393 †
Years 1-5 15.8 16.5 -0.7 0.0 0.562 ††
Average earnings during 2005-2006 tax year (£) 3,722 3,853 -131 0.0 0.783 †
Average earnings during 2006-2007 tax year (£) 4,618 4,256 361 0.0 0.527
Average earnings during 2007-2008 tax year (£) 4,479 4,134 345 0.0 0.540
Average earnings during 2008-2009 tax year (£) 4,921 4,978 -56 0.0 0.925 †
Average 4-year earnings during 2005-2009 tax years (£) 17,740 17,221 519 0.0 0.792 †
Average number of months receiving benefits (JSA) in
Year 1 7.2 7.1 0.1 0.706 †††
Year 2 5.1 5.5 -0.4 0.237 †††
Year 3 4.4 5.0 -0.6 * 0.095 †††
Year 4 3.8 4.0 -0.2 0.525 ††
Year 5 3.8 3.9 -0.1 0.770
Years 1-5 24.2 25.4 -1.2 0.354 †††
Average total amount of benefits (£) (JSA) received in
Year 1 2,082 1,988 94 0.353 ††
Year 2 1,344 1,429 -85 0.418 †††
Year 3 1,180 1,302 -122 0.224 †††
Year 4 1,073 1,101 -29 0.775 ††
Year 5 1,065 1,078 -13 0.897
Years 1-5 6,744 6,898 -155 0.694 †††
Ever received IB in years 1-5 (%) 39.2 39.8 -0.6 0.856
Sample size = 828 421 407
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment and benefits records.
NOTES: Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment characteristics of 
sample members.
 Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
 Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the control group. Statistical significance 
levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent.
 Includes all customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005.
 JSA = Jobseeker’s Allowance; IS = Income Support; IB = Incapacity Benefit.
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Table B.12 Effects of ERA on employment, earnings, and benefits receipt  
 within five years after random assignment, ND25+ target group,  
 North West England
Outcome
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Difference 
(impact) P-value
Ever employed during (%)
Year 1 35.5 33.5 2.0 0.396 ††
Year 2 35.4 30.6 4.7 ** 0.045
Year 3 32.2 29.4 2.7 0.235
Year 4 32.3 29.0 3.3 0.149
Year 5 30.3 28.7 1.6 0.474
Years 1-5 53.8 52.7 1.1 0.671
Average number of months employed during
Year 1 2.4 2.3 0.1 0.547
Year 2 2.7 2.3 0.4 * 0.059
Year 3 2.8 2.5 0.2 0.270
Year 4 2.8 2.5 0.4 0.106
Year 5 2.7 2.5 0.3 0.266 †
Years 1-5 13.4 12.0 1.4 0.112 ††
Average earnings during 2005-2006 tax year (£) 2,604 2,269 335 0.240 †
Average earnings during 2006-2007 tax year (£) 2,703 2,687 16 0.959
Average earnings during 2007-2008 tax year (£) 3,131 2,869 262 0.441
Average earnings during 2008-2009 tax year (£) 3,082 2,998 84 0.804 †
Average 4-year earnings during 2005-2009 tax years (£) 11,521 10,824 697 0.547 †
Average number of months receiving benefits (JSA) in
Year 1 7.2 7.5 -0.3 * 0.084 †††
Year 2 4.8 5.6 -0.8 *** 0.002 †††
Year 3 4.1 4.9 -0.8 *** 0.003 †††
Year 4 3.3 4.1 -0.8 *** 0.001 ††
Year 5 3.4 3.7 -0.3 0.230  
Years 1-5 22.6 25.7 -3.0 *** 0.001 †††
Average total amount of benefits (£) (JSA) received in
Year 1 2,050 2,127 -77 0.297 ††
Year 2 1,247 1,496 -249 *** 0.002 †††
Year 3 1,085 1,330 -245 *** 0.002 †††
Year 4 888 1,115 -227 *** 0.001 ††
Year 5 948 1,012 -65 0.372  
Years 1-5 6,218 7,080 -862 *** 0.002 †††
Ever received IB in years 1-5 (%) 35.8 37.3 -1.6 0.515  
Sample size = 1,557 785 772
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment and benefits records.
NOTES: Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment characteristics of 
sample members.
 Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
 Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the control group. Statistical 
significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent.
 Includes all customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005.
 JSA = Jobseeker’s Allowance; IS = Income Support; IB = Incapacity Benefit.
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Table B.13 Effects of ERA on employment, earnings, and benefits receipt  
 within five years after random assignment, ND25+ target group,  
 East Midlands
Outcome
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Difference 
(impact) P-value
Ever employed during (%)
Year 1 46.1 42.6 3.4 0.191 ††
Year 2 42.0 37.4 4.6 * 0.069
Year 3 38.5 37.5 1.1 0.676
Year 4 36.8 34.1 2.7 0.276
Year 5 33.4 30.8 2.6 0.280
Years 1-5 64.1 60.3 3.8 0.131
Average number of months employed during
Year 1 3.1 2.8 0.2 0.256
Year 2 3.5 3.2 0.4 0.143
Year 3 3.4 3.0 0.4 * 0.085
Year 4 3.3 2.9 0.4 0.131
Year 5 3.1 2.8 0.3 0.176 †
Years 1-5 16.4 14.7 1.8 * 0.074 ††
Average earnings during 2005-2006 tax year (£) 3,817 3,056 762 ** 0.022 †
Average earnings during 2006-2007 tax year (£) 3,753 3,039 714 ** 0.043
Average earnings during 2007-2008 tax year (£) 3,940 3,114 826 ** 0.022
Average earnings during 2008-2009 tax year (£) 3,964 3,419 545 0.146 †
Average 4-year earnings during 2005-2009 tax years (£) 15,474 12,629 2,846 ** 0.025 †
Average number of months receiving benefits (JSA) in
Year 1 7.9 8.3 -0.4 ** 0.048 †††
Year 2 4.9 5.9 -1.0 *** 0.000 †††
Year 3 4.3 5.2 -0.9 *** 0.001 †††
Year 4 3.6 4.0 -0.3 0.188 ††
Year 5 3.2 3.5 -0.3 0.284  
Years 1-5 24.0 26.9 -2.9 *** 0.003 †††
Average total amount of benefits (£) (JSA) received in
Year 1 2,364 2,520 -157 * 0.077 ††
Year 2 1,357 1,614 -258 *** 0.004 †††
Year 3 1,176 1,433 -257 *** 0.002 †††
Year 4 1,032 1,098 -66 0.412 ††
Year 5 893 986 -93 0.217  
Years 1-5 6,821 7,652 -831 ** 0.010 †††
Ever received IB in years 1-5 (%) 32.1 35.3 -3.2 0.199  
Sample size = 1,411 712 699
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment and benefits records.
NOTES: Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment characteristics of 
sample members.
 Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
 Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the control group. Statistical 
significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent.
 Includes all customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005.
 JSA = Jobseeker’s Allowance; IS = Income Support; IB = Incapacity Benefit.
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Table B.14 Effects of ERA on employment, earnings, and benefits receipt within  
 five years after random assignment, ND25+ target group, London
Outcome
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Difference 
(impact) P-value
Ever employed during (%)
Year 1 28.5 26.3 2.2 0.319 ††
Year 2 29.5 26.5 3.0 0.172
Year 3 30.9 28.0 3.0 0.180
Year 4 32.2 29.6 2.6 0.247
Year 5 31.7 30.7 1.0 0.650
Years 1-5 50.3 47.6 2.6 0.278
Average number of months employed during
Year 1 1.9 1.8 0.1 0.399
Year 2 2.4 2.2 0.2 0.303
Year 3 2.6 2.6 0.1 0.807
Year 4 2.7 2.6 0.1 0.752
Year 5 2.9 2.7 0.2 0.492 †
Years 1-5 12.5 11.8 0.6 0.461 ††
Average earnings during 2005-2006 tax year (£) 2,536 2,296 239 0.422 †
Average earnings during 2006-2007 tax year (£) 3,164 2,908 256 0.462
Average earnings during 2007-2008 tax year (£) 3,606 3,188 417 0.277
Average earnings during 2008-2009 tax year (£) 4,074 3,801 274 0.518 †
Average 4-year earnings during 2005-2009 tax years (£) 13,380 12,193 1,187 0.353 †
Average number of months receiving benefits (JSA) in
Year 1 8.3 8.3 0.0 0.942 †††
Year 2 6.3 6.4 0.0 0.897 †††
Year 3 5.4 5.2 0.2 0.365 †††
Year 4 4.4 4.2 0.2 0.419 ††
Year 5 3.7 3.9 -0.2 0.458  
Years 1-5 28.1 27.9 0.2 0.810 †††
Average total amount of benefits (£) (JSA) received in
Year 1 2,787 2,778 9 0.922 ††
Year 2 1,808 1,853 -45 0.623 †††
Year 3 1,541 1,513 28 0.745 †††
Year 4 1,256 1,230 25 0.756 ††
Year 5 1,089 1,154 -65 0.414  
Years 1-5 8,480 8,528 -48 0.890 †††
Ever received IB in years 1-5 (%) 26.9 27.7 -0.9 0.691  
Sample size = 1,619 817 802
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment and benefits records.
NOTES: Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment characteristics of 
sample members.
 Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
 Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the control group. Statistical 
significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent.
 Includes all customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005.
 JSA = Jobseeker’s Allowance; IS = Income Support; IB = Incapacity Benefit.
Appendices – Supplemental tables
292
Table B.15 Effects of ERA on employment, earnings, and benefits receipt within  
 five years after random assignment, ND25+ target group, Wales
Outcome
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Difference 
(impact) P-value
Ever employed during (%)
Year 1 32.6 39.3 -6.7 0.102 ††
Year 2 32.6 38.5 -6.0 0.154
Year 3 30.7 33.4 -2.7 0.519
Year 4 32.6 32.6 0.0 1.000
Year 5 29.6 32.5 -2.9 0.466
Years 1-5 55.8 58.8 -3.0 0.482
Average number of months employed during
Year 1 2.2 2.6 -0.4 0.244
Year 2 2.5 3.1 -0.6 0.130
Year 3 2.5 3.0 -0.5 0.248
Year 4 2.5 2.9 -0.4 0.322
Year 5 2.7 2.9 -0.2 0.592 †
Years 1-5 12.5 14.6 -2.1 0.191 ††
Average earnings during 2005-2006 tax year (£) 2,248 3,134 -886 * 0.086 †
Average earnings during 2006-2007 tax year (£) 2,521 3,344 -823 0.127
Average earnings during 2007-2008 tax year (£) 2,821 3,306 -485 0.373
Average earnings during 2008-2009 tax year (£) 2,961 3,358 -397 0.470 †
Average 4-year earnings during 2005-2009 tax years (£) 10,551 13,142 -2,590 0.164 †
Average number of months receiving benefits (JSA) in
Year 1 8.5 7.4 1.1 *** 0.001 †††
Year 2 5.6 4.7 0.9 ** 0.046 †††
Year 3 4.8 4.1 0.7 0.103 †††
Year 4 3.9 3.3 0.6 0.150 ††
Year 5 3.4 3.4 0.0 0.913  
Years 1-5 26.2 22.9 3.3 ** 0.037 †††
Average total amount of benefits (£) (JSA) received in
Year 1 2,552 2,225 327 ** 0.016 ††
Year 2 1,578 1,196 381 *** 0.004 †††
Year 3 1,350 1,060 290 ** 0.024 †††
Year 4 1,075 862 213 * 0.077 ††
Year 5 962 962 0 0.999  
Years 1-5 7,516 6,305 1,211 ** 0.010 †††
Ever received IB in years 1-5 (%) 33.0 35.7 -2.7 0.512  
Sample size = 515 258 257
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment and benefits records.
NOTES: Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment characteristics of 
sample members.
 Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
 Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the control group. Statistical 
significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent.
 Includes all customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005.
 JSA = Jobseeker’s Allowance; IS = Income Support; IB = Incapacity Benefit.
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Appendix C 
Implementation features of the 
six ERA districts
Table C.1 Implementation features of the six ERA districts
East Midlands
Structure Centralised management through ERA District Manager. Three regional 
Advancement Support Adviser (ASA) Managers phased in between 2004  
and 2005, covering 19 offices between them.
Staffing Initially, ASAs were specialists for ERA customer groups but increasingly served 
all customer groups. A single ASA worked in smaller offices. Some peripatetic 
advisers experienced down time travelling between multiple offices. Central 
management assured the ringfencing of adviser resources, although in smaller 
offices advisers performed occasional mainstream adviser duties.
Intake Mainstream New Deal advisers performed random assignment and passed 
on programme group customers to ASAs. Intake of Working Tax Credit (WTC) 
customer group was the largest of all districts, concentrated at end of intake 
period.
Targets Little pressure on ASAs to contribute to Job Entry Targets meant more time 
could be devoted to delivering ERA. ASA benchmarks for post-employment 
contact introduced in early 2005 but were quickly relaxed and a flexible 
approach assumed. Key Work Objectives for ASAs introduced in 2005 and a 
post-employment QAF (Quality Assurance Framework) for post-employment 
interviews in early 2006.
ERA profile ERA considered to have lower profile than Incapacity Benefit Pathways pilot. 
Given centralised management, less understanding of and support for ERA by 
Business Managers.
Events Closure of pensions centre in district in summer 2004 led to redeployment of 
staff to ERA. From end 2004, pressures on office space meant some ASAs lost 
customer-facing desks. Regional ASA managers phased in between 2004 and 
2005 due to large size of district. New ERA manager assigned in autumn 2004. 
New District Manager appointed in early 2005.
Issues Large geographical district made staffing and management difficult. Large 
customer caseloads in bigger offices detracted from ERA delivery, with 
major pressure on staffing during summer 2004. Large proportion of ASAs 
had no previous advisory experience because redeployed from other parts 
of organisation following restructuring. Pressures on office space had mixed 
impacts: In larger city offices ASAs relocated to separate premises as ‘ERA 
unit’, and in some smaller offices ASAs had to ‘hot desk’.
(continued)
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Table C.1 Continued
East Midlands (continued)
Achievements Centralised ERA management structure effective for maintaining and 
protecting programme resources. Innovative marketing to attract sufficient 
numbers to the WTC customer group. Promoted work retention and 
advancement concepts early in the implementation. System of regional 
ASA managers facilitated contact between ASAs and the development of 
mechanisms for monitoring and supporting ASAs’ post-employment work.
Change over time Most effective period of ERA delivery from spring 2005 to end 2006. Adequate 
management structure and staffing in place by then, plus intake had finished. 
Through training and peer support, more effective strategies for engaging and 
working with post-employed customers had developed. From end 2006, the 
transferral of caseloads between advisers as ASAs left meant that the quality 
of contact was diminished. Also, ASAs were anxious about their post-ERA 
employment opportunities.
ERA ending Due to centralised structure and specialist ASAs, difficult to manage reducing 
caseloads. ERA manager consulted individual ASAs on when they wanted 
to leave and drew up a plan for passing caseloads to those advisers staying 
the longest so that customers would not have a succession of advisers. 
ASAs’ experienced this as an unsettled period when having to take on new 
customers with minimal time left to build a relationship. Six-month and 
3-month ERA ending letters sent out to customers, with 3-month letters 
eliciting the most interest from customers.
London
Structure Management structure differed depending on the New Deal customer group. 
The New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) and WTC group ASAs were coordinated 
and managed centrally. The New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+) ASAs were coordinated 
at the district level but line-managed at the office level. 
Staffing Initially, some resistance to staffing ERA. ASAs were specialists by ERA 
customer groups. NDLP ASAs served both control and programme group. 
Ringfencing of a Post-Employment Team (PET) started in early 2005. Non-
working ERA customers were then served by mainstream New Deal advisers. 
Intake Lone parents randomly assigned by NDLP advisers (who also delivered ERA). 
ND25+ randomly assigned by mix of ASAs and support staff.
Targets Same job-entry targets applied to ASAs, which detracted from ERA delivery. 
Once the PET was formed, ASAs were assigned benchmarks and key work 
objectives. 
ERA profile Perceived to be low because post-employment delivery of ERA did not 
contribute to job-entry targets. 
Events New District Manager in spring 2004. PET formed in early 2005. 
Issues Tension with job-entry targets. Large customer caseloads and mainstream 
Jobcentre Plus work. 
Achievements In spring 2005, District Manager agreed to commit more resources to ERA. 
Established PET in 2005. Developed innovative customer re-engagement 
publicity materials. 
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Table C.1 Continued
London (continued)
Change over time Setting up the PET was a major breakthrough. The first few months were 
taken up with processing retention payments that had fallen behind. In May 
2005, more advisers joined the team, the backlog had been cleared, and ASAs 
thought that from this time ERA delivery improved continuously right until the 
end. This was especially evident with training take-up.
ERA ending From March 2008, caseloads started falling and ASAs started moving off the 
team. ASAs talked about the difficulty of taking on new customers as they 
were nearing the end of ERA. ERA ending letters sent out to customers. ‘Rush’ 
of customers wanted to take advantage of the training. 
North East England
Structure Centralised ERA District Manager but without line management responsibility 
for ASAs. ASAs line-managed locally and remained part of office ND25+ or 
NDLP teams. A number of reorganisations of NDLP management took place 
over course of ERA, shifted from local to district level management and back 
again. NDLP ASAs reported having 13 different line managers over a 3-year 
period.
Staffing ASAs were specialists by ERA customer group. Ringfencing of ASAs phased  
in during 2005 but phased out again during 2006; differed across the district 
and more effective in larger offices, where it remained in place until early 
2007. All ASAs had at times served non-ERA as well as ERA customers.
Intake Random assignment performed by both New Deal and ERA advisers.
Targets ASAs expected to contribute to district job-entry targets, but their targets were 
half those of New Deal advisers.
ERA profile Perceived to be low, Incapacity Benefit Pathways pilot given priority. Priority in 
the district dipped after Technical Adviser left, reflected in a winding down of 
district ASA meetings.
Events District without Technical Adviser support during spring 2004. Ringfencing of 
all ASAs introduced in 2005 but phased out unevenly across the district during 
2006. Reorganisation in spring 2006 split the district in half.
Issues Concentration on ERA work suffered due to tension with job-entry targets, 
large customer caseloads, and mainstream Jobcentre Plus work. Contact 
between ASAs diminished after TA finished in mid 2005. Perceived to be 
ineffective support for ASAs from line managers, exacerbated by numerous 
management reorganisations for NDLP.
Achievements Most ASAs ringfenced during 2005, some for longer. Individual ASAs developed 
innovative ways of working with employed customers, but not always shared 
or co-ordinated throughout the district.
Change over time ERA delivery most effective during 2005: The majority of ASAs were ringfenced. 
Regular networking meetings between ASAs and Technical Adviser (TA) 
provided district-wide support for ASAs. Visit of ASAs to New York in 2004 
also stimulated development of tactics for post-employment customer 
engagement. From end 2005, network meetings dwindled and some ASAs lost 
ringfencing. TA remained as line manager in one office for another year, where 
consequently ASAs felt better supported.
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Table C.1 Continued
North East England (continued)
ERA ending ASAs remained part of mainstream ND25+ and NDLP teams and so simply 
took on additional mainstream customers as ERA caseloads diminished. 
However ASAs in some teams were concerned about over-staffing and being 
surplus to requirements. Six-month, 6-week, and final ERA ending letters 
sent. Some customers responded to 6-week letter with requests for training 
payments.
North West England
Structure Centralised ERA District Manager but ASAs locally line-managed at the office 
level. 
Staffing ASAs were generalists and served all customer groups. Ringfencing of a Post-
Employment Team (PET) started in 2005 when working customer caseloads 
were assigned to ASAs, while non-working customers were assigned to 
administrative staff who performed job search activities. 
Intake Random assignment performed by mix of New Deal and ERA advisers. 
Targets Same job-entry targets applied to ASAs, which detracted from ERA delivery. 
Once the PET was formed, ASAs were assigned benchmarks and key work 
objectives. 
ERA profile Perceived to be low because post-employment delivery of ERA did not 
contribute to job-entry targets. 
Events Delayed start, three months later than other districts. Had been a priority 
district throughout ERA. District reorganisation in April 2005. New District 
Manager in mid 2005. PET started in July 2005. Started to take on pre-
employment caseloads in January 2006. Less securely ringfenced in spring 
2006.
Issues Decentralised line management detracted from ERA delivery. Tensions with 
job-entry targets. 
Achievements Established PET in 2005. Developed innovative customer re-engagement 
publicity materials. ‘End of an ERA’ information pack distributed to customers 
nearing the end of their 33 months of support. 
Change over time Felt they reached a peak in their delivery in January 2006, but it started to tail 
off due to increased caseloads when taking on pre-employment again and the 
slow dissolving of the ringfencing. 
ERA ending Disengagement folder, six-month letters. Pushed the training.
Scotland
Structure Management and budget decentralised to office level. No ERA District 
Manager. 
Staffing Some mixed, some specialist ASAs. Most offices had only one ASA. ASAs 
ringfenced in two offices in spring 2005, while remaining served non-ERA as 
well as ERA customers. 
Intake Random assignment performed by various New Deal, ASA, and support staff. 
Targets Same job-entry targets applied to ASAs, which detracted from ERA delivery.  
No ERA-specific benchmarks.
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Table C.1 Continued
Scotland (continued)
ERA profile Perceived to be low. Upper and some local managers tended to favour 
Incapacity Benefit Pathways pilot.
Events District reorganised in 2004. New District Manager in spring 2004. Change in 
ERA District Co-ordinator in autumn 2005, then dissolution of role in autumn 
2006 when office Business Managers asked to co-ordinate ERA management 
for office clusters. November 2005 held customer Town Hall events to 
encourage re-engagement.
Issues Decentralised line management detracted from ERA delivery. Office 
geographical distribution awkward for support and meetings. Tensions with 
job-entry targets. Large customer caseloads and mainstream Jobcentre Plus 
work. Other pilot given more priority. 
Achievements ASAs in some offices ringfenced during 2005. 
Change over time Ongoing changes to district Jobcente Plus structure brought in new senior 
management who needed to be apprised of ERA. Dissolution of Technical 
Adviser and ERA District Co-ordinator roles put strain on support and 
communications across offices. By 2005, ASAs concentrated contact with 
working customers and felt that between spring 2005 and spring 2006 
programme delivery was at its strongest. 
ERA ending Disengagement letters at six months and one month before customers ended 
ERA. Preferential treatment was given to those who were engaged with the 
programme. ASAs increasingly absorbed into mainstream activity as ERA 
customers flowed off the programme. 
Wales
Structure Centralised management. ERA District Manager also responsible for delivery of 
NDLP across the district. 
Staffing ASAs were specialists by ERA customer groups. A single ASA worked in smaller 
offices. Some peripatetic advisers experienced down time travelling between 
multiple offices. ASA staffing levels affected by long-term sick leave. Continual 
problems with staff being pulled onto mainstream Jobcentre Plus activities
Intake Mainstream New Deal advisers performed random assignment and passed on 
programme group customers to ASAs.
Targets Same job-entry targets applied to ASAs, which detracted from ERA delivery. 
Benchmarks for post-employment contact, and key work objectives around 
advancement and retention from April 2004. 
ERA profile ERA perceived to be supported at office level but devalued at upper-
management level due to tensions with job-entry targets. 
Events Intake of New Deal customer groups ended in summer 2004. From March 
2006, tended to only work with engaged customers as did not have the 
resources to reengage customers. From August 2006, ASAs worked with 
only post-employment customers, with pre-employment going back to 
mainstream Jobcentre Plus.
Issues Tension with job-entry targets. Limited number of ND25+ ASAs. Understaffing, 
large customer caseloads, and mainstream Jobcentre Plus work. 
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Wales (continued)
Achievements Promoted work retention and advancement concepts early in the 
implementation. In spring 2004 established innovative advancement 
materials for use with non-working customers and set benchmarks for 
contacting working customers. 
Change over time Staff thought there had never been enough ASAs in the district. The most 
effective period of ERA delivery from spring 2004 to spring 2005. From May to 
September 2005, there was a big push on job entries in the district and ASAs 
struggled to do ERA work. From September 2005, ASAs were supposed to be 
ringfenced but they were still being asked to do other work and did not have 
enough staff on ERA. In January 2006, an ERA ‘team’ was formed but in March 
the team lost staff. The ASAs had big caseloads and only worked with ‘active’ 
customers. 
ERA ending Staffing reduced to just one ASA in spring 2007. Six-month, 6-week, and final 
ERA ending letters sent. Had responses to 6-week letter, with some customers 
requesting retention payments backdated. Struggled with transferring 
caseloads and losing continuity with customers.
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Appendix D 
Lone parents’ attitudes to and 
understandings of advancement
As discussed in Chapter 3, as the delivery of post-employment support improved, so did 
Advancement Support Advisers’ recognition that Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) 
participants’ understandings of and approaches to advancement were highly dependent on 
personal circumstances and underlying views about work progression. This recognition of individuals’ 
engagement in the advancement agenda was integral to successful delivery of post-employment 
services. This section explores what work advancement meant to lone parents and how this 
informed the implementation and effectiveness of post-employment support. 
Previous qualitative research on lone parent ERA participants242 suggested that advancement as it 
relates to work is a fluid concept, often subject to change, depending on a person’s circumstances. 
The evidence showed that the complexity of people’s lives, including their work histories, personal 
circumstances, and other social factors influence the ways in which they approach advancement. 
Both New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) and Working Tax Credit (WTC) programme group participants 
tended to perceive the concept of advancement in relation to work progression – improvements 
in working conditions and pay. This was not surprising, as this reflected the ethos of ERA. These 
understandings were also linked to previous employment opportunities and exposure to work over 
time. The ageing of children and the point of time in the family life cycle were also significant in 
understanding how the lone parent participant groups viewed advancement. 
Lone parents with young families were less likely to be receptive to the idea of advancement in 
the short term. Often advancement was deferred in favour of better work-life balance and caring 
responsibilities. This finding is supported by recent studies that followed lone parents during their 
first year in work.243 They suggest that part-time work that fitted around childcare commitments and 
school hours was paramount for many lone parents after leaving benefits. Often these jobs were low 
paid and did not represent their skills potential. Likewise, many NDLP participants in the ERA sample 
had limited work experience. They were either re-embarking or just starting on their work journeys 
with young families. This subgroup of lone parents preferred to defer advancement, often citing their 
caring responsibilities as a reason not to pursue advancement opportunities. These care-focused 
workers244 generally saw the value of returning to work since it ‘got	them	out	of	the	house’, but, at 
the same time, they placed a priority on time with their children. For example, one lone parent who 
entered part-time work felt that she could make only small steps in the nursing field because of the 
age of her children.
‘The	kids	are	young;	it’s	not	time	for	me	to	sort	of	move	to,	like	work	at	the	hospital	at	the	
moment…’
(Former participant, NDLP programme group)
242 Hoggart et	al., 2006; Riccio et	al., 2008.
243 Sims et	al., 2010, p 43.
244 See Hoggart et	al., 2006, for a full description of the different types of care orientations of ERA 
participants.
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The research evidence245 points to the fact that progression in work for the NDLP group was 
generally an evolving and dynamic process, often subject to stops and starts. Their orientations to 
care and work changed over time, often becoming more congruent with changes in their attitudes 
to advancement. As caring for children became a lower priority as their family aged, and as they 
adjusted to employment and gained confidence, advancement became more of a reality. These 
lone parents were then prepared to focus more on advancement and progress into work that they 
enjoyed or that would provide a better standard of living, rather than planning for jobs that fitted 
into school hours. 
A corollary of this shift in perspective was increased dissatisfaction with jobs that were perceived to 
limit their advancement trajectory. This is supported by qualitative research that showed that it was 
common for NDLP participants to experience a ‘honeymoon period’ during the early stages of work, 
and this tended to positively influence their attitudes to work.246 Through longitudinal research it was 
possible to observe changes in these individuals over time. As their self-confidence increased, many 
became dissatisfied with their current work roles, recognising their unfulfilled potentials. This acted 
as a catalyst for change. This subset of NDLP participants was able to use ERA to progress in work. 
As shown in Table 4.7, through ERA, more participants in the NDLP programme group were able to 
combine training and work as a way to move ahead, a difference of 5.8 percentage points over the 
control group. 
Although there was significant overlap between NDLP and WTC participants’ attitudes to 
advancement, it was apparent that WTC participants were further along and more established in 
their work journeys than their NDLP counterparts, and therefore more receptive to advancement. 
In general, WTC programme group participants were more likely to have stable childcare, a strong 
interest in increasing their hours, a work environment that facilitated increased hours, some 
qualifications, sustained self-confidence through work experience, and other informal support 
mechanisms. In addition, WTC participants had to be proactive in joining ERA, demonstrating that 
they had strong views about advancing. Indeed, many had been attracted to the idea of progressing 
in work and about the ways in which this could be realised. Data from Table 4.7 show that a 
significant percentage of WTC participants were able to combine training with full-time or part-time 
work. Table 4.7 also confirms that ERA helped working WTC participants to take part in Jobcentre 
Plus-arranged training, a gain of 20 percentage points over the control group. 
An example of this positive approach to advancement is demonstrated through the concept of the 
advanced work journey.247 This work trajectory was more typical of the WTC worker and took the 
form of increased work hours, a job promotion, extra responsibilities, increased job satisfaction, 
improved family-work balance, and pursuing the goal of self-employment. A case in point was one 
WTC participant with three children who had been working part time in a sports centre at the start 
of ERA. The retention bonus acted as an incentive for her to increase her hours, and she was able to 
progress to become the manager at the centre. 
245 Riccio et	al., 2008.
246 Riccio et	al., 2008.
247 See Riccio et	al., 2008, for a full discussion of the work journey concept.
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Some WTC programme group participants held less positive views on advancement or rejected the 
idea of advancement for themselves. This was for a myriad of reasons, including not wanting to take 
on a management role, the desire to avoid longer work hours, or feeling ‘too old’ for a change in 
work. This also included people who were unaware of the ethos of the ERA programme. 
Overall, workers in the WTC programme group proved to be the most positive about advancement, 
and this was reflected in measurable changes, e.g., they were more likely to undertake training and 
improve their employment opportunities. The survey data show that they were more effective than 
their NDLP counterparts in combining training with work, a route to advancement.248 This receptivity 
is also supported by the financial payments records (Table 3.3), which show that working WTC 
participants were more likely than the other ERA groups to receive a retention bonus.
248 Survey findings show that 75 per cent of WTC participants participated in training compared 
with 51 per cent of NDLP participants who worked full time.
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Appendix E 
Other publications from the 
UK Employment Retention and 
Advancement demonstration
ERA UK demonstration, cross-office analysis 
Dorsett, R. and Robins, P. (forthcoming, 2011). Department for Work and Pensions. 
• This report analyses how variation across offices in programme features, personal characteristics, 
and local context affects economic impacts. The analysis presented is for the New Deal for Lone 
Parents target group only. 
The impact of ERA on workers’ outcomes
Sianesi, B. (2011). Department for Work and Pensions Research Report No 759, Sheffield: Department 
for Work and Pensions.
• This report presents non-experimental statistical analysis of the impact that ERA had on a variety 
of outcomes experienced by working members of the New Deal for Lone Parents and Working 
Tax Credit target groups as well as on the earnings of working members of the New Deal 25 Plus 
target group. 
Delivery, take-up, and outcomes of in-work training support for lone parents in the Employment 
Retention and Advancement (ERA) demonstration 
Hendra, R., Ray, K., Vegeris, S., Hevenstone, D. and Hudson, M. (2011). Department for Work and 
Pensions Research Report No 727, Sheffield: Department for Work and Pensions. 
• This mixed-methods analysis looks at the delivery, take-up, and outcomes of the training support 
and incentives provided through ERA. A central question is whether intensive adviser support and 
financial incentives encouraged training beyond what would normally occur. Because training 
encompasses a broad range of activities, the report details the kinds of courses people took in ERA 
and the challenges they faced in balancing family, work, and training. 
Non-participation in the Employment Retention and Advancement study: Implications for the 
experimental fourth-year impact estimates
Chowdry, H. and Sianesi, B. (2011). Department for Work and Pensions Working Paper No 96, 
Sheffield: Department for Work and Pensions.
• The report explores how the four-year findings from the experimental research relate to the 
impacts that would have been experienced, on average, by all the people who were eligible for 
ERA, had they participated in the programme. The report present a statistical analysis of how 
non-participation in the ERA demonstration has affected the extent of external validity of the 
experimental results, and hence their representativeness and policy relevance. It also assesses the 
scope for bias in such estimates in terms of the impact of ERA on the eligibles.
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Different settings, common strategy: Using earnings supplements to improve employment retention 
and advancement programs in Texas and the United Kingdom
Lundquist, E. and Homonoff, T. (2010). New York: MDRC.
• This paper compares the UK and Texas ERA programmes in terms of their programmatic features, 
the patterns and rates of receipt of the cash incentives they offered, the policy contexts in 
which they operated, the demographics of the research samples, and their economic outcomes. 
The paper discusses ways in which these results could be helpful in incorporating earnings 
supplements into interventions designed to help low-wage workers find and keep jobs and 
advance in their careers.
Non-participation in the Employment Retention & Advancement study: Implications for the 
experimental first-year impact estimates
Sianesi, B. (2010). Department for Work and Pensions Working Paper No 77, Norwich: Her Majesty’s 
Stationery Office.
• The report explains the issues that non-participation raises for the ERA demonstration, introduces 
the methodologies to deal with it, and presents findings based on 12-month follow-up data. 
It assesses whether the non-participation rate is likely to have affected the extent to which 
the experimental results can be generalised to the full eligible population, and hence their 
representativeness and policy relevance. The research evaluates the scope for bias by assessing 
first the incidence of non-participation and then how selective it is. 
The cost of services and incentives in the UK Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) 
demonstration: Preliminary analysis.
Greenberg, D., Walter, J. and Knight, G. (2009). Department for Work and Pensions Working Paper 64, 
Norwich: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office.
• This report presents the preliminary ERA cost analysis, focusing on the cost to Jobcentre Plus to 
operate ERA – that is, Jobcentre Plus expenditures on providing services and making incentive 
payments to ERA customers in the three target groups. The report presents costs on a per-
customer basis, distinguishes between gross and net costs, and presents the methods used to 
estimate the individual cost items.
Implementation and second-year impacts for lone parents in the UK Employment Retention and 
Advancement (ERA) demonstration
Riccio, J. A., Bewley, H., Campbell-Barr, V., Dorsett, R., Hamilton, G., Hoggart, H., Marsh, A., Miller, C., 
Ray, K. and Vegeris, S. (2008). Department for Work and Pensions Research Report No 489, Leeds: 
Corporate Document Services.
• This report presents the implementation results and the second-year impacts of ERA on labour 
market outcomes and benefits receipt for the two lone parent target groups: New Deal for Lone 
Parents and Working Tax Credit.
Implementation and second-year impacts for New Deal 25 Plus customers in the UK Employment 
Retention and Advancement (ERA) demonstration
Miller, C., Bewley, H., Campbell-Barr, V., Dorsett, R., Hamilton, G., Hoggart, L., Homonoff, T., Marsh, A.,  
Ray, K., Riccio, J. A. and Vegeris, S. (2008). Department for Work and Pensions Research Report No 
520, Leeds: Corporate Document Services.
• This report presents the implementation results and the second-year impacts of ERA on labour 
market outcomes and benefits receipt for the long-term unemployed New Deal 25 Plus group.
Appendices – Other publications from the UK Employment Retention and Advancement 
demonstration
304
Implementation and first-year impacts of the UK Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) 
demonstration
Dorsett, R., Campbell-Barr, V., Hamilton, G., Hoggart, L., Marsh, A., Miller, C., Ray, K., Riccio, J. A., 
Rich, S. and Vegeris, S. (2007). Department for Work and Pensions Research Report No 412, Leeds: 
Corporate Document Services.
• This report presents findings on the implementation and early effects of ERA, addressing three 
main questions: First, how well have the districts implemented the ERA model, particularly its 
extended job coaching and financial incentives for customers who enter work? Second, as a result 
of ERA, did customers receive substantially more advice and assistance from Jobcentre Plus to 
help them succeed once in work and were they more likely to have combined work and training 
activities? And third, has ERA begun to produce any improvement in customers’ employment and 
earnings and any reductions in their reliance on government benefits?
Non-participation in the Employment Retention and Advancement study: A quantitative descriptive 
analysis
Goodman, A. and Sianesi, B. (2007). Department for Work and Pensions Working Paper No 39, Leeds: 
Corporate Document Services.
• This paper present a statistical analysis of how non-participation in the ERA demonstration 
has affected the extent of external validity of the experimental results, and hence their 
representativeness and policy relevance. Additionally, the research aims to assess the scope 
for bias in such estimates in terms of the originally intended parameter, the impact of ERA on 
the eligibles. This key question is addressed sequentially by assessing first the incidence of non-
participation and then how selective it is. 
Employment Retention and Advancement demonstration project and Pathways to Work for 
Incapacity Benefit customers: Costing for staff time – ERA and IB cost studies
Vegeris, S., MacKinnon, K., Knight, G., Greenberg, D., Carrino, J., Olsen, K. and Strudwick, M. (2006). 
Department for Work and Pensions Working Paper No. 32, Leeds: Corporate Document Services.
• This paper describes three different methods that were used to determine how ERA and 
Incapacity Benefit advisers allocated their work time among different groups of Jobcentre 
Plus customers. The three methods were: observational studies, diaries, and interviews. The 
report presents the findings from this research, considers the implications of these findings for 
the separate policy interventions, and, more broadly, for future staff time research within the 
department.
Making random assignment happen: Evidence from the UK Employment Retention and Advancement 
(ERA) demonstration
Walker, R., Hoggart, L. and Hamilton, G. (2006). Department for Work and Pensions Research Report 
No 330, Leeds: Corporate Document Services.
• This report focuses on implementation of random assignment in the UK ERA demonstration. In 
principle, random assignment is a powerful tool for determining causality. In practice, though, 
the challenges of implementing a proper random assignment study, and one that will meet 
high ethical standards, abound. This qualitative study focuses on how customers reacted to the 
random assignment process.
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Staying in work and moving up: Evidence from the UK Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) 
demonstration
Hoggart, L., Campbell-Barr, V., Ray, K. and Vegeris, S. (2006). Department for Work and Pensions 
Research Report No 381, Leeds: Corporate Document Services.
• This report addresses the relevant in-work experiences and attitudes of a subsample of people 
involved in the ERA demonstration. Drawing on qualitative evidence collected through 170 in-
depth interviews with ERA customers, the report focuses on factors significant to work retention 
and advancement that any in-work support programme, like ERA, would need to anticipate and 
address.
Employment Retention and Advancement scheme – the early months of implementation: Summary 
and conclusions
Hall, N., Hoggart, L., Marsh, A., Phillips, J., Ray, K. and Vegeris, S. (2005). Department for Work and 
Pensions Research Report No 265, Leeds: Corporate Document Services.
• This report documents the early implementation challenges of ERA. It presents profiles of the 
three customer groups, demographic comparisons of the programme and control groups, and the 
regional distribution of ERA participants. 
Designing a demonstration project: an Employment Retention and Advancement demonstration for 
Great Britain
Morris, S., Greenberg, D., Riccio, J., Mittra, B., Green, H., Lissenburgh, S. and Blundell, R. (2003). UK 
Government Chief Social Researcher’s Office, London: Cabinet Office.
• This report presents a comprehensive research design for evaluating the UK Employment 
Retention and Advancement (ERA) demonstration. The document highlights the design and 
theoretical considerations underlying the demonstration, including: policy design; site selection; 
process, impact, and cost-benefit studies; and data collection.
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This report presents the final results on the implementation, impacts, costs, and economic 
benefits of the UK Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) programme. ERA’s 
distinctive combination of post-employment advisory support and financial incentives  
was designed to help low-income individuals who entered work sustain employment  
and advance in the labour market. Launched in 2003 in selected Jobcentre Plus offices,  
ERA targeted three groups: (1) unemployed lone parents receiving Income Support  
and volunteering for the New Deal for Lone Parents welfare-to-work programme,  
(2) lone parents working part time and receiving Working Tax Credit, and (3) long-term 
unemployed people aged 25 or older receiving Jobseeker’s Allowance who were required 
to participate in the New Deal 25 Plus welfare-to-work programme. The effectiveness of 
the programme was evaluated using a random assignment research design.
The evaluation found that ERA produced short-term earnings gains for the two lone 
parent target groups. The early gains resulted from increases in the proportion of 
participants who worked full time (at least 30 hours per week). However, these effects 
generally faded after the programme ended, largely because the control group caught  
up with the ERA group. 
More impressive were the results for the long-term unemployed participants (mostly 
men) in the New Deal 25 Plus target group. For them, ERA produced modest but sustained 
increases in employment and substantial and sustained increases in earnings. These 
positive effects emerged after the first year and were still evident at the end of a five-year 
follow-up period. The earnings gains were accompanied by lasting reductions in benefits 
receipt. ERA proved cost-effective for this group from the perspectives of the participants 
themselves, the Government budget, and society as a whole. 
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